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ABSTRACT 
 
The 2008-09 global economic crisis has impacted UK high streets and town centres 
in complex and little understood ways. In addition, the vitality of UK high streets has 
been differentially impacted by three other forces and has become an increasing focus 
of  government  and  public  anxiety: These  forces  include:  (i)  the progressive  rise  of 
online  shopping,  (ii)  the  complex  consequences  of  the  implementation  of  a  ‘town 
centre  first’ policy  in  retail development  and  (iii)  the  rise  of  often  underestimated 
influence of convenience culture.  
This  research  investigates  the  response  of  UK  high  streets  to  these  drivers  of 
change, and seeks to make three main contributions. First, to provide new descriptive 
evidence on the differential performance of UK retail centres during and since the 
economic crisis. Although some of these findings parallel those suggested by specialist 
commercial research companies they also significantly extend available knowledge. In 
particular, they depict the discrepancy in the response of independent and multiple 
retailers to the economic and competitive shocks. Second, to identify the key drivers of 
town centre performance, by employing the multivariate analysis of that issue at both 
cross-regional and intra-urban levels. The cross-regional analysis derives seven factors 
associated with retail centre enhanced resilience or fragility to the economic crisis;  the 
intra-urban analysis validates and reinforces the results of the cross-regional analysis 
and provides further insights into the dynamics of UK town centres performance in the 
post-crisis decade. Third, to conceptualise the nature of UK retail centres’ complex 
adjustment to the shock of economic crisis and other forces of change, by exploring 
alternative interpretations of the resilience of economic systems. In particular, we use 
the concept of adaptive resilience to understand the dynamic process through which 
UK  high  streets  have  gradually  and  constantly  evolved.  We  suggest  a  conceptual 
framework which links the notions of adaptive capacity and adaptive resilience and 
indicates how a position of a centre in adaptive cycle and the role of various actors are 
important to performance of that centre.  
At a time when the economic health of high streets has generated a large amount 
of research, the findings of this study have the potential to contribute to the policy 
agenda and set a benchmark against which future research can be positioned and 
interpreted.      
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  Introduction  Chapter 1:
1.1  Economic health of UK town centres and high streets 
The UK retail sector has been highly successful over the past 25 years. Between 
1986 and 2006, the market increased almost twofold in real terms, with the total value 
of retail sales in 2006 reaching the equivalent of 21% of GDP (BCSC, 2007). Given that 
an average person in the UK makes 200 shopping trips every year and approximately a 
third of an average household’s annual spending is on retail goods, excluding food, 
some commentators have argued that shopping is a national pastime and many people 
treat shopping as a leisure activity in its own right (BCSC, 2007). Until recently, the 
success  of  UK  retailing  was  primarily  driven  by  high  consumer  confidence  and the 
growth  in  real  disposable  income  (Anagboso  2009;  BRC,  2009).  However,  although 
many UK town centres and high streets have benefited from the dynamics, some UK 
retail centres have been struggling for years. Often viewed as lacking the investment or 
the  vision  to  offer  a  compelling  choice  to  local  catchments,  a  growing  number  of 
predominantly secondary and tertiary retail centres have been failing to compete with 
better experiences offered by neighbouring towns or out-of-town developments (BRC, 
2009). Indeed, the vitality and viability of British town centres and high streets over 
recent years – and particularly since the economic crisis of 2007-09 - has become an 
increasing focus of government and public anxiety.  
As  portrayed  in  Figure  1.1  four  forces  are  widely  recognised  as  causes  of  that 
concern. First,  the progressive rise of online shopping, reaching in 2012 more than 
12%  of  total  retail  sales  has  increasingly  exerted  direct  and  indirect  pressure  on 
traditional British high street (Burt and Sparks, 2003; Weltevreden 2007). Second, the 
long-term  and  cumulative  impacts  of  competition  from  large  out-of-town 
developments. However, because of the switch of policy to tightening retail regulation 
beginning  in  the  mid-1990s  (the  PPG6,  Sequential  Test)  and  the  subsequent 
implementation of ‘town centre first’ policies (Wood et al., 2006; Guy, 2007; Wrigley, 
2010a) those impacts have become increasingly complex and difficult to read. Third,   Chapter 1 
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the rise of progressive, and often underestimated influence of ‘convenience culture’ 
which has placed increasing doubts on the long term prospects of large format out-of-
town retail (Wrigley, 2010) as consumers have recently rethought the economic and 
social cost associated with long rather than short distances to shops and the time cost 
associated  with  large  and  often  inhospitable  stores.   Fourth,  and  most  recent, the 
sharp  drop  in  consumer  confidence,  observed  in  2007-2008  following  the  global 
financial crisis and the subsequent plunge into the recession.  
 
Figure 1.1: Forces (re)shaping UK high streets configurations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The speed and severity of the recession caught the vast majority of retailers by 
surprise with only a few retailers and manufacturers having a strategy in place to deal 
with the impacts of the economic crisis (IGD, 2009). In consequence, high streets and 
town centres across the UK have suffered from sharp increases in retail/service unit 
closures  not  only  involving  small  independent  shops,  often  perceived  as  most 
vulnerable, but also large corporate chains. In particular, the closure of more than 800 
iconic Woolworth's stores coupled with other national chains such  as Adams, MFI, 
Borders,  Habitat  etc.  sparked  increasing  anxiety  about  the  future  of  many  retail 
centres.  As  a  result  the  portrayal  of  UK  town  centres  dramatically  changed,  from 
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first’ approach 
 
Increase in 
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buoyancy  in  the  mid-2000s  to  cataclysmic  decay  towards  the  end  of  the  decade.  
Furthermore,  the  new  reality  of  ‘Austerity  Britain’  characterised  by  painful  public 
spending cuts and declining real personal income, has adversely affected consumer 
spending and increased further the fears about future of UK town centres and high 
streets (Wrigley and Dolega, 2011).  
However,  to  what  extent does  the  available  evidence  support those views  and 
what is known about the differential performance of British  high streets and town 
centres  during  the  global  economic  crisis  and  emerging  austerity?  Surprisingly, 
research, which charts the complex and differential performance of town centres and 
high  streets  impacted by  the  shock  of  economic  crisis  and  other  slower  drivers  of 
change is extremely sparse and attempts to conceptualise the transformational change 
have not yet generated the large scale and detailed empirically-based studies, which 
may seem a logical consequence.   
1.2  Aims and objectives 
This study attempts to answer the above questions by performing an investigation 
of the complex adjustment of UK high streets and town centres to the 2007-09 global 
economic  crisis  and  the  other  drivers  of  change  which  are  (re)shaping  their 
configurations. The key aims of this study are twofold: 
1.  First, to provide new empirical evidence of the differential response of UK 
town centres and high streets to the shock of economic crisis and of their 
adjustment to the emerging period of austerity.  
2.  Second,  to  conceptualise  the  nature  of  that  complex  adjustment  to  the 
shock of economic crisis and other forces of change by exploring alternative 
interpretations of the resilience of economic systems. 
The aim of providing new empirical evidence has been satisfied in two ways:  
(i) by utilising descriptive statistical analysis to depict the differential performance 
of UK town centres and high streets during the economic crisis and the subsequent 
period  of  emerging  austerity.  This  analysis,  which  involved  evaluating  retail-
composition surveys completed before and after the collapse of consumer confidence, 
attempts to capture the changes in retail/service configurations of UK town centres   Chapter 1 
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and high streets’ configuration during and since the economic crisis. Importantly, such 
simple analysis can be used to assess the components of the differential performance 
of  particular  retail/service  types  and  can  help  to  distinguish  between  the  impacts 
associated with the shock of economic crisis those are attributed to the other forces of 
change.  
(ii) by implementing top-down theoretically-driven statistical modelling to obtain 
the determinants of vacancy rates change – one of the key indicators of town centre 
vitality. In particular, we employ a cross-regional analysis – identifying the drivers of 
differential performance of UK town centres, measured by the vacancy rate change 
between the pre-crisis and within-crisis periods – to derive a set of factors associated 
with UK high streets’ resilience/fragility. This is followed by the intra-urban empirical 
analysis, which can also be viewed as a validation process to test the extent to which 
the cross-regional determinants of enhanced resilience hold at the single urban area 
level. In this intra-urban analysis we make use of a ‘third wave’ of data to assess the 
economic performance of UK town centres between both the within-crisis and post-
recession shallow recovery periods as well as the change between the pre-crisis and 
shallow recovery periods.  
The aim of developing a theorisation of the reconfiguration of UK retail centres was 
tackled in three ways:  
(a) by exploring the concept of resilience of economic systems that has recently 
become popular amongst economic geographers  and extend it to the retail sector. 
Initially, we review three different concepts of resilience, then position our empirical 
findings against the type of resilience that stresses the anticipatory or reactive capacity 
of a system in order to minimise the impacts of a destabilising shock and which focuses 
on resilience as a dynamic and evolutionary process. 
(b)  by  evaluating  the  consequences  of  that  complex  adjustment  in  terms  of 
changes  to  the  pre-existing  evolutionary  trajectories  of  UK  town  centres  and  high 
streets – assessing their resistance to the shock of economic crisis and examining the 
degree of their recovery in the shallow recovery period as the economy came out of 
the recession.  Further, we investigate the nature of reconfiguration and reorientation   Chapter 1 
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observed by UK retail centres, and to a lesser extent, we evaluate the extent to which 
town centres and high streets have resumed their pre-shock development paths.  
(c) by considering what the implications might be for the design of policy proposals 
and instruments aimed at revitalising UK town centres and high streets.  That task of 
identifying  the  problems  concerning  the  post-crisis  high  street  and  formulation  of 
policy instruments which might help ameliorate these issues also lies at the heart of 
the UK government's Revitalising the High Street initiative led by Mary Portas and 
launched by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills in May 2011. 
1.3  The value added by this study 
There is a consensus amongst researchers that the adjustment of UK town centres 
and high streets to the shock wave of global economic crisis has been complex and is 
not  fully  understood.  Some  commercial  research  consultancies  (e.g.  Local  Data 
Company),  have  regularly  reported  the  declining  fortunes  of  certain  types  of  high 
streets and retail/service types during the plunge into recession in 2008, the shallow 
recovery of 2009-10 and the subsequent period referred to as austerity. In particular, 
they  have  highlighted  increasing  vacancy  rates  and  large  insolvency  rates  amongst 
comparison  retailers  and  financial  services  providers.  Those  results  however,  are 
purely  descriptive  and  have  been  often  criticised  for  sparseness  of  their  data  and 
unsystematic  methods  (Wrigley  and  Dolega,  2011,  Colliers  CRE,  2009).  Indeed,  the 
higher order insights such as academic analyses and statistically supported scientific 
evidence are almost totally missing.  
The value added by this study is threefold:  
1. It attempts to fill the gap in empirical knowledge and contribute to the evidence 
base on the differential performance of retail centres during the economic crisis. In 
particular, by means of theory driven and top-down multivariate modelling, this study 
attempts  to  deliver  a  number  of  statistically  significant  indicators  that  can  be 
associated with enhanced resilience or fragility of UK town centres and high streets to 
the shock of economic crisis. Providing such empirical evidence which can contribute 
to UK policy debate, in particular to the Portas’ Revitalisation of High Street initiative   Chapter 1 
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supported  by  the  Government,  is  itself  a  novel  undertaking  with  potentially  very 
significant implications.  
2. It offers new and valuable insights on the effects drivers of change have in re-
shaping  the  configurations  and  evolutionary  trajectories  of  UK  retail  centres;  in 
particular, by assessing comprehensively the recent phenomenon of progressive rise 
and often underestimated influence of convenience culture and examining the extent 
to which persistently rising online sales impact various retail/service types especially 
during unfavourable economic conditions. 
3. It seeks to conceptualise the nature of change in retail/service configurations of 
UK high streets and town centres by the concept of resilience of economic systems. 
Although the broad concept of resilience has been adopted from studies investigating 
the  differential  performance  of  regions,  this  research  endeavours  to  identify  the 
components and phases of the mechanisms controlling the adaptive capacity of UK 
town  centres  and  high  streets.  Furthermore,  by  investigating  the  dynamic  and 
constantly evolving nature of retail centres it draws our attention to the possibility of 
new interdependencies being formed, and by doing so it seeks to set a benchmark 
against which future studies investigating town centres and high streets resilience can 
be positioned and interpreted.   
The thesis proceeds in the following way. Chapter 2 provides essential background 
on the impacts of the global economic crisis on UK high streets and outlines different 
concepts of resilience applied to economic systems. Chapter 3 considers the way in 
which the remaining forces of change have been impacting the economic health of UK 
town centres and high streets; in particular, the rise of online sales, the impacts of 
switching in retail planning policy and the emergence of ‘convenience culture’. Chapter 
4 then switches to the empirical basis of the study beginning with the design of the 
study, triangulated approach of implemented methodology and encountered issues 
and limitations. Chapter 5 then provides the details of empirical evidence found in the 
cross-regional analysis. In particular it reports on the complex adjustment of UK high 
streets to the global economic crisis evident in our descriptive analysis and derives a 
number of indicators responsible for the performance of UK town centres.  Chapter 6 
switches to the intra-urban level to check whether the cross-regional findings hold   Chapter 1 
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steady at a local scale and in the context of a ‘third wave data’ it evaluates Bristol retail 
centres performance during the ‘post-recession shallow recovery’ period. In chapter 7, 
these empirical findings are utilised and linked to the concept of constantly evolving 
high streets. That concept of evolutionary changes underpins the theorisation of their 
adjustment to the economic and competitive shocks, based on the notion of adaptive 
resilience. Finally, Chapter 8 discusses the implications of the results, particularly the 
policy significant novel finding that both the policy-compliant corporate foodstores 
and independent small retailers have been beneficial for the vitality of UK high streets. 
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  The shock of economic crisis on UK high  Chapter 2:
      streets-contextualisation and theorisation 
This chapter explains impacts of the global economic crisis on UK high streets and 
town centres and reviews the concepts of resilience. It firstly examines the response of 
UK retail centres to the 2008-09 economic crisis and then explores the determinants of 
vacancy rate – a key performance indicator of a town centre performance. Further, 
this chapter outlines the theoretical work related to the economic health of UK town 
centres  and  focuses  on  the  factors  affecting  vacancy  rate  change  as  a  product  of 
filtering the economic shock through two systems - national/regional and local. Then, 
it reviews the three concepts of resilience which have recently become popular in the 
regional and economic geography. Finally, this chapter considers in more detail the 
emerging concept of adaptive resilience by exploring its components and explanatory 
frameworks and then positions the constantly evolving high streets in that context. 
2.1  The shock of global economic crisis 
The shock of global economic crisis of 2008-09, which followed the sharp drop in 
consumer confidence, has impacted UK town centres and high streets configurations in 
a complex and uneven way. Whilst many high streets have suffered significant erosion 
of their vitality and viability with substantial increases in vacant units, some centres 
have been able to survive the crisis and adapt successfully to the new era of austerity. 
One reason for the uneven impact of the economic crisis on UK town centres could be 
associated with the geographically different retail landscapes and the geography of 
demand itself. In addition, the adverse impacts of that shock can be associated with 
the speed and severity of the last recession which caught the majority of retailers by 
surprise. Indeed, only a few retailers and manufacturers admitted having a strategy in 
place to deal with the consequences of the economic crisis (IGD, 2009).  Consequently, 
a  large  number  of  UK  high  streets  and  town  centres  have  experienced  a  rise  in 
retail/service  outlets  closures,  which  in  fact  were  not  confined  to  the  small   Chapter 2 
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independent  retailers,  often  perceived as  most  vulnerable, but  were also  common 
amongst large corporate chains. As boarded up shops have become an increasingly 
common scene, the press and media started to claim that once-thriving UK high streets 
were  turning  into  'Ghost  Towns'  (The  Guardian,  2010).  These  has  raised  serious 
concerns  about  the  future  of  traditional  UK  high  streets  not  only  amongst  the 
members of public but were also publicly expressed by the Government. Overall, the 
portrayal of UK town centres has dramatically changed from buoyancy in  the mid-
2000s  to  cataclysmic  decay  towards  the  end  of  the  decade.    Furthermore,  the 
emerging reality of ‘Austerity Britain’ with painful public spending cuts, high inflation 
and low or non-existing salary increases has affected not only consumer spending but 
also consumer confidence, bringing it down again to a record low levels (Experian, 
2012).  
 On the other hand, there were town centres that were able to withstand the shock 
of economic crisis; that is to say those retail centres that have maintained or improved 
their performance, measured by the change in vacancy rate. Importantly, despite low 
consumer confidence and unfavourable economic conditions the particular dynamics 
of those centres have not only continued to protect their vitality but also attracted 
some retailers to open new stores. Such distinctive response of UK town centres and 
high  streets  to  the onset of  economic  crisis  can  be  viewed  as  a function of  those 
centres’  differential  abilities  to  be  resistant  to  and  to  recover  from  the  economic 
shock. However, in order to understand UK high streets’ resilience to the economic 
crisis, first the intriguing question of what the determinants of a ‘healthy centre’ needs 
to be dealt with. The sections below contextualise those determinants and establish 
their expected impact on vacancy rate, then theorise the impacts of economic crisis by 
evaluating  the  concepts  of  adaptive  resilience  that  have  recently  attracted 
considerable attention of economic geographers. 
2.1.1  Determinants of vacancy rate  
Vacancy rate is the most commonly used indicator of UK high streets’ economic 
health and is an essential element of town centre health checks performed regularly 
by local authorities, commercial consultancies and town centre managers (Guy, 2007;   Chapter 2 
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Findlay and Sparks, 2010). However, as pointed out by some commentators, there has 
been  inconsistency  in  approaches  to  the  assessment  of  high-street  economic 
performance when using vacancy rate. For instance, Colliers CRE (2009) distinguishes 
two types of vacancies, the hard voids (empty units available for occupation) and soft 
voids (available units but trading) however, Goad Experian does not account for the 
latter, essentially splitting the category of ‘vacant outlets’ into vacant retail and vacant 
non retail. Despite limited benchmarking and a lack of agreed definitions, in general 
terms, vacancy rate refers to a number of vacant units relative to an overall number of 
retail/service outlets in a particular town centre/high street. 
Typically, elevated retail vacancies are strongly associated with negative impacts of 
economic crisis; however, it should be noted that vacancy rates are not uniformly and 
inevitably an indicator of the fragility of a town centre/high street (Findlay and Sparks, 
2010). They may equally be a sign of an on-going and essential readjustment, as even 
in stable economic conditions, a degree of what is termed  churn is essential for a 
`healthy high street'. Often rapidly changing retailers’ requirements, in particular store 
formats,  sizes,  and  preferred  locations  within  town  centres/high  streets  aid  to 
accommodate and adjust to shifting consumer tastes and fluctuating levels of market 
demand. Nevertheless, high vacancy rates are perceived as harmful to a town centre’s 
vitality and viability, and their causes have been investigated by numerous studies.  
One  of  the  first  such  studies  claimed  that  local  demographics  and  economic 
conditions  are  primarily  responsible  for  retail  market  size  and  its  economic 
performance (Di Pasquale and Wheaton, 1996), thus indicating that an alteration of 
either of these factors can easily cause an increase or decrease in vacancy rate. More 
recently,  Zweeden  (2009),  who  examined  Dutch  town  centres,  claimed  that  retail 
vacancies  are  derivatives  of  various  exogenous  and  endogenous  factors,  and  the 
extent to which they can be altered by retailers or local authorities is defined as a key 
difference  between  them.    The  exogenous  factors  including  economic  cycles, 
demographics of catchment areas, planning policies and online shopping, are believed 
to have been important, but they could not be controlled locally. On the other hand, 
local  authorities  and  retailers  could  manage  the  endogenous  factors  such  as 
accessibility,  parking  policy,  average  rent,  opening  hours,  available  store  space,   Chapter 2 
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diversity of stores, and presence of the most attractive stores. Consequently, it could 
be argued that town centre retailers in order to adjust to any change to the former 
indicators would have to reorganise the latter factors, which in turn, might have direct 
impact on retail vacancies and high streets structures.  
Similarly, as Findlay and Sparks (2010) schema (Figure 2.1) implies, the increase in 
vacancy rates can be seen as a product of filtering the shock of economic crisis through 
two different systems. First, through the national structures that have the potential to 
weaken retail sector such as financial environment or failures of national chains.  This 
can  produce  regional,  sub  regional and  local  variations  in both  levels of  consumer 
confidence and in levels of demand across the immediate catchment areas (Wrigley 
and Dolega, 2011).  
 
Figure 2.1: Determinants of retail vacancy - the view of Findlay and Sparks (2010) 
  
 
Second, through the existing economic structures of the town centres/high streets 
themselves  such  as  pre-existing  mix  of  businesses,  the  relationships  and 
interdependencies  between  those  businesses,  and  through  local  institutional   Chapter 2 
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structures supportive or less supportive of their business-practice environments and 
entrepreneurial cultures.  
In  terms  of  the  first  dimension,  the  location  of  a  retail  centre  and  its 
embeddedness might be important as some researchers e.g. Dorling (2010) reported a 
clear north-south divide in the UK which has the tendency to produce local variations 
in affluence, spending patterns etc. Various aspects of local variations, often controlled 
by the demographics, have been widely examined by both retailers and researchers as 
recognising local consumers’ characteristics and predicting their potential behaviour 
enhances substantially the understanding of local catchments.  Campo et al., (2000) 
investigating the relationship between the composition of local population and a town 
centre’s sales levels, have found that the total retail sales’ increase/decrease is based 
on the local market spending potential or purchasing power. This has indicated that 
local  demographic  factors  such  as  increase  in  population,  age  and  affluence  of  a 
particular catchment area have the capacity to influence neighbouring vacancy rates. 
Similarly,  BCSC  (2007)  has  linked  the  success  of  retailing  in  recent  decades  to  the 
growth in customers’ real disposable income, and the demographic factors such as 
increasing wealth of middle classes and significant population growth. Moreover, they 
have also pointed out that the changing age structure, in particular the substantial 
increase of the 20 to 44 year-olds, which is a key, high-spending group, has been a vital 
determinant of the growth in the retail sector. Besides, Guy (1998) draws our attention 
to the fact that vacancy rates in UK town centres/high streets could be impacted by 
the increase in car ownership, which is one of the key parameters changing shopping 
behaviour as more private car ownership allows people to visit large edge-of-town and 
out-of-town shopping centres and retail parks.  
Since the economic crisis is an exogenous global factor, the necessary elements in 
self-organising anticipatory or reactive reconfiguration have been strictly related to the 
second dimension, the economic structures and configurations of town centres/high 
streets  themselves,  which  in  turn  comprised  the  following  groups  of  endogenous 
factors: 
a) The mix and interdependencies of business,    Chapter 2 
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b)  Local  supportive  or  unsupportive  institutional  practices  influencing 
attractiveness of the town centre/high street,  
c) The physical configuration of the town centre or high street and the extent to 
which that might help facilitate reconfiguration and renewal.  
2.1.2  The mix and interdependencies of business  
The importance of retail mix, especially in a success of medium sized and smaller 
town  centres  has  drawn  attention  of  researchers  analysing  shopper’s  attitudes  to 
choice  of  shopping  location  (BCSC,  2007).  Considerable  presence  of  local  and 
independent retailers, which is the key enhancement of high street diversity, has been 
argued by small-retailer trade organisations and NGOs to be beneficial and protective 
of UK town centres (Wrigley, 2010), however potentially fragile. Furthermore, different 
centres have diverse potentials that might be associated with their past functions, and 
failure  to  address  these  issues  can  prejudice  successful  retailing  (Dawson,  2000; 
Findlay and Sparks, 2009). For example, the lack of a major food store in a market 
town or deprived area can lead to outshopping or poor urban fabric can lead to retail 
blight.  
By  extension,  the  importance  and  benefits  of  corporate  foodstore  presence  or 
entry via a town centres first policy-compliant in-centre or edge-of-centre site to  the 
economic performance of a town centre have been discussed by various researchers 
such as Thomas and Bromley (2003); Powe and Shaw (2004); Wrigley et al., (2010b). 
They have demonstrated that a large-format food retail development can not only 
integrate functionally with other parts of a centre, but also generate high levels of 
linked trips, which is an essential element of a vital and vibrant town centre. Finally, 
the right balance between retail and service outlets within a retail centre, with the 
increasing  importance  of  services,  has  been  viewed  as  a  potentially  important 
determinant  of  vacancy  rates.  Indeed,  customers  value  the  availability  of  different 
services in close proximity to stores; in particular the recent escalation of ‘fun/hedonic 
shopping’  sees  the  presence  of  bars,  restaurants  and  coffee  shops  as  an  inherent 
element of this phenomenon (Moeller, 2009; Zweeden, 2009). These findings simply 
specify the desirable ‘retail mix’ which attracts higher footfall as one that comprises   Chapter 2 
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food stores alongside vibrant independent stores and numerous services. It could be 
argued that town centres with such ‘retail mix’ are equipped better to withstand the 
impact of economic crisis and should be able to preserve their vitality and viability 
better than those lacking diverse independent retailers, corporate foodstore or service 
and leisure outlets.  
2.1.3  Local  supportive  or  unsupportive  institutional  practices  influencing 
attractiveness of a town centre/high street 
Developing  and  maintaining  an  attractive  trading  environment  is  crucial  to  the 
economic success of a town centre. British Retail Consortium (2009) indicates that not 
only customers but also employees and businesses must feel that the high street is 
safe, welcoming and clean.  
The  overall  attractiveness  of  retail  centres  requires  a  visionary  management 
approach (Portas, 2011), substantial investments into the design and maintenance of 
the built environment and `streetscape' (BRC, 2009). This, however, not always has 
been the case and despite UK town centres and high streets having traditionally been 
at the heart of the land-use planning system, in many cases the state of retail fabric 
forming an integral part of town centres and high streets has been a cause for concern 
(Findlay  and  Sparks  2009b).  Nevertheless,  as  British  Retail  Consortium  (2009) 
acknowledges, a number of other policy initiatives that required co-ordinated activity 
between local authorities, public bodies and private interests have addressed the issue 
of deteriorating town centres. These include various schemes and partnerships with 
the most common and often highly successful including Town Centre Management 
Scheme  and  Business  Improvement  Districts  (BID’s).  Findlay  and  Sparks  (2009) 
evaluating town centre management schemes have noticed that their impacts were far 
from uniform, mainly due to the implementation of various approaches, however, they 
concluded that such schemes were helpful in seeing the town centre as a functioning 
whole.  Business  Improvement  Districts  (BIDs)  on  the  other  hand,  have  provided 
additional services such as regeneration or improvements to town centres establishing 
various partnerships between local authorities and local businesses. They are normally 
funded in whole or in part by a levy on ratepayers and co-ordinated by the Association 
of Town Centre Management (Sear and Parry, 2012). BIDs however, differ from town   Chapter 2 
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centre management crucially in the involvement of local businesses and although they 
are being currently developed across England, their impacts have not yet been fully 
evaluated.  
But  how  do  we  measure  town  centre  attractiveness?  It  could  be  argued  that 
attractiveness and image of retail centres are difficult attributes to define and measure 
quantitatively; therefore, a range of qualitative measures could be more applicable 
(Dennis, 2005). Nevertheless, in one of the first examples of such a study McGoldrick 
and  Thompson  (1992)  adopted  the  former  approach  by  modelling  the  attributes 
associated  with  perceptions  of  shopping  centres’  attractiveness.  Remarkably,  they 
have found that perceptions of attractiveness were strongly correlated with simple 
addition of the satisfactions and dissatisfactions that customers experienced during 
shopping. The qualitative approach however, has been far more popular. Guy (1998) 
highlighted  that  the  general  qualities  affecting  consumer  choice  of  shopping 
destination include not only a variety of goods and a price, but also the spaciousness of 
a  centre  and  quality  of  car  parking.  Dennis  et  al.,  (2002),  evaluating  shoppers’ 
perceptions of the attributes responsible for town centre attractiveness, has indicated 
such merits as quality of stores, cleanliness and availability of toilets as important.   
On  the  other  hand,  some  qualitative  attributes  that  are  easier  to  quantify  e.g. 
presence  of  anchor/food  stores  or  adequate  parking  provision  have  been  used  by 
several studies to determine the measures of town centre attractiveness. The studies 
by  Finn  and  Louviere  (1996)  investigating  the  shopping  centres  in  Edmonton  and 
Feinberg et al., (2000) evaluating the prediction of US mall patronage from attraction 
scales,  found  that  specific  anchor  stores  had  a  substantial  impact  on  consumers’ 
images of shopping centres, accounting for ‘most of the variation in centre patronage’. 
Findings  such  as  these,  demonstrate  that  most  attractive  shopping  centres  are 
expected to attract the most successful and popular retailers (Dennis et al., 2002) in 
order to maximise their footfall. Attracting sufficient footfall is a crucial part of retail 
success and town centre vitality and viability, therefore additional elements associated 
with easy access for shoppers, retail staff and deliveries are vital. Weak transport links 
and inadequate parking provision threaten the viability of high street retailers (BRC, 
2009) as the majority of shopping places in the UK are almost entirely reliant on the   Chapter 2 
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car-borne shopper.  According to BCSC (2007), car as a means of transport accounts for 
61% of all trips undertaken for shopping whether as driver or passenger. Walking is the 
second most popular way of getting to a town centre with 25% of shopping trips, 
whilst 9% of people go by bus. Rail and all other means of transport have only a minor 
share, making up only 3.5% of the total. 
Taking this into account it is not surprising that some commentators argue that 
retailers  perceive  parking  provision  as  the  most  important  location  criterion 
(Timmermans, 1986). In addition, it has been found that shoppers when choosing a 
shopping  destination  rely  not  only  on  the  car  park  provision  but  also  consider 
important the type of parking, with surface car parks seen as more favourable than 
multi-storey ones (Walters, 1996). However, studies examining those aspects such as 
Still and Simmonds (2000) showed that the effects of parking restraint policies had 
only  a  very  weak  statistical  relationship  between  accessibility  and  urban  economic 
vitality.  Nevertheless,  there  seems  to  be  support  for  a  view  that  without  decent 
accessibility  town  centres  might  experience  leakage  in  customers’  spending  as 
consumers are more likely to visit other centres in the neighbourhood with better 
accessibility or choose to do their shopping online. Furthermore, Findley and Sparks 
(2009) found that in poorly provisioned areas consumers tended to shop outside the 
area for food, seeking out large food stores for their weekly shopping.  
Finally, several factors such as the increasing cost and finite supply of oil, concerns 
over CO2 emissions, congested roads and political opinion have been exerting pressure 
for controlled car access to shopping places by restricting the supply of parking or 
raising  prices.  However,  the  demand  for  more  and  simultaneously  affordable  car 
parking is a major issue with shoppers. This needs to be addressed by local authorities 
as the research indicates that measures making cars more difficult or costly to use are 
at present more likely to increase online sales than get people onto public transport 
(BCSC, 2007; Portas, 2011).  
2.1.4  The physical configuration of the town centres and high streets 
Town  centre  physical  configurations  and  their  potential  impacts  on  vitality  and 
viability, investigated over last few decades, have taken into account several aspects.   Chapter 2 
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First, the concept of centre size, introduced by Timmermans (1986) as an important 
retail location factor, considered both number of outlets and retail floorspace. Some 
examples of studies that employed both those measures include Mintel (1997) linking 
the number of retail outlets to the attractiveness of shopping and town centres, Guy 
(1994) applying retail floorspace as a proxy measure when defining retail hierarchy in 
Cardiff and Dennis et al., (2002) who used retail floorspace to establish the defining 
point for a substantial competitor. However, the lack of consistent approaches when 
using centre size, in particular to calculate vacancy rates was pointed out by Findlay 
and Sparks (2009) as potentially problematic. In particular, they observed that in some 
secondary shopping areas there could be a large number of vacant units comprising 
relatively  small  floorspace,  whereas  the  primary  areas  of  the  centre  can  comprise 
fewer  but  larger  vacant  outlets.  Employing  only  one  measure  could  create  biased 
results; therefore, they have concluded that both measures are likely to be useful.  
Generally, larger centres have been associated with higher attractiveness, offering 
more variety and better customer experience. On the other hand, the competition 
within large centres can be tough and the high presence of multiple retailers could be 
a detrimental factor for small independent retailers, thus contributing to a decrease in 
town centre diversity. Despite prevailing levels of competition, larger centres offer a 
potentially  wider  variety  of  niches,  which  facilitate  flexible  reconfiguration  when 
compared with the typically older less adaptable retail fabric of many UK smaller town 
centres/high streets (Wrigley and Dolega, 2011). It is clear that the views linking retail 
centres  size/position  within  retail  hierarchy  and  their  resilience  capacity  to  the 
economic shock have been divided. On the one hand, the BCSC (2007) predicted that 
centres with large, modern shop units towards  the top end of the retail hierarchy 
would remain highly competitive, whereas centres further down the hierarchy, with 
many small stores and poor retail fabric would face challenges. On the other hand 
smaller  centres  were  found  to  be  more  resilient  to  the  shock  of  economic  crisis 
measured by the vacancy rate change (Wrigley and Dolega, 2011), a finding which was 
confirmed later on by the LDC’s results (2010).  
A second factor related to town centres’ physical configuration which could have 
been responsible for the recent rise in retail vacancy rates,  involved the increased   Chapter 2 
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demand for a new retail floorspace, largely imposed by the economic prosperity of the 
first half of 2000s. The statistics compiled by CB Richard Ellis (2010) show that on 
average over past 30 years, 13 million square feet (Sq Ft) of gross retail space has been 
added per  annum, predominantly  in  primary  shopping areas.  Retail  centres  with  a 
relatively large amount of newly completed retail/service floorspace shortly before the 
economic crisis, could have been faced with difficulties in letting the new space during 
the unfavourable economic conditions leading to, presumably temporarily, increases in 
vacancy rates. 
Finally, the level of what can be termed structural vacancy in the town centre/high 
street, defined as long-term empty units in existence for more than two years, has also 
been viewed as a potentially important  factor in determining the vacancy rate (Findlay 
and Sparks, 2009; Zweeden, 2009).  High proportions of such units usually indicate 
poor retail fabric and can be harmful to the attractiveness of a centre as a shopping 
destination. That is to say, the level of ‘bad’ vacancy as opposed to the short-lasted 
‘healthy’ vacancy associated with normal churn and which facilitates both adjustment 
of store formats, sizes, and in-centre locations by existing retailers/service providers 
and a necessary level of entry and exit. 
2.2  Theorising the impacts of economic shock 
The growth path of UK high streets and town centres has been far from smooth 
and  intact,  having  frequently  been  a  subject  to  various  types  of  interruptions  and 
disruptions  such  as  changes  in  planning  policy,  emergence  and  rapid  increase  in 
internet sales and periodic economic crisis. Martin (2011, p. 4), drawing on Keynesian 
business cycle theory, argues that ‘major recessions can be viewed as system-wide 
shocks  that  periodically  interrupt  and  disrupt  the  process  of  economic  growth  and 
development’.  He  also argues that  there  is  evidence  that three  major  recessionary 
shocks, which have occurred across the advanced economies during the last thirty 
years, have been far from geographically even in their occurrence.  Further, he claims 
that ‘geography of recession’ facilitates an evaluation of regional responses to major 
recessionary shocks and is often interlinked to a long-run regional growth patterns, 
and  the  existence  and  evolution  of  regional  disparities  in  economic  prosperity.  In   Chapter 2 
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consequence,  the  recent  economic  crisis  has  triggered  an  alteration  of  local  and 
regional development discussions ‘broadening it from a preoccupation with growth to 
one that captures the notion of resilience’ (Dawley et al., 2010, p. 1).   
UK high streets and town centres could be viewed as diverse and relatively well-
organized  economic  systems,  therefore  their  adjustment  to  the  onset  of  2008-09 
economic crisis has been complex and as of yet not fully understood. Exploring the 
notion of ‘resilience’ in the context of UK retail centres adjustment to the recessionary 
shock  seems  to  be  highly  relevant  and  potentially  significant  (Simmie  and  Martin, 
2010). However, it is important to recognise that the application of resilience to local 
and regional systems remains embryonic (Christopherson et al., 2010; Dawley et al., 
2010) and its application to town centres and high streets is virtually non-existent. 
Thus, the consideration by this study of the anticipatory or reactive capacities of town 
centres  and  high  streets  to  minimize  the  impacts  of  major  shocks  is  a  novel 
undertaking, which has the capacity to extend the understanding of a link between the 
evolutionary trajectories and the differential performance of those centres. 
2.2.1  Three concepts of resilience 
The  concept  of  resilience  broadly  defined  as  the  ability  to  `recover  form  and 
position elastically' following a disturbance of some form, has been used for some time 
in  the  physical,  engineering  and  ecological  sciences,  but  only  very  recently  has 
attracted  attention  from  regional  analysts,  spatial  economists  and  economic 
geographers (Pendall et al., 2010; Christopherson et al., 2010; Hassink, 2010; Simmie 
and Martin, 2010; Martin, 2011). Dawley et al., (2010) pointed out that the inspiration 
has been largely drawn from recent analyses of the response of how regions, localities 
and  public  policies  have  adapted  to  disastrous  events  and  environmental  shocks, 
ranging from 9/11 to Hurricane Katrina (see, Foster 2007; Hill et al., 2008). Essentially, 
interest has focused on the capacity of local economic systems to recover from an 
external shock, what Hassink (2010, p. 45) describes as ‘one of the most intriguing 
questions in economic geography ... why some regional economies manage to renew 
themselves, whereas others remain locked in decline’. Although most commentators 
argue that such performance ought to be seen as a result of an on-going evolution and   Chapter 2 
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adaptation  as  an  alternative  and  fuller  conceptualisation  of  resilience.  Simmie  and 
Martin (2010) and Martin (2011) draw our attention to three different interpretations 
of  the  concept  of  resilience,  adopted  in  different  scientific  traditions:  (i)  the 
engineering  resilience  interpretation  found  in  physical  science;  (ii)  the  ecological 
resilience interpretation found in biological science; and (iii) the adaptive resilience 
interpretation found in complex systems theory. 
(i) Engineering resilience focuses on the ability of a system to bounce back to its 
pre-shock state or growth path; i.e. on the resistance of a system to economic shock 
and the speed of returning to a stable configuration. Martin points out that a system is 
assumed to be in ‘equilibrium’ before the shock and a disturbance moves the system 
off  its  equilibrium  growth  path;  however,  self-correcting  forces  and  adjustments 
eventually bring it back onto that path. The resilience, in this instance, is measured by 
the differential capacity to being moved off the path and the speed of returning to its 
pre-shock ‘equilibrium’ state or configuration (Figure 2.3 a). The problem with this 
type of resilience is that regional, local economies or town centres do not need to be 
necessarily in an equilibrium state. Pike et al., (2006) argue that the perceived qualities 
of  a  successful  region  such  as  dynamism  contrasts  with  the  equilibristic  approach, 
which implies that a resilient economy would not necessarily change over time.  
(ii) Second definition, the so-called ‘ecological resilience’ focuses, as Martin shows, 
on the scale of shock a system can absorb before it is destabilised and moved to a new 
configuration. Despite some ambiguities of what constitutes the resilience, it can be 
measured by the magnitude of the disturbance that is absorbed before the system 
changes its structure, in other words, the level of ‘elasticity threshold’ required by the 
system to be pushed into a new, stable configuration. The key difference offered by 
the ‘ecological resilience’ is that the new configuration can also be superior or inferior 
relative to the pre-existing one, which respectively is associated with higher and lower 
resilience    (Figure  2.2  b,  c  and  d).  In  this  context,  Simmie  and  Martin  (2010) 
demonstrated  that  a  resilient  regional  economy  would  adapt  successfully  to  the 
economic crisis and either resume, or even improve its long-run equilibrium growth 
path. Conversely, they argued that a non-resilient regional economy would presumably 
fail  to  transform  itself  successfully  and  instead  become  ‘locked’  into  a  long-run   Chapter 2 
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outdated trajectory or under-performing equilibriums of decline. Such a response, on 
the one hand, implies that a resilient regional economy or town centre is one that is 
capable  of  absorbing  and  accommodating  extreme  shocks  without  any  significant 
change to its form or function, thus somewhat resembling the engineering resilience 
(Simmie and Martin, 2010). However, on the other hand, it offers an approach that is 
more dynamic, linking resilience with adaptability of a system’s structure and function, 
and according to McGlade et al., (2006) is much richer when the evolutionary aspect is 
considered. In the context of the responses of UK town centres to the external shock, 
both engineering and ecological interpretations of resilience are present in the debates 
which inform and frame policy. The concept of ‘bouncing back’ has often been implicit 
and the notion of ‘tipping mechanisms’, which move town centres/high streets beyond 
their elasticity thresholds, has been present in public debate on the future of UK high 
streets (Wrigley and Dolega, 2011). 
 
Figure 2.2: Responses of a regional economy to an external shock, a) engineering 
resilience, b) stable, c) inferior and d) superior new configurations found in ecological 
resilience, Simmie and Martin, 2010 
 
 
Indeed, both small-retailer trade organisations (e.g. the Association of Convenience 
Stores)  and  anti-corporate-food-retail  or  environmentally  focused  NGOs,  have 
mounted arguments relating to the potentially adverse impacts of corporate foodstore   Chapter 2 
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entry on the fragile ecologies of small and specialist independent-retailer-dominated 
town centres and high streets (Wrigley and Dolega, 2011). Yet, despite acknowledging 
that  ecological  resilience  offers  some  analytical  leverage,  neither  of  these 
interpretations quite captures the subtle nature of town-centre/high-street adaptation 
to the economic crisis.  
(iii) The third interpretation, identified by Martin as adaptive resilience, focuses on 
anticipatory  or  reactive  reorganisation  of  the  form  and  function  of  a  system  to 
minimise the impact of a destabilising shock, and thus offers far greater traction. As 
Martin  observes,  complex  adaptive  systems  are  distinguished  by  self-organising 
behaviour  and  adaptive  capacity  which  enable  them  to  reconfigure  their  internal 
structures spontaneously. As a result, the adaptive resilience interpretation focuses on 
resilience as a dynamic and evolutionary process. Furthermore, this interpretation, in 
Martin's  view,  resonates  with  Schumpeterian  (1942)  notions  of  the  `creatively 
destructive'  potential  of  macroeconomic  shocks  in  which  the  sweeping  away  of 
outmoded economic structures opens up opportunities to develop new configurations 
and new trajectories of growth. In the context of UK town centres and high streets, the 
closure of Woolworth stores, often criticised for their lack of identity, or Borders, not 
being  able  to  compete  directly  with  Amazon,  can  be  seen  as  examples  of  such 
creatively destructive force in action.  
2.2.2  Adaptive resilience: the emerging concept 
In the context of resilience and evolutionary adaptation of economic systems to an 
economic shock, Simmie and Martin (2010) distinguish four conceptual frameworks: 1) 
generalised  Darwinism,  2)  path  dependence  theory,  3)  complexity  theory  and  4) 
panarchy. Generalised Darwinism, which emphasises variety, novelty and selection, 
suggests that adaptability is about the potential to adjust to changing circumstances in 
an appropriate way. Variety or in our case the enhanced diversity of UK high streets 
are perceived as more resilient structures being on the one hand less prone to shocks 
and on the other able to recover faster, than the more homogenous ‘cloned’ town 
centres. Additionally, the widely discussed shifting diversity of UK high streets, the 
fragile ecologies of small and specialist independent-retailer dominated centres, seen   Chapter 2 
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by some NGO’s as in need of protection, could be viewed in the context of what is 
termed the Jacobs versus Marshall-Arrow-Romer (MAR) debate (Glaeser et al., 1992). 
In particular, the issue of concentration versus diversification, considered within that 
debate, has important implications for the ability of regional economies to cope with 
changing  competitive  dynamics  flowing  from  the  macroeconomic  shocks  of  rapid 
globalisation of industries. 
Path dependent process links the adaptive capabilities of a region’s economy to the 
nature of its pre-existing state where the system can become ‘locked into’ a particular 
trajectory of economic development. As Simmie and Martin (2010) pointed out the 
effect of path dependence on resilience is open to interpretations, nevertheless the 
economic  shock  has  the  capacity  to  ‘de-lock’  the  system  from  one  of  the  multi 
equilibrium paths (David, 2005; Martin and Sunley, 2006). Translating this into retail, 
the  interpretation  of  ‘lock-in’  as  a  negative  characteristic  which  holds  back  the 
adaptation of town centres to a shock, involves such attributes as poor existing retail 
fabric  or  lack  of  new  and  modern  stores.  On  the  one  hand,  such  configuration 
decreases  attractiveness  of  a  high  street  and  on  the  other  hand,  prevents  the 
necessary and desirable retail churn, increasing consequently the unwanted structural 
vacancy. The adaptively resilient high street would emerge through opportunities or 
decisions to leave the path from the past in favour of a new, related or alternative 
trajectory  or  niche,  such  as  regeneration  or  demolition  of  outdated  retail/service 
outlets (Dawley et al., 2010).  
Further, the complex system theory, which is characterised by non-linear dynamics 
and  self-reinforcing  interactions  among  system  components  (Martin  and  Sunley, 
2007), highlights self-organisation, and adaptive growth as mechanisms responsible for 
adaptation of their structures to changes in the external environment e.g. economic 
crisis.  However,  there  are  some  implications  of  this  approach  as  the  increased 
connectedness  of  complex  economic  systems  has  the  capacity  to  decrease  their 
adaptability and therefore resilience to the external shocks (Simmie and Martin, 2010). 
This overlaps with the framework of ‘panarchy’, defined by Simmie and Martin as a 
model  that  adopts  a  four-phase  process  of  continual  system  adjustment,  explicitly 
associates resilience with the adaptive cycles. The are two explicit loops in that model;   Chapter 2 
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one related to the emergence and development of a growing path and another related 
to the decline of that structure but simultaneously opening up the potential for its 
reorganisation.  Dawley  et  al.,  (2010,  p.7)  summarising  these  adaptive  cycles  have 
shown  that  the  accumulated  resources  available  to  a  system  lead  to  increased 
connectedness and dependency within the system, resulting in lower adaptability and 
reduced resilience to a shock or long-term structural decline. However, due to that 
decline, relations once again become looser and more diverse as part of a second 
release reorganisation loop which in turn nurtures innovation, technological change 
and new growth trajectories. 
The conceptualisation of evolutionary trajectories of economic systems, offering 
explanations for the differentiated resilience of places, has been closely linked to the 
notions of adaptation and adaptability. Pike et al., (2010, p.62) drawing largely on 
previous  work  of  Grabher  and  Stark  (1997)  defined  adaptation  as  a  ‘movement 
towards a pre-conceived path in the short run … whereas adaptability as the dynamic 
capacity to effect and unfold multiple evolutionary trajectories’. They pointed out that 
these  definitions  can  be  seen  ‘in  tension  with  each  other’  as  resilience  through 
adaptability may involve decisions to leave the successful pre-shock path opening up 
opportunities to a new, related or alternative trajectory. Nevertheless, in their view 
adaptation  and  adaptability  may  offer  a  complementary  explanation  on  how  the 
dynamics  of  particular  places  may  interrelate  in  order  to  provide  more  complex 
resilience to both external and internal shocks. 
In order to envisage and outline the response of regions and town centres to the 
shock of economic crisis, the four interrelated dimensions: resistance, recovery, re-
orientation and renewal, identified by Martin (2011) and shown on Figure 2.3 seem to 
be  highly  relevant.  Firstly,  the  resistance  defined  as  the  degree  of  fragility  or 
vulnerability of a system to macroeconomic shock such as recession. On the one hand, 
the resistance of a system will be determined by the nature and strength of the shock 
itself  but  on  the  other  hand,  the  degree  of  sensitivity  will  largely  depend  on  the 
underlying characteristics and dynamics of town centres and regions in which they are 
embedded, as different configurations create diverse adaptability. A second dimension 
is the recovery, in particular its speed and extent plus the way it relates to the degree   Chapter 2 
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of  resistance.  The  hypothesis  here  is  that  systems,  which  had  strong  and  sound 
underlying dynamics such as healthy retail mix and attractive physical environment 
attracting  high  footfall,  exhibit  stronger  resistance  and  in  turn,  are  more  likely  to 
recover quicker from the economic crisis. The third aspect focuses on the extent to 
which the regional economy or town centre undergoes structural re-orientation and 
what implications such re-orientation has for the town centre’s vitality and viability. 
Finally, the renewal is defined as the extent to which economies resume their pre-
shock growth path. The degree of both the re-orientation and the renewal can be 
established by analysing the structures of UK high streets and town centres in the post-
recession period. Additionally, Martin highlights the fact that all four dimensions are 
interlinked and can interact in different ways to produce different outcomes in terms 
of the observed resilience.  
 
Figure 2.3: Four Dimensions of Regional Economic Resilience to Recessionary Shock, 
Martin (2011) 
 
 
In summary, drawing from an emerging concept of resilience of economic systems, 
the response of UK town centres to the economic shock can be seen as a function of   Chapter 2 
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the mix and interdependencies of existing business, the dynamics  of those centres 
such  as  diversity,  attractiveness,  accessibility  and  the  national  planning  policies  or 
institutional  supportive/unsupportive  actions.  Those  characteristics  and  action  are 
responsible for building town centre adaptive capacity which in turn, disturbed by an 
economic or competitive shock can create new opportunities for development and 
innovation  (Pendall  et  al.,  2010;  Raco  and  Street,  2012).  These  substantiate  the 
emergence  of  sufficiently  adaptable  systems,  which  are  characterised by  enhanced 
resilience  and  are  able  to  withstand  future  shocks  in  better  shape.  The  resilience 
framework strengthens some basic arguments derived from evolutionary economics 
such  as  the  advantages  of  diversity,  seeing  regional  economies  as  path-dependent 
systems (Hassing, 2010) or the potential of novelty and selection in economic system 
adjustment  to  evolving  circumstances  (Simmie  and  Martin,  2010).  However,  some 
commentators expressed their criticism to an idea of bringing the concept of resilience 
into economic geography in order to explain regional differences. In particular, Hassink 
(2010) and Pike et al., (2010) were concerned with the focus on equilibrium or multi 
equilibrium state and the neglect of state and policies at various spatial levels. They 
claimed  that  the  notion  of  equilibrium  appears  to  contradict  with  the  constantly 
changing form observed in regions and town centres. Moreover, as Swanstrom (2008, 
p.3) pointed out the issue of power and conflict ‘present in regional governance in 
ways  they  are  not  present  in  ecosystems’  is  itself  problematic.  In  terms  of  town 
centres, the conflict of interests between developers and large multiple retailers on 
one side and the policy makers and town planners on the other has been present since 
the 1990’s. In the view of some researchers (e.g. Hassink, 2010; Hudson, 2005) the role 
of state and policies are the most important factors in explaining regional differences. 
However, Martin (2011) claims that recessionary shocks can cause sudden and intense 
structural change and re-orientation of a system, resulting in hysteretic change to a 
region’s growth path and for that reason resilience should be central to any conceptual 
framework explaining the evolution of the economic landscape. In particular, as Pike et 
al., (2010, p.62) pointed out, the notions of adaptation and adaptability should be 
perceived ‘as central causal concepts in explaining the geographically uneven resilience 
of places’. Nevertheless, as the research investigating the adaptive resilience of UK   Chapter 2 
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high  streets  and  town  centres  is  almost  non-existent,  there  is  an  urgent  need  to 
develop a conceptual framework against which future studies could be positioned and 
interpreted. 
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  Other forces driving UK High Streets’  Chapter 3:
      performance and geography of demand 
This chapter summarises the remaining three forces of change which have been 
driving high streets evolution and performance over last fifteen years and positions 
those forces in the context of retail demand. First, it outlines the rapid rise in online 
retailing and its impacts on the traditional British high street, then compares the two 
approaches  to  that  issue  adopted  by  various  studies  -  the  revolutionary  versus 
evolutionary approach. Second this chapter summarises the long-term and cumulative 
impacts of competition from large out-of-centre retail developments and outlines the 
changes in retail planning policy over the last twenty-five years as a response to those 
impacts. In particular, this section highlights the implementation of  a ‘town centre 
first’ policy to retail developments and the subsequent adaptation to that agenda by 
corporate food retailers. Third, it investigates the emergence of ‘convenience culture’ 
and the nature of corporate food  retailers’ entry into the small convenience store 
sector.  Finally, it looks at different aspects of the demand for retail goods and retail 
space. This chapter also analyses different factors responsible for the change in that 
demant and its geographical variation. 
3.1  The increasing impact of online retailing 
The  rise  of  online  retailing,  also  referred  to  as  B2C  (business  to  consumer),  e-
commerce (electronic commerce) or e-tailing, has generated substantial amount of 
interest amongst academics, politicians, industrialists, managers, entrepreneurs, and 
principally retailers (Doherty and Ellis-Chadwick, 2010). In general, the technological 
change has been widely seen as the major cause of industry changes (Dosi et al., 1997) 
and  indeed, the  rapid  advancement  in the  World  Wide  Web technology  had been 
named ‘the greatest technological evolution in traditional retailing in the past decade’ 
(Sethuraman and Parasuraman 2005, p. 109). The potential of the internet as a vehicle 
for  promoting  goods  and  capturing  sales  was  apparent,  offering  unrestricted   Chapter 3 
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convenience,  especially  global  reach,  ease  of  access,  flexibility  and  speed,  cost 
efficiency  and  ease  of  maintenance  (Doherty  and  Ellis-Chadwick,  2010;  Williams, 
2009). Many innovators and entrepreneurs pursued the newly arisen opportunistic 
strategy, however as Williams (2009) demonstrated, often in a rapid and erratic way. 
The  initial  period  can  be  associated  with  the  emergence  of  mega  stores  such  as 
Shopping.com, specialist sites such as Amazon.com, price comparison, event planning 
and  auction  sites  e.g.  eBay.  Exceptionally  large  rates of new  e-commerce  business 
start-ups, driven by the prospect of a quick growth, generating large profits and often 
underestimating  the  barriers  and  impediments  lying  ahead,  created  the  so-called 
‘dot.com’  bubble.  In  that  period,  many  e-tailers  had  poor  business  models,  which 
tested against the reality of capital markets, had little chance to generate profit. For 
instance,  early  e-tailers  spent  exceptionally  high  amounts  on  marketing  and 
advertising comparing to the physical retailers, with average respective figures at $26 
and $2.50 per order (Rosen and Howard, 2000). Additionally, the damaging costs of 
collection and delivery involved in operating an infrastructure of completing orders 
placed over the internet, together with issues of tactility and security (Wrigley, 2009) 
certainly  contributed to  a  spectacular  end  of  ‘dot.com’  bubble  in 2000.  This  initial 
period  of  e-tailing,  viewed  by  many  as  a  ‘disruptive  technology/innovation’ 
(Christensen  and  Raynor,  2003),  had  the  capacity  to  ‘alter  the  existing  basis  of 
competitive advantage in the industry, lowering barriers to entry and circumventing 
the  value  chains  of  traditional  retailing’  (Wrigley,  2009,  p.  402).  Moreover,  some 
academics have argued that e-commerce has challenged traditional retailers at a time 
when  they  were  beginning  to  assume  an  increasingly  important  role  in  the  global 
economy (Wrigley, 2009; Williams, 2009). Initially, many retailers demonstrated some 
reluctance and defensive retreat in relation to the new trend but, by the end of the 
1990s, larger and more established traders had considered adaptation to that change 
as a way forward, developing strategic responses (Burt and Sparks, 2003). Traditional 
store-based retailers began to transfer part of their business online and reorganise 
themselves into multichannel organizational forms, referred to as ‘bricks and clicks’ 
retailers (Burt and Sparks, 2003; Williams, 2009; Wrigley, 2009). They had considerable 
advantage  over  virtual  retailers,  having  warehouses,  supply-chains,  distribution   Chapter 3 
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systems,  customer-support  centres,  and  product-return  networks  already  in  place; 
they could simply add e-commerce operations to their existing businesses (Wrigley, 
2009).  On the other hand,  e-tailers as opposed to ‘bricks and clicks’ retailers, had high 
fixed costs related to building their brand identities, forming marketing alliances and 
increasing business efficiencies such as taking it to economies of scale e.g. Amazon, 
eBay. As a result, the so-called ’pure-play’ retailers have not become as significant as 
originally  predicted,  representing  only  about  a  third  of  the  UK’s  total  online  retail 
spend  at  the  end  of  the  2000s  [KPMG/Synovate  Retail  Think  Tank  (RTT),  2011]. 
However, Wrigley (2009a) demonstrated that several years after the ‘dot.com’ crash, 
e-commerce had recovered strongly and become a popular form of shopping not only 
in  the  U.S.  and  Western  Europe  but  worldwide.  Although,  issues  such  as  tactility, 
sociality  and  ease  of  fulfilment  urged  B2C  retailers  to  penetrate  different  product 
sectors,  the  growth  was  largely  driven  by  the  established  store-based  retailers 
developing multichannel operations. Beginning with Tesco opening the online retail 
channel in 1999, the last decade has seen an ever-increasing numbers of traditional 
retailers  joining  the  multi-channel  players  with  Zara,  Selfridges  and  Gap  being 
examples of 2010 entrants (RTT, 2011). Main factors contributing to these expansions 
given by Wrigley include, existing know-how,  growing consumer trust in both the 
established  retailers  and  security  of  online  shopping,    and  an  increasing  range  of 
‘virtual products’ that could be transported within electronic space not compromising 
the  quality  such  as  music,  software  or  games.  Further,  Williams  (2009)  identified 
additional attributes strongly associated with e-tailing such as increased possibility of 
price comparison, 24/7 convenience, selection of a product not limited by physical 
space and much wider geographical reach. Finally and most recently, the shock wave 
of  global  economic  crisis  and  subsequent  adjustment  to  the  emerging  reality  of 
‘Austerity  Britain’  with  highly  limited  economic  growth  and  public  spending  cuts 
affecting family incomes have increased and accelerated the progress of substitution 
effects, defined as longer-term structural shifts to online retail. As a result, online sales 
have been growing exponentially in the UK, increasing tenfold in the past twelve years 
from merely £581 million in 1999 (Verdict, 2000) to over £50 billion in 2011, which was 
about 12.0% of the total UK retail sales. In the foreseeable future, online sales are   Chapter 3 
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expected to continue their fast growth, and are predicted to reach around £60 billion 
by the end of 2012, a 14.0% share of all UK retail sales (Centre for Retail Research, 
2012). However, it needs to be noted that there has not been common consensus in 
the  way  online  sales  have  been  estimated  by  different  consultancies,  creating 
considerable  discrepancy;  for  instance,  Interactive  Media  in  Retail  Group  (2012) 
claimed that UK online sales reached £68 billion in 2011 
3.1.1  Evolution or revolution in e-commerce? 
Although arrival of B2C e-commerce has been seen by some early commentators as 
a  hyped  e-revolution  within  retail  industry  (Mahajan  et  al.,  2002)  the  term  of 
evolution, often used to describe how retail innovations and formats have changed 
over  time,  became  increasingly  prevalent  (Thomas  et  al.,  2005;  Williams,    2009).  
Dawson (2000, p. 142) claimed that ‘while much is talked about a ‘‘retail revolution’’, 
there is in reality little evidence of either major paradigm shifts or of  change of a 
revolutionary  nature.’  Similarly,  Doherty  and  Ellis-Chadwick  (2006)  reviewing  the 
literature on e-commerce have concluded that in terms of strategy formulation the 
question of evolution or revolution has not been answered by academic research. 
Williams (2009) however, largely drawing on Davies’ (1998) work, has developed a 
framework for e-tailing evolutionary changes, as opposed to revolutionary changes. He 
has distinguished four stages of the evolution process in e-tailing, namely hype and 
experimentation,  retrenchment  and  sobriety  sustainability  phase,  and  focus  and 
fragmentation. The initial stage was characterised by a rapid change in ‘technological 
ferment’  pursued  by  e-tailing  pioneers  exploiting  transient  opportunities  using 
different strategies and formats, however they were often too fragile, specifically at 
dealing  with  larger  competitors.  E-tailing  at  that  stage  had  the  potential  to  shift 
traditional retailing, offering the convenience and lower price, but the high cost of 
marketing  and  distribution  had  questioned  the  sustainability  of  many  businesses. 
Despite high rate’ of insolvencies within e-commerce businesses during that period, 
Murray and Tripsas (2004) advocated the entrepreneurial experimentation and saw 
this stage as a continuous progression and learning.    Chapter 3 
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The  second  stage,  according  to  Williams  (2009)  occurred  when  larger  retailers 
began to enter e-tailing, establishing good market coverage. These were mostly the 
leaders from other retailing sectors, primarily catalogue and store-based retailers who 
entered e-tailing directly such as Tesco, J.C. Penney, Office Depot, The Gap, L.L. Bean, 
and The Limited; by acquisition including CWP buying Drugstore.com and finally  by 
forming  alliances  with  an  early  e-tailing  pioneer  e.g.  Toys‘R’Us  and  Amazon.  Their 
efficient operation drove down costs; however, many conventional retailers were still 
slow  at  coping  with  or  taking  advantage  of  the  technological  change.  Although 
Williams (2009) argues that there were no clear boundaries between particular stages, 
the  ‘dot.com’  bubble  crash  has  been  viewed  in  an  evolutionary  framework  as  a 
defining  moment  in  e-tailing  evolutionary  change,  accounting  for  the  end  of  the 
revolutionary  period  and  entering  a  longer  period  of  stabilization.  One  of  the 
important implications of this stage, differentiating it from the previous one, was the 
emphasis on profitability and high standards. The established store-based retailers saw 
e-commerce as a new channel facilitating deeper exploitation of new opportunities 
and maximising sales through improving the professionalism and overall quality of e-
tailing. The development of dual or multichannel retailing by major retailers acted as a 
competence  enhancing  and  sustaining  force  for  existing  virtual  retailers  (Williams, 
2009).  
The third stage of maturity is typified by increased stability and differentiation, and 
according to Davies (1998), the focus strategy of dominating ‘clicks and bricks’ retailers  
based on major market segments and cost leadership and reflected in lower prices was 
an  important  part  of  this  stage.  This  was  the  basis  of  increased  efficiency  and 
effectiveness, where ‘pure play’ was the norm (Bower and Christensen, 1995; Burt and 
Sparks, 2003). Moreover, it has been argued that in this stage e-commerce retailers 
pursuing  cost  efficiencies  seek  out  economies  of  scale  and  tend  to  neglect  small 
market segments, so-called niches (Levy et al., 2005). Finally, increasing specialisation 
and customer targeting, where lower price is seen as an important component of e-
commerce strategy, determine stage four, which is still underway. Williams (2009, p. 
229) gives an account of such instances where ‘Reflect.com sold customized cosmetics; 
Dell … enables customers to order custom-built PCs directly from the company; and e-  Chapter 3 
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tailers, such as Zappos, permit buyers to customize their web pages’. The development 
of business partnerships or marketing alliances between various e-tailers and even 
manufacturers  has  become  increasingly  popular.  For  instance,  about  30%  of  all 
products sold on Amazon.com come from third party retailers (The Economist, 2008). 
Recently, as social networking came to a prominence, it has increasingly been viewed 
by  e-tailers  as  providing  virtual  gateways  or  distribution  mechanisms,  allowing  the 
penetration  of  virtual  communities  and  providing  products  and  services  to  niche 
markets (Kirkpatrick 2007). 
Nevertheless, the evolutionary framework, according to Williams (2009), suffers 
from a number of limitations common to other theoretical models of retail evolution. 
He  pointed  out  that  while  focusing  only  on  one  dimension  of  retail  change,  the 
evolutionary framework, is purely conceptual and has not been empirically evaluated. 
It  does  not  identify  the  causes  of  e-tailing  changes;  neither  does  it  specify  the 
mechanisms  of  change,  nor  account  for  geographical  differences.  Furthermore, 
Williams (2009) claims that the boundaries between traditional retailing channels are 
blurred, evolving into multichannel retailing; the evolutionary framework should be 
envisaged in that context, rather than analysing e-tailing as an isolated channel. 
3.1.2  Impact of online retailing on UK high streets 
The rapid growth of e-commerce, its nature and impacts on the traditional UK high 
streets and town centres have attracted over the past fifteen years much attention of 
both  academic  and  commercial  researchers.  Doherty  and  Ellis-Chadwick  (2010) 
pointed out that amongst early commentators there was a consensus view envisaging 
significant impact of Internet shopping on future retail sales, presumably due to the 
fact that e-tailing had the potential to make existing retail business models redundant 
(Wrigley  et  al.,  2002b;  Burt  and  Sparks,  2003).  However,  the  degree  of  predicted 
changes varied significantly from the demise of ‘physical market place’, which could be 
replaced by the ‘virtual market space’, to much more restrained forecasts.  
Doherty  and  Ellis-Chadwick  (2010),  reviewing  literature  on  e-commerce,  have 
found  that  early  commentators  predicted  three  main  threats  likely  to  affect  the 
traditional  UK  high  street  in  the  foreseeable  future.  First,  the  elimination  of  a   Chapter 3 
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middleman, as it was believed that manufacturers through the Internet could target 
their consumers directly and have a more intimate relationship with them. Second, 
some commentators (e.g. Doherty et al., 1999) speculated that ‘virtual merchants’ or 
‘pure  play’  retailers,  with  no  established  high-street  presence  could,  by  using  e-
commerce  software,  bypass  traditional  distributors,  fundamentally  changing  the 
distribution channels. Third, the danger associated with the pressing need imposed on 
traditional retailers to develop a presence on the web in order to protect their market 
share.  Becoming  a  ‘brick  and  click’  enterprise  raised  some  concerns  amongst 
traditional retailers related to ‘cannibalisation’ of their existing operations (Enders & 
Jelassi, 2000) and base cost inflation when operating dual channels (Alba et al., 1997). 
Such views were later castigated by Burt and Sparks' (2003, p.276) evaluation of online 
retailing, which stated ‘short history of consumer Internet purchasing is littered with 
spectacular  overestimates’;  however  it  is  fair  to  make  an  observation  that  some 
studies  have  been  far  more  sensible  in  their  approach.  For  instance,  Weltevreden 
(2007) investigating the implications of e-commerce, has attempted to establish the 
extent  to  which  online  retailing  should  be  associated  with  substitution, 
complementarity, and modification of traditional retailing. Weltevreden has viewed 
substitution as the extent to which e-commerce replaces physical shopping such as 
Internet purchase replacing a trip to a physical store. The complementarity, according 
to the Dutch researcher, could be attributed to two different factors: enhancement 
and  efficiency,  but  in  his  view,  it  was  difficult  to  distinguish  them  in  practice. 
Nevertheless,  the  former  happens  when  e-tailing  influences  physical  shopping  e.g. 
online advertising provides incentives generating additional trips to the store, and the 
latter,  when  physical  shopping  is  a  necessary  component  of  e-commerce  such  as 
picking up a product ordered online from the traditional store. The latter implication, 
suggested by Weltevreden, pertained to the extent to which e-tailing has modified 
traditional  retailing  or  physical  shopping.  This  could  be  attributed  to  a  number  of 
factors  such  as  the  duration  and  mode  of  transportation,  or  the  destination  of  a 
shopping trip. A potential customer could have done  some online research on the 
product,  compared  prices  etc.  before  going  to  a  physical  store,  and  although  the 
physical  trip  to  the  store  still  takes  place,  it  would  certainly  be  modified  by  the   Chapter 3 
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Internet.  Likewise,  BCSC  (2000)  has  predicted  that  the  impact  of  e-commerce  on 
traditional retailers, to a large degree, would depend upon the extent to which e-
tailing develops as a complimentary or substitution channel.  
Furthermore, various academic and commercial researchers investigating impacts 
of e-commerce on traditional UK high street retailers have demonstrated that those 
would vary substantially amongst retail sectors (Burt and Sparks, 2003; Veltevreden, 
2007). In particular, as Wrigley (2009) observed, some types of traditional retailers 
appeared to have increasingly suffered from the emergence of a new demographic 
group - the so-called ‘digital generation' who had grown up in the Internet age. They 
have created new types of consumption referred to by Currah (2006) as the ‘digital 
storm’,  which  progressively  have  challenged  the  copyrights  of  music,  film  and 
publishing industries; in effect, having serious implications for the traditional retailers. 
Indeed, those claims have been confirmed by Weltevreden (2007) who has found that 
in the Netherlands a wide range of ‘digitally supplemented’ retail categories  have 
been adversely affected by increasing internet sales, with the most evident including 
CDs,  videos,  DVDs,  books,  travel,  computer  hardware,  software  and  second-hand 
items, often bought on online auctions. The trends recorded in Great Britain have been 
comparable (Burt and Sparks, 2003); however, given the leading position of the UK in 
online sales, ranging in 2011 between 12% and 14%, it could be argued that they have 
been even more robust.  In consequence, the rapid expansion of online shopping has 
increasingly been viewed as a major cause of changes to the structure of traditional UK 
high streets. Indeed, once big names such as Borders, Zavvi, Thomas Cook or Game, 
have entirely withdrawn or substantially limited their presence in UK town centres 
only  within  the  last  two  years.  However,  it  should  be  highlighted  that  other  retail 
categories such as DIY, groceries, clothing have observed a more diverse impact of 
online retailing (Burt and Sparks, 2003; Weltevreden, 2007), with complementarity or 
modification effects having been more relevant than the substitution outcome.  
Finally, as the Internet has begun to be perceived as an integral part of retail fabric 
in the UK (RTT, 2011), the consideration of e-commerce impacts on the future of UK 
high streets was vital. Although it might be difficult to predict with any degree of 
certainty how the Internet will shape the destination of UK high streets, it is almost   Chapter 3 
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certain  that  online  sales  will  continue  to  grow  in  the  foreseeable  future. 
Commentators  have  been  cautious  in  their  predictions  and  seem  to  be  somewhat 
unclear when it comes to long-term projections, on the one hand, predicting a growing 
threat to the viability of a traditional high street, especially with the recent economic 
crisis  and  the  emerging  reality  of  austerity  Britain  undoubtedly  accelerating  this 
process.  This  seems  to  be  supported  by  the  fact  that  both  the  retailers  and  the 
customers  increasingly  search  for  efficiency,  rationalisation  and  cost  savings  (RTT, 
2011). But on the other hand, recognising that shopping activity is multifaceted and led 
by different motives (Crewe, 2000) researchers have believed that the traditional high 
street provides additional benefits unavailable in virtual shopping, in particular, the 
sociable aspects associated with the leisure shopping making it a heart of towns and 
communities (Burt and Sparks, 2003; Portas, 2011).  
3.2  Competition  from  out-of  town  retail  developments  and 
implementation of a ‘town centre first’ approach  
3.2.1  ‘Free for all’ approach and economic health of UK high streets 
Much of the Government’s planning policy advice on town centres reflects concern 
about the impact of out-of-town retail developments on the health of individual town 
centres.  Out-of-town  developments  have  largely  resulted  from  the  policies  of 
Thatcher’s  Conservative  Government  who  saw  the  town  planning  system  as  an 
impediment to economic development. They believed that speeding up and simplifying 
the  planning  system  would  lead to economic growth  (Thornley,  1991).  This  ‘loose’ 
government approach, referred to by Guy (2007, p.32) as ‘free for all’, coupled with 
the consumer spending boom of the 1980 resulted in a ‘third wave of decentralisation’ 
(Schiller, 1986).  Following a well-established trend in North America, this period was 
characterised by the rapid expansion of retail development of all types including large 
stores in out-of centre locations, retail parks and regional shopping centres. According 
to the new planning system regulations, such developments were likely to be rejected 
only in the case of the potential loss of Green Belt land, when there was a risk  of 
creating traffic problems, and unacceptable levels of impact on existing town centres 
(URPI,  1990).  Arguably,  as  the  empirical  evidence  on  the  impacts  of  out-of-centre   Chapter 3 
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developments  on  existing  town  centres  was  sparse  or  non-existent,  such 
developments were likely to receive a planning consent.  One of the main retail policy 
concepts of the 1980s was to encourage the ‘balance’ between town centre and out-
of-centre retailing (Guy, 2007); however the fast and large growth in the latter type of 
developments began to raise considerable concerns about the economic health of UK 
high  streets  and  town  centres.  In  this  context,  a  healthy  and  vibrant  town  centre 
became a central element of both national and local level retail planning regulations. 
The notion of ‘vitality and viability’, introduced in 1985 by a Parliamentary statement, 
became the key indicator of town centre performance and was used as a criterion for 
impact studies (Guy, 2007). A report commissioned by the DoE proposed separate 
definitions of vitality and viability. One reflected how busy the centre was at different 
times and in different parts and another referred to the ability of a centre to attract 
continuing  investment  (URBED,  1994).  Furthermore,  the  1993  PPG6  guidelines 
indicated that the defining criteria should include a mixture of quantitative measures 
such  as  commercial  yield,  pedestrian  flow  and  diversity  of  uses  and  qualitative 
measures including the physical structure of a centre or perception of safety. 
Nevertheless,  as  Guy  (2007,  p.57)  claims  ‘there  was  clear  evidence  of  political 
dogma affecting retail planning policy’  as ‘…conservative antagonism towards local 
authority planning practice was also a factor’. Indeed, the private sector was expected 
by  central  government  to  take  the  initiative,  within  broad  planning  constraints, 
however, this was unacceptable to many public sector bodies and commentators who 
believed that such an approach had mainly benefited affluent ‘car borne’ shoppers 
rather than the whole society. As concerns about the economic health of UK town 
centres grew, an additional evidence of impacts of out-of-centre developments on the 
existing town centres became available. Several studies, which investigated retail parks 
(Bromley and Thomas, 1988; Guy, 2000), regional shopping centres (Rowley, 1993) and 
large  ‘one-stop’  supermarkets  (DETR,  1998),  concluded  that  such  developments 
became powerful  competitors  to  the traditional  high  street.  By  the  early  1990s,  it 
became  clear  that  a  shift  in  national  retail  planning  policy  towards  town  centres 
support  was  increasingly  needed  and  would  have  been  welcomed  by  local 
communities and planning authorities.   Chapter 3 
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3.2.2  ‘Town centres first’ decade – the impacts of regulatory tightening  
Following the ‘laissez-faire’ approach to retail planning policy, which had resulted 
in the rapid expansion of out-of-town developments, the new decade of the 1990’s 
saw a gradual reversal from that system. Initially, sustainability and regeneration was 
introduced to the agenda and then amendment of the Planning and Compensation Act 
gave  more  power  to  the  local  planning  authorities  in  terms  of  land  designations. 
However,  it  was  the  1993  PPG6,  that  in  response  to  the  adopted  ‘sustainability 
agenda’,  had  primarily  emphasised  the  benefits  of  developments  in  town  centres, 
whilst  seeking  a  ‘balance’  between  in-centre  and  out-of-centre  developments.  In 
particular, it encouraged local authorities to enhance the ‘vitality and viability’ of town 
centres by promoting the ‘diversification of uses in the town centre as a whole’ and 
ensuring easy access to shopping areas. Moreover, the 1993 PPG6 defined the edge-of 
centre as a preferable location for foodstores and provided criteria for evaluating the 
impacts  of  proposed  development  on  town  centres.  Although  the  out-of-centre 
locations  were  more  suitable  for  large-format  developments  and  retail  parks,  this 
clause was removed by later guidance, strengthening the ‘town centres first’ approach. 
Although it was widely criticised for not doing enough to protect town centres, it was 
not  until  1996,  that  the  revised  version  of  PPG6  was  published,  which  eventually 
prioritised the ‘vitality and viability’ of UK town centres. One of the most significant 
changes introduced by the 1996 amendment to PPG6 was  the adoption of the so-
called ‘sequential test’. This test essentially privileged retail development within town 
centres, followed by edge-of-centre, district and local centre sites and only as a last 
resort the out-of-centre locations that were accessible by a choice of means of public 
transport  (Wrigley  et  al.,  2002a).  Other  important  changes  included  detailed 
instructions  on  the  preparation  of  development  plans  in  retail  policies  and  a 
requirement  for  impact  assessment,  which  had  to  be  submitted  with  planning 
applications for out-of-centre large developments of above 2500 sq m (Guy, 2007). 
Moreover,  the  new  guidance  encouraged  local  authorities  to  draw  up  a  traffic 
management  strategy  to  compete  effectively  with  out-of-centre  developments, 
defined the facilities that should be present in district and local centres and imposed 
the requirement of monitoring changes in town centres.   Chapter 3 
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Subsequently, as a result of a High Court judgement in 1998, developers applying 
for planning permission for ‘out-of-centre’ development were required to show there 
was a ‘need’ for additional retail space and that there were no central locations that 
were suitable and available (Guy, 2007). Furthermore, a series of Ministerial speeches, 
clarifications statements, responses to Parliamentary Committee reports and so on, 
continued  to  tighten  the  policy,  especially  introducing  a  stricter  ‘class  of  goods’ 
interpenetration of the ‘sequential test’. By the end of the 1990s, despite numerous 
attempts to shape the interpretation of PPG6 by the major retailers and their trade 
associations,  obtaining  planning  permission  for  out-of-centre  developments  had 
become progressively more difficult (Adlard, 2001; Wrigley et al., 2002 and Wood et 
al., 2006). Moreover, with the election of a Labour Government in 1997 other issues 
such  as  ‘social  inclusion’  and  ‘urban  regeneration’  came  to  prominence.  The 
Department of Health expressed concern for residents living in areas with poor access 
to  fresh  food  and  other  retail  goods  in  so-called  ‘food  deserts’  (Wrigley,  2002). 
Simultaneously, in many parts of the UK, the implementation of the above agendas has 
been increasingly seen by retailers as a clever device to obtain planning permissions 
for  large  format  developments.  The  Cardiff/Hiller  Parker  2004  review  of  PPG6 
confirmed these trends and highlighted areas for improvement – many of which were 
incorporated into a draft of updated planning guidance Policy Planning Statement 6 
(PPS6). The new PPS6 was viewed by many as the start of a new positive and proactive 
style of planning, far more ambitious than PPG6 in its vision for planning town centres’ 
(Hill,  2004).  The  principal  objective  of  the  draft  PPS6,  and  then  its  final  version 
published in 2005, was the promotion of ‘vitality and viability’ of UK town and district 
centres  and  the  enhancement  of  consumer  choice  and  further  improvement  of 
accessibility to shopping areas. Furthermore, wider government policy aims including 
tackling social exclusion, promoting economic growth and regeneration of deprived 
areas were incorporated into the planning framework (Guy, 2007). The Guidance also 
appeared to promise a more ‘proactive’ and responsive planning system to retailers 
i.e. by partial withdrawal of the ‘class of goods’ interpretation of the ‘sequential test’ 
and by strengthening the role of regional spatial strategies in determining location for 
major growth, including possible creation of new centres (Guy, 2007). However, some   Chapter 3 
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commentators argued that despite many months of deliberation PPS6 retained a ‘plan 
led emphasis and a focus on town centres’, with the assessment of ‘need’ and the 
‘sequential test’ being the key tools (Findley and Sparks, 2005). 
3.2.3  Effects of policy tightening on retail developments 
One of the immediate effects of the 1996 PPG6 was the submission of impact 
statements,  assessing  predominantly  the  influence  of  the  proposed  out-of  centre 
developments of over 2500 sq m on vitality and viability of a nearby town/district 
centre. As a result, the development rate of large stores in out-of-centre location in 
the UK had slowed down substantially, falling from about 60-80 completions a year in 
the  early  1990s  to  less  than  40  in  the  year  of  2000  (Guy,  2007).  However,  retail 
development has not disappeared, but in response, had adjusted to the constrains of 
the new post PPG6 era in various ways including more flexibility regarding both store 
formats  and  the  sites  they  were  willing  to  develop  (Wrigley,  2010a).  Firstly,  the 
average size of retail development began to fall in the late 1990s and as Figure 3.1 
shows the number of ‘policy friendly’ stores mainly located in-town or edge-of-town 
centres increased substantially.  
 
Figure 3.1: Store growth in post-planning regulatory tightening, Griffith and Harmgart 
(2008) 
  
 
Another response of retailers was to maximise the potential of already existing 
stores in the capacity of store extensions or the so-called ‘mezzanine floor loophole’ as   Chapter 3 
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such  developments  did  not  require  any  planning  consents  from  local  authorities 
(Wood et al, 2006; Wrigley, 2010). Both schemes were widely implemented until the 
amendment of Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act in 2004 and then the PPS6 that 
regulated  such  developments.  Finally,  the  major  retailers  began  to  reconsider  the 
potential of developing new stores on what previously had been regarded as marginal 
locations. Brownfield sites or those located in deprived council housing estates began 
to  attract  the  attention  of  food  retailers  as  they  were  exploring  different  ways  of 
working with the grain of ‘town centres first’ policy (Wood et al., 2006; Wrigley, 2002; 
Guy,  2007).  Moreover,  Wrigley  (2010a)  argued  that  such  an  approach  arose  from 
public expectations regarding the link between corporate growth prospects and their 
social and community responsibilities including urban regeneration and social inclusion 
projects. 
3.2.4  Retail-led urban regeneration programmes 
The adoption of the urban regeneration agenda by major retailers, although by 
necessity,  has  led  to  a  development  of  many  partnership  stores  in  neglected  and 
deprived urban areas across the UK. The wider urban regeneration schemes take place 
for several reasons such as improving the appearance of the area and providing space 
for  new  or  relocated  economic  activities  (Guy,  2007).  Most  of  these  regeneration 
programmes have been based around partnership schemes involving major retailers 
and the local authority, employment agencies or community organisations. Since the 
late  1990s,  such  partnership-based  urban  regeneration  schemes  have  become 
increasingly common, becoming larger and more complex over time (Wrigley, 2002; 
Guy, 2007). During the 1990s many Urban Development Agencies set up to encourage 
private sector investment into inner cities’ derelict areas, used retail development as a 
device to ‘kick-start’ broader urban regeneration schemes (Wrigley et al., 2002a). An 
additional  benefit  of  such  partnership  was  that  retailers  were  prepared  either  to 
purchase sites outright or offer far more money ‘up front’ than any other developer. 
An  interesting  example  of  such  development  took  place  in  the  former  Cardiff  Bay 
Development  Corporation  area  where  the  retail  component  was  the  first  to  be 
developed on site leading to further office, and residential development. These include   Chapter 3 
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The Penarth Haven development where Tesco opened its store in 1994 and The Ferry 
Road development of a large Asda Store and 11 retail warehouses on a former gas and 
oil storage site. 
In  effect,  during  the  1990s  retailers  had  developed  inner  and  outer  city 
‘brownfields’ far more than is often realised. For instance, Peter Sitch from Safeway 
(quoted in Willis, 2001) claimed that 40 per cent of its stores build in the 1990s (some 
250 developments) were in fact, built on ‘brownfields’. Although no comprehensive 
data  are  available  for  the  whole  UK,  some  indication  is  provided  by  the  Scottish 
Government statistics which shows that out of 30 new retail developments approved 
by local authorities  in out of centre locations 22 were ‘brownfield’ schemes, adding up 
to 136 000 square meters (Wrigley et al., 2002). In the late 1990s, however one type of 
regeneration-based  development  emerged to  be  increasingly  important.  It  was the 
redevelopment  of  purpose  built  district  shopping  centres,  built  mainly  by  local 
authorities in the 1960s-70s. Often poorly maintained and composed mainly of small 
shops, such centres already approaching the end of  their economic life cycle were 
characterised by high vacancy rates and often attracted vandalism. Thus, the offer of 
redevelopment  by  the  private  sector,  often  food  retailers,  was  attractive  to  local 
authorities. Such regeneration schemes would normally offer various advantages to 
local authorities; in addition to financial profit of selling the land, the area physically 
would  be  more  attractive,  safer  and  the  investor  could  provide  employment  and 
training opportunities for local residents, particularly the long-term unemployed. It 
was an arrangement, which became increasingly attractive to the major retailers as it 
offered the prospective of building very large stores in the ‘sequential test era’ of very 
restricted  planning  regulation  (Wrigley,  2002).  Indeed,  Tesco,  Asda  and  Kingfisher 
became progressively more involved in the urban regeneration agenda (although other 
retailers e.g. Sainsbury in Castle Vale, Birmingham also participated). Asda opened its 
partnership store in Hulme, Manchester in 1998 and followed with the announcement 
of the development of another such store in the east Manchester redevelopment area. 
However, it was Tesco that adopted the most extensive regeneration programme 
in  terms  of  retail-led  urban  regeneration  (DTZ, BITC,  BCSC,  2008).  The corporation 
entered  into  partnership  with  public  sector  agencies  including  local  authorities,   Chapter 3 
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training providers, the Government’s Employment Service and Basic Skills Agency as 
well as local community representatives (Guy, 2007).  
 
Table 3.1: Regeneration partnership stores in the UK, after Cudworth (2009) 
STORE  YEAR OPENED  FLOOR AREA 
Tesco Seacroft, Leeds 
Tesco Springburn, Glasgow 
Tesco Dragonville, Durham 
Tesco Alloa, Clackmannanshire 
Tesco Beckton, London 
Tesco Shettleston, Glasgow, 
Tesco Long Eaton, Nottingham 
Tesco Stockport, Manchester 
Tesco Dumfries, Dumfriesshire 
Tesco Pollock, Glasgow 
Tesco Wick, Caithness 
Tesco Failsworth, Manchester 
Tesco Cradley Heath, Birmingham 
Tesco Deysbrook, Liverpool 
Tesco Haydock, Liverpool 
Tesco Rutherglen, Glasgow 
Tesco Maesteg, South Wales, 
Tesco Aston, Birmingham 
Tesco Cheetham Hill, Manchester 
Tesco Gorton, Manchester 
Tesco Orpington, London 
Asda Llanelli, South Wales 
Asda, Hulme, Manchester 
Asda Widnes, Manchester 
Asda Huyton, Liverpool 
Asda Milton Keynes, Northamptonshire 
Asda Romford, London 
Asda Hounslow, London 
Asda Feltham, London 
Asda Bootle, Liverpool 
Morrisons Alloa, Clackmannanshire 
Sainsbury’s Castle Vale, Birmingham  
Sainsbury’s Shaw, Oldham 
2000 
2001 
2001 
2002 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2004 
2004 
2006 
2006 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2008 
2008 
2008 
2009 
1997 
1998 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2006 
2006 
2006 
2007 
2000 
2008 
  97 000 sq ft 
  90 000 sq ft 
  69 000 sq ft 
  55 000 sq ft 
100 000 sq ft 
  50 000 sq ft 
108 000 sq ft 
120 000 sq ft 
102 000 sq ft 
  85 000 sq ft 
  50 000 sq ft 
  88 000 sq ft 
  60 000 sq ft 
  36 000 sq ft 
  37 000 sq ft 
  80 000 sq ft 
  56 000 sq ft 
  80 000 sq ft 
  52 000 sq ft 
  88 000 sq ft 
  80 700 sq ft 
  64 000 sq ft 
  59 100 sq ft 
  47 000 sq ft 
147 000 sq ft 
110 000 sq ft 
  50 000 sq ft 
  43 000 sq ft 
  45 000 sq ft 
  40 000 sq ft 
  30 000 sq ft 
  64 000 sq ft  
  35 500 Sq ft 
 
In 2000, they appointed a ‘Regeneration Manager’ and increasingly saw the social 
exclusion agenda with their own property programme as a ‘win-win’ for communities, 
customer  and  business  (Tesco,  2005;  2).  By  2004,  Tesco  had  opened  11  large 
regeneration partnership stores, in 2005 a further six stores and had plans for a dozen   Chapter 3 
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more  in  the  following  years.  Table  3.1  provides  the  aggregated  data  of  the  urban 
regeneration partnership stores developed by major retailers by the end of the 2000s. 
Less  research has been  conducted  on  the  contribution  of non-food retailers to 
urban regeneration programmes. However, it is widely known that they too actively 
took  part  in  such  schemes.  In  the  year  2000,  B&Q  began  working  with  local 
government  regeneration  programmes  which  focused  on  areas  in  need  of 
development (Kingsfisher, 2002: 24). In addition, Ikea has participated in several of 
these schemes to support the planning applications for its large stores.  
Overall, retail-led regeneration projects appeared to be encouraged by retail policy 
and widely supported by local authorities. Such projects were not required to prove 
‘need’ nor to submit prediction of impacts with the planning application. Lacking many 
other options of developing large stores, retailers increasingly came to see inner and 
outer  city  brownfields  as  ‘attractive  sites’  for  new  developments.  However,  in 
response to the ‘town centre first’ approach, retailers have incorporated the social 
inclusion agenda too. 
3.2.5  Social exclusion and the underserved communities agenda 
The social exclusion agenda, viewed in the context of tightening retail regulations, 
certainly had the capacity to re-shape the configurations of UK town centres and high 
streets. It became a key issue after the election of the Labour Government in 1997, 
giving much attention to poor access of deprived areas to fresh food and other retail 
goods.  Social  exclusion  happens  when  people  or  whole  areas  suffer  from  a 
combination  of  linked  problems  such  as  unemployment,  poor  skills,  low  incomes, 
unfair  discrimination,  poor  housing,  high  crime,  bad  health  or  family  breakdown 
(ODPM, 2004: 4). Soon after the election, a Social Exclusion Unit has set up within the 
Cabinet Office and in 1998 presented to Parliament its action report ‘National Strategy 
for Neighbourhood Renewal’. Based on academic and government research the report 
highlighted  the  increasingly  polarised  position  of  the  poorest  neighbourhoods  in 
Britain  showing  that  between  1979  and  1995;  net  income  of  the  richest  tenth  of 
population had grown by 68%, whilst those of the bottom tenth had fallen by 8% 
(Speak  and  Graham  1999;  Wrigley,  2002).  In  response  to  the  report,  the  national   Chapter 3 
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strategy for neighbourhood renewal proposed 18 action teams working on fast track 
projects to develop policy solutions and an action plan by 2001. One of the teams 
involved in this process, PAT 13, developed a strategy for improving access to shopping 
in poor neighbourhoods. Their views were influenced by the earlier work of the Low 
Income Project Team, which had described the nutrition and public health problems of 
the areas with poor retail access. The term ‘food deserts’ was coined for such areas by 
the  Department  of  Health  Nutrition  Task  Force  (Beaumont  et  al.,  1995)  and  soon 
caught the imagination of both commentators and those involved in policy planning. It 
was soon established that ‘food deserts’ would typically describe urban areas which 
lack adequate food shopping facilities within 500m from people’s homes. Poor levels 
of access to sources of good quality and healthy foods such as fruit and vegetables was 
seen as a factor that had been exacerbating the poor levels of nutrition frequently 
observed  in  areas  of  social  deprivation  (Wrigley  et  al.,  2002a,  Guy,  2007).  The 
promotion of tackling social exclusion and addressing the problem of people living in 
‘food deserts’ arose from the Cabinet office and the Department of Health. However, 
the first recognition of the issue of underserved communities as a new criterion for 
retail  planning  policy  (Wrigley,  2002)  was  in  a  speech  of  Planning  Minister  Nick 
Raynsford (2000) who said that ‘tackling social exclusion is the new main task for retail 
planning policy’. 
Large retailers rapidly recognised that there were development opportunities for 
them,  especially  if  they  could  position  their  stores  as  regeneration  investment  for 
deprived communities. Retailers argued that not only would such stores provide better 
access to food in such areas, improving diet and health, but they could also act as a 
catalyst for economic development and enhance local employment skills (Guy 2004; 
Cummins et al., 2005; Wood et al., 2006). 
However, it became clear at that stage that such retail development proposals 
claiming the contribution they could make to reduce social exclusion entirely lacked 
scientific evidence. Firstly, the study by Clarke et al., (2002) by identifying areas of poor 
access to food retailing in Leeds/Bradford and Cardiff provided a benchmark against 
which  food  deserts  could  be  identified,  then  studies  commissioned  by  the  ESRC/J 
Sainsbury  and the  Department of  Health  examined  the nature of  ‘food  deserts’  in   Chapter 3 
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various cities across the UK. It became clear that overall the diet in deprived areas was 
relatively  poor,  including  low  fresh  fruit  and  vegetable  consumption  (Guy,  2007). 
Importantly,  the  Seacroft  study,  examining  the  relationships  between  poor  food 
accessibility and occurrence of unhealthy diets, has shown the increase in intake of 
fresh fruit and vegetables amongst those shoppers who switched to the newly opened 
Tesco store (Wrigley at al., 2002a). A similar study conducted in Glasgow has identified 
only a very weak statistical relationship between those two factors mainly due to the 
specifics  of  the  study  design  (Cummins  et  al.,  2005);  however,  it  reported  other 
positive impacts associated with the opening of a large foodstore in a deprived area. 
These included not only significantly improved food provision and increase of physical 
and economic accessibility, but also wider regeneration effects and decreasing vacancy 
rates. Additionally both studies found that a large proportion of shoppers from the 
deprived areas were using the new stores and walking as a means of transport has 
significantly increased.  Nevertheless, despite the reported benefits, it has become 
explicit that the issue of food poverty is a multi-dimensional one. Guy (2007) argues 
that physical access to good quality food at a reasonable price is only a minor factor 
decreasing  food  poverty  in deprived  areas  and  should  rather  be  associated  with  a 
combination of demographic and socio-economic factors such as attitudes to diet and 
nutrition and individual life style including amount of exercise and alcohol and tobacco 
consumption. Although many commentators castigated such developments as merely 
‘clever  devices  to  get  stores  built  and  passed  by  planners’  (The  Scotsman,  20 
September  2000),  major  retailers  have  managed  to  mount  a  strong  argument  for 
participation in such schemes (Wood et al., 2006). The argument was mainly based on 
the  benefits  that  large  retailers  could  offer  to  the  deprived  communities  which 
included the redevelopment of an existing but often derelict local retail centre and the 
employment of the local workforce.  
3.3  Convenience culture and entry of corporate retailers into the small     
convenience store sector 
The dominant role of convenience in western culture has emerged as increasingly 
important at the turn of 20
th and 21
st century (Buckley et al., 2007). This trend can be   Chapter 3 
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closely  associated  with technological  advancements,  which have  altered  household 
structures, social norms and values. According to Buckley et al., (2007) such alteration 
has resulted in shifting demand for all types of consumer goods including food, with 
the role of convenience emerging as increasingly important. Despite the acknowledged 
importance, convenience has attracted relatively little attention in the literature, and 
although  some  conceptualisation  efforts  are  known,  the  attempts  to  develop 
comprehensive measures of it have been limited (Seiders et al., 2007). Historically, the 
notion  of  ‘convenience  oriented  consumers’  had  attracted  the  attention  of  some 
researchers  (e.g.  Yale  and  Venkatesh,  1986;  Morganosky  1986),  but  afterwards,  it 
became clear that different customer factors such as employment status or affluence 
produce  variations  of  convenience  orientation  rather  than  ‘convenience  oriented 
consumer’ per se (Brown and McEnally, 1993). One of the first aspects considered by 
convenience  conceptualisation  included  time  and  effort;  in  particular  a  number  of 
researchers (e.g. Berry et al., 2002; Seiders et al., 2007; Buckley et al., 2007) viewed 
the lack of time and/or energy as the drives for convenience. In relation to those two 
elements Berry et al., (2002) developed a model of service convenience utilising five 
dimensions: purchase decision, time and effort associated with access, transaction, 
benefit  and  finally  the  post-benefit  convenience.  Furthermore,  Dawes  and  Rowley, 
(2009) implied that convenience may operate at two different levels: a) at product 
attribute level, where convenience is viewed as an integral part of the offered good, 
such as assorted ingredients in a ready meal and b) at consumer segmentation level 
which  accounts  for  additional  variables  such  as  spatial,  psychological,  sociological, 
situational and philosophical factors, which are responsible for a decrease or increase 
in consumer preference for convenience.  
The pioneering food-related lifestyle research was conducted by The Centre for 
Research on Consumer Relations in the Food Sector in Denmark, (Brunsø, et al., 1996) 
and although the concept was still somewhat vague, they have established that a food 
related lifestyle comprises a set of ‘declarative and procedural characteristics’, which 
reflect  the  values  of  the  individuals.  Likewise,  Reimers  and  Clulow,  (2004)  who 
investigated attitudes related to food convenience found that it should be associated 
with  a  wide  range  of  factors  responsible  on  the  one  hand  for  changing  customer   Chapter 3 
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behaviour such as rising levels of consumer awareness or affluence, and on the other 
hand, for shifting social trends towards increasingly individualistic lifestyles and the 
growth of non-traditional households. Moreover, other demographic factors such as 
longer working hours, increasing leisure orientation and the changing role of women 
leading to an increase in the number of male food shoppers, were found significant in 
the formation of convenience culture. More recently, Buckley et al., (2007) examining 
food-related  lifestyle  mechanisms,  have  identified  comprehensive  measures 
associated with the convenience lifestyle and determined additional forces driving the 
demand for convenience. These included an ageing population, changing household 
structure, healthy eating, breakdown of traditional mealtimes and value for money.  
This study seeks the nexus between shifting consumer patterns responsible for the 
rise of convenience culture and the entry of corporate foodstore retailers into  the 
small convenience store market. Wrigley, (2010) defines ‘convenience culture’, as a 
rising  demand  for  local  stores,  normally  within  easy  walking  distance,  that  can 
essentially offer access to good quality fresh produce associated with superstores. This 
relatively new trend in consumer culture can be viewed as a major force driving the 
expansion of large grocery retailers into the small convenience store sector. Wrigley, 
(2010) also claims that convenience stores are often seen as a ‘choice edited’ version 
of the larger format superstores, thus have the potential to generate large footfall, 
mainly from local catchments. Since shopping in convenience stores involves less travel 
and shopping time commitment, it has become an attractive option to many types of 
households. According to Mintel (2008) convenience stores are not serving the main 
shopping needs, however, they play an important role during the week, predominantly 
as ‘top up’ and 'on-the-move' shopping. Mintel’s report also claims that over half of all 
adults from the immediate catchment area shop in local convenience stores at least 
once a week, with the most frequent users being under 35s.  
At  this  stage,  it  is  important  to  consider  two  further  issues  pertaining  to  the 
patronage behaviour and the importance of the small convenience store sector to the 
corporate  retailers.      First,  portrays  consumer’s  expectation  in  terms  of  the  local 
grocery store and identifies the drivers of the store choice. Although several studies 
have shown that those expectations can vary substantially, the general perspective   Chapter 3 
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offered by the Office of Fair Trading (2006), views consumer’s choice of food store as a 
derivative of weighing factors such as convenience, price and loyalty to a particular 
store. More specifically, Pan and Zinkhan (2006) found that the convenience factors 
normally associated with large multiple retailers, in particular, the accurate, speedy 
checkout, uncluttered aisles and convenient location played a vital role when it comes 
to  store  choice  and  patronage  behaviour.  The  other  important  factors  relate  to 
physical  aspects  of  a  store  and  customer  service,  in  particular  the  reliability  and 
standard procedures in solving problems such as return of purchased goods (Huang, 
2009; George (2005).  
Second,  attempts  to  answer  the  question  why  a  ‘top  up’  shopping  was  so 
important to the corporate retailers and has resulted in a rapid expansion of the major 
food retailers into the small convenience store sector. One reason given by Moeller, 
(2009) views the entry of major retailers into convenience store sector as an essential 
aspect for remaining competitive. However, some commentators suggested that there 
were other significant reasons for the corporate retailers to enter the convenience 
store  sector.  Wrigley  et  al.,  (2010)  and  Wood  et  al.,  (2010)  argued  that  the 
Competition  Commission  (2000,  2003,  2007)  has  provided  a  shelter  for  such 
developments  interpreting  the  wider  UK  grocery  market  as  a  combination  of  two 
separate  sectors,  the    ‘one  stop’,  which  was  highly  regulated  and  the 
secondary/convenience store sector, which was highly fragmented and neglected by 
the large retailers.  
Despite  the  protests  of  various  NGOs  such  as  the  Association  of  Convenience 
Stores (ACS) the corporate retailers expanded fast into the small convenience store 
sector. Indeed, in 2000, the four largest supermarkets owned 54 convenience stores in 
the UK but, by 2005, this figure had risen to 1,306 (OFT, 2006).  By the late 2000s, 
Tesco developed more than 650 ‘Express’ stores and 500+ ‘One Stop’ branded units. 
This was largely due to the acquisition of 1215 T&S convenience stores in 2003 and the 
45 outlets of London based chain Adminstores. Meanwhile, Sainsbury’s has developed 
a  portfolio  of  more  than  300  ‘Local’  stores,  largely  resulting  from  acquisitions  of 
convenience stores from Jacksons and Bell in 2004.    Chapter 3 
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The ‘essential responsiveness’ of large grocery retailers to the changing consumer 
culture became increasingly explicit.  However, the changes in consumer culture are 
not even in the geographic terms as the demand (footfall) is driven by different factors 
for different types of retail centres. Some types of centres therefore, should be more 
attractive to a corporate investment than others, and it needs further investigation. In 
addition, a somewhat more philosophical question could be asked: which came first, 
convenience culture or a rise in convenience stores? 
 Other  types  of  convenience  stores  such  as  symbol  group  and  non-affiliated 
independent retailers have too recorded substantial increases in their store numbers. 
In fact, both the Competition Commission (2008) and Wrigley et al., (2009a) reported 
that in terms of unit numbers symbol group and independent retailers expanded faster 
than corporate retailers, with  independent retailers having the biggest share of that 
increase. Nevertheless, the expansion of corporate retailers into the convenience store 
sector can be associated with the increase in standards amongst both symbol group 
and independent retailers as they become more competitive in fulfilling the raising 
consumer expectations (Competition Commission, 2006). Many independent retailers 
have joined various symbol groups, as in addition to the above reasons, they could also 
enjoy some benefits associated with being a part of a larger organisation such as lower 
purchase  price  or  bigger  distribution  network.  Such  rapid  increase  in  convenience 
store  numbers  has  contributed  largely  to  the  growth  in  sales.  In  2010,  sales  in 
convenience stores represented around 21% of total grocery retail sales. Effectively, 
convenience stores have been established as one of the most buoyant sectors of food 
retailing, with the market worth £32.1 billion in 2010 and the overall number of outlets 
in the UK at 48,410 (IGD, 2010). 
3.4  Geography of demand 
3.4.1  Shifting consumer behaviour and spatial trends 
The  forces  impacting  the  performance  of  UK  high  streets  and  town  centres 
discussed  above  should  be  also  perceived  in the  context  of demand for  retail  and 
services facilities and its geographical variation. Birkin et al., (2002) claim that demand   Chapter 3 
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is  a  lifeblood  of  the  retail  industry.  Consumers,  in  particular  their  choices  and 
behaviour, are fundamental drivers of the demand and therefore are closely related to 
evolution of the retail landscape. As mentioned in the section on convenience culture, 
consumer’s behaviour and attitudes are constantly changing, which also has important 
implications to the retailers, town centre managers and policy makers. 
There are several widely recognised indicators of that shift and importantly they all 
vary spatially and therefore are directly related to the geography of demand for retail 
facilities. The first and perhaps the most important factor is related to the increased 
mobility of consumers. As the car ownership has increased substantially over last few 
decades, consumers spend more time travelling to work or shops. In some ways, the 
retail system itself was a driver for an increasing use of cars, with most prominent 
examples being the rise of out of centre retail developments and regional shopping 
centres (Guy, 2004). Despite numerous attempts of policy makers to revitalise British 
town centres, seen predominantly in the planning regime promoting the ‘town centre 
first’ approach, the out of centre retail developments have not vanished. Rather, they 
have performed well, largely due to the car-borne shoppers, who often take advantage 
of the free parking space offered (Guy, 2007). Nevertheless, the car ownership varies 
spatially and across different social groups, for instance the ratio of cars per household 
in the deprived areas on the fringe of a larger city would be substantially lower than 
that in the more affluent rural areas. Figure 3.2, showing the spatial variability in the 
proportion of households with no car within Greater Manchester, indicates that the 
percentage  of  such  households  for  some  deprived  areas  e.g.  Manchester 
Wythenshawe or Longshaw was twice as high as in the affluent areas of Altrincham or 
Cheadle Hulme. Second important factor relates to the overall and long term rise in 
disposable  income,  in  particular  during  the  period  of  prosperity.  This  was  partially 
linked to the restructuring of labour market across the Western countries with the 
most common trends being a decline in manufacturing and manual skilled jobs and 
growth in the service economy (Birkin et al., 2002). Importantly, this trend was not 
uniform and has led to an increasing polarisation between the rich and poor. In terms 
of geography, this was visible at both regional and local scales. The previously heavy 
industrialised regions such as the North East, North West or the Midlands have seen   Chapter 3 
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large  increases  in  unemployment,  which  ultimately  translates  into  a  decline  in 
disposable income (Dorling, 2010). However, within the last decade those regions have 
transformed their labour markets substantially, with the general tendency to growth in 
the public sector employment. Such a model was not sustainable which was exposed 
by  the  economic  crisis  and  austerity  period  when  the  vulnerability  of  a  heavy 
dependence of those regions on the public sector jobs was exposed by the spending 
cuts (Fingleton et al., 2012), Wrigley and Dolega, 2011). 
 
Figure 3.2: Proportion of households with no car within 1km and 3km catchment areas 
of analysed town centres in Greater Manchester 
 
The  service  economy  in  the  UK,  on  the  other  hand,  was  mainly  driven  by  the 
prosperous  Greater  London  and  the  South  East.  The  southern  regions,  although 
affected to a degree by the downfall in housing market and soaring financial sector, 
were still performing better than the northern regions. That geographical split has also 
the capacity to produce regional, sub-regional variations both in levels of consumer 
confidence and in levels of demand across the immediate catchment areas of UK town 
centres  and  high  streets.  It  could  be  argued  that  even  more  important  from  the 
demand for retail spaces view are the local variations. One of the key indicators for 
estimating potential demand for the retail spaces is the affluence of a local area and its   Chapter 3 
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micro variations. Figure 3.3, showing the affluence in Bristol urban area, indicates that 
there is a significant spatial variability at the intra-urban level.  
 
 Figure 3.3: Spatial variability of affluence in Bristol urban area 
 
The geography of demand has profound implications for the retailers, who have 
increasingly endeavour to understand the geography of income (Birkin et al., 2002). 
There  is  a  consensus  that  understanding  the  evolving  geodemographics  of  local 
catchments  responsible  for  the  change  in  consumer  behaviour  and  their  spatial 
variation is crucial to the viability of both retail centres and retailers themselves. 
3.4.2  Consumer characteristics and catchment areas 
It has been long argued that the viability of a retail centre or a store depends to a 
great extent on their capability to satisfy the expectations of the consumers that live in 
the catchment area (Wood et al., 2010). In terms of understanding the consumers of a   Chapter 3 
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particular catchment area there are two widely recognised components, the quantity 
and quality (Gonzales-Benito and Gonzales-Benito, 2005). In terms of the quantity, in 
other words the market size, population growth/decline, its density and redistribution 
are important attributes of the demand prediction process. In the UK, some areas such 
as Liverpool, Manchester or the West Midlands have seen population decline while 
Essex,  Hampshire  or  Cambridgeshire  have  witnessed  substantial  increases  in 
population (Birkin et al., 2002). These trends certainly have implications for the long-
term demand predictions and viability of some centres or stores, in particular those 
located in the areas with negative projected population growth.  Conversely, in the 
case  of  large  population  growth  retailers  explore  the  possibility  of  exploiting  the 
potential arising in those areas and therefore often consider them when choosing new 
sites. Indeed, large retailers constantly monitor those trends and reassess the viability 
of their stores in that context.  
Arguably, even more important is the understanding of the qualitative aspects of a 
consumer such as age profile, income, spending habits, household size etc. As the life 
expectancy increases, the growing elderly population is increasingly active and now 
form ‘a substantial consumer niche in its own right’ (Birkin et al., 2002, p.13). Although 
that  general  trend  has  been  well  documented  in  the  UK  and  other  developed 
countries, it is worth mentioning that it is far from being geographically uniform. Some 
areas such as coastal towns or the so-called ‘cathedral cities’ are much more attractive 
to this type of consumers that the large urban areas, city centres etc. There is an 
agreement  amongst  researchers  that  in  the  areas  dominated  by  the  elderly  the 
demand for items such as fashion, leisure, entertainment and sport-related products 
will be much lower than in those areas where young adults predominantly dwell. On 
the other hand, the middle-to-old-aged adults will increase the demand for financial 
services, holidays, home furniture and appliances (Birkin et al., 2002). 
Also  consumers’  expenditure  patterns  have  changed  over  last  two  decades, 
especially  in  the  developed  economies.  In  the  period  of  prosperity,  UK  consumers 
spent smaller percentage of their income on food, fuel and clothing; however some 
commentators claim that this trend has been interrupted by the current economic 
crisis. Income is a crucial factor driving expenditure; therefore the decline in disposable   Chapter 3 
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income  combined  with the  bottom  low  consumer  confidence, recorded during the 
economic crisis, subdued the growth in expenditure and shifted the spending patterns 
observed in the period of prosperity (Wrigley and Dolega, 2011). What seems to be 
almost an undisturbed trend is that consumers are still spending more of their income 
on  services  and  leisure.  It  is  often  associated  with  hedonic/fun  shopping  which 
provides  the  'unique  experience'  (Moeller  et  al.,  2009),  however  this  can  vary 
considerably  depending  on  the  type  of  consumer.  Another  important  change  in 
consumer lifestyle is the rapidly decreasing average household size. This has some 
implications to the retailers; in particular the rapid increase of single households and 
non-married  couples  indicates  a  growth  in  the  demand  for  household  appliances, 
residential services and convenience (Birkin et al., 2002). As all these changes vary for 
different types of consumers, the spatial aspect of consumer behaviour should not be 
underestimated. Understanding both overall changes in demand for retail spaces and 
goods and their spatial variations is the key aspect for a viable location of a new store.  
3.4.3  Demand and supply factors - location techniques 
Fundamental to the viability of a retail centre is right balance between the demand 
for retail goods and services created by local catchment and supply of retail/service 
spaces offered by the centre. From a retailer’s point of view, the assessment of a new 
location is based on two key factors: a) market factors, relating to the potential of a 
particular  location  in  attracting  consumers  and  therefore  enhancing  sales  and  b) 
operational factors, relating to the effort involved in opening and operating the store. 
In a somewhat simplified view, the former refer to the ability to generate income, and 
the latter refer to the costs involved  (Gonzalez-Benito and Gonzalez-Benito, 2005). 
Moreover, there is growing evidence that location of a store should also be assessed in 
relation to the location of other complementary facilities such as other retail stores, 
post offices, banks, libraries, leisure facilities etc. (Wood, 2010; Findlay and Sparks, 
2009). These complementary facilities are often associated with generating additional 
footfall partially explained by the mechanism of linked trips (Wrigley et al., 2009b), 
where consumers are likely to combine different destinations and purposes. Therefore 
it  could  be  argued  that  the  complementary  facilities  are  helpful  in  retaining  the   Chapter 3 
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expenditure within a particular retail centre which otherwise would have leaked to 
neighbouring  and  more  attractive  centres  that  simply  provided  those  facilities 
(Popkowski Leszczyc et al., 2004; Wrigley at al., 2009b). Besides, some shopping needs 
arise  when  consumers  are  far  from  their  residence,  during  leisure  time  or  at  the 
workplace. This is an important constituent of the so-called ‘convenience culture’ and 
has  become  one  of  the  key  factors  increasingly  considered  by  the  store  location 
analysts.  
The  attractiveness  of  a  retail  location  also  depends  on  the  location  of  the 
competitors. A location close to competitors may imply the overlapping of catchment 
areas and consequently, resulting in the so-called cannibalisation of a market share 
(Ingene & Lusch 1981).  
Another important demand and supply factor is the role of a hierarchy of retail 
centres.  Centres  towards  the  lower  end  of  the  scale  tend  to  cater  for  day-to-day 
purchases of regularly consumed items such as food, grocery or regularly consumed 
household items. Conversely, sub-regional and regional centres cater normally for a 
broader range of goods and services that encapsulate both food and non-food retail 
goods. They tend to be focussed on higher order discretionary purchases  including 
diverse household goods and clothing, bulky goods and leisure (Dennis et al, 2002). 
Essentially,  retail  location  decisions,  taking  into  account  factors  responsible  for 
creating  local  demand,  existing  supply  and  their  spatial  variations,  became  very 
complex. They can be managed at different levels of geographic aggregation: regional, 
sub-regional, metropolitan, intra-urban area or a specific site. Although there always 
will  be  an  element  of  intuition,  the  techniques  of  site  selection  have  become 
increasingly  complex.  Specifically,  the  large  food  retailers  have  developed  highly 
sophisticated and data rich-methods of store locations, which rely on a remarkably 
accurate  revenue  forecasting  (Birkin  et  al.,  2002).  Typically  such  approaches 
implement  detailed  geo-demographic  data  and  focus  on  modelling  the  extensive 
catchments of large stores, predominantly over 10,000 Sq Feet in size (Wood, 2006). 
The  main  techniques  of  store  location  and  forecasting  sales  used  by  the  large 
corporate  retailers  are  the  gravity  modelling  of  retail  expenditure,  analogue  store 
models and regression analyses (Benoit and Clarke, 1997).   Chapter 3 
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Gravity modelling and GIS techniques 
Gravitational  models  apply  the  Newtonian  laws  of  physics  to  the  modelling  of 
shopper behaviour based on the influence and the attractiveness of the store and the 
distance between the shopper’s home and the store. They provide an approximate 
store  trade  area  by  considering  the  spatial  distribution  of  all  locations,  including 
competitors, and evaluating each locations relative attractiveness (Rogers, 1984).  The 
probability of a consumer using a given store declines at an exponential rate as travel 
time or in other words distance increases. Initially, although this modelling technique 
was useable in theory it was far less successful in practice (Openshaw, 1973). However, 
the development of the information technology and in particular the advancement of 
Geographical Information Systems (GIS) has considerably improved the effectiveness 
of  this  method  (Wood,  2006).  The  spatial  representation  of  geo-demographic  and 
retail data provided by GIS is very powerful and based ‘on a crossing of digitalized 
cartography in addition to relational databases’ (Mendes and Themido, 2004, p. 14) 
allows  non-GIS  specialists  to  quickly  interpret  and  understand  complex  geo-
demographic patterns and trends.  
The implementation of GIS methodology has, for example, allowed site location 
analysts to base their models on ‘drivetime’ rather than simple Euclidean distance, 
which is likely to misrepresent the real world. Although GIS has become increasingly 
popular amongst retailers it needs to be pointed out that there are some limitations to 
that technique. Some of the main issues relate to defining the catchment areas and 
adequate treatment of the competitors (Birkin et al., 2002). In terms of the catchment 
areas, although the drivetime is more accurate than the straight line distance, there is 
an issue of giving equal weight to all households within the buffered zone, and equal 
costumer  drawing  power  in  all  directions.  What  it  means  in  practice,  is  that  the 
household  located  very  close  to  the  store  are  given  the  same  patronage  as  those 
located few miles away. In terms of the competitors within the catchment areas, it is 
very  challenging task  to  estimate  accurately  the  share  of  revenue for a  new  store 
without modelling of the complex spatial interactions in that catchment.   Chapter 3 
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Analogue stores approach 
The analogue store approach is a popular technique for site location in the UK. It is 
‘directly associated with the historical sales performances of existing stores’ (Drummey, 
1984,  p.  281)  and  utilised  to  forecast  the  potential  sales  and  results  of  spatial 
interaction models (Clarke et al., 2003). The technique evaluates the potential site ‘by 
drawing comparisons (or analogies) with other stores in the corporate chain that are 
alike in physical, locational and trade area circumstances’ (Birkin et al., 2002, p. 137). 
Typically, by using regression or descriptive analyses, it measures market share by 
distance from the store and is underpinned by data from food spend levels, loyalty 
cards or customer surveys (Rogers and Green, 1979). In addition to store location, this 
method is also used for store formatting. This is potentially an important decision, as 
similar size town centres or local centres may require different formats, depending on 
their  geo-demographic characteristics  (Birkin  et  al.,  2002).  The technique  is  largely 
dependent on the experience and judgment of a store location analyst but also the 
extent and variability of the store network is important. Wood (2006) pointed out that 
on the one hand a retailer with a few examples of a particular format in its portfolio 
may suffer from a lack of analogous stores from which to choose and on the other 
hand; a retailer with an extensive store base may encounter a difficult task of finding 
appropriate analogue stores. Another problem with this technique relates to the fact 
the  performance  of  similar  stores  with  comparable  geo-demographics  may  vary 
geographically  or  the  analogue  stores  may  over/under  perform  at  a  time  of  data 
collection. 
 
Regression modelling 
Another simple but robust technique for location assessment and estimating the 
demand for retail facilities is regression modelling. Both linear and logistic regressions 
are used to predict the revenue of a single store as well as the entire network (Birkin et 
al., 2002). In general, regression model establishes a number of independent variables 
that explain the variance in the dependent variable, which in the case of a retail store 
it  would  typically  be  the  turnover.  The  usual  independent  variables  include  geo-  Chapter 3 
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demographic data such as age profile, socio-economic status, market size related data 
or information on competition stores within the catchment area. Although regression 
analyses  are  more  objective  and  sophisticated  than  more  manual  analogue  store 
techniques Birkin et al. (2002) identify several weaknesses. Most important limitation 
pertains  to the  inability  of  regression  models to  handle  effectively  complex  spatial 
interactions  or  customer  flows.  They  simply  do  not  account  for  the  processes 
generating  the  footfall  or  are  responsible  for  customer  flows.  Another  important 
weakness they highlighted was that regression models evaluate sites in isolation with 
no  consideration  of  the  impacts  from  competitor  or  the  company’s  own  network 
stores. Finally, they pointed out the problem with a feature of the regression which 
assumes that the explanatory variables in the model are independent of each other 
and  uncorrelated.  When  modelling  a  store  turnover,  often  this  is  not  the  case  as 
several variables are more than likely to be correlated to an extent; the issue referred 
to as the multicollinearity (Ghosh and McLafferty, 1987). For instance, independent 
variables such as a floorspace and a number of car park spaces, although seemed to be 
physically  unrelated,  they  are  likely  to  be  correlated.  This  can  lead  to  unreliable 
estimates or serious misinterpretation of the results, which in effect may be linked to a 
limited  understanding  of  certain  catchment  areas,  depending  on  the  business 
experience of the location analyst. 
3.4.4  Available data sources 
Clearly, all the above methods are only as good as the data that they employ; 
therefore estimating the demand for retail and services facilities at different spatial 
and temporal levels is of an uppermost importance. Measuring the demand at a small 
Outputs Areas level provides the retailers with a number of benefits as the detailed 
data on neighbourhoods can be aggregated into a store or shopping centre catchment 
areas, or even the whole regions. Although the major retailers collect their own data, 
predominantly derived from the customers’ loyalty cards, Clarke and Rowley (1995, p. 
5)  claim  that they  must  ‘proactively  seek  strategies  which  allow  the  generation  of 
additional datasets which support effective monitoring of customer activity’. There are 
a  number  of  external  data  supplying  agencies  providing  geo-demographic  data   Chapter 3 
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including CACI (ACORN), Acxiom (Personcix) and Experian (MOSAIC) (Gonzalez-Benito 
and Gonzalez-Benito, 2005). This data typically provides consumer segmentation  in 
terms of lifestyle, family structure, age profile and income level and can be utilised in 
combination  with  data  from  the  Expenditure  &  Food  Survey  (EFS)  from  National 
Statistics, the National Census, NOMIS/employment statistics, dwelling stock figures, 
house price changes, business rates etc. (Wood, 2006). Ultimately, GIS techniques can 
be  used  as  a  platform  combining  some  or  all  the  above  sources  into    data  rich 
catchment  maps,  which  in  turn  are  crucial  to  ‘analysing  sites  based  on  drivetime, 
demographic  as  well  as  psychodemogaphic  variables,  competitive  information,  and 
customer information’ (Mendes and Themido, 2004, p. 14). In doing so, the use of GIS 
and  gravity  models  allows  more  precise  and  accurate decisions to be  made  which 
becomes  more  important  as  the  number  of  available  sites  reduces  and  those 
remaining are all the more marginal and complex (Byrom et al., 2001). 
 
Loyalty cards 
One of the most popular sources of information on consumer’s dynamics, which 
presents opportunities for understanding customer behaviour but is also beneficial to 
a decision making on site location, is the loyalty card (Wood, 2006; Ziliani and Bellini, 
2004). In essence, major retailers in return for some sort of discount are entitled to 
collect  valuable  data  on  their  customers  such  as,  favourite  items,  average  spend, 
frequency  of  shopping  etc.  Using  the  raw  data,  retail  analysts  can  determine 
consumer’s expenditure patterns, geographical discrepancies, as well as to analyse the 
shift in consumer behaviour. Wood (2006) pointed out that there a number of unique 
benefits loyalty card data provide to the retailers: a) it allows a precise understanding 
of customer lifestyles and their requirements e.g. decisions on product range within 
certain catchment, b) it permits a more comprehensive analysis of the competitors, 
store openings e.g. an assessment of an impact on sales cannibalisation and c) by 
utilising  GIS  techniques  they  allow  a  comprehensive  scope  of  ‘gaps’  in  the  store 
portfolio  and  subsequent  decision  to  supplement  with  additional  units.  The  main 
challenge with loyalty card information is to identify ‘data with meaning’ (Byrom et al.,   Chapter 3 
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2001, p. 221) and develop a more precise understanding of how current stores trade 
spatially and temporally (Wood, 2006).  
 
Geo-demographics data 
The  complex  information  on  consumer  characteristics  is  normally  provided  by 
specialist firms who implement the so-called geo-demographic segmentation. The geo-
demographic segmentation aims to capture the spatial heterogeneity of the market in 
a certain catchment area by classifying the characteristics of its residents (Gonzalez-
Benito and Gonzalez-Benito, 2005). It is also a tool indicating the shopping needs and 
habits  of  different  geographic  areas.  There  are  two  underlying  principles  of  that 
technique: a) similar residential areas have similar shopping needs and habits and, 
consequently, similar response patterns (Batey & Brown 1995; Birkin 1995) and b) 
individuals  with  similar  characteristics  tend  to  reside  in  the  same  areas  and  share 
similar  backgrounds  –  that  is  to  say,  residential  areas  tend  to  be  internally 
homogeneous so that their residents do not differ significantly from an average profile 
(Gonzalez-Benito and Gonzalez-Benito, 2005). 
The most prominent examples of the geodemographic data providers in the UK 
include  CACI  (ACORN)  and  Experian  (MOSAIC).  ACORN is  a  geo-demographic 
segmentation of the UK’s population at the small neighbourhoods’ level which offers 5 
major  categories,  17  smaller  groups  and 56  detailed  types.  Its  competitor  MOSAIC 
classifies the UK’s population into 11 Main Groups and 61 distinct types. 
Although  the  geo-demographic  data  has  many  strengths  such  us  high  quality 
(largely based on the census data), is easily understood, visualised and applied, it is not 
free  from  limitations.  Birkin  et  al.,  (2002)  list  a  number  of  such  weaknesses:  the 
unrealistic  assumption  that  all  individuals  within  certain  area  have  the  same 
characteristics,  not  taking  into  account  pastimes,  values  and  preferences  of  the 
population or the low frequency of census which goes easily out-of-date. 
 
Additional useful data 
Databases  have  grown  exponentially  over  past  two  decades  and  therefore  the 
demand for retail and services facilities can be estimated from all kind of sources other   Chapter 3 
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than census (Birkin et al., 2002). The most useful sources include Expenditure & Food 
Survey  (EFS) from  National  Statistics,  NOMIS/employment  statistics, data  on house 
price changes, business rates or rents.  
The EFS is an annual voluntary sample survey of private households which provides 
comprehensive information on daily expenditure for two weeks. In addition, detailed 
questions are asked about the income of each adult member of the household and 
personal  information  such  as  age,  sex  and  marital  status  is  recorded  for  each 
household member. Besides, information about regular expenditure, such as rent and 
mortgage payments, is obtained from a household interview along with backdated 
information  on  certain  large,  infrequent  expenditures  such  as  those  on  vehicles 
(Economic and Social Research Council, 2012).  
NOMIS provides official most detailed and up-to-date labour market statistics at 
various spatial levels including national, regional and neighbourhood. The data comes 
from a  variety  of  sources  including  the  Labour  Force  Survey  (LFS),  claimant  count, 
Business Register and Employment Survey (BRES), New Earnings Survey (NES), and the 
2011,  2001,  1991  and  1981  Censuses  of  Population.  There  are  two  main  ways  of 
viewing  the  data:  a)  the  labour  market  profile  at  the  Local  Authority  level,  which 
contains information on employment and unemployment rates, economic activity and 
inactivity,  employment  by  occupation,  qualifications  and  average  earnings;  and  b) 
detailed statistics at the Lower Super Output Area which provide access to the full 
range of data (Office for National Statistics, 2012). 
Data  on  house  price  changes  can  be  obtained  from  the  Land  Registry,  who 
generates on a monthly basis the House Price Index (HPI). By using their own dataset 
of completed sales they provide the most accurate independent house price index in 
the  UK.  The  HPI figure  compares  the  average  current  house  price  to  what  it  was 
in January 1995, with the index set then at 100.  In addition, Land Registry publishes on 
a monthly basis the average house price and it compares it to the data from previous 
year.  Both  HPI  and  average  house  price  figures  are  available  at  national,  regional, 
county and London borough level (Land Registry, 2012). 
Business rates are taxes charged on most non-domestic properties. In England and 
Wales business rates are worked out by multiplying the ‘rateable value’ of a property   Chapter 3 
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set by the  Valuation  Office  Agency  by  the  business  rates  multiplier,  set by  central 
government  (Gov.uk,  2012). In  order  to  reflect  changes  in  the  property  market  a 
revaluation takes place, usually every 5 years. Whilst the data on business rates can be 
obtained from local council it is much more difficult to get hold of systematic data on 
rents, which is unfortunately not freely available. Typically, rents vary geographically 
with regional and sub-regional variations being common but also it is recorded at the 
local micro-level scale e.g. the difference between primary and secondary shopping 
areas may be significant. Rents are substantial operating costs to the retailers and 
therefore, the level of local rents might shape the demand for retail facilities.  
3.4.5  Demand and supply issues considered by the study 
Following the 2008-09 economic crisis, the widespread decline of UK high streets 
reflected in increasing vacancy rates, became increasingly important in policy debates 
and attracted significant media attention. In these debates, the vitality and viability of 
UK high streets was viewed as driven predominantly by local supply factors: much of 
the government regulation related to the economic performance of UK town centres 
focuses  on  the  supply  side.  For  instance,  PPS6  (2005)  indicates  that  the  need  to 
promote town centre vitality and viability should be satisfied by enhancing consumer 
choice and the provision of a range of shops, leisure and local services that meet the 
needs  of  the  entire  communities  including  the  socially-excluded  groups.  Another 
supply factor promoted by the PPS6 includes accessibility, in particular improving the 
existing accessibility and ensuring that existing or new development is accessible and 
well-served by a choice of means of transport. And perhaps the most significant is the 
PPG6 (1996) which implemented a ‘town centre’ first approach to retail development 
and has been widely adopted by the large corporate retailers. 
However,  more  recently,  attention  has  been  drawn  to  the  importance  of  the 
consideration of consumer characteristics and the general role of demand in the study 
of high street performance. In particular, recent research (e.g. Experian, 2009b) has 
showed that the impact of the 2008-09 economic crisis varied spatially,  suggesting 
that the role of demand in the adjustment of UK high streets to the recession was most 
possibly underplayed. It could be argued that some areas, presumably due to their   Chapter 3 
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geodemographic  characteristics,  are  more  vulnerable  than  others.  Clearly,  the 
response of individual town centres to the 2008-09 economic crisis, is related to the 
pre-crisis characteristics of their immediate catchment areas and the extent to which 
the economic crisis impacted consumer spending power at local and regional scales. 
For instance, the temporal and financial implications of the crisis are felt differently by 
the catchment areas characterised by a large proportion of young professionals than 
those populated with elderly pensioners or low income families in deprived areas. In 
the regional context, the consequences of public spending cuts are believed to impact 
most severely the post-industrial areas suffering from a long-run decline and heavy 
dependence on public sector jobs (Hastings et al., 2012). 
Moreover, the economic crisis had the capacity to change some of the trends in 
demand for retail spaces. As the increasing retail sales recorded prior to the economic 
crisis,  were  mainly  related  to  an  increasingly  low  price  of  comparison  goods  such 
household  items,  clothing  and  furniture and  leisure  services  (Anagboso,  2009),  the 
increased  demand  for  these types of  goods  was  satisfied by  rapidly  growing  retail 
space in UK town centres. In 2008-09, presumably due to the property market crush 
and  the  declining  disposable  income,  household  goods  stores  became  the  largest 
contributor  to  the  downward  trend  observed  in  non-food  stores  sales  (Anagboso, 
2009) and as  a result, the demand for retail spaces declined and many stores had to 
close  increasing  vacancy  rates.  In  addition,  the  economic  crisis  has  increased  the 
demand for ‘good value’ products which paved the way for rapidly increasing online 
sales. Nevertheless, it is clear that the economic performance of UK town centres is to 
a  large  extent  determined  by  a  mix  of  demand  and  supply  factors  of  particular 
catchment areas and their broader hinterlands. What is unclear however, is the role 
which  geodemographics  and  other  demand  factors  play  in  that  performance  as 
opposed to the supply factors.  
This  study  attempts  to  consider  both  demand  and  supply  factors  in  order  to 
investigate  changes  in  UK  high  streets  configuration  during  economic  crisis  and 
austerity. In the above context it could be argued that both types of factors play a 
considerable role in sustaining town centre vitality and viability and therefore they can 
be associated with enhanced resilience or fragility of retail centres to the competitive   Chapter 3 
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and  economic  shocks.  The  interesting  question  here  however  is  to  what  extent 
demand factors as opposed to supply, can explain the differential adjustment of UK 
high streets and town centres to the economic crisis and austerity. By using both types 
of variables, those that quantify demand and provide proxies for supply factors, this 
thesis aims to answer this research question.  
Nevertheless, this study tends to evaluate in more detail the supply factors which 
are ‘controlling’ tools for both policy makers and local authorities. The nature and 
design of the study aim to enhance the available empirical basis on the instruments 
available to the policy makers involved in the Revitalising the High Street initiative. 
Therefore the complex relationship between various supply factors which have the 
capacity to impact the performance of UK high streets, are of a particular interest to 
this study. The multivariate models analysing that performance consider in particular 
the role of mix and interdependencies of local businesses, physical structure of retail 
centres and institutional support.  
Recognising the importance of demand factors, the study employs a set of socio-
economic indicators to assess the performance of retail centres. However, given the 
fact that MOSAIC and Census 2001 data contain outdated information, the outcome is 
likely  to  be  affected.    Importantly,  none  of  these  data  sources  portray  the  recent 
changes in the demand for retail spaces, those related to the crisis. Therefore it has to 
be acknowledged that the study could benefit from an inclusion of other up to date 
statistics  such  local  employment  data  or  house  price  changes.  Increasing 
unemployment and falling house prices can depress consumer confidence (BRC, 2009) 
and disposable income elasticity  (Meen 2001) so in consequence these factors are 
more likely to depict the recent variability in consumer spending. The inability to use 
these  factors,  due to  the  complexity  of  spatial  hierarchy  of  the  sample  catchment 
areas, should be perceived as a limitation to this study.    Chapter 4 
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  Study design and methodological issues  Chapter 4:
This chapter outlines the study design, data availability and methodology used by 
the research; moreover it discusses the preferred approach adopted to achieve the 
objectives as well as the limitations to the study. It begins with the design aspects such 
as time series of Goad surveys, differential performance of UK high streets and town 
centres and their complex adjustment to the shock of economic crisis. Then it moves 
onto the data availability, characteristics and spatial distribution of the cross-regional 
sample and in addition, this chapter provides the details on other secondary data used 
in  the  study.  Furthermore,  it  explains  the  measures  used  to  depict  town  centre 
performance and provides the explanatory data analysis. Then Chapter 4 considers the 
employed  methods  and  positions  them  against  other  similar  studies.  Finally,  this 
chapter elaborates on a number of methodological issues and uncertainties, which had 
to be considered throughout the study. 
4.1  Study design 
This  study  is  part  of  a  broader  research  programme  at  the  University  of 
Southampton focusing on the consequences of a decade long tightening in UK retail 
planning  regulation.  As  some  of  the  data  sample  came  from  the  period  that 
immediately followed the steep plunge in consumer confidence, it was not entirely 
clear  how  the  2008-09  global  economic  crisis  affected  the  obtained  results.  The 
opportunity  arose  with  ESRC  RIBEN  support  -  to  design  a  study  depicting  the 
differential performance of UK high streets and town centres as they adjusted to the 
onset of economic crisis. Essentially, the main task involved comparison of town centre 
configurations in two consecutive periods: a) the immediate pre-crisis period (2006-07) 
and b) the period which followed the steep plunge in UK consumer confidence (2008-
09), as shown in Figure 4.1. Such comparison has facilitated a thorough assessment of 
the  changes  that  occurred  to  the  occupancy  rates  in  each  retail/service  category, 
including vacant retail outlets.    Chapter 4 
68 
 
Consumer confidence began to weaken in the summer of 2007 and the contraction 
continued through  rising  global  commodity prices  and falling property  prices  (BRC, 
2009). Figure 4.1 shows that following the steep fall recorded during late 2007 and the 
first half of 2008, the CCI began a steady rise throughout late 2008 and 2009, showing 
the expectation of a quick recovery. However, Consumer Confidence started to decline 
for the second time in December 2009 demonstrating signs of a rather shallow and 
weak recovery. 
 
Figure 4.1: UK consumer confidence index 2002-09 showing the periods in which pre-
crisis and within-crisis surveys took place 
 
 
Given that the consumer confidence index is a leading indicator, it was not until Q4 
2008-09 that the effects of the economic crisis began to be felt most strongly by UK 
high  streets  and  town centres.  This  is  to  say  that  a time  lag  of  a  minimum  of  12 
months, measured from the time that the CCI had begun to fall, was applied to ensure 
that the impacts of the economic crisis have been strongly reflected in the data. In 
addition to the adjustment of UK high streets to the onset of economic crisis, this 
study has investigated the speed and extent of the recovery and has also made an 
attempt to assess the degree of the reorientation process by using a ‘third wave’ post-
recession shallow recovery period data. Although such data were available only for 
some centres, the intra-urban analysis has offered a great potential to broaden our 
understanding of  UK  high  streets’  resilience;  in  particular,  we  used the  concept  of 
adaptive  resilience  which  focuses  on  a  dynamic  and  evolutionary  process  through 
which retail centres gradually change and benefit from the new configurations.    Chapter 4 
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4.1.1  Goad plans and Goad surveys 
The study relied on retail composition information drawn from the detailed and 
long-established Goad/Experian surveys - a data source which has increasingly been 
used to provide vital evidence-based research for UK regulatory enquiries and policy 
debate. The Competition Commission (2008, A5(1) 8-18) and Wrigley et al., (2009a, 
p.2066) discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the Goad/Experian data; however, 
importantly,  the  Competition  Commission  (2008,  A5(2)  -9)  has  publicly  expressed 
confidence in the quality of the data. The Goad/Experian retail survey data provides 
detailed maps and the associated databases for over 2,300 retail centres in the UK. 
Essentially each retail unit in a centre is mapped onsite by Experian surveyors, and 
retail occupancy information on the fascia of the occupying retailer/service provider, 
their retail/service category, and the floor space of the unit is collected. An example of 
such data-driven mapping, portraying a Goad Plan for Swinton town centre, is shown 
in  Figure  4.2.  All  outlets  have  been  divided  into  broad  retail/service  types  which 
include comparison retail, convenience retail, retail services, leisure services, business 
& financial services, health & medical services, non-retail and vacant units. The broad 
retail/service  types  are  subdivided  by  Goad  further  into  smaller  categories,  e.g. 
convenience retail comprises butchers, bakers, convenience stores, supermarkets and 
so on. For the entire list of Goad Subclasses and categories, see Appendix 1. The initial 
surveys and maps date back to the mid-1960s when Charles Goad’s company started 
the Goad town centre plans and databases at the request of the then Department of 
Trade and Industry. Since then, the coverage of retail centres has been progressively 
extended over time, both geographically and to include smaller centres.  Currently, the 
top 500 ‘ranked’ retail centres in the UK are surveyed on an annual basis with the 
remainder being surveyed every two years. The longitudinal richness of the available 
data on large numbers of centres has resulted in increasing use of the information 
outside the retail and property industries. Nevertheless, there are some limitations of 
using  Goad  data  too,  such  as  already  discussed  irregular  frequency  of  undertaken 
surveys,  alterations  to  classification  of  retail  categories  or  the  issue  of  constantly 
evolving boundaries of retail centres proved to be at times problematic. These issues 
however will be discussed in more detail later on in this chapter.    Chapter 4 
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Figure 4.2: Swinton town centre Goad plan by Sub class 
 
4.1.2  Available data  
Initially, there were more than 360 retail centres across four UK regions that had 
their Goad surveys completed in either the pre-crisis or within-crisis period. However, 
only 267 town centres/high streets had their surveys completed in both those periods, 
providing necessary data to assess the differential performance of retail centres as 
they adjusted to the economic crisis. Most of the pre-crisis surveys (218 centres) were 
conducted in 2006 surveys and most of the within-crisis surveys (238 centres) were 
carried out in 2009. A genuine effort to have consistent survey dates in each respective 
period has been made, however this was not always possible as some centres had 
their surveys completed less frequently than others. Table 4.1 shows that the pre-crisis 
sample  had  to  be  supplemented  with  surveys  from  2007  and  in  addition  a  small 
number of surveys came from the second half of 2005. In turn, surveys from Q4 2008 
and January 2010 have been added to the within-crisis sample. At this stage, it needs 
to be acknowledged that such study design, resulting purely from the data availability, 
had some limitations. Although it could be argued that vast majority of surveys (more   Chapter 4 
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than 80%) came from the consistent periods of 2006 and 2009, the remaining data 
could potentially cause some issues. 
 
Table 4.1: Goad surveys - availability and distribution across the sample 
Pre-crisis  Within-crisis  Shallow-recovery 
Year  No of centres  Year  No of centres  Year 
No of centres 
2005  10  Q4 2008  27  2010 
47 
2006  218  2009  238 
    2007  39  Jan-2010  2 
     
In particular, the small subsample of surveys coming from years other than 2006 or 
2009 could create some inconsistencies and ambiguities in the observed responses of 
UK high streets to the shock of economic crisis. The main concern was that the unequal 
gaps  in  applied  time  lags  were  likely  to  depict  different  stages  of  the  economic 
downturn  reflected  by  differential  impacts  on  UK  high  streets.  For  instance,  as 
Woolworths ceased trading at the end of 2008 – which was during the within-crisis 
survey - there was a discrepancy in recording those stores by the Goad survey. The 
surveys completed in Q4 2008 recorded the Woolworth’s department stores as trading 
units, whilst the surveys completed in 2009 categorised - by then already unoccupied 
stores - as vacant units. However, given the size of the sample and the evolving nature 
of town centres some degree of uncertainty was unavoidable; therefore the preferred 
approach  involved  monitoring  of  such  cases  and  undertaking  some  precautionary 
measures if necessary. 
4.1.3  Spatial distribution of the dataset  
The 267 centres/high streets (shown in Figure 4.3) were divided into two groups– a 
‘southern’ group of 150 centres (119 located in the South West and 31 in East Anglia) 
and a ‘northern’ group of 117 centres (93 in the North West and 24 in West Yorkshire).  
The southern subsample comprised one large urban area – Bristol and several mid-
sized  cities  such  as  Bournemouth,  Exeter,  Gloucester,  Norwich  and  Cambridge, 
however  the  market  towns,  scattered  across  rural  areas,  were  undoubtedly 
predominant.  
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Figure 4.3: Location and type of 4-region sample of centres/high streets by type 
 
 
The South West sample not only had the largest number of centres but has also 
covered the greatest area extending from Penzance in Cornwall to Bournemouth on 
the south coast and Tewkesbury in Gloucestershire. Importantly, a large part of SW 
data came from Bristol where 47 high streets had their surveys completed in all three 
analysed  periods.  The  sample  from  East  Anglia  was  rather  small,  predominantly 
comprising market towns and smaller retail centres. In contrast, retail centres from the 
northern  sample  were  concentrated  around  few  large  urban  areas  including 
Manchester, Liverpool and Leeds, thus occupying significantly smaller and primarily 
urban area. The North West and West Yorkshire samples were situated very close to 
each  other,  with  no  apparent  geographical  split,  however  their  dynamics  were 
somewhat different.   Chapter 4 
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The choice of data represented a pragmatic ‘least cost’ supplementation of Goad 
surveys to  which  University  of  Southampton had  access  as  a  part  of on-going  and 
larger industry-funded research project (see Wrigley et al, 2010, Ch 14). Nevertheless, 
despite the pragmatic and constrained nature of its design, the sample offered good 
representation across centre size and retail hierarchy. All types of retail centres, as 
defined in PPS4, including city, town, district and local centres were represented in the 
dataset rather well. Although the urban/rural and South/North spectrum, displaying 
distinguished underlying dynamics, were captured relatively well (see Dorling 2010), it 
was not a sample that was sufficiently large or spatially structured to be representative 
of the whole UK. Significantly, it excluded London, where different retail and service 
growth patterns had been found in the first half of the 2000s by both the Competition 
Commission (2007) and the University of Southampton research group (Wrigley, 2007; 
Wrigley et al, 2009a). In consequence, the adjustment of London retail centres to the 
economic  shock  would  display  a  somewhat  different  propensity  than  both  the 
Southern and the Northern subsamples.  For instance, London enjoyed significantly 
lower vacancy rates in both the pre-crisis and the within-crisis periods, which was 
reported by various commercial consultancies such as LDC or Colliers CRE. 
4.1.4  Other data employed by the study 
This study has also used a number of other supplementary sources of data such as 
Experian Mosaic, consumer classification, Census data, IMD2007, detailed data on UK 
supermarkets,  Venuescore  retail hierarchy  and Bristol  retail  surveys.  These  reliable 
sources of secondary qualitative and quantitative data have complemented the Goad 
surveys by providing specific and valuable information on UK high streets and town 
centres. 
Experian’s Mosaic  
The Mosaic UK consumer classification comes from Experian and provides accurate 
understanding  of  the  demographics,  lifestyles  and  behaviour  of  all  individuals  and 
households in the UK. Most of the information used to build Mosaic UK, some 62 %, is 
sourced  from  Experian’s  Consumer  Dynamics  Database,  which  provides  consumer 
demographic information for the UK’s 47 million adults and 24 million households. This   Chapter 4 
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database includes edited Electoral Roll, Council Tax property valuations, house sale 
prices and lifestyle surveys. The remaining 38 per cent of the data come from Census 
estimates  for  2009,  which  is  an  accurate  and  up-to-date  measure  of  the  key 
demographic characteristics of local areas that have taken place since the 2001 Census 
(Experian, 2009a). This study has implemented the 2009 version of Mosaic UK mainly 
used  to  extract  some  demographical  variables  which  were  utilised  to  explain  the 
variance in vacancy rate changes. In particular, the up-to-date estimates of affluence in 
each high street catchment area were beneficial to the statistical modelling stage.  
Index of Multiple Deprivation 2007 
The Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) from 2007, which effectively is a measure 
of a multiple deprivation at small area level, is an updated version of the IMD 2004. It  
contains  seven  components,  referred  to  as  domains,  which  relate  to  income 
deprivation,  employment  deprivation,  health  deprivation  and  disability,  education 
skills  and  training  deprivation, barriers  to  housing  and  services,  living environment 
deprivation, and crime (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2007). 
Each  domain  consists  of  a  number  of  ONS  measures  that  aim  at  capturing  the 
proportion of the population experiencing some sort of deprivation in the area. For 
instance, income deprivation, which was employed by our model to explain the change 
in Bristol’s vacancy rate, comprised numerous components:   adults and children on 
Income  Support,  adults  and  children  in  Income-Based  JSA  Households,  adults  and 
children in Pension Credit (Guarantee) Households and so on.  
Various elements of IMD 2007 were tested in the multivariate modelling but the 
most significant proved to be the income deprivation, used by this study as a proxy of 
affluence for the intra-urban analysis. Each high street and town centre had a 500m 
buffer created around and the average scores for the relevant lower super output 
areas have been calculated.  Although it might be argued that the 500 m buffer depicts 
the  dynamics  of  a  rather  small  catchment  area,  this  can  be  justified  by  the  large 
density  of  Bristol’s  retail  centres  and  the  very  specific  and  fragmented  picture  of 
deprivation  within  the  city.  Moreover,  it  was  believed  that  such  an  approach  has 
resulted in providing the best possible proxy which depicts the average values in a 
consistent way.   Chapter 4 
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Corporate foodstore data  
Tesco  has  provided  the  detailed  and  up  to  date  information  on  all  corporate 
foodstores’ entry/presence in the UK. It has provided systematic data on all existing 
grocery  stores  including  the  information  on  facia,  holding  company,  store  format, 
opening date, floorspace area and the exact location. Indeed, this was a particularly 
valuable  source  of  data  and  has  been  used  extensively,  especially  to  establish  all 
edge/out-of  town  foodstores  present  in  different  periods,  as  Goad  only  covers  in-
town-centre locations. Figure 4.4 shows the GIS buffer method that was applied to 
define the edge/out-of-town centre supermarkets. It can be seen that in this particular 
high street there were two supermarkets including Aldi and Netto located in-town 
centre. Additionally, Figure 4.4 shows that there was a Morrison superstore located on 
the edge-of-town centre, which has not been accounted for by the Goad survey. 
 
Figure 4.4: Criteria used to define in/edge/out-town centre corporate foodstores 
 
 
The criteria used to define edge-of-town developments applied a 400m buffer zone 
from the primary shopping area, which is a distance of a convenient five-minute walk. 
The outer blue layer, defining out-of-town centre developments, used an 800m buffer 
and accounted for large supermarkets of more than 15,000 Sq Ft only. Although in this   Chapter 4 
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case no such foodstore was present, it was generally believed that only large out-of-
centre stores would have significant impact on a nearby high street or town centre, so 
for that reason the small and medium stores were omitted. 
Venuescore 
Venuescore is an annual survey compiled by Javelin Group, which ranks the UK's 
top  2,000  retail  venues  including  town  centres,  stand-alone  malls,  retail  parks  and 
factory outlet centres. These rankings are widely used by retailers, developers, local 
authorities  and  various  consultancies  as  they  provide  straightforward  tools  for 
understanding some of the key differences between shopping venues, such as scale of 
offer, market positioning, fashionability and age positioning (Javelin Group, 2011). This 
study has employed the results of its 2009 survey, which again was supplied by Tesco’s 
research unit. In addition, in order to enable a more comprehensive understanding of 
UK high street performance, those Venuescores were used to create an explanatory 
variable referred to as ‘centre hierarchy’. However, the final model did not retain this 
ordinal independent variable, mainly because it had omitted a number of the smallest 
centres and has been found to interact with the ‘centre size’ variable.  
Bristol retail surveys 
Further useful source of secondary data, widely used by our study, included the 
Bristol citywide retail study which was commissioned by Bristol City Council.  It has 
provided  comprehensive  insights  into  the  1500  household  and  2000  local  shopper 
surveys as well as the retail centres health check analyses carried out in 2006 (DTZ, 
2007). The surveys have been a respected source of qualitative data on catchment 
area demographics, perceptions and habits of Bristol shoppers providing such valuable 
information as reasons and frequencies of visits to the main high streets, mode of 
transport and opinions on a particular centre’s strengths and weaknesses. Importantly, 
the health  check  study contains  detailed  Goad plans  for  each  Bristol  retail  centre, 
which were very useful in establishing the alterations to their configurations. On the 
other  hand,  Bristol  retail  health  check  analyses  were  used  to  construct  some 
explanatory variables, especially those that depicted the qualitative aspects of each   Chapter 4 
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high street such as the shopping environment quality, ease of parking, perception of 
safety and occurrence of crime. 
4.2  Methodology – triangulated approach  
To  depict  the  differential  performance  of  UK  high  streets  and  town  centres 
between the pre-crisis, within-crisis periods as well as to establish their trajectories in 
the era of austerity, this study has employed a wide range of computing tools and 
quantitative  techniques  such  as  GIS,  spatial  and  multivariate  analyses.  Adequate 
selection of methods and validation processes were carefully considered at each stage 
of the study. Crucially, these two issues are strictly interlinked as validation processes 
are very useful tools to determine which methods to employ, as well as when and how 
to employ them (Frey and Dym, 2006). One of the validation methods adopted by this 
study was triangulation which cross verified the data and computed results against 
other sources and studies such as Colliers CRE and Local Data Company (LDC). Such a 
method, defined by O’Donoghue and Punch (2003) as a process 'of cross-checking data 
from  multiple  sources  to  search  for  regularities  in  the  research  data'  is  commonly 
applied in economic geography and according to Altrichter et al., (2008) it provides a 
more detailed and balanced picture of the situation. The analysis of UK high streets 
and town centres’ adjustment to the economic crisis proved to be a multidimensional 
and very complex one, thus adopting different but consistent measures of change in 
their configurations, experienced between the analysed periods, was essential.  
4.2.1  Measures 
Two separate measures for each retail or service type in the 267 town centres/high 
streets  sample,  of  change  between  the  ‘pre-crisis’  and  ‘within-crisis’  (subsequently 
referred to as ‘recession’) surveys were calculated: 
(a) The  first,  measure  M1,  was  the  relative  change  in  retail/service  units  of  a 
particular type in the centre/high street. That was computed as the difference 
between  unit  numbers  recorded  in  the  two  Goad  surveys  (‘pre-crisis’  and 
‘within-crisis’), relative to the ‘pre-crisis’ numbers as a base.   Chapter 4 
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(b) The  second  measure,  M2,  was  the  simple  absolute  percentage-points  (pp) 
increase/decrease  recorded  between  the  two  surveys  in  the  percentage  of 
retail/service units of a particular type in a centre/high street. 
Importantly, both measures help to understand the magnitude of UK high streets 
configurations changes at both regional and individual town centre levels and although 
each measure depicts different propensities of that change, they both had strengths 
and weaknesses. For instance, in the case of M1, low pre-crisis base figures recorded 
for a particular retail/service type in a centre has the capacity to produce high and 
unstable  values.  This  was  clearly  evident  at  the  level of  an  individual  retail  centre 
where a very small number of additional vacant units recorded in the within-crisis 
survey could easily generate a 100% increase in M1, specifically when the pre-crisis 
base was very small. However, it was  a very useful measure at the regional level, 
especially when visualising the differential performance of a particular retail category. 
Conversely,  M2  which  measures  the  absolute  change  as  a  percentage  of  each 
retail/service type is controlled by size and therefore more stable. However, it can 
occasionally produce somewhat misleading results e.g. in the case of the intra-urban 
sample, where the overall number of comparison retail went up by 20 units between 
the pre-crisis and within-crisis surveys, the respective M2 recorded negative value. This 
normally happens when the increase in a town centre total numbers of retail/service 
units, calculated for the analysed periods, is higher than the increase in a particular 
retail type or category. 
4.2.2  Descriptive analyses 
Both  measures,  relative  (M1)  and  absolute  (M2),  have  played  a  crucial  role  in 
obtaining our descriptive results. They have provided comprehensive insights not only 
into the response of UK high streets to the onset of global economic crisis but also 
have  facilitated  the  empirical  assessment  of  other  powerful  and  interlinked  forces 
reshaping  their  configurations.  Additionally,  by  utilising  ‘third  wave  data’,  changes 
between  the  within-crisis  and  post-recession  shallow  recovery  periods  have  been 
examined. This however, due to the ‘third wave’ data availability, was only feasible for 
the single urban area - Bristol.    Chapter 4 
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It needs to be highlighted that to derive the descriptive results for the overall cross-
regional changes recorded in each retail/service type, a methodology considering the 
two-tier Goad classification was employed. First, the descriptive analysis investigated 
the  change  in  broad  retail/service  types,  referred  to  as  the  ‘Goad  subclasses’  i.e. 
comparison, convenience, retail services, leisure services, financial services or vacant 
retail.  In  broad  terms,  comparison  retail  can  be  defined  as  non-food  units  and 
convenience  retail  comprises  essentially  the  food  related  outlets.  Occasionally 
however, this simple divide can be blurred, especially in the case of some mix-retail 
superstores  such  as  M&S,  Tesco,  Asda  etc.  which  often  sell  both  types  of  goods. 
Second, the descriptive analysis has also accounted for more detailed retail/service 
categories - in other words the components of the broad retail types described above. 
Interestingly, the implementation of the two-tier approach to the retail/service types 
has revealed the truly complex nature of the change in UK high streets’ configurations. 
Often the performance of the detailed retail/service subcategories contrasted sharply 
with  the  trends  exhibited  by  the  broad  category  they  were  part  of.  For  instance, 
comparison retail as a whole recorded large decline in the overall number of outlets, 
however some of its components such as phones & accessories or charity shops have 
recorded substantial increases.  
Further,  vacancy  rates  -  the  most  commonly  used  indicators  of  the  impact  of 
economic crisis ‘shock’ on UK town centres/high streets - have been calculated in a 
slightly different way than the remaining retail/service categories. As vacant retail did 
not contain any sub-components in Goad surveys it was more important to consider its 
variations for different spatial levels: a) the overall regional vacancy rates changes and 
b) the changes at the level of individual high streets/town centres. The former was 
primarily used in the descriptive analysis and the latter was adopted as the response 
variable in the multivariate modelling.  
The importance of descriptive analysis should not be undermined as it had the 
capacity to depict the type of retail/service that had been affected most adversely by 
the economic crisis and other forces of concern. Furthermore, the descriptive results 
have provided much needed empirical evidence on the adjustment of UK high street to 
the onset of economic crisis, against which: a) further statistical modelling could be   Chapter 4 
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positioned and evaluated, b) the results of other commercial consultancies such as LDC 
or Collier CRE could be assessed and c) the claims raised by the media and press could 
be validated and verified. 
4.2.3  Exploratory Data Analysis and GIS 
The additional techniques of data interrogation implemented by this study included 
exploratory  data  analysis  (EDA)  and  geographical  information  systems  (GIS).  The 
simplest form of EDA involves computation of basic statistical summaries of analysed 
data  using  various  graphical  tools  such  as  histograms,  pie  charts,  box  plots and/or 
scatter plots. Although none of the EDA tools provide an explicitly spatial perspective 
on the data, the implementation of powerful GIS techniques provides a dynamic link to 
a  map  and  tabular  views  of  the  data  (De  Smith  at  al.,  2007).  Nevertheless,  both 
techniques are essential to exploit the data in sufficient detail and crucially, they have 
the capacity to depict key characteristics of the analysed sample. The EDA provides 
initial exploration, understanding and the ‘feel’ for the examined data primarily by 
determining  underlying  patterns  and  establishing  underlying  trends.  One  of  the 
simplest  examinations may  involve  testing  for  normality of  the data and  detecting 
outliers that might affect final results. For instance, Figure 4.5 shows the histograms of 
the ‘pre-crisis centre size’ variable, used the multivariate modelling. The graph on the 
left  hand  side,  showing  the  ‘raw’  centre  size  data,  is  positively  skewed,  and  thus 
indicates a data which are not normally distributed and require a transformation. After 
applying  a  log  transformation,  the  graph  on  the  right  hand  side  appears  to  have 
reasonably  regular  ‘bell’  shape,  confirming  the  normality  of  the  transformed  data. 
Moreover, EDA often focuses on possible outlier detection at an early stage of  the 
analysis.  Outliers  are  spatial  objects  whose  values  on  one  or  more  attributes  are 
significantly different from others in the examined dataset (De Smith at al., 2007). The 
questioned data may be correct, but it may be the result of some form of an error in 
measurement, coding, representation etc. Therefore, such data need to be examined 
closely  and  the  outliers  adjusted  or  even  removed.  There  are  various  methods  to 
detect  outliers;  however,  one  of  the  simplest  and  most  effective is  to  create  a 
histogram  of  the  data  using  fine  division.  As  Figure  4.6  shows,  the  histogram  of   Chapter 4 
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vacancy  rate  change  in  our  four-region  sample  indicates  the  presence  of  several 
possible outliers.  
 
Figure 4.5: Histograms of ‘centre-size’ data pre and after log transformation 
 
 
 
The examination of the variable reveals five retail centres with extremely high or 
low values, those of +/-15pp of change in vacancy rate, due to a number of reasons. In 
such cases it is important to investigate the reasons responsible for a particular retail 
centres under/over performance. Closer inspection confirms that two of those centres 
performed  exceptionally  well  namely,  Rothwell  and  Cambourne.  The  former  had 
undergone an extensive regeneration programme between the pre-crisis and within-
crisis surveys and as a result, 17 retail/service units, of which 11 were recorded as 
vacant  in  the  pre-crisis  period,  became  redundant,  decreasing  the  vacancy  rate 
dramatically by -15pp. The latter centre appears to have performed genuinely well 
between the pre-crisis and within-crisis surveys, filling three of the four vacant outlets, 
which coupled with an exceptionally small size of the centre, used as a base, produced 
a  colossal  (-16pp)  decrease  in  vacancy  rate.  In  contrast,  the  three  centres  that 
observed extremely large increases in vacancy rates included Manchester Openshaw, 
Bristol Lawrence Hill and Bristol Arnside Road. The Manchester centre was undergoing 
a transition when the within-crisis survey was carried out; planning permission has 
been granted for a mall, and offices anchored by a large Morrisons store. In effect, 
large part of the town centre, comprising more than 30 outlets, had to be demolished,   Chapter 4 
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causing  existing  businesses  to  close  down  which  resulted  in  a  massive  rise  of  the 
vacancy rate by +19pp. The two tertiary Bristol retail centres were both extremely 
small and appeared to have been adversely affected by the economic crisis; however 
the  small  base  issue  once  again  has  exacerbated  the  magnitude  of  the  recorded 
increases in vacancy rates. Finally, although the causes of high vacancy rate changes 
which  have  occurred  in  those  five  retail  centres  have  been  diverse,  two  of  those 
centres  could  potentially  be  named  as  outliers.  Nevertheless,  none  of  those  retail 
centres was deleted at that stage, as more verification was needed at the modelling 
stage.  
 
Figure 4.6: Histogram of vacancy rate change clearly indicating presence of several 
outliers 
 
 
 
GIS  has  a  variety  of  definitions  from  being  a  digital  map  with  an  associated 
database  to  a  tool  for  displaying  geographical  information  and  revealing  what  is 
otherwise  invisible  in  geographic  information  (Longley  at el.,  2005). This  study  has 
utilised  various  GIS  techniques,  in  particular  to  provide  a  valuable  visual  data 
exploration tool to enable spatial queries and derive new binary variables. GIS has also 
been used to map various dynamics of UK high streets such as centre size, retail mix or 
deprivation levels; which was useful in depicting their spatial variation. Further, the   Chapter 4 
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obtainment of variables such as levels of deprivation, affluence etc. for the immediate 
town centre catchment areas, was only possible due to the implementation of GIS 
techniques. Even more importantly, GIS techniques have been applied to execute a 
number  of  spatial  queries  such  as  resolving  the  issue  of  constantly  evolving  town 
centre boundaries  or  differentiating between  policy-compliant  in/edge-of-town  and 
out-of-town supermarkets’ presence/entry. Additionally, without GIS it would not be 
possible to determine the distances between larger regional centres and the centres 
towards the lower end of retail hierarchy. The latter, positioned in hinterlands of the 
regional retail centres, often experienced leakage of expenditure raising the question 
of  whether  there  was  a  significant  relationship  between  the  distance  from  large 
centres  and  their  economic  performance.  Finally,  GIS  techniques  have  provided  a 
platform for a complex spatial analysis of both the dependent variable values and the 
regression model residuals allowing the examination of their spatial dependence and 
establishing potential trends and relationships. 
4.2.4  Multivariate analyses 
Multivariate  analyses  offer  various  ways  of  exploring  variance  in  the  response 
variable, which in the case of this study was the vacancy rate change between the pre-
crisis and within-crisis and post-recession shallow recovery periods.  These types of 
analyses provide compelling statistical evidence  supporting investigated hypotheses 
and are normally used to identify significant coefficients that can explain the variation 
in the response variable (Belsley et al., 1980; Henderson and Velleman, 1981; Wrigley, 
1983) and might help to reveal underlying spatial patterns (Bailey and Gatrell, 1995).  
This  study  has  utilised  several  multivariate  techniques  such  as  principal 
components, cluster analyses and various types of regression modelling.  One of the 
most powerful techniques reducing the number of derived variables and one which, at 
the same time, preserves most of the variance is the principal components analysis. It 
makes redundant those variables that are correlated with each other by producing a 
smaller  set  of  ‘artificial  variables’  called  principal  components  (Abdi  and  Williams, 
2010). To calculate principal components that explain the variance in the vacancy rate 
change standardized variables were used as the original covariates were very diverse   Chapter 4 
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and their original values were set at multiple scales. The other multivariate technique 
employed by this study was the cluster analysis, which by using Ward method and K-
means  optimisation,  has  indicated  the  presence  of  three  main  clusters  within  our 
cross-regional  dataset.  In  order  to  enable  the  interpretation  of  both  principal 
components and cluster analyses results, they were plotted on loading and scatter 
plots respectively, and then mapped.  Such method helps to compare derived scores 
against each other and establish possible correlations with the dependent variable. 
However, one of the most commonly used multivariate methods is the multiple 
regression analysis. This method specifically helps one to understand the relationships 
between the dependent variable changes and any of the independent variables, while 
the  other  independent  variables  are  held  constant.  The  key  purpose  of  using  a 
multivariate regression analysis by this study was twofold. First, to explain the variance 
in vacancy rate changes between the pre-crisis and within-crisis periods amongst the 
four-region  sample  of  267  high  streets.  Regression  analysis  was  a  vital  tool 
implemented to establish what caused the change in vacancy rate from a range of 
possible factors Second, to establish the significance of cross-regional results when 
taking  into  consideration  both  single  urban  area  and  the  post-recession  shallow 
recovery period.  This study has initially employed more than one type of regression 
modelling; however, the final and most robust model used the ordinary least squares 
(OLS)  linear  regression.  The  OLS  model  is  used  when  the  residuals  are  not 
autocorrelated; otherwise, the spatial models have to be run. This is normally verified 
by mapping the residuals on Moran’s I scatter plot where the autocorrelation can be 
easily determined.  Nevertheless, there was no spatial autocorrelation present in the 
cross-regional sample, therefore spatial lag or spatial error models were not required. 
Quantitative models normally rely on assumptions about the way the world works, and 
regression models are no exception. There are four key assumptions that justify the 
use of linear regression models for the purpose of prediction (Duke University, 2011):  
  linearity of the relationship between dependent and independent variables  
  independence of the errors (no serial correlation)  
  constant variance of the errors (homoscedasticity) 
  normality of the error distribution.    Chapter 4 
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If  any  of  these  assumptions  is  violated  (i.e.,  if  there  is  nonlinearity,  serial 
correlation, heteroscedasticity, and/or non-normality), then the predicted results may 
be  (at  best)  inefficient  or  (at  worst)  seriously  biased  or  misleading.  Thus,  rigorous 
measures were applied to ensure our models complied with those assumptions. 
4.3  Methodological issues  
4.3.1  Defining town centre boundaries 
Town centres are dynamic and evolving systems, therefore their configurations and 
boundaries are not constant. In this section I deal with this issue by identifying the 
causes of boundary shifts and their potential consequences on both descriptive and 
empirical results. Furthermore, I evaluate the approaches adopted by other studies 
dealing  with  that  issue  and  propose  a  third  method,  which  I  believe  is  the  most 
comprehensive  approach.  A  thorough  analysis  of  a  few  successive  Goad  surveys 
indicates that town centre boundary change occurs mainly due to two reasons. First, 
such  alteration  might  be  caused  by  an  expansion  or  contraction  of  physical  town 
centre borders in consecutive surveys, and second as a result of subdivision or merger 
of  existing  units  within  specified  and  already  existing  boundaries.  Previous  studies 
dealt with this issue by creating and implementing two separate datasets: 
(a) The first, referred to as the 'entire dataset' accounted for all spatial changes 
that took place between analysed periods. This in practice meant that town 
centre boundaries were allowed either to expand, predominantly due to the 
inclusion of new areas or completion of new retail developments outside the 
existing boundaries, or to contract mainly as a result of old retail units being 
retired. 
(b) The second, so-called 'like for like' dataset contained only those retail/service 
units that remained completely unchanged between analysed periods. In the 
case of this study, it meant a 4% reduction in total number of retail/service 
outlets, declining from 72625 in the entire dataset to 69785 units in the 'like 
for  like'  dataset.  The  figure  of  4%  was  only  an  average  and  varied  greatly 
across retail categories, with the lowest value of 2.2% in the case of retail   Chapter 4 
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services and the highest of 8.4% occurring in the vacant retail. These of course, 
were  the  aggregated  values  for  the  entire  four-region  sample  and  they 
fluctuated across analysed centres significantly. 
The descriptive statistics in Table 4.2 compiled for the four-region sample show 
that the number of vacant retail units in the ‘entire dataset’ differed considerably from 
its ‘like for like’ equivalent. As many as 694 vacant retail units recorded by the ‘entire 
dataset’ in the pre-crisis survey were not accounted for in the ‘like for like’ dataset 
therefore the relative number for the within-crisis surveys was only slightly lower at 
657. Such a large discrepancy had a strong potential to affect our results; in particular 
it was very evident when calculating the relative change (M1) in vacant retail.  That 
relative change between the pre-crisis and within-crisis periods stood at 28.2% for the 
‘entire dataset’ but in the case of the ‘like for like’ dataset was 4 percentage points 
(pp) higher, at 32.1%.  
 
Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics of vacant units for ‘entire dataset’, ‘like for like’ and       
fixed boundaries’ compiled for pre-crisis and within-crisis periods. 
Pre-crisis vacant units  Within-crisis vacant units 
Entire 
dataset 
Like for 
Like 
Fixed Boundary  Entire 
dataset 
Like for 
Like 
Fixed Boundary 
No of vacant units 
6495  5801  6157  8325  7668  7896 
Difference: absolute/proportion 
0  694  338  0  657  429 
0  10.7%  5.2%  0  7.9%  5.2% 
Absolute change between pre and within-crisis 
0  0  0  1830  1867  1739 
0  0.0%  0.0%  28.2%  32.1%  28.2% 
Centres with constant vacant units 
267  98  178  267  150  223 
100%  36.7%  66.6%  100%  56.2%  83.5% 
 
Likewise, the comparison of both ‘entire’ and ‘like for like’ datasets shows that the 
number of pre-crisis vacant units remained constant only in 98 of 267 centres (27% of 
the total). In the within-crisis survey, that number was consistent in 150 centres, which 
was an equivalent of 56% of the entire sample.  The key problem here was to define 
the extent to which the discrepancy in vacant unit numbers a) could be associated   Chapter 4 
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with  the  variable  boundary  issue,  and  b)  resulted  from  subdivision  or  merger  of 
already existing units. Although the University of Southampton research team pointed 
out in submissions to the Competition Commission (see Wrigley et al., 2009a, p. 2069) 
those boundaries can also be held constant, clearly, the simple ‘like for like’ subset 
does  not  resolve  this  query  as  it  excludes  all  newly  built,  retired,  subdivided  and 
merged units.  
In essence, our way of resolving this issue was to create consistently defined fixed 
boundaries  for  each  high  street  and  town  centre.  They  would  account  for  the 
vacancies  that  resulted from  subdivision or  a merger  of  already  existing units, but 
would also exclude all vacancies due to new build or retired outlets beyond the static 
boundaries. This is to say that the ‘fixed boundary method’ unlike the ‘like for like’ 
accounted for all retail/service outlets that were somehow modified in between the 
pre-crisis and within-crisis surveys but disregarded those that were responsible for 
boundaries extension or/and contraction. For instance, across the four-region sample 
there were 48 vacant units identified as newly built but were located within the static 
boundaries.  These,  as  newly  recorded  outlets  in  the  within-crisis  survey  would  be 
excluded by the ‘like for like’ dataset, however the ‘fixed boundary’ method takes 
those outlets into account as they are part of some redevelopment project and have 
not resulted from the expanding/shrinking boundary issue. 
Subsequently, vacant units in each retail centre have been recalculated and then 
used  to  create  a  new  dependent  variable  measuring  the  change  in  vacancy  rates 
between  the  pre-crisis  and  within-crisis  periods  based  on  the  ‘fixed  boundaries’ 
method.  However,  it  needs  to  be  emphasized  at  this  stage  that  the  majority  of 
analysed centres had only point data available in terms of mapping each retail/service. 
Such data, not showing the boundaries of actual buildings, had the potential to create 
some uncertainties and in some cases the best proxy had to be applied.  
4.3.2  Liverpool Central case study-using point data 
Figure 4.7 shows all retail/service units in Liverpool Central recorded in the pre-
crisis Goad survey, carried out in August 2006.  To map the retail/service units their 
coordinates were used, but as mentioned above this only allows displaying each outlet   Chapter 4 
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as  a  point.  Nevertheless,  it  can  be  seen  that  there  were  134  vacant  retail  units, 
highlighted in red, which accounted for 15.7% of the overall number of retail/service 
outlets.  
 
Figure 4.7: Retail/service units in Liverpool Central during the pre-crisis survey 
 
 
Figure 4.8 on the other hand, portrays Liverpool Central’s retail units recorded in 
the within-crisis survey, which took place in January 2009. When comparing Figures 4.7 
and  4.8,  it  is  clear  that  the  boundary  of  area  surveyed  within-crisis  has  expanded 
substantially, adding an entire new part on the southwest fringe of the city centre. 
Moreover, it becomes apparent that the boundary change has had a considerable 
impact on the overall number of vacant retail units, as a large number of newly added 
outlets was vacant. The overall number of vacant retail units had gone up from 134 in 
the pre-crisis to 183 outlets in the within-crisis survey, increasing the share of vacant 
retail in the centre from 15.7% to 18.1%. Although this represents a +36.9% rise in 
relative measure (M1), the increase in absolute change (M2) of +2.4pp was somewhat 
concealed by the rising total number of centre outlets. However, the latter figure has 
been used as the dependent variable for Liverpool Central ‘variable boundary method’. 
The newly added units, as redlined on Figure 4.9, have been overlaid onto the pre-
Vacant units 
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crisis  Goad  plan  which  allowed  visual  assessment  of  the  extent  and  magnitude  of 
vacant units resulting from boundary extension, displayed in yellow.  
 
Figure 4.8: Retail/service units in Liverpool Central during within-crisis survey 
 
 
Since the ‘like for like’ dataset accounts only for those units that have identical 
Goad ID’s in consecutive surveys, the overall number of units was reduced when using 
that method. In consequence, the number of vacant units in Liverpool Central for the 
‘like for like’ method was 121 in the pre-crisis and 130 in the within-crisis period. This 
represents an increase in vacancy rate change of only +1.1pp as opposed to +2.4pp in 
the case of the ‘entire dataset’ method. Further analysis reveals that overall, the ‘like 
for like’ method has excluded 53 vacant units in the within-crisis survey, of which 43 
were associated with the extended boundary issue. This implies that there were 10 
vacant units that were not accounted for by the ‘like for like’ dataset, however they 
have not resulted from the extended boundary issue. So in such a case, applying the 
‘fixed boundaries’ method makes a significant difference, as unlike the ‘like for like’ 
method, it includes the 10 outstanding vacant outlets. Analogically, the analysis of the 
pre-crisis vacant units indicates that only five of the 134 vacant outlets ceased to exist 
in  the  within-crisis  survey,  presumably  having  been  demolished.    The  remaining  8 
vacant units that were not accounted for by the ‘like for like’ dataset had undergone 
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some kind of modification but were still physically present in the Liverpool sample, so 
indeed, they were included by the ‘fixed boundary’ method. 
Taking into consideration the above,  it can be summarised that when applying the 
‘fixed boundary’ rule the number of vacant units was set to 129 in the pre-crisis (134 in 
the ‘entire dataset’ less 5 due to boundary contraction) and 140 in the within-crisis 
period (183 in the ‘entire dataset’ less 43 due to the extended boundaries issue). Thus 
implementation of the ‘fixed boundary’ method implies that the absolute change of 
Liverpool Central’s vacancy rate increases by +1.3pp, which is positioned between the 
values computed for the ‘entire’ and the ‘like for like’ datasets. 
 
Figure 4.9: Pre-crisis retail units in Liverpool Central overlaid over the ‘Non Like for 
Like’ within-crisis data   
 
4.3.3  Axminster case study - using polygons data 
The ‘entire dataset’ for Axminster consisted of 137 units including retail, service 
and  other  non-retail  units  in  the  pre-crisis  and  146  such  units  in  the  within-crisis 
period. The ‘like for like’ method indicates that there were 134 units, i.e. recorded as 
identical in both analysed periods. However, when only retail and services outlets were 
considered the equivalent figures were 111 in the pre-crisis and  123 in the  within-
crisis periods for the ‘entire dataset’ and 110 units and 112 units respectively for the 
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‘like for like’ method (see table 4.3). Taking into consideration vacant retail, it can be 
seen from Table 4.4 that there is a large discrepancy between both the ‘entire’ and 
‘like for like’ datasets. Vacancy rate measured as a relative change has gone up by 50% 
for the ‘entire dataset’ contrasting sharply with the 12.5% computed for the ‘like for 
like’ method. That is to say that the ‘like for like’ dataset has accounted only for one 
additional vacant outlet between the pre-crisis and within-crisis periods, as opposed to 
the four vacant units recorded in the ‘entire dataset’. 
Additionally, there was a large difference between both datasets, specifically in the 
within-crisis surveys when considering retail unit numbers. Thus, we could speculate 
that the issue of variable town centre boundaries has the potential to explain the 
unaccounted for vacant and retail outlets. Indeed, the detailed spatial analysis reveals 
that  some  of  these  changes  were  caused  by  the  expanding/contracting  boundary 
problem, but others resulted from subdivision of already existing units located within 
the fixed boundary, which had not been accounted for by the ‘like for like’ dataset.  
 
Table 4.3: Axminster’s retail composition for the entire and like for like datasets 
Retail class  Entire dataset    Like for Like 
pre-
crisis 
within-
crisis 
relative change   
 
pre-
crisis 
within-
crisis 
relative change 
retail  44  51  15.9%    43  44  2.3% 
services  59  60  1.7%    59  59  0.0% 
vacant  8  12  50.0%    8  9  12.5% 
Total  111  123  10.8%    110  112  1.8% 
 
Once again, the ‘fixed boundaries’ method has been implemented as it accounts 
for the outlets that had their unique Goad ID changed due to a subdivision or a merger 
of previously existing units. The visual analysis of an identical part of the Axminster 
Goad plan in the pre-crisis period, shown on the top part of Figure 4.10 and the within-
crisis on the bottom, clearly demonstrates that in the latter period there were three 
new vacant units - marked in red, seven new comparison units - shown in yellow and 
one new leisure unit in orange.  
The small transparent circles indicate all units that have been accounted for by the 
‘like  for  like’  dataset,  which  in  turn  help  to  determine  the  outlets  that  had  been 
excluded by that method.   Chapter 4 
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Figure 4.10: Clip of Axminster’s 2006 retail plan  
 
Figure 4.10 clearly indicates that in Axminster there were four comparison retail 
outlets, two vacant and one leisure unit resulting from boundary extension between 
the  pre-crisis  and  within-crisis  periods.  However  additionally,  some  of  the  newly 
recorded units including three comparison retail and one vacant unit had been created 
as a consequence of subdivision of previously existing outlets. Unlike the ‘like for like’ 
dataset,  the  ‘fixed  boundary’  method,  shown  in  Table  4.4,  accounts  for  the  three 
comparison  retail  and  one  vacant  unit,  retaining  in  total  47  retail  and  10  vacant 
outlets. 
Essentially, all retail categories have been impacted by the implementation of the 
‘fixed boundary’ method, altering slightly the overall numbers, which in turn, affects 
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the applied measures of town centre economic performance. The values derived for 
‘fixed boundary’ method are typically somewhere in between those calculated for the 
‘entire’  and  ‘like  for  like’  datasets.  The  degree  of  variation  can  vary  for  each 
retail/service category and each analysed centre, but it is the number of vacant retail 
that is affected most, impacting both measures M1 and M2. In the case of Axminster 
the relative change in vacant retail numbers (M1)  between the pre-crisis and the 
within-crisis periods, calculated for the fixed boundaries, was 12.5% higher than in 
case of the ‘like for like’ method. The respective absolute change (M2) would be 1.8pp.  
 
Table 4.4: Axminster’s retail composition for the ‘variable’ and ‘fixed’ boundary 
datasets 
Retail class  Variable boundary    Fixed boundary 
pre-
crisis 
within-
crisis 
relative 
change 
 
 
pre-
crisis 
within-
crisis 
relative 
change 
retail  44  51  15.9%    43  47  9.3% 
services  59  60  1.7%    59  59  0.0% 
vacant  8  12  50.0%    8  10  25% 
Total  111  123  10.8%    110  116  5.5% 
 
In summary, given that the number of vacant retail outlets is the most sensitive 
and most important indicator of how the economic crisis impacts on UK high streets, it 
needs to be highlighted that even a small change in vacancy rate can affect greatly the 
dependent variable. The ‘entire dataset’ accounts for all spatial changes in UK high 
streets that occurred between the pre-crisis and the within-crisis periods. However, as 
the town centre boundaries are allowed to contract and expand this method may not 
provide an accurate picture of the resilience and fragility of UK high streets and town 
centres. In turn, the ‘like for like’ dataset, excludes those retail/service outlets that are 
associated with the boundary shifts but, additionally, eliminates units existing in both 
periods that had undergone any kind of modification.  This study proposed a solution 
to  this  problem  which  involves  creating  consistently  defined  fixed  town  centre 
boundaries that hold them constant over two periods of time and at the same time, 
account for all retail units that had been merged or subdivided in between the pre-
crisis and the within-crisis surveys. It is firmly believed that the fixed boundary rule 
provides the best estimate of vacant units within the specified town centre borders   Chapter 4 
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although  due  to  the  availability  of  only  point  data  (geographical  coordinates) 
occasionally the best proxy had to be used. Had the polygons for each town centre 
been obtainable, the retail vacant units within the fixed boundaries could have been 
specified even more accurately. More importantly, the dependent variable calculated 
by using the fixed boundaries estimates have delivered more robust results during the 
modelling stage with higher r-square and stronger t-values for the coefficients. 
4.3.4  Base used to calculate occupancy/vacancy rates 
A further issue faced by this study relates to the base from which occupancy rates, 
including the vacancy rates, were calculated. As Colliers’ (2009) report pointed out, 
there was inconsistency of approaches to the assessment of high street performance 
amongst various research institutions. Some experts have calculated vacancy rates at a 
given point in time by expressing empty units as a percentage of all shop units (only), 
whilst others considered all outlets occupying the town centre (including non-retail) – 
resulting in a lower percentage. In some cases, such differences might be insignificant 
but in other cases, they might be substantial. In the case of our pre-crisis four-region 
sample the discrepancy between these two bases was large (9123 units), indicating 
that 14.6% of outlets were not considered by Goad surveys as retail or service. This 
study adopted the former approach – expressing empty units as a percentage of retail 
and  service  units  only.  If  we  had  adopted  the  latter  approach,  then  the  overall 
combined vacancy rate in the pre-crisis period across our sample of 267 centres/high 
streets would have been 9% rather than 10.4%.  The difference would have been even 
greater in the case of large centres, which were more likely to have a greater number 
of  non-retail  units.  For  instance,  the  pre-crisis  vacancy  rate  in  Manchester  Central 
adopted by this study stood at 17%, a 3pp higher than the 14% when all Goad units 
would have been accounted for. Conversely, one of the lowest discrepancies were 
observed in the small high streets and shopping centres where the share of non-retail 
units was insignificant e.g. in Cribbs Causeway the relevant figures would have been 
5% and 4.8% respectively. 
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4.3.5  Base used to calculate absolute vacancy rate changes 
Similarly, the base used to calculate absolute vacancy rate changes needs some 
clarification. This study used both the pre-crisis and within-crisis town centre size as a 
base to calculate the change in vacancy rate. Importantly, in some cases the size of a 
town centre in those two periods was far from being constant. The discrepancy in 
centre  size  can  be  largely  attributed  to  the  expansion/contraction  of  town  centre 
boundaries  (described  above)  in  two  given  time  periods.  The  largest  discrepancies 
were observed when the 'variable boundaries' approach was adopted; whilst the 'fixed 
boundaries' would have only minor inconsistencies and the 'like for like' method would 
see no change in centre size. Implementing the pre-crisis centre size as a vacancy rate 
base seems reasonable as it provides systematic estimates of vacancy rate change, 
relative to the constant number of pre-crisis units. However, the estimates provided by 
this method can be associated with disregarding both redundant and new built units. 
Moreover, the constant base had the capacity to provide somewhat biased results not 
fully  depicting  the  dynamic  nature  of  town  centre  configurations  and  boundaries. 
Given that this study has considered three different approaches to the town centre 
boundary issue, a distinctive base was adopted for each method: the 'like for like', 
'fixed ' and 'variable’ boundaries. Of course, in the case of 'like for like' method, both 
the pre-crisis and within-crisis centre size were matching, as only units with identical 
ID’s were accounted for by this category. Further, the ‘fixed boundary' method used 
the pre-crisis size which was not an ultimate solution, but possibly, it was the closest 
proxy depicting the semi-static nature of this approach.  Finally, in the case of 'variable 
boundary' method, two independent bases were utilised to calculate vacancy rates in 
each  analysed period.  This  was  the  most dynamic  way  fully  reflecting  the  variable 
nature  of  vacancy  rate  changes  between  the  pre-crisis  and  within-crisis  periods, 
particularly  in  those  centres  that  experienced  some  sort  of  development  or 
regeneration. 
4.3.6  Other methodological issues 
Additionally, the potentially significant limitations of this study were related to the 
inconsistency of available data and missing variables. The former issue was already   Chapter 4 
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considered earlier in this chapter, however it needs to be emphasised that despite a 
genuine effort made to design a robust study, scrupulously depicting the pre-crisis and 
the within-crisis dynamics of UK high streets and town centres, the irregularity of Goad 
surveys had the potential to affect the results. Although we strongly believe that the 
overall  differential  performance  of  UK  town  centres  has  been  depicted  relatively 
accurately,  the  performance  of  a  few  detailed  retail/service  categories  could  be 
somewhat less precise. For instance, the closure of Woolworths happened during our 
within-crisis survey creating inconsistencies in the way these stores were recorded by 
Goad surveyors, with some of them still trading, others having been vacated and some, 
even having already been sublet. 
However, it was the issue of missing variables that could be viewed as posing a 
major threat to this study, in particular, to the statistical modelling of vacancy rate 
change, where deriving the factors associated with enhanced town centre vitality was 
one  of  the  key  aims.  It  was  crucial  to  consider  as  many  such  factors  as  possible; 
omitting any important dynamic could deteriorate the robustness of the model at best, 
and, at worst, alter the results. It has to be acknowledged that although this study 
considered  more  than  20  such  indicators,  we  had  no  access  to,  some  which 
undoubtedly  would  enhance  our  model.  Aspects  such  as  different  parking  policies 
including parking charges, footfall counts and business rents are viewed as playing 
significant roles in the economic health of UK town centres and high streets; however 
we had no access to systematic information on these data. Parking policy and fees are 
believed to be particularly important to sustaining a healthy town centre, especially 
during  tough  economic  conditions.  Indeed,  as  Government  public  spending  cuts 
resulted in a decline of consumer disposable income, shoppers are more than ever 
driven by ‘value for money’. Therefore free or reasonably priced car parks could retain 
some  consumers  in  traditional  high  streets  as  opposed  to  out-of-town  shopping 
centres and retail parks who offer free parking. Footfall count is a reflection of retail 
strength and it is a key element of understanding the economic performance of town 
centres.  The  comprehensive  measurement  of  footfall  should  include  not  only  the 
number of visitors to shops but also other attractions in the area such as public, health, 
religious services or major businesses (Genecon, 2011). Finally, the level of business   Chapter 4 
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rates is a crucial factor directly affecting the number of shop closures and openings in a 
particular location. Business rates which are inadequate to the generated footfall may 
drive  vendors  out  of  particular  locations,  especially  the  secondary  shopping  areas. 
Presumably, omission of either of these variables may also have played a role in our 
inability to retain a catchment affluence variable in the cross-regional model and have 
resulted in significantly lower values of the coefficient of determination. 
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  Empirical results – four region sample  Chapter 5:
This  chapter  examines  the  complex  adjustment  of  UK  high  streets  and  town 
centres to the onset of the 2008-09 economic crisis. It begins from the explanatory 
data analysis which provides characteristics of the 267 retail centres sample, located in 
four  UK  regions.  Further,  using  Goad  surveys  for  the  cross-regional  sample,  this 
chapter assesses the differential economic performance of UK town centres between 
the pre-crisis and the within-crisis periods. This task has been achieved in two separate 
but  complementary  stages.  First,  the  descriptive  analysis  has  depicted  changes  in 
major  retail/service  categories  recorded  between  the  pre-crisis  and  within-crisis 
surveys. Second, by means of statistical modelling, the variation in vacancy rate change 
has  been  examined. As  a  result,  a number  of indicators  associated  with enhanced 
resilience of UK high streets to the shock of economic crisis have been derived, leading 
to novel and policy significant findings. Of particular interest was the finding that the 
effects of both policy-compliant corporate foodstore entry and diversity, depicted by 
high proportion of independent retailers, should be seen as beneficial to the vitality 
and viability of UK high streets, despite popular debate portraying those two factors as 
polar opposite. 
5.1  Study area and the pre-crisis characteristics 
The analysed sample comprised 267 high street and town centres located in four 
UK regions: South West, East Anglia, North West and West Yorkshire. The sample has 
been divided into two groups: northern and southern depicting the persistent divide in 
regional performance, recently evaluated by Dorling (2010). Each retail centre from 
our sample had the Goad Experian survey completed in both the pre-crisis and within-
crisis periods allowing systematic assessment of their complex adjustment to the shock 
of economic crisis. The northern cluster of 117 retail centres comprised predominantly 
urban areas including three major agglomerations of Liverpool, Manchester and Leeds-
Bradford.    On  the  contrary,  the  southern  group  of  150  retail  centres  contained   Chapter 5 
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predominantly smaller market towns with only one large agglomeration - Bristol, and 
several medium-size urban centres such as Bournemouth, Gloucester, Exeter, Norwich, 
Peterborough  and  Cambridge.  In  terms  of  retail  size,  the  entire  sample  comprised 
approximately 63,000 retail/service units in the pre-crisis period, with an aggregated 
retail floorspace of about 140 million Sq Ft. The average (mean) centre size across the 
entire sample was 237 units, which was a relatively large size, given that only about 60 
centres from the four-region samples have fallen within the higher end of the retail 
hierarchy  -  the  regional,  sub-regional  and  major  district  centres.  Taking  into 
consideration the geographical split, an average southern high street/town centre was 
somewhat smaller in size at 206 units, comparing to the 276 outlets in the northern 
part of our sample. Figure 5.1, depicting the 267 centres by size, reveals that both sub-
samples comprise mainly medium and large retail centres. 
  
Figure 5.1: Spatial distribution of the four-region sample by centre size (no. of units) 
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However,  the  southern  group  contains  also  a  significant  number  of  small  centres, 
predominantly located in Bristol. The sample did include a relatively large number of 
local  centres  and  shopping  parades  which  in  some  cases  comprised  only  15-20 
retail/service outlets. Taking retail floorspace as a measure of centre size, it can be 
seen that an average high street/town centre in our four-region sample occupied 0.52 
million Sq Ft in the pre-crisis period. Northern centres with an average retail floorspace 
of 0.63 million Sq Ft, were yet again larger than their southern counterparts with a 
respective  figure  of  0.44  million  Sq  Ft.  Some  centres  were  exceptionally  large,  in 
particular those located in the northern part such as Manchester Central and Leeds 
Central  comprising  more  than  1,200  units  each.  Furthermore,  several  other  town 
centres  contained  more  than  750  retail/service  outlets,  namely  Norwich,  Liverpool 
Central,  Bath,  Cheltenham  and  Southport.  Similarly,  in  terms  of  occupied  retail 
floorspace recorded in the pre-crisis surveys, Manchester Central was unquestionably 
the largest analysed centre with 4.8 million Sq Ft, followed by Leeds Central with 3.0 
million  Sq  Ft,  then  Norwich  and  Liverpool  Central  with  2.7  and  2.4  million  Sq  Ft 
respectively. 
It appears that the vast majority of retail centres displayed a strong correlation 
between the unit numbers and occupied retail floorspace; however, there were some 
exceptions.  As  Figure  5.2  indicates,  a  number  of  retail  centres  demonstrated  a 
different  pattern,  in  particular,  the  Trafford  Centre  and  Cribbs  Causeway,  which 
occupied very large floorspace relatively to their outlet numbers. This can be explained 
by the fact that both centres are regional shopping centres, which in contrast to a 
traditional  UK  high  street  comprise  rather  large  and  modern  units,  predominantly 
occupied  by  multiple  retailers.  In  effect,  other  shopping  centres  from  our  sample 
displayed similar trends; however, they were not as apparent. Conversely, there were 
few  centres  with  a  large  numbers  of  outlets  which  occupied  relatively  small  retail 
floorspace. For instance, Bath in the pre-crisis period was the fifth largest centre in 
terms of outlet numbers but came 19
th when floorspace was considered. Presumably, 
it was due to the peculiarity of this historic and affluent town centre, featured with 
stylish boutiques and a large selection of independent shops.  
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Figure 5.2: Relationship between pre-crisis number of units and the floorspace 
 
When comparing the numbers of retail/service outlets recorded in the pre-crisis 
and within-crisis surveys, Goad Experian surveys indicate that the overall number of 
retail and service units had increased by +1.4% in the entire four-region sample. Taking 
into consideration retail floorspace, even bigger growth at +3.3% was recorded, which 
in real terms meant that there has been almost 4.6 million Sq Ft of new retail space 
added recently. As described in detail in the previous chapter, town centres constantly 
evolve, thus their boundaries are never static. Although the overall increases, or in 
some cases decreases, in centre size were minor in most high streets and town centres 
of our sample, some retail centres observed substantial changes in their size between 
the analysed periods. In particular, Bristol Broadmead, after opening Cabot Circus, had 
experienced  an  exceptionally  large  increase  (+41%)  in  the  total  number  of  units. 
Moreover,  several  other  centres  (e.g.,  Swindon  McArthur  Glen,  Bournemouth 
Castlepoint or Liverpool Central) had also seen significant growth in their overall size, 
ranging  from  18%  to  24%.  Conversely,  centres  such  as  Rothwell,  Manchester 
Cheetham  Hill  and  Bristol  Avonmouth  Village  had  decreased  their  total  number  of 
outlets by at least -10%. The main reasons responsible for outlet numbers growth in a   Chapter 5 
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town centre include newly completed retail trading space (e.g. McArthur Glen and 
Castlepoint) or inclusion of entire new parts of a city by a subsequent Goad survey (e.g. 
Liverpool  Central).  Large  contractions,  on  the  other  hand,  are  often  related  to 
regeneration  schemes  taking  place  during  one  of  the  surveyed  periods,  where 
outdated and predominantly vacant units are demolished and replaced by new retail 
developments. This was the case in Rothwell and Manchester Cheetham Hill, where 
corporate  food  retailers,  adopting  the  town  centre  regeneration  agenda,  have 
effectively become the anchor stores. 
In addition to the centre size, other pre-crisis characteristics attributed to UK town 
centres and high streets have played a crucial role in understanding their economic 
performance during the economic crisis. The retail/service mix, depicting occupancy 
rates  of  each  broad  retail/service  category  suggested  that  comparison  retail  and 
leisure services were prevailing in the four-region sample during the pre-crisis period, 
occupying respectively 37% and 20% of the total number of retail/service units. The 
occupancy rates of remaining categories varied only marginally and ranged from 8% in 
the  case  of  convenience  retail  to  12%  in  the  case  of  retail  services.  Taking  into 
consideration the geographical split, both southern and northern parts of our sample 
had almost identical aggregated retail mix with the exception of comparison retail, 
which had a slightly lower share in the North (35.7%) than in the South (35.7%). Vacant 
retail, shown in Table 5.1, which was calculated as the percentage of empty retail 
outlets  in  the  pre-crisis  survey,  accounted  for  10.4%  of  the  total  number  of 
retail/service  outlets  in  the  entire  sample.    The  average  regional  vacancy  rates, 
standing at 8.6% in the South and 12.1% in the North, have indicated the potential of 
diverse dynamics and underlying patterns responsible for the relatively strong South-
North divide.   
The next indicator, potentially important to the performance of UK high streets 
during the economic crisis, is the ratio of service outlets relative to retail units, which 
simply provides broad information on whether a particular region or retail centre was 
service or retail oriented. In the case of our four-region sample, this ratio was 1.2 
implying that, on average, for each retail unit there were 1.2 service outlets. In the   Chapter 5 
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context of South-North divide, services were prevailing in the southern part of our 
sample, although the difference was only marginal.  
 
Table 5.1: Characteristics of the cross-regional sample 
Attribute  Entire sample  South  North 
Average centre size (units)  237   206  276 
Vacancy rate (%)  10.4  8.6  12.1 
Services vs. retail (ratio)  1.2  1.25  1.15 
Independent retail (%)  62.5  64  60.5 
 
A few analysed centres such as Cambourne, Bristol Whitchurch and Bristol Baldwin 
Street appeared to  have an exceptionally high number of services relative to retail 
outlets,  recording  the  ratio  of  4.0  and  above.  The  first  two  of  those  centres  had 
somewhat  similar  configurations  as  both  were  remarkably  small  in  terms  of  unit 
numbers; anchored by large corporate foodstores, they additionally comprised a small 
cluster of complementary service outlets. Had the retail floorspace been used in those 
two instances, the ratio would have been considerably different. Baldwin Street on the 
other hand, is a predominantly leisure-oriented area, with an exceptional range of 
bars, public houses and restaurants, serving the large labour force working in nearby 
offices,  and  a  high  student  population  (DTZ,  2007).  Conversely,  several  shopping 
centres and designer outlets, present in the dataset, had the ratio of retail to service 
outlets extremely low, at 0.4 and lower. 
Finally, in order to evaluate more comprehensively the retail mix in the analysed 
centres, of central importance was to establish the proportion of independent retailers 
relative to the national multiples. It is widely accepted that high diversity represented 
by strong presence of independent retailers can be associated with `extra value that 
small, independent and genuinely local shops provide in terms of economic benefit, 
environmental  distinctiveness  and  the  social  glue  that  holds  communities  together' 
(NEF, 2006, p.23). The results have revealed that in the pre-crisis period independent 
retailers  were  prevailing,  representing  62.5%  of  the  total  number  of  retail  outlets 
across the 267-centre sample. Furthermore, a discrepancy between the southern and 
northern  part  of  our  sample  was  noticeable  with  the  respective  average  values   Chapter 5 
105 
 
standing at 64% and 60.5%. Figure 5.3 depicts the spatial distribution of sample retail 
centres distinguishing those with high and low proportions of independent retail.  
 
Figure 5.3: Spatial distribution of retail centres with high and low proportions of 
independent retail 
 
 
It implies that the centres with high proportions of independent retailers in the 
pre-crisis,  shown  in  brown/red  colour,  were  scattered  around  the  entire  sample, 
however those with low proportions of independent retailers, shown in blue, slightly 
prevailed in the North. To some extent, this could be explained by the fact that the 
southern subsample contained a large amount of market towns which historically had 
been  renowned  for  their  diversity,  reflected  by  a  high  proportion  of  independent   Chapter 5 
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retail. Indeed, several small local retail centres, notably all located in the Bristol area, 
did not contain any multiple retail outlets, comprising solely small independent shops. 
In  contrast,  as  Figure  5.3  indicates,  the  locations  with  the  smallest  share  of 
independent retailers predominantly included town centres within the largest urban 
areas  such  as  Manchester,  Liverpool,  Bristol,  Bournemouth,  Plymouth  and 
Peterborough. Additionally, the small number of out-of-town shopping centres present 
in  our  data  had  similar  characteristics.  Indeed,  four  retail  centres  recorded  solely 
multiple retail outlets in both Goad surveys. Two of those centres, namely Cribbs Retail 
Park and Peterborough Serpentine Green Shopping Centre have simply confirmed the 
fact that out-of-town developments, as a retail norm, have been reinforcing the big-
box  format,  predominately  occupied  by  multiple  retailers  (Genecon,  2011). 
Cambourne and Bristol Whitchurch on the other hand, already discussed in the context 
of exceptionally high ratio of services vs. retail outlets, had to be considered at this 
stage as potential outliers.  
5.2  Descriptive analysis of changes in retail composition 
The descriptive analysis depicts differential performance of UK town centres and 
high streets by retail/service category utilising the so-called composition rates, which 
are the percentages of each retail/service type relative to a total number of outlets in 
particular centre, region or the entire sample. Such analysis provides valuable insights 
into the differential performance of UK town centres between the analysed periods by 
illustrating the change in each retail/service category, including vacant outlets. It also 
provides a systematic base for an assessment of UK retail centres’ adjustment to the 
shock of economic crisis and other drivers of change. Two measures of change, the 
relative change (M1) and the absolute change (M2), were calculated for each retail and 
service type. Initially, those measures have been computed for the entire four-region 
sample and then independently for each region, so the performance of southern and 
northern groups could be compared. The analysis computing the composition rates has 
considered both the number of units and the retail floorpace. As suggested by some 
researchers (e.g. Findlay and Sparks, 2010), the implementation of both measures of   Chapter 5 
107 
 
centre size offers a wider scope to investigate the changes in configurations of UK high 
streets and town centres. 
 
Table 5.2: Broad and compiled detailed retail categories used by the study 
Goad subclass                                                 Goad category 
                                                                                Antique and Art goods 
             Booksellers 
             Sport and leisure goods 
                                Charity Shops 
             Clothing and footwear 
Comparison                                    Chemists and Beauty shops 
             DIY and households goods 
             Furniture and furnishings 
             Cards, gifts and toys 
             Florists 
             Jewellers 
             Telephones 
             Music, video and photography 
             Department stores 
             Bakers 
             Butchers and fishmongers 
             Convenience stores 
Convenience           Supermarkets 
             Delicatessen and healthy foods 
             Greengrocers  
             CTN and off licences       
             Health & Beauty 
             Travel agents 
             Dry cleaners 
Retail Services                    Opticians 
             Photo services 
             Post Offices 
             Estate Agents 
             Printing and copying 
             Building societies 
Financial and Business       Retail Banks 
             Legal services 
             Employment agencies 
             Financial services 
             Restaurants 
             Cafes 
             Fast foods and takeaways 
Leisure services         Pubs and bars 
             Hotels and guest houses 
             Sport and leisure 
 
Further,  the  study  has  accounted  for  the  two-tier  retail/service  classification 
adopted by Goad surveys. Firstly, it derived changes for the broad retail/service types, 
referred to as ‘Goad subclasses’ and secondly, examined the differential performance 
of  their  components,  the  so-called  ‘Goad  categories’  accounting  for  a  much  more   Chapter 5 
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detailed  division.  As  some  ‘Goad  subclasses’  comprised  a  large  number  of  ‘Goad 
categories’ the closest and most related types of businesses were joined together in 
order  to  provide  a  more  comprehensive  picture  in  visual  terms,  especially  when 
presented  on  graphs.  This  approach  had  also  some  limitations,  with  those  most 
apparent having the capacity to mask some of the observed decline or rise in particular 
categories due to the amalgamated categorisation. Table 5.2 shows the breakdown of 
‘Goad subclasses’ into the amalgamated ‘Goad categories’ employed by this study. The 
broad  comparison  retail  subclass  comprises  the  largest  number  (14)  of  smaller 
categories,  whilst  other  broad  retail/service  types  contain  between  six  and  eight 
smaller components. Crucially, vacant retail includes only one category and does not 
account for any non-retail vacant outlets present in our dataset. 
5.2.1  Overall changes in retail composition rates 
As  already  mentioned  in  previous  chapters,  the  closures  of  retail/service  units, 
leading to an increase in vacancy rates, are most commonly used indicators of the 
impact  of  the  macroeconomic  shock  of  economic  crisis  experienced  by  UK  town 
centres/high streets. Figure 5.4 shows that in our four-region sample, between the 
pre-crisis and within-crisis surveys, vacant units increased by 28% in terms of relative-
change  (M1  measure),  from  an  average  of  10.4%  to  13.1%,  that  is  to  say,  2.7 
percentage points (pp) on absolute-change (M2 measure). Taking into consideration 
the geographical split, centres from the northern part of our sample have observed 
higher  rates  of  retail  outlets  closures,  recording  an  overall  rise  in  vacancy  rate  of 
+3.2pp, measured as absolute change. This increase was calculated from a historically 
high vacancy rate at 12.1% in the pre-crisis to 15.3% in the within-crisis period. In the 
South the rise in vacancy rate was smaller at +2.3pp, from the 8.6% in the pre-crisis to 
10.9% in the within-crisis period. Although the M1 measure indicates that the overall 
increase in vacant unit numbers was greater in the South than in the North, this was 
entirely due to its low pre-crisis base, as the actual number of new-recorded vacant 
units in the South was substantially smaller. The greatest adverse impact of the shock 
of economic crisis appears to have been felt by the comparison retail as this broad 
retail category has contributed most to the recorded closures of retail outlets.    Chapter 5 
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Figure 5.4: Relative (M1) and absolute (M2) change between pre-crisis and within-
crisis, by retail broad category 
 
 
Overall, taking into consideration the number of units, it could be seen that across 
our 267 centres more than 1200 comparison retail outlets were closed between the 
pre-crisis  and  within-crisis  surveys,  accounting  for  a  -5.3%  decline  in  the  relative 
change, which was an equivalent of -2.5pp on the absolute measure. The differential 
performance of comparison retail has been significantly worse in the North, declining -
7.7% on relative change, compared to -3% in the South. 
In contrast, convenience retail, financial and business services, retail services, and 
leisure services contributed far less to the increases in vacancy rates. Indeed, Figure 
5.4 shows that in each of these broad categories, with the exception of financial and 
business services, there was some evidence of  a growth, both in terms of relative 
change in unit numbers and in square feet of floorspace. Convenience retail and retail 
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services, despite recording small declines for the entire sample, measured as relative 
change, have shown some resilience in the southern regions, where both categories 
have enjoyed small growth in outlet numbers, at 1.6% and 2.2% respectively. Leisure 
services  were  the  only  broad  service  category  that  recorded  substantial  increases 
across all regions in both relative and absolute measures. As the 2008-09 economic 
crisis has started with the ‘credit crunch’, perhaps there is little surprise that financial 
& business services were second to comparison retail in terms of the most adversely 
affected  broad  categories,  observing  widespread  closures  of  its  outlets.    Although, 
measured in absolute change, financial services declined only -0.5pp across the four-
region sample, the relative change at -2.5% was not distant from the decline recorded 
in comparison retail. Nevertheless, when considering the geographical split, financial & 
business services, was the most adversely affected broad retail/service category in the 
South, recording decrease of -4.4%. 
Remarkably, the picture of change observed in broad retail/service types across the 
267 centres was somewhat different when retail floorspace was considered. 
 (i)  The  relative  increase  in  vacant  retail,  reaching  35%,  was  larger  than  one 
recorded  by  the  number  of  units.  This  presumably  could  be  explained  by  the 
substantial share of newly built, large and modern retail floorspace which remained 
vacant during the economic crisis.  
(ii) The broad categories that observed increase in retail floorspace included not 
only leisure services (+2.9%), but also convenience retail (+2.2%). The increase in the 
latter  was  mainly  due  to  opening  brand  new  corporate  foodstores  both  large 
supermarkets and small convenience stores.  
(ii) Most adversely impacted broad retail/service categories comprised financial & 
business  services  (-3.6%)  and  retail  services  (-2.2%)  with  comparison  retail,  rather 
surprisingly, recording only a minor decrease at -0.2%. 
5.2.2  Change in comparison retail categories 
Almost all types of retailers within broad comparison retail category performed 
weakly as declines in the discretionary spending have led to subdued demand and 
deeper exploration of alternative retail channels offering better value such as e-tailing.    Chapter 5 
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As Figure 5.5 shows, the hardest hit appeared to have been department stores; music, 
video,  and  photography  retailers;  florists;  furniture  and  furn ishings  retailers; 
booksellers; and cards, gifts and toys retailers - each type recording a relative decline 
(measure M1) in the range from -29% to -9%. Closures of more than 800 Woolworth's 
stores across the UK followed by the MFI and Adams, to a degree,  may explain the 
decline in department & variety stores as  the crash in  the housing market can be 
blamed for the misfortune of furniture and furnishing retailers.  
 
Figure 5.5 Relative change between pre-crisis and within-crisis in comparison retail 
 
Furthermore, although the decrease in disposable income adversely affected some 
small  independent  businesses  such  as  florists  or  cards,  gifts  and  toys,  the  rapidly 
expanding internet sales should be associated with the declines in bookshops, music & 
video  and  photo  retailers.  Those  retailers  had  suffered  from  the  increasing  e-
commerce  competition  considerably  before  the  2008-09  economic  crisis 
(Weltevreden,  2007;  Burt  and  Sparks,  2003),  however  it  seems  that  the  shock  of 
recession  exacerbated  the  challenges  faced  by  traditional  British  high  streets. 
Nevertheless, the impact of economic crisis on comparison retail was not uniformly 
negative.  Telephones  and  accessories  retailers;  household  discounters  (comprising 
`pound shops', household bargain shops, etc.); and to a much lesser degree `chemists   Chapter 5 
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and  beauty'  retailers  recorded  increases  rather  than  declines.  Indeed,  telephone 
retailers recorded a relative increase of almost 16% and household discounters of 8%. 
Moreover, as many types of comparison retailers closed their units, the charity shops 
moved into some of the vacated space and as a result, they increased their presence 
on  high  street  by  almost  7%.  Furthermore,  that  trend  was  largely  mirrored  by 
household bargain stores as their increases were mostly associated with filling the 
vacant space e.g. large share of former Woolworths stores were filled by ‘Poundland’ 
and  ‘99p  stores’  (LDC,  2010).  In  terms  of  the  geographical  split,  the  majority  of 
comparison categories, with the exception of jewellers, ‘chemists and beauty’ shops, 
exhibited comparable trends. Rather surprisingly, jewellers have observed a growth of 
+4.2% in the South whilst declining by -6.2% in the North, and 'chemists and beauty’ 
retailers recorded a small growth at +1.4% in the South and remained unchanged in 
the North. Finally, some types of comparison retailers such as booksellers, ‘antique 
and art’, ‘sport and leisure’ and furniture retailers, although decreasing their numbers 
in the entire four-region sample, performed noticeably weaker in the northern part of 
our sample, declining more than -10%. 
5.2.3  Change in convenience retail categories 
In  the  case  of  convenience  retail,  Figure  5.6  shows  that  only  three  categories 
namely butchers and fishmongers (-8.2%), greengrocers (-7.9%), and confectionery, 
tobacconists,  and  newsagents  (CTNs)  and  off-licences  (-7.1%)  experienced  relative 
declines close to the lower bound (-9%) figure recorded by the hardest hit types of 
comparison retail.  The decline in unit numbers in these three types of convenience 
retail  was  comparable  across  the  four-region  sample  with  the  exception  of 
greengrocers, which had the insolvency rate twice as high in the northern as in the 
southern  part  of  our  sample.  Furthermore,  the  decrease  in  supermarkets 
predominantly recorded in the North can be attributed to the closure of Kwik Save 
stores, which went into administration in 2007, rather than to the adverse effects of 
the economic crisis. This was confirmed by strong and continuous growth of the 'big 
four' supermarkets recording increases in the range of +14% between the pre-crisis 
and within-crisis period.  Clearly, there was other evidence that the convenience sector   Chapter 5 
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has been comparatively resilient to the onset of the economic crisis. The strong growth 
in small food-retail-based convenience stores during the early to mid-2000s, revealed 
by both the Competition Commission (2007; 2008) and the Southampton research 
team (Wrigley, 2007; Wrigley et al. 2009a) and reported to the Groceries Market 
Inquiry (2006-08), appears to have been maintained despite the shock of economic 
crisis.  Indeed,  as  in  those  earlier  findings  relating  to  the  first  half  of  the  2000s, 
significant increases (above 20%) were recorded not only in corporate convenience 
stores, but also among `symbol group' and `independent' retailers. 
 
Figure 5.6 Relative change between pre-crisis and within-crisis in convenience retail 
 
The growth in the former can be largely attributed to the independent retailers 
joining various symbol groups in search of benefits exclusive to larger organisations 
such as lower purchase price or bigger distribution network, but also in an attempt to 
enhance  their  standards  in  order  to  fulfil  the  raising  consumer  expectations 
(Competition  Commission,  2006).  The  latter,  however,  has  been  claimed  by  some 
commentators, especially during the early to mid-2000s, to be associated with the 
growth of ethnic retail (particularly in London and prospering southern England), or 
what  Guy  (2008)  referred  to  as  the  `Polish  grocer'  effect.  However, growth  during 
economic  crisis  was  not  confined  to  the  small  food-retail-based  convenience-store 
sector. Although some specialist small food retailers declined in the northern part of 
our four-region sample, there was evidence, in the southern part, the `delicatessens'   Chapter 5 
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`bakers', and ‘health foods’ have increased numbers, with the two former recording 
gains of between 5% and 10%.  
5.2.4  Leisure services 
Leisure services as the only retail/service category experienced consistent positive 
growth in total unit numbers across all analysed regions. Such a trend was observed in 
76% of sample town centres and high streets and it was particularly visible in centres 
towards the higher end of the retail hierarchy. As Figure 5.7 shows that growth was 
recorded for almost all categories of leisure services (a decline in pubs is masked by 
the categorisation in Table 5.2). In particular, there was a substantial (+13%) relative 
increase  in  cafes,  a  finding  duplicated  at  the  local  level  in  an  earlier  study  of  the 
transformation of the retail structure of a market town in South West England (Wrigley 
et al., 2009b). 
 
Figure 5.7: Relative change between pre-crisis and within-crisis in leisure services
 
 
In  addition,  restaurants  and  ‘fast  foods  and  takeaways’  have  increased  their 
numbers noticeably, by +5.3% and 4.5% respectively. The Independent, (25 Nov 2009, 
p.6)  indicated  that  those  perceived  to  have  a  healthy  eating  image  have  grown 
considerably during the recession.  
‘Among  the  UK's  biggest  fast-food  chains,  Subway  grew  its  number  of 
restaurants by 25.9 per cent Domino Pizza ramped up its outlets by 19.8 per cent 
while the store numbers of some of the sector's established chains have declined. 
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For instance, McDonald's saw a slight decrease in its number of restaurants and 
Burger King and Wimpy's outlet count fell by 8.3 per cent and 12.9 per cent 
respectively’.  
As noted above, public houses observed  a decline of nearly -5% with recession 
symptoms such as job loss and lower disposable income, coupled with the beer tax 
increases and competition from supermarkets have been widely blamed. A British Beer 
& Pub Association (BBPA) representative in an interview with The Sunday Times (29 
July 2009, p.3) expressed his concerns about the future of a traditional British pub:  
‘The biggest impact is the recession. There are fewer people out and fewer 
people  spending  money  in  pubs  and  bars.  Pubs  are  diversifying  but, 
unfortunately, if you are a community pub you can’t transform yourself into a 
trendy town centre bar’.  
Nevertheless, two opposite trends within this service category were increasingly 
becoming apparent, with local pubs serving small communities having been hit worst, 
and establishments that serve foods, such as gastro-pubs, were more resilient and by 
contrast, branded pubs and café-style bars were faring relatively well.  
5.2.5  Retail services 
Although retail services as a whole demonstrated some resilience recording small 
relative growth across the four-region sample, the detailed picture, shown on Figure 
5.8, was rather mixed. Three of its smaller categories, namely health and beauty, post 
offices and other retail services, observed growth in the range of +2.5% to +9.5%, but 
travel agents, photo services and dry cleaners appeared to have suffered from large 
declines  exceeding  -10%.  In  fact,  the  declines  in  photo  services  and  travel  agents 
numbers  were  almost  as  high  as  those  noted  amongst  most  adversely  affected 
comparison  retail  categories.  Yet  again,  technological  advancement  and  online 
retailing  are  more  likely  causes  for  declines  in  those  categories,  rather  than  the 
economic crisis. The latter however, associated with lower disposable income, could 
accelerate  those  long-term  changes  often  viewed  as  evolutionary  trajectories  of 
traditional UK high streets (Wrigley and Dolega, 2011).    Chapter 5 
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Nevertheless, what is rather  surprising is the rise in  post office outlet numbers 
between  the  pre-crisis  and  within-crisis  periods,  as  services  they  offer  have  been 
increasingly substituted by emails and mobile phone texting, resulting in lower profit 
and declining number of customers. Conversely, the growth in health and beauty 
services, reported in the first half of  the 2000s could be attributed to the growth in 
disposable incomes; however, that trend appears to have continued despite the shock 
of economic crisis. 
 
Figure 5.8: Relative change between pre-crisis and within-crisis in retail services 
 
5.2.6  Financial and business services 
Financial and business services were the second most adversely affected broad 
retail/service type, following comparison retail. Overall, this service category declined 
by -3.2% between the pre-crisis and within-crisis periods in terms of  relative change, 
which  represented  a  -0.5  pp  decrease  in  occupancy  rates,  measured  as  absolute 
change.  
As  Figure  5.9  shows,  virtually  all  constituting  categories,  with  the  exception  of 
financial services, had declined between the pre-crisis and within-crisis surveys. The 
employment agencies recorded the largest decline in outlet numbers (-12.4%), which 
was  related to the  subdued  demand for  employment  typically  associated  with  the 
economic crisis. The restrained lending between banks, unfavourable stock exchange   Chapter 5 
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conditions and crash in the housing market can explain to a large extent the decline in 
retail  banks,  building  societies  and  estate  agents.  The  decrease  in  printi ng  and 
photocopying outlets is presumably associated with the advancement in technology 
and the availability of portable and increasingly popular 'all in one' printers. Perhaps 
somewhat more surprising is the relative strength of financial and legal services in the 
northern part of our sample, recording small gains in outl et  numbers despite the 
unfavourable  economic  conditions  and  contrasting  sharply  with  large  de clines 
observed in the southern part. 
 
Figure 5.9: Relative change between pre-crisis and within-crisis in financial and 
business services 
 
5.2.7  Differential performance of corporate vs. independent retailers 
Having completed the descriptive analysis for both broad types and more detailed 
retail/service  categories,  of  central  importance  was  to  compare  the  differential 
performance of corporate and independent retailers. Such analysis has the capacity on 
the one hand to depict similarities and differences in the response to the economic 
crisis between corporate and independent retailers and on the other hand, to identify 
the causes of those differences. It is important to note that vacant retail units have 
been excluded from this analysis because it was not possible to establish what share of 
empty units has resulted from closures of corporate or independent retail outlets. One   Chapter 5 
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implication of this approach was that the base used to calculate occupancy rates of 
particular retail/service types was slightly reduced. Nevertheless, such analysis offers 
new  and  valuable  insights  into  the  changes  in  configurations  of  UK  high  streets, 
recorded by the corporate and independent retailers.  Figure 5.10 shows the relative 
and absolute changes recorded by broad retail/service types, accounting for both the 
corporate-independent retail divide and regional variations. 
 
Figure 5.10: Differential performance of corporate and independent retailers by 
retail/service type, showing the relative and absolute changes 
 
 
The regional changes in the independent retail outlets have been shown by using 
black  triangles  for  northern  and  red  diamonds  for  southern  centres.  Figure  5.10 
indicates  that  the  response  of  multiple  and  independent  retailers  to  the  onset  of 
economic crisis was not uniform. In terms of the comparison retailers there was a clear 
divide in the response to the impacts of economic crisis, with independent retailers 
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accounting for much larger relative decline at -9.2% than the multiple retailers at -
0.1%, measured for the entire four-region sample. 
The difference was even more apparent when considering the absolute change; 
whilst  the  corporate  retailers  recorded  an  increase  of  +0.3pp,  the  independent 
retailers declined by -1.8pp. In the regional context, a strong South-North divide was 
present, which in terms of independent retailers was manifested by a considerably 
weaker performance of the northern centres. 
Other retail/service categories that performed poles apart included retail services, 
where  independent  retailers  increased  by  +4.9%  in  the  relative  and  +0.6pp  in  the 
absolute measure, compared to the respective declines of -9% and -0.3pp recorded by 
the corporate retailers. Further, both types of convenience retailers performed more 
uniformly,  showing  somewhat  greater  resilience  to  the  economic  crisis,  especially 
when the absolute measure across the four-region sample was considered. What was 
consistent with the previously revealed trend was the small growth of independent 
retailers  in  the  southern  part  of  our  sample.  In  terms  of  financial  &  business  and 
leisure  services  the  performance  of  both  corporate  and  independent  retailers  was 
comparable, with southern regions once again demonstrating stronger resilience. 
As in the main descriptive analysis (Figures 5.5 – 5.9) here we also analyse each 
broad retail/service category in more detail. As Figure 5.11 shows, virtually all types of 
independent comparison retailers have observed declines. Some of the most adversely 
affected categories such as independent footwear, greetings cards, toiletries & beauty, 
chemists  and  DIY  retailers  recorded  large  declines  of  -10%  or  more.  Conversely, 
independent  department  &  variety  stores  observed  large  relative  increase  in  their 
numbers,  contradicting with the trend  amongst  corporate  retailers.  Partly, the  low 
number of independent department & variety stores in our sample can explain such a 
trend but more importantly, it was the closure of Woolworth’s stores that had largely 
contributed to the observed decline in the corporate department & variety stores. 
Further, unlike the tendency amongst independent retailers, five multiple comparison 
retail categories including toiletries & beauty, toys & games, crafts & gifts, hardware & 
household goods and DIY increased the number of stores between the pre-crisis and 
within-crisis surveys. In terms of the geographical split, the independent sector in the   Chapter 5 
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southern  part  of  our  sample  performed  notably  stronger  than  in  the  northern, 
recording small gains in two subcategories, namely ladies’ and childrens’ wear. 
 
Figure 5.11: Relative change in comparison retail categories by corporate and 
independent retailers 
 
The largest declines in corporate comparison retail are attributed to the closures of 
Adams stores trading kids wear and in the case of florists to the exceptionally small 
numbers  of  affiliated  stores,  where  a  drop of six  units  caused  a  decline  of -40% . 
Overall, it can be seen from Figure 5.11 that although a few corporate comparison 
retail types have experienced large deterioration in their performance, independent 
retailers  have  primarily  felt  the  effects  of  the  economic  crisis  and  rising  online 
shopping. Multiple retailers are normally better equipped to deal with the impacts of 
such external shocks, and unless a top-down decision is taken to close down the whole 
chain or substantial part of it, they are more likely to demonstrate more resilience, at 
least temporarily, to the factors such as declining consumer spending, lower footfall or 
increasing online competition. 
The performance of the main types of convenience retail, with the exception of 
convenience stores, analysed in detail in the previous section, is shown in Figure 5.12. 
Overall, it can be seen that the independent convenience sector has shown greater 
resilience  to  the  economic  crisis  than  corporate  retailers,  clearly  demonstrated  by 
increases  in  four  of  its  categories  in  the  southern  part  of  the  sample  and  in  two   Chapter 5 
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categories (grocers & delicatessens and off licences) in the entire sample. The most 
adversely  affected  types  of  corporate  retailers  in cluded  butchers,  greengrocers, 
grocers & delicatessens and off licences. Such results could be associated with  two 
different factors. First, the small base used to calculate changes in corporate butchers, 
greengrocers, grocers & delicatessens had the capac ity to produce high values in 
relative measure. Second, the large decline in off licences was attributed to First 
Quench Retailing going into administration. 
 
Figure 5.12: Relative change in comparison retail categories by corporate and 
independent retailers 
 
Likewise,  the  small  number  of  independent  supermarkets  has  produced  large 
relative  changes  and  the  small  decline  in  corporate  superstores  is  almost  entirely 
associated with Kwik Safe chain closure in the northern part of our sample and the 
divestment of some Somerfield stores, which were taken over by the Co-op Group in 
2009.  On  the  contrary,  the  overall  number  of  the  'big  four'  supermarkets  (Asda, 
Morrison, Sainsbury’s and Tesco), already having 65% share in the UK grocery sales 
(Wrigley, 2010) continued rising. In the case of the four-region sample the relative 
measure indicates a considerable increase (+14.2%) of those supermarkets, recording 
24 net entries between the pre-crisis and within-crisis surveys.  
Perhaps  most  surprising  were  the  poles  apart  changes  recorded  by  the  retail 
services,  where  overall  a  number  of  independent  retailers  recorded  substantial   Chapter 5 
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growth, as opposed to the multiples. However, when taking into consideration the 
more  detailed  categorisation  it  became  apparent  that  the  large  increase  in  the 
numbers of health and beauty shops completely masked the substantial declines in the 
travel agents, photo and video services, principally linked to the adverse impacts of e-
commerce.  
5.3  Modelling vacancy rate change 
5.3.1  Nature of the response variable 
The analysis uses change in vacancy rates between the pre-crisis and the within-crisis 
surveys as the response variable in the multivariate modelling. Although it is not a 
comprehensive  measure  of  town  centre  vitality,  (see  the  limitations  discussed  in 
sections 4.3.4  and 4.3.5)  it  is  the  most  commonly  used  indicator  of  the  impact  of 
macroeconomic shock on UK town centres and high streets. Additional measures of 
‘vitality  and  viability’,  specified  by  the  PPS6  such  as  quality  of  built  environment, 
accessibility or perceived strength of key stores, do not depict the subtle nature nor 
extent of the economic crisis impact on the structure of UK town centres.  Indeed, 
descriptive analyses showed that the biggest change in retail centres configurations 
during the economic crisis was the closure of retail/service-units, which in turn, lead to 
It is clear from Figure 5.4, depicting the aggregated differential performance of broad 
retail/service categories, that overall vacant retail recorded large increases between 
the pre-crisis and within-crisis periods. The response variable takes into account the 
absolute change in vacant retail and has been calculated for each of the 267 centres, 
implementing  both  variable  and  fixed  town  centre  boundaries.  As  Figure  5.13 
illustrates, the trend within our response variable was far from uniform, displaying 
complex  spatial  variability  across  the four-region  sample. Taking  into  consideration 
their economic performance it simply divides the 267 retail centres into two groups: 
(a) those that have shown some resilience to the shock of economic crisis recording 
decreases or holding their vacancy rates constant between the analysed periods, and 
(b) those that have displayed fragility recording increases in their vacancy rates either 
above or below the average change.    Chapter 5 
123 
 
Overall, Figure 5.13 reveals that 69.3% of our sample town centres/high streets 
experienced  increases  in  vacancy  rates  between  the  pre-crisis  and  within-crisis 
surveys, with some centres recording raises in the range of 5 to 10 percentage points 
(pp). On the contrary, 22.8% of our sample centres recorded declines in vacancy rates 
and  further  7.9%  experienced  no  change  between  the  pre-crisis  and  within-crisis 
surveys. That is to say that almost a third of our sample had been very resistant to the 
shock of economic crisis and either remained stable or enhanced their vitality despite 
unfavourable  economic  conditions.  Taking  into  account  the  geographical  split,  the 
North-South divide was explicit with 81.1% of northern centres recording increases in 
vacancy rate in comparison to the 63.3% recorded by the southern centres. 
 
Figure 5.13: Spatial variation in vacancy rate change in the four-region sample  
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Furthermore, in relation to the dynamic and evolutionary trajectories of UK high 
streets, outlined in previous chapter, it should be highlighted that vacancy-rate change 
is  a  multi-dimensional  variable.  Findley  and  Sparks  (2010)  pointed  out  that  some 
vacancies may be a sign of on-going and essential readjustment, thus not always being 
an indicator of the fragility of a town centre/high street. In stable economic conditions, 
a degree of what is termed retail churn is essential to accommodate and facilitate 
often rapidly changing retailers’ requirements in terms of store formats, sizes, and 
preferred locations within town centres/high streets.  In other words, a certain level of 
vacancy  is  essential  to,  and  reflects,  a  `healthy  high  street'.  In  periods  of 
macroeconomic shock, a somewhat higher churn rate might be necessary, allowing a 
self-organising anticipatory or reactive reconfiguration of town centres/high streets. 
This  is  to  say  that  some  retail  centres  as  a  result  of  an  economic  shock  might 
temporarily increase their vacancy rates in order to facilitate the reorganisation  of 
their configurations and the renewal of their growth paths. Further issues related to 
our response variable pertained to the variable nature of constantly evolving town 
centre boundaries. Thus, at this stage it was essential to establish the extent to which 
the variable boundary issue was associated with the alteration in computed vacancy 
rate. As vacancy rate change can be calculated within fixed boundaries, allowing us to 
report what might be termed the like-for-like increases or decreases in vacancy rates, 
both fixed and variable boundaries results were derived. Overall, the average change 
in vacancy rate across the 267 centres was similar in the case of both methods with 
+2.2pp for the fixed and +1.9pp for the variable boundaries. However some centres, 
especially those that were undergoing transformation or expanded their boundaries in 
between  the  pre-crisis  and  within-crisis  surveys,  have  recorded  far  greater 
discrepancies. In order to minimise the bias in our results, we have taken into account 
both  types  of  town  centre/high  street  boundaries  when  modelling  the  variance  in 
vacancy rate change. Nevertheless, the final and best supported model has employed 
the 'fixed boundary' method, as it has delivered slightly more robust results.  
   Chapter 5 
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5.3.2  Specification of the explanatory variables 
The factors potentially accountable for the variance in our response variable were 
directly drawn from the theoretically specified determinants of vacancy rate described 
in Chapter 2. Furthermore, the schema of Findlay and Sparks (2010), shown in Figure 
2.1, implies that the differential performance of UK high streets and town centres, 
measured  by  changes  in  vacancy  rates,  could  be  seen  as  a  result  of  the  shock  of 
economic  crisis  being  filtered  through  two  structures.  First,  through  the  regional 
economic  system  in  which  town  centres/high  streets  were  located  was  likely  to 
produce  regional,  sub  regional  and  local  variations  in  levels  of  both  consumer 
confidence and demand across the hinterlands of those centres. Second, through the 
existing  economic  structures  of  town  centres/high  streets  themselves  such  as  pre-
existing  mix  of  businesses,  the relationships  and  interdependencies  between those 
businesses and local institutional supportive or unsupportive structures.   
As a result, the attempts to identify potentially significant explanatory variables 
focused  on  capturing  both  those  dimensions.  They  have  been  captured  by  a  wide 
range  of  theoretically  grounded  indicators  and  it  was  of  central  importance  to 
establish the expected sign of each coefficient accordingly to the available evidence 
(Table 5.2) rather than common perception, often shaped by the media and various 
NGOs. In terms of the first dimension, a clear North-South divide was present in the 
descriptive findings reported above and supported by similar results of commercial 
research companies e.g. LDC. As far as the multivariate modelling was concerned, the 
expectation was that the high streets located in southern regions, which had stronger 
underlying growth dynamics in the pre-crisis period would, other things being held 
constant,  have  resulted  in  less  dramatic  increases  in  vacancy  rates  than  similarly 
configured  retail  centres  in  the  more  vulnerable  regional  economies  of  the  North. 
There was also the expectation that within regional economies, holding other things 
constant,  town  centres/high  streets  with  more  affluent  catchments  or  with 
demographics favouring higher spending would also have performed better in terms of 
vacancy rate changes.    Chapter 5 
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In terms of the second dimension, the economic structures and configurations of 
town  centres/high  streets  themselves,  the  focus  was  on  the  following  groups  of 
factors: 
(a) The mix and interdependencies of businesses which included the balance of 
retail  versus  service  units,  the  retail  diversity,  proxied  by  a  proportion  of  small 
independent  retailers  and  the  presence  or  entry  via  a  town-centres-first  policy-
compliant in-centre or edge-of-centre site, of a corporate foodstore. The expectations 
here  were  that  factors  increasing  attractiveness  of  a  town  centre  as  a  shopping 
destination should be seen as potentially protective of its vitality and viability. For 
instance,  the  presence  of  both  leisure  services  (Zweeden,  2009  and  supermarkets 
(Powe and Shaw, 2004, Wrigley, 2010b) appeared to have been the crucial elements of 
a  successful  retail  centre.  The  former  is  often  associated  with  hedonic  shopping 
providing  the  'unique  experience'  and  the  latter  often  by  anchoring  smaller  town 
centre/high street increases its attractiveness as a shopping destination. The presence 
of various services and a corporate foodstores in a retail centre offer complementary 
commodities Wrigley and Dolega, 2011) which have the potential not only to increase 
the footfall but also the time and frequency of visits and by the mechanism of linked 
trips  encourages  the  retention  of  expenditure.  Furthermore,  small-retailer  trade 
organisations  and  NGOs  have  argued  that  the  diversity  of  independent-specialist-
stores dominating town centres/high streets was potentially a protective, but fragile 
factor. 
(b) Local supportive or unsupportive institutional structures and business practices 
that affect the visual and functional attractiveness of the town centre/high street were 
investigated.  In  particular,  the  importance  of  indicators  such  as  investment  in  the 
design  and  maintenance  of  the  built  environment  and  `streetscape'  of  the  centre; 
involvement  in  Business  Improvement Districts (BIDs)  schemes;  funding  of  a  `town 
centre  manager';  supportive  car  parking  policies;  attraction  of  key  `magnet  stores' 
entry and/or investment in temporary `crowd-pulling' attractions. The first two factors 
enhance the attractiveness of a town centre/high street; the presence of town centre 
manager is essential to envisage its future and adequate and reasonably priced car 
park provision encourages consumer spending spillover. Additionally, attracting the   Chapter 5 
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‘crowd-pulling’  stores  and  organising  different  events  such  as  market  days  as 
suggested  by Portas  (2011),  are  crucial  practices/interesting  ideas  supporting town 
centre vitality in economically challenging times. In effect, we have expected these 
factors to be protective of town centres’ vitality and viability and prevent them from 
large increases in vacancy rates. 
(c) The physical configuration of the town centre or high street and the extent to 
which  that  might  help  facilitate  the  processes  of  reconfiguration  and  renewal.  In 
particular, the overall size of the town centre/high street, recently completed new 
retail  floorspace,  its  position  within  the  retail  hierarchy  and  the  distribution  of 
floorspace across units in the centre was important. In terms of the centre size, it was 
unclear what impact it would have on the vacancy rate as there were arguments that 
larger  centres  potentially  offer  a  wider  variety  of  niches  but  also  higher  levels  of 
competition in comparison to the small centres. However, researchers (e.g. Findlay 
and  Sparks,  2009)  agree  that  retail  centres  characterised  by  higher  proportions  of 
larger  modern  shop  units  offering  the  potential  for  flexible  reconfiguration  when 
compared  with  the  older  less  adaptable  retail  fabric,  were  expected  to  be  more 
resilient  to  the  onset  of  economic  crisis.  Finally,  the  level  of  what  can  be  termed 
structural vacancy in the town centre/high street has been argued to be potentially 
important (Findlay and Sparks, 2009; Zweeden, 2009). Structural vacancy, normally 
defined as long-term empty units in existence for more than 12 months, indicates poor 
retail fabric and can be harmful to the attractiveness of a centre. High levels of `bad' 
vacancy as opposed to the short-run `healthy' vacancy, associated with normal churn, 
were likely to have been detrimental to the attractiveness of a town centre/high street 
and to have been associated with more severe increases in overall vacancy rates.  
Table 5.3 provides a summary of the determinants of vacancy rate, employed by 
our  multivariate  modelling  as  explanatory  variables  and  additionally  indicates  the 
theoretically expected impact on the change in vacancy rate. Overall, there were three 
types of such impacts distinguished: positive, negative and uncertain. The latter type 
depicts those factors that were subject to some sort of ambiguity in previous studies, 
either  having  been  found  to  have  positive  and  negative  influence  or  having  been 
inconclusive.  In  terms  of  technical  specifications  of  our  explanatory  variables,  the   Chapter 5 
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regression model had employed both types the numerical and categorical, however 
numerical coefficients were prevailing, and only a few dichotomous variables such as 
South-North  divide  or  presence/entry  of  corporate  foodstores  were  used. 
Furthermore, the majority of numerical variables have been systematically calculated 
as the percentage of the values recorded pre-crisis period used as a base. Finally, the 
multiplicative variable depicting an average floor space and the floor space occupied 
by  the  key  ‘magnet  stores’,  has  used  standardised  values  to  avoid  potential 
complications arising from a variety of numerical scales. 
 
Table 5.3: Summary of explanatory variables tested in the regression model and the 
theoretically expected impact on response variable  
System   Group of factors  Explanatory variable  Theoretically 
expected impact  
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  Underlying dynamics  South-North  Positive-negative 
demographics  Affluence of catchment 
areas 
Positive 
Mosaic demographics 
favouring bigger demand 
Positive 
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Mix and interdependencies 
of businesses 
Retail vs. services  Uncertain 
Diversity  Positive 
Presence/entry of corporate 
foodstore 
Uncertain 
Local business environment  Involvement in BID’s  Positive 
Funding town centre 
manager 
Positive 
Ease of parking  Positive 
Presence of a key magnet 
store 
Positive 
Physical  configuration  of 
town centres 
Town centre size  Uncertain 
Structural vacancy  Negative 
Modern and adaptable retail 
fabric 
Positive 
5.3.3  Best supported model of vacancy rate change 
The  best  supported  and  theoretically  grounded  model  of  vacancy  rate  change 
between  the pre-crisis and  within-crisis  periods  is  summarised  in  Table  5.4.  It is  a 
parsimonious seven-variable ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model obtained 
after  exploration  of  many  different  specifications  of  possible  sets  of  explanatory 
variables.  The  model  has  retained  seven  variables  which  might  capture  the  two   Chapter 5 
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dimensions discussed above, dimensions through which the shock of economic crisis 
was filtered into differential changes in vacancy rates across our four-region sample of 
267  town  centres  and  high  streets.  Negative  parameter  estimates  indicate  factors 
which, holding all other things constant, are associated with reductions in the rate of 
increase in vacancy rate between the pre-crisis and within-crisis surveys. These factors 
could be linked to relative improvement in performance of town centres/high streets; 
in  other  words  the  enhanced  resilience  during  economic  crisis.  Positive  parameter 
estimates indicate the opposite; factors associated with relative worsening of UK high 
streets’ performance or increased fragility during economic crisis. Overall, the model in 
Table 5.4 explains 36% of the variability in our response variable, the complex changes 
in vacancy rates shown in Figure 5.13 which is a respectable level for a parsimonious 
model of a relatively large cross-sectional sample, a model which leaves more than 250 
degrees of freedom. 
 
Table 5.4: A parsimonious theoretically grounded model of vacancy-rate change 
Explanatory Variable          Parameter 
estimate 
Standard 
Error 
T-value 
Constant                                                -0.076  0.019        -3.998
** 
South-North divide                              -0.016  0.004  4.170
** 
Centre size (Log)                                  +0.013  0.002  +5.743
** 
Retail diversity pre-crisis                    -0.027  0.013         -2.139
* 
Corporate food store entry                -0.008  0.004         -2.081
* 
Retail vs services % pre-crisis            +0.095  0.021  +4.463
** 
Structural vacancy pre-crisis              +0.060  0.010  +6.130
** 
Std  Avg  Store  Size  x  Std  magnet  store 
floorspace                  
-0.349  0.082  -4.243
** 
* *parameter estimate
 significant at 1%, 
*significant at 5%       R squared = 35.6        N = 259 
 
P-value for normality test of residuals =0.84 
Durbin-Watson d value = 2.17  
Condition index value of = 28.61 
--------------------------------------------------------  
 
The model has been subject to a series of standard tests to check that it conforms 
to  OLS  assumptions  and  provides  robust  estimates.  The  OLS  assumption  tests  are 
summarised below the table and their graphical representations are shown on Figure 
5.14. Firstly, the normality test with p-value of 0.84 and the histogram of standardised 
residuals  suggest  normally  distributed residuals.  Secondly, both the  Durbin-Watson   Chapter 5 
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test  and  the  scatterplot  of  standardized  residuals  plotted  against  standardized 
predicted  values  show  reasonably  constant  variance,  thus  indicating  there  is  no 
evidence of heteroscedasticity in the dataset. Thirdly,  the condition index value of 
below 30 implies that there is no significant multicollinearity in the dataset. Finally, 
although the White test has not been performed the standardized residuals plotted 
against  the  case  number  form  a  random  scatter  about  zero,  suggesting  that  the 
assumption of independence of data holds well.  
 
Figure 5.14: Graphical representation of OLS assumptions  
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Further, outlier and leverage plots were used to check the robustness of the model 
and  on  the  basis  of  outlier/high-leverage  detection  criteria  which  have  become 
standard practice in regression diagnostic approaches (Belsley et al, 1980; Henderson 
and Velleman, 1981; Wrigley, 1983), a small number of centres (8) were removed from 
the  initial  sample  of  267  retail  centres.  Most  of  the  outliers  have  already  been 
highlighted by the EDA analysis in the previous chapter and they included those retail 
centres  that  were  undergoing  transformation  between  the  survey  periods  or  their 
characteristics had extreme values affecting the results.  
Nevertheless,  it  has  to  be  acknowledged  that,  more  than  60%  of  the  complex 
spatial variability of changes in vacancy rates remains unaccounted for. Thus, there is a 
strong probability that there may be missing explanatory variables that have not been 
included in our model and they could have important role to play in accounting for the 
differential performance of our 267 retail centres in response to the shock of global 
economic crisis.  In particular, variables such as rents, footfall and parking charges are 
perceived to play a significant role in the economic health of town centres and high 
streets, thus would unquestionably strengthen the model, but such systematic data for 
each retail centre was not available to this study. Omission of either of these variables 
may have played a role in our inability to retain a catchment affluence variable in the 
model reported in Table 5.4.  
The interpretation of our cross-regional model results should be as follows. Town 
centres and high streets in the four-region sample displayed the greatest resilience to 
the shock of economic crisis sustaining their vitality and viability (measured by lower 
rates of increase, or reductions, in vacancy rates) if they were more likely, all other 
things being equal/held constant to have been: 
  southern rather than northern; 
   smaller rather than larger; 
  those  whose  business  mixes  in  the  pre-crisis  period  were  characterised  by 
higher proportions of service units relative to retail units; 
  those whose retail unit compositions in the pre-crisis period were characterised 
by the diversity offered by higher proportions of small independent specialist 
stores;   Chapter 5 
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  those which, despite the shock of economic crisis, had experienced between 
the  pre-crisis  and  within-crisis  surveys  an  in-centre  or  edge-of-centre 
corporate-foodstore  entry  which  conformed  with  the  town-centres-first 
approach to retail-planning policy; 
  those with lower levels of structural vacancy in the pre-crisis period i.e., with 
lower  levels  of  the  `bad'  long-term  vacancy  potentially  harmful  to  the 
attractiveness of town centres/high streets; 
  those whose physical structures going into economic crisis could be seen as 
both relatively attractive and facilitative of reconfiguration; in the model this 
was proxied by larger average store sizes which additionally had higher levels of 
that  floorspace  occupied  by  twenty  of  the  UK's  key/`magnet'  retailers;  the 
multiplicative effect of these two characteristics. 
The  majority  of  these  findings  are  consistent  with  our  theoretical  expectations 
outlined above. For example, filtering the shock of economic crisis through regional 
structures  that  in  the  pre-crisis  period  had  stronger  underlying  growth  dynamics 
(southern  regions)  is  clearly  reflected  in the model,  with  a  North-South  coefficient 
being very robust. Similarly, filtering the macroeconomic shock through the mix and 
interdependencies  of  businesses  within  town  centres/high  streets  and  the  physical 
configurations of those centres produced theoretically expected results. The beneficial 
effects of centre diversity based on small independent specialist stores, town-centres-
first  policy-compliant  and  expenditure-retaining  corporate  foodstore  entry  and  the 
presence  of  modern  large  crowd-pulling  stores,  which  increase  town  centre 
attractiveness, were reflected by the model.  Additionally, in terms of the detrimental 
impacts, the long-term structural vacancy, as expected, contributes to the increases in 
vacancy rates. Moreover, in the case of factors such as the influence of centre size or 
proportion  of  services  relative to  retail,  where  our  expectations  were  theoretically 
more  ambiguous,  our  findings  that  smaller  centres  and  those  with  raised  ratio  of 
services performed better are supported not only by the descriptive results but also by 
similar findings reported by the LDC. 
It is important, however, to highlight that the model shown in table 5.3 includes 
none  of  the  measures  of  the  group  of  factors  which  we  termed  supportive  local   Chapter 5 
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institutional  structures  and  business  practices.  Several  of  our  proxies  such  as  BIDs 
scheme participation, presence of a town centre manager or a number of car park 
spaces,  when  included  in  preliminary  specifications  of  the  model,  had  parameter 
estimates  consistent  with  our  theoretical  expectations,  however,  at  best  they 
suggested weak relationships and none approached conventional levels of significance. 
Thus, it could be questioned whether this group of factors has not been retained by 
the  model  as  a  result  of:  inappropriate  proxies  being  selected,  the  peculiar 
configurations of our 267 town centres/high streets sample, or because they genuinely 
had  a  relatively  marginal  impact  on  differential  performance  of  our  retail  centres 
between the pre-crisis and within-crisis periods. Similarly, our expectation was that 
within regional economies, holding other things constant, town centres/high streets 
with catchments that are more affluent or with demographics favouring higher rates of 
consumer demand were likely to have been more resilient to the shock of economic 
crisis than the centres with less affluent catchments. However, while they produced 
parameter estimates with the expected signs, suggesting stronger relationships with 
centre  performance  than  the  factors  associated  with  the  local  institutional 
structures/business practices group, none of the proxies of catchment affluence we 
experimented with, reached conventional levels of significance. 
5.3.4  Model-predicted vacancy rate changes  
To  help  visualise  the  significance  of  the  multivariate  modelling  findings,  I  have 
created a graphical summary, shown in Figure 5.15, which depicts the effects of four of 
the  explanatory  variables  in Table 5.4  on predicted  values of  vacancy-rate  change. 
With the remaining three explanatory variables having been set at their average values 
the `larger/smaller', `high/low', etc. values of four assessed explanatory variables are 
defined by setting them to their upper or lower quartile values. Firstly, showing the 
impacts of the North-South divide on the differential performance of UK high streets, 
Figure 5.15 displays the 267 centres in two different tables – southern group on the 
left-hand side and northern group on the right-hand side. Secondly, the impacts of 
foodstore entry and centre diversity on the predicted increase in vacancy rate are 
shown in the respective quadrants of each table. The numbers in the large green circle   Chapter 5 
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within each quadrant display the predicted increases in vacancy rate and the numbers 
in  parentheses  depict  the  number  of  cases  in  the  sample  falling  into  that 
quadrant/group. The detailed key under the diagram helps interpret what initially may 
seem a complex picture. Beginning in the top-left-hand quadrant of the left-hand side, 
Figure 5.15 provides predictions of the change in vacancy rate pre-crisis to within-crisis 
for  southern  town  centres/high  streets,  with  high  levels  of  diversity  (measured  in 
terms of the proportion of small independent specialist stores) in the pre-crisis period, 
and which also experienced a planning policy-compliant, in-centre or edge-of-centre, 
corporate-foodstore entry. According to our model, these are the better performing 
town  centres/high  streets  in  our  sample,  with  the  average  predicted  increase  in 
vacancy rate of +0.5pp. 
 
Figure 5.15: Visualising the impacts of four of the explanatory variables in Table 5.4 on 
predicted values of Vacancy Rate Change  
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Finally, including the fourth dimension, which depicts the impact of centre size on 
the increases in vacancy rates, it is clear that smaller centres have performed better 
than larger centres. Thus, the smaller centres within this group would perform best 
with the absolute vacancy rate (M2) decreasing by -0.02pp. If that specification is then 
changed  slightly  from  smaller  to  larger  town  centres/high  streets,  all  other  things 
remaining  the  same,  Figure  5.15  shows  the  predicted  vacancy  rate  would  have 
changed  from  the  small  (-0.02pp)  decrease  to  a  +1.26pp  increase.  In  summary, 
therefore, the graphical representation of the most policy significant variables suggests 
that southern, smaller town centres/high streets, with high levels of diversity in the 
pre-crisis  period  and  with  corporate-foodstore  entry  between  the  pre-crisis  and 
within-crisis surveys, would display the strongest resilience to the economic crisis.  
Conversely, in the lower right-hand quadrant of the right-hand table of Figure 5.15, 
are displayed the predicted increases in vacancy rates for what, on the same basis, the 
model predicts to be poorer performing town centres/high streets. Here, in the case of 
northern, larger town centres/high streets, with low levels of diversity in the pre-crisis 
period, and which did not experience corporate-foodstore entry between the pre-crisis 
and within-crisis surveys, the model predicts that the absolute vacancy rate would 
have increased by +4.39pp. This is to say, almost 5 percentage points worse than the 
small improvement (-0.02pp) predicted for the best performing centre-type, shown in 
our graphical representation of the model.  
In summary, the examination of Figure 5.15 shows that, other things being held 
constant, town centres/high streets located in northern regions of England have been 
likely  to  increase  their  vacancy  rates  by  additional  +1.6pp  in  comparison  to  their 
southern counterparts. Further, the effect of the town centre/high street being larger 
rather than smaller has been predicted to raise the vacancy rate by +1.3pp. On the 
same  basis,  Figure  5.15  shows  that  diversity  and  corporate  foodstore  entry  have 
identical impacts on predicted changes in vacancy rates. The predicted vacancy rate is 
raised by +0.8pp if the town centre/high street had low rather than high diversity in 
the pre-crisis period, and raised by an identical +0.8pp if the town centre/high street 
did not experience corporate-foodstore entry located either in-centre or edge-of-town 
centre. Other explanatory variables, which were retained by our model but were not   Chapter 5 
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shown in Figure 5.15, included levels of structural vacancy and the balance of retail 
relative to service units. In a similar fashion, the obtained increases in vacancy rates for 
high/low levels implied that the effect of high structural vacancy levels, holding all 
other things constant, was predicted to increase vacancy rates by +1.5pp and high 
proportion  of  retail  relative  to  services  had  detrimental  effect  on  vacancy  rates, 
increasing them by +1.1pp. Table 5.5 shows the importance of each variable on the 
predicted change in vacancy rate. 
 
Table 5.5: Importance of the cross-regional variables on the predicted vacancy rate 
change 
Retail centre characteristic (variable)  Predicted impact on vacancy rate 
Southern rather than northern 
Low structural vacancy 
Smaller size 
High proportion of services 
High diversity 
Entry of a corporate foodstore 
Multiplicative variable 
-1.6pp 
-1.5pp 
-1.3pp 
-1.1pp 
-0.8pp 
-0.8pp 
-0.5pp 
 
Finally, taking into consideration all seven significant variables the predictions of 
vacancy  rate  changes  for  two  polar  opposite  -  best  and  worst  -  scenarios  were 
obtained. First, which assumed that all parameter estimates had the expected sign and 
their values were set at upper quartiles, produced the predicted vacancy rates changes 
for  a  hypothetically  top  performing  town  centre/high  street  at  -1.3pp.  Conversely, 
town centres/high streets with most vulnerable dynamics, in other words those which 
all  parameter  estimates  had  the  opposite  sign,  were  predicted  to  increase  their 
vacancy rates by +6.1pp.  
Some of the absolute differences in vacancy rate change, predicted for various 
levels e.g. larger/smaller, high/low and so on, of the factors included in the model, 
might seem somewhat muted, however, this could be explained by the limited time 
which separates our pre-crisis to within-crisis surveys and the particularities of the 
available  four-region  sample.  However,  the  overall  difference  between  the  most 
resilient and the most fragile configurations of about 7.5pp can produce a substantial 
change in vacancy rate in the case of medium and large size town centres. What it   Chapter 5 
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means in real terms for a large town centre such as Liverpool Central, which comprises 
about 1000 outlets, is a decrease/increase of about 75 vacant units. These findings, 
although less important at the local scale, certainly provide important indicators to 
town centres’ managers and  local authorities of the district an regional retail centres. 
5.3.5  Cluster analysis 
The depiction of UK town centres’ and high streets’ complex adjustment to the 
economic crisis derived by the OLS regression model represents a two-dimensional 
performance  of  those  centres,  attributing  their  success  or  failure  to  a  positive  or 
negative sign of the derived coefficients. Although such a model is fundamental to 
establishing  the  significant  drivers  of  vacancy  rate  change  and  quantifying  their 
influence, it can be argued that the regression model is somewhat less successful when 
it comes to the actual observations, especially when the value of the coefficient of 
determination is below 0.4. The comparison of vacancy rate change predictions, shown 
in  Table  5.15,  and  the  actual  changes,  recorded  in  the  267-centre  sample 
demonstrated that the accuracy, within +/-1% error margin, ranged between 60%, for 
the  best  performing  quadrant,  and  20%,  in  case  of  the  weakest  one.  The  strictly 
theoretical concept of 'holding other things constant' is not always effective in the real 
world, especially when assessing the dynamic and constantly evolving configuration of 
UK town centres. One way of dealing with this issue is to employ other complementary 
types of multivariate analysis such as cluster analysis. On the one hand, such a method 
could be used to cross validate the results obtained by our regression model, and on 
the other hand, to derive various groups of centres which performed comparably due 
to  their  closely  related  characteristics.  Such  groups  can  be  termed  as  contextual 
clusters because they provide additional insights into the dynamics of the four-region 
sample, responsible for the differential adjustment of each cluster to the economic 
crisis.  Some  of  the  267  town  centres/high  streets  share  properties  regardless  of 
location, and conceptual cluster analysis can depict those. 
The  centroid  model,  by  utilising  the  k-means  algorithm,  which  represents  each 
cluster  by  a  single  mean  vector  rather  than  distance  connectivity,  and  taking  into 
account both response and explanatory variables, showed the presence of three main   Chapter 5 
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clusters in the cross-regional sample. The dendrogram derived for the cluster analysis, 
shown  in  Figure  5.16,  portrays  the  similarities  and  complex  linkages  between  the 
dynamics of the 267 town centres. At a lower and more detailed level, as many as 
eleven sub-clusters can be distinguished; however, three larger clusters, portrayed by 
different  colours,  were  chosen.  Arguably,  five  different  clusters  could  be  chosen, 
however it was felt that in terms of the town centres’ differential performance it could 
create  a far  too  complex  picture.  In  simple terms,  the  chosen  option  implied  that 
within the cross-regional sample there different responses to the shock of economic 
crisis could be distinguished. As Figure 5.17 shows, the distinctive characteristics of 
each cluster have the capacity to impact vacancy rate change in three different ways. 
 
Figure 5.16: Dendrogram showing presence of three main clusters within the four-
region sample 
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 (i) First, the specific combination of factors found to have negative impact on the 
performance  of  UK  high  streets  between  the  pre -crisis  and  within-crisis  periods 
contributes to the increases in mean vacancy rate (Cluster 2).  This cluster, as Figure 
5.17 indicates, contains mainly those retail centres that were larger in size, located 
predominantly  in  the  northern  part  of  our  sample,  experienced  small  number  of 
corporate  foodstore  entries  and  additionally  were  characterised  by  low  diversity,   Chapter 5 
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measured by the proportion of independent retailers. Further, the remaining three 
dynamics  of  cluster  2  have  observed  smaller  discrepancies  in  their  means  which 
indicates  that  their  significance  was  somewhat  muted,  presumably  due  to  more 
complex  interdependencies  with  the  vacancy  rate.  Nevertheless,  those  three 
characteristics  indicate  town  centres  slightly  dominated  by  retail  units  relative  to 
services,  those  with  a  relatively  high  proportion  of  structural  (bad)  vacancy  and 
additionally those whose physical structures were relatively modern and capable of 
reconfiguration.  
(ii)  Second,  cluster  analysis  has  indicated  a  set  of  dynamics  that  were  likely  to 
enhance  the  vitality  of  retail  centres;  in  other  words  those  associated  with  the 
decrease  in  vacancy  rate.  As  cluster  3  demonstrates  the  centres  which  performed 
stronger during the economic crisis were likely to have been: predominantly southern, 
with limited corporate foodstore entry, rather small in size, and those  with a  high 
proportion of independent retailers and a prevailing ratio of services relative to retail 
units. Moreover, they were characterised by a relatively high proportion of long-term 
structural (bad) vacancy and the dominance of small outlets with only a few occupied 
by the most attractive stores.  
 
Figure 5.17: Characteristics of the three clusters present in cross-regional sample 
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(iii) Third, the set of dynamics that to an extent was protective of town centre 
performance and kept the vacancy rates relatively constant. Figure 5.17 indicates that 
cluster 1 comprised relatively large centres of both northern and southern subsamples 
which experienced a corporate foodstore entry. The level of diversity in those centres 
was about average, the structural vacancy was relatively low and the proportion of 
modern and attractive retail units was prevailing 
With few exceptions, the dynamics of clusters 2 and 3 closely resembled the results 
of the cross-regional regression model. In particular, the cluster analysis has captured 
well the configurations of poorly performing centres, where six out of seven indicators 
can be strongly associated with the previous findings. The only conflicting factor was 
the dominance of larger units with higher presence of the key ‘magnet stores’, which 
in cluster analysis unlike the regression modelling was found to be associated with the 
increases in vacancy rate change. In terms of the most resilient centres, four indicators 
were consistent with the regression model results, but the factors such as corporate 
foodstore entry, levels of long-term structural vacancy and the multiplicative variable 
have displayed less clear or even opposite trends than expected. Although cluster 3 
(associated with enhanced resilience) indicated centres with a slightly higher numbers 
of  corporate  foodstore  entries  and  a  lower  proportion  of  structural  vacancy  than 
cluster 2 (associated with fragility), it could be argued that both levels were far from 
expected.  Of  particular  interest  is  the  inconsistent  positive  impact  of  corporate 
foodstore entry on the performance of UK town centres, measured by the change in 
vacancy rate between the pre-crisis and within-crisis periods. To a degree, this could 
be explained by the presence of cluster 1, which depicts the characteristics of those 
centres that attracted corporate foodstore entry. It indicates that corporate foodstore 
entry should be associated with rather larger centres whose physical structure could 
be seen as both relatively attractive and facilitative of reconfiguration and consisted of 
high levels of retail units relative to services. This is not however, the description of the 
traditional diverse UK high street, which was portrayed by cluster 2. An attempt to 
identify the individual centres forming cluster 1 has revealed that in the majority of 
cases they were large city centres, out-of-town shopping centres or those that recently   Chapter 5 
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experienced  retail-led  regeneration  projects.  Typically,  such  types  of  modern  and 
prosperous centres are characterised by high footfall, therefore often attracting the 
investment from the large food retailers and are performing relatively well. However 
the  key  issue  here  is  the  nature  of  the  relationships  between  corporate  and 
independent retailers, as the cluster analysis shows that those both protective of town 
centre performance dynamics are not necessary shared by the same  type of retail 
centres. 
5.3.6  Assessing cluster analysis 
In order to provide additional insights into the response of our 267 retail centres to 
the onset of the economic crisis we have implemented a complementary multivariate 
technique  -  cluster  analysis.  Taking  into  consideration  the  response  variable  and 
statistically significant explanatory variables, the 267-sample has been partitioned into 
three groups of retail centres; each characterised by closely related dynamics in terms 
of their differential performance, measured by the vacancy rate change. That is to say 
that  the  complex  linkages  between  those  eight  factors,  which  varied  substantially 
across  the  analysed  centres,  have  been  decomposed  into  three  clusters.  Such  an 
approach had a number of implications. First, the cluster analysis has depicted various 
underlying trends that may be accountable for  UK town centres’ and high streets’ 
uneven  adjustment to  the  economic  crisis.  Second,  it  has  largely  corroborated  the 
results obtained by the cross-regional regression modelling, in particular by deriving 
the  dynamics  responsible  for  both  increases  in  vacancy  rates  and  protecting  town 
centre vitality. Third, as the resilient centres have been divided into two groups, it 
could be argued that the cluster analysis has exposed  an additional and important 
aspect of the complex adjustment of UK town centres to the onset of economic crisis. 
An aspect that was documented by the descriptive analysis but was not very explicit in 
our regression model results should certainly be considered when evaluating UK town 
centres’  and  high  streets’  resilience.  In  addition  to  the  characteristics  of  the  most 
resilient and most fragile centres, cluster 1 has revealed the dynamics of those centres 
that retained relatively constant vacancy rates. To some extent, this could be related 
to the limitations of our response variable, which solely by depicting the gap between   Chapter 5 
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the  pre-crisis  and  within-crisis  vacancy  rate,  did  not  portray  its  absolute  value. 
Regrettably, the two-dimensional response variable does not take into consideration 
the pre-crisis economic health of a centre and by placing the whole weight  on its 
differential performance fails to depict simultaneously the overall vitality of a centre. 
Indeed, the data analysis shows that more than half of the centres referred to as most 
resilient, in other words those that did not experienced any rises of vacancy units, had 
their pre-crisis vacancy rates higher than the entire sample average. Indeed, when the 
declines in vacancy rates of more than -3pp were considered, it became apparent that 
only 6 centres of the 26 fulfilling these criteria had their pre-crisis vacancy rates lower 
or equal to the four-region sample average.  
One implication of that issue is that some retail centres specified by the response 
variable  as  resilient,  cannot  be  associated  with  a  ‘healthy’  centre  in  the  pre-crisis 
period,  characterised  by  low  vacancy  rate.  Conversely,  a  considerable  number  of 
‘healthy’  high  streets  with  low  pre-crisis  vacancy  rates  suffered  large  increases  in 
vacancy rates. Cluster analysis appears to account for this type of centre by forming a 
group of town centres/high streets that are relatively resistant to the economic crisis 
and simultaneously recorded low vacancy rates in the pre-crisis survey.  
A  further  issue,  which  has  become  explicit,  indicates  that  the  best  performing 
centres  of  our  sample are  unlikely  to  encompass  all  dynamics  associated  with  the 
enhanced resilience to the shock of economic crisis. Cluster analysis has shown that 
only a number of factors are crucial in defining the economic performance of town 
centres,  with  the  remaining  determinants  having  smaller  or  no  impact  on  their 
economic performance.  
Finally, the fact that about 60% of the variance in our response variable remains 
unaccounted for, strongly indicates that there are other crucial factors determining the 
vacancy rate change. For instance, the cluster analysis implies that the small and most 
diverse centres experienced corporate foodstore entry to a smaller extent than the 
predominantly  large  high  streets  with  medium  levels  of  independent  retailers. 
Nevertheless, both types of town centres have shown somewhat enhanced resilience 
to the economic crisis, either holding constant or decreasing their vacancy rates. Thus, 
it is clear that both these factors are beneficial for town centre vitality and viability and   Chapter 5 
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in  the  most  desirable  scenario  independent  and  corporate  retailers  would  form  a 
symbiotic relationship. However, the evidence from cluster analysis suggests that this 
could not always be the case as only some centres were found to have shared both 
dynamics. Thus, what are the interdependencies between corporate foodstore entry 
and independent retailers observed in our four-region sample? On the one hand, the 
policy-compliant corporate foodstore could have already been present in the pre-crisis 
period enhancing their vitality. On the other hand, a number of small and diverse high 
streets performed well without a medium or large superstore and the role of attracting 
footfall and helping to retain the expenditure was taken by the convenience stores.  
However, the nature of corporate foodstore entry/presence and the extent to which 
they impact vacancy rates as well as the comprehensive role of convenience stores 
needs to be investigated further. To a degree those key issues will be analysed in 
Chapter 6 which assesses the significance of the above assumptions within the single 
urban area. 
5.4  Cross-regional results triangulated against competitors’ findings 
The assessment of the initial descriptive findings should consider two issues. First, 
how do they compare with the results obtained by the commercial consultancies, in 
particular the Local Data Company (LDC) ones. As LDC used a larger but more thinly 
spread sample of 705 UK centres, which included fewer smaller (district and local) 
centres than in the research reported here, it would be of central importance to match 
the similarities in obtained results and identify the differences. Second, what are the 
indicators of the differential performance of UK town centres and high streets, which 
might have been revealed in response to the economic shock and could have been 
used to explain the exhibited differential levels of resilience?  
First, with regard to the findings of the LDC, several observations need to be made. 
LDC has monitored the change in UK high streets regularly and has mainly charted to a 
non-academic  audience.  In  regular  reports  released  since 2009,  which  covered the 
changing  vacancy  rates  and  the  declines/increases  in  all  major  retail/service 
categories, there were many similarities to descriptive results outlined above (LDC, 
2009; 2010; 2011). They have documented well the `gathering storm', in particular,   Chapter 5 
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showing that within the first 9 months of 2009 over 25,000 shops had been closed, 
rising  retail  vacancy  rates  substantially.  It  was  reported by  LDC  that  vacancy  rates 
reached 12% at the end of 2009 and 14.5% at the end of 2010. Correspondingly, they 
have also highlighted the main contributions to closures and increased vacancy rates 
as coming from comparison retail, with convenience-retail categories displaying much 
greater  resistance  to  the  shock  of  economic  crisis.  Importantly,  they  have  also 
identified  other  reasons  having  adverse  effect  on  UK  retail  centres;  in  particular, 
increasing online sales were blamed for the misfortune of some types of retail, such as 
music, video, bookshops and travel agents. The LDC's end of 2009 vacancy figure of 
12% derived for the 705 retail centres across the entire UK is closely comparable to the 
13.1% recorded in our Q4 2008-09 within-crisis sample.  Taking into consideration that 
each  study  can  use  slightly  different  methodology,  the  final  vacancy  rate  might 
fluctuate noticeably. For instance, this study used only retail/service units as a base to 
calculate  the  vacancy  rates,  however,  had  all  units  from  the  Goad  survey  been 
accounted  for,  our  within-crisis  figure  would  have  been  11.5%.    With  regard  to 
performance of particular retail/service types, despite the different categorisations of 
comparison-retail and convenience-retail used by LDC compared with this study, the 
LDC's  findings  are  broadly  equivalent  to  those  reported  above.  In  particular, 
department stores; gifts and stationary/cards retailers; florists; furniture and related 
retailers, and music and video (or home entertainment) retailers are identified in both 
studies as amongst the hardest hit comparison retail categories, with relative declines 
in the -29% to -10% range being recorded in both. Likewise, the LDC and this study 
agree  that  the  types  of  convenience  retail  that  showed  largest  decline  in  relative 
measure  include  butchers  and  fishmongers,  confectioners,  tobacconists  and 
newsagents  (CTNs)  and  off-licences.  However,  it  needs  to  be  highlighted  that  the 
declines experienced by these categories place them at or below the lower end of the 
range  noted  for  the  hardest  hit  comparison  retailers.  Furthermore,  both  studies 
pointed at travel agents and estate agents as the fastest declining categories of retail 
services  and  conversely  coffee  shops  and  some  chain  restaurants  as  the  quickest 
growing categories observed in leisure services.    Chapter 5 
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Nevertheless, there were some differences too when comparing our results with 
those from LDC. The most striking difference relates to the average vacancy rate in the 
pre-crisis  period.  In  our  2006/07  pre-crisis  sample,  that  figure  was  10.4%,  but  in 
contrast, LDC estimated their ‘pre-crisis’ Q1 2008 vacancy rate to have been around 
4.5%.  In  part,  the  difference  reflects  a  general  reduction  in  vacancy  rates  which 
occurred  during  2006/07,  and  the  different  geographical  structure  of  the  samples. 
However, it needs to be highlighted that leading UK property consultancies expressed 
some  concerns  regarding  `confusing'  data  and  `inconsistency  of  approaches'  to 
measuring vacancy rates when reviewing LDC and related figures (e.g. Colliers CRE, 
2009)  or  in  more  general  context  (Genecon,  2011).  Colliers  reported  that  its  own 
vacancy  rate  figures,  defined  on  the  basis  of  empty  units  available  for  occupation 
(`hard voids'), rose from 7.3% in October 2006, which was a central point of our pre-
crisis sample, to 13.8% in April 2009, which in turn, was a central point of our within-
crisis sample. Given that the Colliers sample included London, where vacancy rates in 
2006 were significantly below the UK average, Colliers' figures were much closer to 
those recorded in our sample than those reported by LDC. Other differences included 
the  performance  of  some  retail/service  categories;  for  instance,  our  study  has 
indicated  an  increase  in  charity  shops  numbers,  but  the  LDC  report,  presumably 
masked by the aggregation of retail categories, showed that ‘charity, pet shops and 
other’ category had declined by -8%. In addition, both studies indicated the decrease 
in footwear and clothing retailers, however our results suggested a more moderate 
decline (-3.4%) than the one recorded by LDC (-14.9%).  
The second issue refers to the systematic and identifiable indicators present within 
the descriptive findings that could potentially explain the dimensions of the differential 
performance of UK town centres and high streets between the pre-crisis and within-
crisis periods.  One such indicator was the obvious `north-south divide' clearly visible 
throughout Figures 5.3 – 5.8. The different underlying dynamics of high streets and 
town  centres  located  in  southern  and  northern  parts  of  our  sample  have  created 
different  levels  of  resilience  to  the  onset  of  economic  crisis.  Our  findings  were 
consistent with Dorling’s (2010) recent insightful account of the persistent significance 
of the north-south divide concept, present in the economic geography of the UK. That   Chapter 5 
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divide with northern town centres/high streets performing significantly worse in terms 
of rising vacancy rates and the performance of various retail/service categories has 
also consistently been highlighted in the LDC reports. Northern centres struggling with 
the onset of economic crisis, are expected to perform even weaker in the medium 
term, given their heavier dependence on public sector employment at a time of severe 
government expenditure cuts (Anagboso, 2009). Additionally, the LDC reports suggest 
differential performance related to centre size, which, in turn, compounds the north-
south differential. The results, suggesting that large and medium-size centres in the 
north appeared to have performed poorly in terms of increasing vacancy rate and the 
medium-size centres in the south have shown much greater resilience to the shock of 
economic crisis, are in line with our findings. However, the inclusion of many small 
local and district centres by our sample has provided evidence that these types of 
centres also perform well in the South. 
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  Empirical results - single urban area  Chapter 6:
This chapter builds on the four-region sample research by moving down a scale 
from cross-regional to intra-urban. It uses three rather than two-wave survey data to 
conduct a ‘drilled down’ analysis of retail configuration adjustments in a single urban 
area - Bristol. Such a remarkably large number of systematically mapped retail centres 
in  Bristol  has  facilitated  better  understanding  of  the  intra-urban  variation  in 
performance of retail centres/high streets during the shock of economic crisis and the 
following period of austerity. 
Initially, the explanatory analysis evaluates the dynamics of Bristol retail centres 
and positions them against the cross-regional averages. Then it explores the nature of 
policy-compliant  corporate  foodstores  expansion,  and  in  particular  examining  the 
entries into small convenience stores sector. Additionally, it offers an opportunity to 
assess  the  extent  to  which  the  determinants  of  enhanced  resilience,  significant  at 
cross-regional scale, may hold at the level of a single urban area. This was achieved by 
both the descriptive analysis depicting changes in Bristol high streets’ configurations 
and the statistical modelling of vacancy rate changes defining the significant factors 
attributed to that change in each of the three-wave periods. The intra-urban findings 
support the complex nature of change in retail configurations, which has been induced 
not only by the economic crisis but also by other interrelated and powerful forces 
including  the  ‘town  centre  first’  policy,  rapid  growth  of  internet  sales  and  rise  of 
convenience culture. 
6.1  Characteristics of Bristol retail centres 
Bristol is the largest city in the South West region and is the centre of a city-region 
of about one million people. The city, in our pre-crisis period, had the highest GDP of 
any major city outside London and generated 24% of the South West’s GDP (Tallon, 
2008). Moreover, the city region has a relatively prosperous, well-educated and highly 
skilled population. Tallon (2008) argues however, that in terms of shopping Bristol was   Chapter 6 
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viewed  as  a  lower-status  destination  in  comparison  to  neighbouring  Bath,  Cardiff, 
Cheltenham or the regional shopping centre of Cribbs Causeway. This could be largely 
attributed  to  the  city’s  rather  unattractive  main  shopping  area  –  Broadmead. 
Developed in the 1950s as a replacement of the old historic shopping centre damaged 
during the war, the retail centre had little appeal, especially to the nearby affluent 
catchments.  However,  since  the  pre-crisis  survey,  Bristol  city  centre  has  changed 
considerably, mainly as a result of two projects: a) the Business Improvement District 
(BID) regeneration scheme of Broadmead area and b) the construction of an adjacent 
brand new shopping centre – Cabot Circus; both completed in late 2008.  
Bristol is notable for having a remarkably large number (50) of retail centres for 
which Goad/Experian survey data is available, therefore it offers a rich potential to 
conduct a ‘drilled down’ analysis, which can broaden the understanding of intra-urban 
variation in economic performance of high streets during the economic crisis. Such 
thorough  and  extensive  surveys  are  linked  to  the  Charles  Goad  mapping  company 
which was commissioned during the late-1960s to undertake mapping of retail centres 
by the then Department of Trade and Industry.  Remarkably, 47 Bristol retail centres 
had their surveys completed in the pre-crisis (Jul 2006) and within-crisis periods (Oct 
2008 - Feb 2009) allowing the examination of their response to the onset of the 2008-
09  economic  crisis.  Additionally,  all  those  centres  were  resurveyed  in  the  post-
recession shallow recovery period (Feb – Mar 2010), thus extending the availability of 
systematic data on those centres to a ‘third-wave’ period.  This vital information has 
facilitated an assessment of intra-urban retail centres’ resistance to and recovery from 
the global economic crisis, and additionally it allowed us to examine the extent of the 
reorientation process and emerging trajectories of growth.   
6.1.1  Retail hierarchy and centre size 
In the case of Bristol, the Goad survey data cover a remarkably large number of 
intra-urban retail centres. The systematic retail/service composition data was available  
for 47 retail centresAccording to the PPS4 definition of retail hierarchy, DTZ (2006) 
identified the City which comprised Broadmead, Baldwin/Victoria Street and Queens 
Road; 11 town centres, also referred to as major district centres, 10 district  and more   Chapter 6 
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than 20 local centres (see Appendix 2 for details). However, the Goad classification of 
retail centres in Bristol at least in some cases is questionable. As suggested by the DTZ 
some central retail areas, especially in the inner city locations, should be treated as a 
whole. For instance, there is no reasonable argument why Baldwin Street situated a 
mere 150  m  away  from  Broadmead  is a  ‘retail centre’ in its own right and the newly 
opened Cabot Circus is a part of Broadmead. On the contrary, Goad surveyors treated the 
entire inner city of a comparable in size Leeds, Manchester or Liverpool as a one retail centre – 
the central retail area. Besides, some other retail centres located within the Bristol urban 
area such as the regional shopping centre of Cribbs Causeway and a town centre of 
Kingswood  were  excluded  from  the  analysis,  due  to  the  Goad  geographical 
classification. As they were located outside Bristol Unitary Area they have not been 
accounted for as Bristol centres (see Figure 6.1 for the discrepancies between Bristol 
urban and unitary areas).  
 
Figure 6.1: Study area; comparison of Bristol unitary and urban area 
 
 
Taking  into  consideration  the  key  characteristics  likely  to  impact  Bristol  retail 
centres’ differential performance; this study provides detailed insights into a) centre 
size, b) retail/service mix, c) diversity and d) corporate foodstore presence. In terms of   Chapter 6 
150 
 
the centre size, an average Bristol high street/town centre comprised 88 outlets in the 
pre-crisis period, which was significantly fewer than the 237 units across the four-
region sample. Furthermore, as many as 35 of Bristol centres, almost 75% of the entire 
sample, were classified as small retail centres (below 100 units), a further 10 were 
medium in size and only two, Gloucester Rd and Broadmead, were large, comprising 
more than 400 units. The latter, however  had been considered as a medium-sized 
centre in the pre-crisis survey, prior to the opening of Cabot Circus in 2008 (Figure 6.2). 
On the other hand, the smallest centres such as Lockleaze, Whitchurch, Mina Rd and 
Shirehampton  Rd  comprised  no  more  than  20  retail/service  outlets.  Taking  into 
consideration  the  amount  of  floorspace  occupied  by  retail  and  service  (including 
vacant)  outlets  the  average  size  of  a  Bristol  centre  prior  to  the  economic-crisis 
measured 0.166 million Sq Ft and once again, was considerably smaller than the four-
region sample average of 0.526 million Sq Ft.   
 
Figure 6.2: Bristol analysed centres by size (no of units) 
 
 
Interestingly, the total floorspace of Bristol's largest centres such as Broadmead 
with 0.890 million Sq Ft, Bedminster (0.757), Gloucester Rd (0.676), Baldwin Street 
(0.624) and Queens Rd (0.607)  have only slightly exceeded the four-region sample   Chapter 6 
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average. However, in the case of Broadmead this has changed radically as opening of 
the Cabot Circus in 2009 has almost doubled its floorspace. The 1.54 million Sq Ft of 
Broadmead's  floorspace  area,  recorded  in  the  within-crisis  survey,  was  closely 
comparable to the size of the regional shopping centres of Cribbs Causeway and Cribbs 
Retail  Park  combined.  Remaining  Bristol  centres  have  not  observed  any  major 
developments during the analysed periods and hold their size relatively constant. On 
the  contrary,  the  smallest  centres  of  Lockleaze,  Mina  Rd,  Chandos  Rd  and 
Shirehampton Rd each had their total floorspace area under 25,000 Sq Ft, which was 
approximately an equivalent of an average size supermarket (Figure 6.3).  
 
Figure 6.3: Bristol centres by Goad (Sub) Class and their size in Sq Ft 
 
When taking into consideration both measures of retail centre size, the number of 
units was strongly associated with the floorspace in majority of Bristol high streets, 
however some centres such as Whitchurch or Millennium Square exhibited somewhat 
different patterns. The former, anchored by Asda and comprising only 12 stores, has 
been  entirely  dominated  by  the  large  grocery  superstore,  demonstrating  an 
abnormally large ratio of available floorspace to the total number of units. The latter 
although  having  a  similar  ratio,  is  a  new  development  that  has  resulted  from  an   Chapter 6 
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extensive  inner  city  regeneration  scheme  and  has  comprised  a  low  number  of 
predominantly large units occupied by sport and leisure facilities with some of them 
still having been vacant.  
6.1.2  Retail/service mix and diversity in the pre-crisis period 
The  aggregated  pre-crisis  data  for  the  analysed  Bristol  high  streets  and  town 
centres, shown in Table 6.1, shows total numbers of units and retail floorspace by 
broad retail/service type. In 2006, the overall number of retail/service outlets across 
the 47 Bristol high streets exceeded 4,000 and the total floorspace area measured in 
Sq  Ft  was  almost  7.8  million.  Furthermore,  this  was  supplemented  by  almost  0.7 
million  Sq  Ft  of  additional  newly  completed  retail  and  service  floorspace 
predominantly  as  a  result  of  the  opening  of  Cabot  Circus  immediately  before  the 
economic-crisis.  This  had  a  substantial  impact  on  the  Broadmead  vacancy  rate, 
elevating it by +8.7pp; this is to say an increase from 12.5% in the pre-crisis survey to 
21% in the within-crisis survey. 
 
Table 6.1: Bristol retail occupancy rates by Goad Sub Class 
Broad category  Retail composition in pre-crisis  
units 
no 
% of 
total 
Sq Ft 
(000) 
% of 
total 
Comparison  1129  27.6%  2208.8  28.4% 
Convenience  414  10.1%  1046.0  13.5% 
Retail services  526  12.9%  643.0  8.3% 
Financial & business  474  11.6%  752.8  9.7% 
Leisure services  971  23.8%  2216.1  28.5% 
Vacant retail  572  14.0%  901.9  11.6% 
Total  4086     7768.6    
 
One way of dealing with this issue was to use alternative fixed boundaries that 
excluded the  effect of incorporating  large new  areas  by  a  particular  retail  centre. 
Nevertheless, in this analysis we used both the variable and fixed boundaries. Table 6.1 
also shows that Bristol retailing, in terms of  the pre-crisis retail unit numbers, was 
dominated  by  comparison  retail  (27.6%)  and  leisure  services  (23.8%)  with  the 
remaining broad categories occupying between 10 and 13%. The aggregated vacancy   Chapter 6 
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rate in the pre-crisis survey at 14% was significantly higher than the averages in the 
southern  part  and  across  the  entire  sample.  When  using  available  floorspace  as  a 
measure the trend was largely duplicated, with leisure services and comparison retail 
having the biggest share in Bristol retailing at 28.5% and 28.4% respectively, followed 
by the convenience sector with 13.5%. The proportion of vacant retail for this method 
was slightly smaller at 11.6%. 
The split between comparison, convenience retail and services at the individual 
centre level, shown on Figure 6.3, has exhibited a relatively uniform trend, one which 
is comparable to the aggregated results from table 6.1 and indicates a rather healthy 
retail  mix.  However,  a  small  number  of  retail  centres  such  as  Baldwin  Street, 
Broadmead  or  Millennium  Square  appeared  to  have  been  entirely  controlled  by  a 
single retail/service category. In the case of Baldwin Street and the Millennium Square 
service outlets and in the case of Broadmead, comparison retail occupied more than 
70% of total available retail floorspace (Figure 6.4).  
The next important feature depicts a more general split between retail and service 
outlets. The cross-regional analysis indicated that a higher proportion of services is a 
key factor sustaining a centre’s vitality and viability during the economic crisis. Given 
as  a  ratio,  it  indicates  that  across  the  Bristol  sample,  on  average  there  were  1.7 
services for each retail unit, a substantially higher figure than the four-region sample 
equivalent of 1.2. Furthermore, the majority of Bristol retail centres had a relatively 
high proportion of independent retailers in the pre-crisis period, averaging 73.2%. This, 
sharply contrasting with the 64% in the South and 62.5% across the entire four-region 
sample, indicates that retail diversity was a strong element of many high streets’ in the 
city  during  the  pre-crisis  period.  High  diversity  appears  to  be  one  of  the  vital 
determinants  of  UK  high  streets’  strong  economic  performance  and  enhanced 
resilience to the shock of economic crisis (Wrigley and Dolega, 2011). There were even 
some small retail centres such as Victoria Street and Fishponds Road that completely 
lacked any presence of multiple retail, or comprised at most one multiple retail outlet 
e.g. Coral in Filwood Broadway and the Post Office in Mina Road. On the contrary, only 
a small number of Bristol retail centres contained a substantial number of multiple 
retailers. The only example where multiple retail had a dominant position in the pre-  Chapter 6 
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crisis period, occupying more than half (62.2%) of all retail outlets, was Broadmead. 
Other centres where the share of multiple retailers was substantial included several 
major districts e.g. Queens Road (45.5%), Fisponds (37.2%) and Shirehampton (35.5%) 
or other parts of the city centre e.g. Baldwin Street (37.7%). 
 
Figure 6.4: Composition and floorspace of High Streets in central Bristol 
 
6.2  Corporate foodstores in Bristol 
Corporate foodstores comprised what was termed by the Competition Commission 
large  grocery  retailers’  stores,  which  included  Asda,  Co-op,  M&S,  WM  Morrison, 
Sainsbury, Somerfield, Tesco and Waitrose. Additionally, the presence of Aldi, Lidl and 
Netto stores was considered, primarily to verify the media and press claims that the 
so-called Limited Assortment Discounters were rapidly expanding during the economic 
crisis. However, the frozen food retailers such as Iceland and Farmfoods were excluded 
from the analysis, since they formed a separate category in Goad surveys. Firstly, the 
study has  considered the overall numbers of corporate foodstores present in each 
analysed period, then depicted their split by format and location. Table 6.2 shows the 
number  of  convenience  stores  in-town  centre,  supermarkets  in-town-centre  and 
supermarkets on-edge/out of centre in each respective period.   Chapter 6 
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Table 6.2: Corporate foodstore presence/entry in Bristol 
 Grocery 
retailer 
  
Pre rec (Jul06)  Rec (Oct 08-Mar09)  Post rec (Feb10) 
C-store  
(TC) 
Supermarket 
In-TC      Edge-TC 
C-store 
In-TC 
Supermarket 
In-TC      Edge-TC 
C-store 
(TC) 
Supermarket 
In-TC      Edge-TC 
Tesco  8  2  3  12  2  3  13  2  3 
J Sainsbury  1  2  2  1  2  2  3  2  2 
Asda  -  2  -  -  2  -  -  2  - 
Morrisons  -  1  -  -  1  -  -  1  - 
Coop 
/Somerfield 
10(1)  6(7)  -  11  12  -  10  12  - 
Waitrose  -  1  -  -  1  -  -  2  - 
M&S  1  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Aldi  -  3  -  -  3  -  -  3  - 
Lidl  -        2  2  -  2  3  -  2  3 
Total  21  26  7  24  25  8  26  26  8 
 
6.2.1  Corporate foodstores during the pre-crisis period  
According  to  the  2006  pre-crisis  Goad  survey,  there  were  21  corporate 
convenience stores and 26 supermarkets located in-town-centre, which were defined 
as  those  positioned  within  Goad-identified  retail  centre  boundaries.  Convenience 
stores were specified as those with net floorspace below 3,500 Sq Ft and supermarkets 
were  identified  as  those  stores  that  had  net  selling  area  above  3,500  Sq  Ft. 
Subsequently, reflecting the Competition Commission store format classification, the 
supermarkets were subdivided further, using the threshold of 15,000 Sq Ft, into the 
mid-sized  and  large  superstores.  It  appears  that  in  the  pre-crisis  period  Coop
1 and 
Tesco had dominant position in the c-store sector with 10 and  8 outlets respectively 
(Figure 6.5). Furthermore, it can be seen from Figure 6.5 that  Sainsbury, Somerfield 
and M&S operated one convenience store each.  Taking into consideration the policy 
compliant supermarkets, Somerfield and Co-op operated the highest number of mainly 
medium-size stores in the pre-crisis period, with seven and six outlets respectively. The 
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high  number  of  Somerfield  stores  can  be  justified  partially  by  the  fact  that  the 
corporation had its headquarters in Bristol. 
 
Figure 6.5: Policy compliant corporate foodstores recorded in the pre-crisis period 
 
 
The three largest grocery retailers - Tesco, Asda and Sainsbury - each had two 
supermarkets located in various town centres. Furthermore, WM Morrison owned one 
superstore in Fishponds and the upmarket Waitrose was present in an affluent area of 
North  View.  Finally,  Aldi  and  Lidl,  representing  the  so-called  Limited  Assortment 
Discounters, operated three and two stores respectively.  
Taking  into  consideration  the  store  format,  it  was  clear  that  the  mid-sized 
supermarkets  between  3,500  and  15,000  Sq  Ft  were  prevailing  in-town-centre 
locations, with 20 such stores across the intra-urban sample. This reflected well the 
preferences in planning regulation and the subsequent adoption by major retailers to 
that regime. The remaining six large superstores present across Bristol retail centres, 
those with the floorspace above 15,000 net Sq Ft, included two Asda stores and one of 
each: VM Morrison, Waitrose, Somerfield and J Sainsbury.   Chapter 6 
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Additionally, there were four policy compliant supermarkets identified as ‘edge-of-
town centre’, positioned within 400m or 5 min walking distance from the primary 
shopping area of a particular retail centre. In this category, only stores above 3,500 Sq 
Ft were considered, as it was believed that small convenience stores located on the 
edge/out-of-centre  would  have  either  very  marginal  or  no  impact  on  an  existing 
centre. Further, three large out-of centre developments have been identified - those 
which were located beyond 400m of nearest town centres (Figure 6.6).  In turn, in this 
category only the larger superstores, with the net floorspace above 15,000 Sq Ft, were 
considered to have potentially significant impact on the nearest town centres.   
 
Figure 6.6: Edge-of-Town centre/ Out-of-Town centre corporate foodstores in pre-
crisis period 
 
 
Figure 6.6 shows that Tesco had three large format superstores (Tesco Extra), two 
of them situated on the edge-of Brislington and Fishponds Rd and one out-of-centre in 
close proximity to both Gloucester Rd and Henleaze. Sainsbury's on the other hand, 
operated two out-of centre superstores in the pre-crisis period, however, both were 
within  walking  distance  (about  800-900m)  from  Sandy  Park  and  Bedminster. 
Additionally, taking into consideration the Limited Assortment Discounters, the edge-  Chapter 6 
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of-town  stores  were  represented  by  Lidl,  having  two  additional  stores  in  the  near 
proximity  of  Bedminster  and  Southmead  Rd.  Finally,  there  were  also  several  large 
superstores shown on Figure 6.6; however they have not been accounted for by this 
study. Although the majority of these stores were located within Bristol urban area, 
the town centre of Kingswood with Asda and Sainsbury’s, and Cribs Causeway, with 
Asda  and  WM  Morrison,  were  effectively  beyond  Bristol  City  Unitary  boundaries. 
Figure 6.6 also shows the presence of an additional large corporate foodstore in the 
southern  part  of  Bristol  unitary  area,  which  was  unaccounted  for by the  compiled 
figures. What on first sight appears to have been an out-of-town development was in 
fact a large in-town-centre superstore. The WM Morrison store, which anchored the 
retail-led urban regeneration project in Symes Avenue, was excluded from our analysis 
due to the lack of systematic data. 
6.2.2  Corporate foodstore entry between the pre-crisis and within-crisis surveys 
When taking into consideration the corporate foodstore entries between the pre-
crisis  and  within-crisis  periods,  Tesco  appeared  to  have  been  the  leading  investor. 
According to Goad surveys the large grocery retailer  added four
2 new convenience 
stores (two in Baldwin Street, and one in each: Broadmead and Bedminster) bringing 
their total number up to 12 in early 2009. This represents  a 50% increase in relative 
measure (M1) on the eight stores present in the pre -crisis period. Moreover, since 
Tesco had few additional convenience stores situated outside  town centres surveyed 
by Goad, they have been excluded from the descriptive analysis. Nevertheless, Tesco 
Express has become the most common fascia amongst convenience stores in Bristol.  
Besides, Coop/Somerfield opened two stores during that  period; a convenience 
store in Shirehampton and a small supermarket (5,100 Sq Ft) in Whiteladies R d, 
replacing what in the pre-crisis period was a video rental store. However, the retailer 
closed down three of its outlets during that  period including a convenience store in 
Queens  Rd  and  two  supermarkets  in  Gloucester  Rd  and  Shirehampton,  overall 
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decreasing the total number of its outlets by one.  Although none of Bristol's analysed 
high streets/town centres was subject to the Office of Fair Trading order to divest 133 
Somerfield  stores  across  the  country  as  a  part  of  the  merger  deal  (OFT,  2009),  it 
appears that the option of having two mid-sized supermarkets (Somerfield and Coo-
op) in such a small centre as Shirehampton could have not been viable. In effect, some 
sort of trade-off took place with a voluntary divestment of Somerfield supermarkets on 
the one hand, but on the other a takeover from Texaco of a small forecourt store. 
Furthermore, according to Goad surveys M&S closed its only convenience store that in 
the pre-crisis period had operated in Millennium Square, effectively, withdrawing its 
presence from Bristol's convenience market. Finally, in terms of the heavy discounters, 
no  great  expansion  was  detected,  as  no  single  in-town-centre  entry  had  been 
recorded, although Lidl has opened one new store on the edge of Brislington. Figure 
6.7 shows all corporate foodstore entries/exits across Bristol high streets/town centres 
between the pre-crisis and within-crisis periods.  
In order to see whether the siting of new stores has been increasingly taking place 
in the more deprived areas, often viewed as retailers’ response to the tightening in 
retail planning regulation(Wrigley, 2010), this study has employed the IMD index from 
2007. The multiple deprivation scores in Bristol LA varied from around 5 to 66, with the 
lowest values representing the least deprived areas. It appears however from Figure 
6.7,  that  the  relationship  between  an  average  IMD  score  and  corporate  foodstore 
entries was unclear or at best, weak. The comprehensive examination shows that one 
of Tesco’s entries to a relatively deprived area of Broadmead/Stokes Croft (IMD score 
55.6) has resulted from an extension of Broadmead town centre boundaries by Goad 
surveyors, as the actual store opening date had been prior to the pre-crisis survey. A 
further two Tesco entries were located  in Baldwin Street, an extension to the city 
centre shopping area, which had the IMD score of 33.5. It needs to be pointed out that 
the IMD score for Baldwin Street immediate catchment area, computed the way that 
was described in Chapter 3, has little relevance as the footfall in this part of the city 
results  predominantly  from  the  activities  of  office  workers  and  night-time  economy. 
Furthermore, this trend appeared to have been followed by Sainsbury's which opened 
convenience stores in the above locations during the post-recession shallow recovery   Chapter 6 
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period. To a degree, this validates some findings of Wood et al., (2006 p.241) who 
argued that ‘… factors that are especially important in making convenience store sites 
viable include footfall and the degree of available car parking’.  
 
Figure 6.7: Corporate food stores entry/exit in Bristol between the pre-crisis and 
within-crisis periods 
 
6.2.3  Corporate foodstore entry between within-crisis and shallow recovery period  
Between  the  pre-crisis  and  within-crisis  surveys  Tesco  opened  an  additional 
convenience  store  in  Queens  Rd  and  Sainsbury's,  which  appeared  to  have  been 
catching up with its bigger competitor, opened further two convenience stores in the 
inner city locations of Broadmead and Baldwin Street. John Lewis, which opened a 
Waitrose  store  in  Queens  Rd,  filling  what  in  the  within-crisis  survey  was  a  vacant 
outlet, represented a single entry of a corporate foodstore above 3500 Sq Ft in that 
period.  Drawing  from  the  entry/exit  analysis  it  becomes  explicit  that  Broadmead, 
Baldwin  Street  and  Queens  Rd  have  been  the  key  Bristol  locations  for  corporate 
grocery retailers’ investments. Indeed in March 2010 the total number of corporate 
foodstores present only in those three locations was 12, with Tesco having the biggest 
share (6 stores), followed by Sainsbury's (3 stores), Co-op (2 stores) and Waitrose (1   Chapter 6 
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store). In terms of the store size, only the policy-compliant formats were present, with 
nine  convenience  stores  and  three  mid-size  supermarkets.  This  could  imply  that 
corporate chains are more interested in large centres because they are targeting the 
workplace market rather than traditional residential catchments.  
As  already  mentioned,  the  above  figures  excluded  four  Iceland  stores 
systematically present in Bristol high streets and town centres because they fell into a 
'Frozen food’ Goad category, rather than supermarkets. Nevertheless, the number of 
Iceland stores was constant with no new entries recorded throughout the analysed 
periods.  
In summary, the overall number of corporate foodstores in Bristol high streets and 
town centres has been on a slow but steady rise, totalling 47 in 2006, 49 in 2009 and 
52  in  2010,  predominantly  due  to  the  rapid  expansion  of  convenience  stores.  In 
addition,  the  number  of  edge/out-of  centre  stores  slight  increase.  The  remarkable 
growth in convenience store numbers was investigated further and not only corporate 
entries/exits but also the non-affiliated independent and symbol group retailers were 
considered by the more comprehensive analysis.  
6.3  Convenience stores entry/exit analysis 
The  number  of  convenience  stores  in  Bristol  high  streets/town  centres  has 
increased substantially, overall adding 23 new stores between the pre-crisis survey and 
the period of post-recession shallow economic recovery (Table 6.3). These findings 
were consistent with the substantial growth in convenience store numbers observed in 
the UK during the first half of the 2000s reported by the Competition Commission 
(2007)  and  Wrigley  et  al.,  (2009a).  Taking  into  account  the  type  of  operator  our 
analysis demonstrates that the biggest change in convenience store numbers, a raise 
of  +31.3%,  occurred  in  the  non-affiliated  independent  retailers,  whilst  increases  in 
symbol  group  and  corporate  retailers  were  slightly  smaller,  at  +28.6%  and  +23.6% 
respectively.  
Some high streets/town centres had already recorded a substantial presence of 
convenience stores in the pre-crisis period, with highest numbers ranging from 5 to 7 
recorded by Gloucester Rd, Stapleton Rd, Queens Rd and Stokes Croft. Subsequently,   Chapter 6 
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in the within-crisis period Stapleton Rd experienced the biggest net increase in stores 
numbers (+4) followed by Baldwin Street (+2) and Bedminster (+2). 
 
Table 6.3:  Overall numbers of convenience stores in Bristol by type 
Survey period  Independent  Symbol  Corporate 
Pre-crisis (2006)  32  28  21 
Within-crisis (2008/9)  41  26  24 
Post-recession recovery (2010)  42  36  26 
Overall  change 2006-2010  +10  +8  +5 
Change in %  (M1)  +31.3%  +28.6%  +23.8% 
 
Further, some Bristol retail centres such as Ashley Rd, Broadmead, Gloucester Rd 
and Stapleton Rd each experienced a number of additional net entries during the post-
recession  shallow  recovery  period.  This  provides  evidence  that  the  expansion  of 
convenience stores, partially linked to the rise of the so-called 'convenience culture', 
took place not only between the pre-crisis and within-crisis periods but the trend was 
also very robust in between the within-crisis and shallow recovery periods. As a result, 
some  Bristol  high  streets,  regardless  of  their  size,  have  begun  to  see  record  high 
numbers of convenience stores e.g. Stapleton Road (12) or Gloucester Road (10). 
6.3.1  Net vs. overall entry/exit  
The  overall  changes  in  convenience  store  numbers  across  Bristol's  high 
streets/town  centres,  shown  in  Table  6.3,  account  not  only  for  the  net  entry/exit 
experienced  by  a  particular  type  of  operator  but  also  include  the  ‘retail  churn’ 
recorded amongst those types of convenience stores. This is to say that we distinguish 
two different types of convenience store entries; (a) those that were drawn from a 
diverse range of retail categories, referred to as net entries; (b) those that resulted 
from some sort of acquisitions, mergers and fascia changes within previously existing 
convenience stores, referred to as overall entries.  
Goad surveys however, would normally record both types of entries with no clear 
distinction. Our analysis addresses this issue by constructing two separate tables, each 
depicting  a  different  type  (net  or  overall)  of  c-store  entry/exit.  Firstly,  Table  6.4 
presents only the net entries and exits, thus excluding any ‘retail churn’ associated   Chapter 6 
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with mergers or changes in facia within the c-store sector. It becomes clear from the 
table that between the pre-crisis and within-crisis periods the independent retailers 
were primarily accountable for the net increases, raising the number of convenience 
stores by 10 outlets. The gains of corporate retailers were marginal (+1) and on the 
contrary symbol group retailers observed a small decline (-1) during the same period. 
Taking  into  consideration  the  period  between  within-crisis  and  shallow  recovery, 
shows that the independent retailers continued with the expansion but only at half of 
the previous rate. Furthermore, the corporate grocery retailers observed only one net 
entry, but symbol group retailers experienced a substantial growth, adding +7 new 
convenience stores. However, some of the growth recorded by symbol group retailers 
resulted purely from the alteration in Goad classification as several units recorded in 
the within-crisis survey as CTN’s appeared in the post-crisis survey as convenience 
stores. This could be somewhat justified in the case of the outlets that had undergone 
some kind of physical modification, but this was not always the case.  
 
Table 6.4: Net entry/exit of convenience stores in Bristol, excluding churn within c-
store sector 
Period     Independent  Symbol  Corporate 
 
Between pre-crisis and  
within-crisis 
Entry  15  2  3 
Exit  5  3  2 
Net change  +10  -1  +1 
 
Between within-crisis and  
post- recession (recovery) 
Entry  8  8  3 
Exit  3  1  2 
Net change  +5  +7  +1 
Net change 2006-2010  +15  +6  +2 
Nevertheless, considering the entire period between 2006 and 2010 it can be seen 
that  the  majority  (65.2%)  of  the  net  increase  in  convenience  store  numbers  was 
accounted for by the non-affiliated independent retailers, with 26.1% of the increase 
having been represented by the symbol group and 8.7% by corporate retailers.  
In  contrast,  Table  6.5  shows  the  overall  changes  which  comprise  the  net 
entries/exits (as shown in Table 6.4) supplemented by those associated with ‘retail 
churn’ within the c-store sector, shown in brackets.   Chapter 6 
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Overall,  there  were  as  many  as  nine  such  entries  recorded  in  the  within-crisis 
survey and five during the shallow recovery period. In the former period, independent 
retailers recorded three  entries  due  to  a  change  of fascia/ownership of  previously 
existing symbol group convenience stores. The three c-stores that had been operating 
under the  fascia of  Costcutter  in the  pre-crisis  period  appeared  as  independent  c-
stores in the within-crisis survey. Conversely, as Table 6.5 indicates, four c-store entries 
observed by symbol group retailers were simply drawn from what previously were 
independent  convenience  stores.  Two  of  those  outlets  changed  their  facia  to  the 
rapidly expanding Premier Group and a further two joined the Bestway One symbol 
group but retained their previous fascias.  
 
Table 6.5: Convenience Stores overall entry/exit (including the churn within c-store 
category) 
Period    Independent  Symbol*  Corporate 
Between pre-crisis 
and 
within-crisis 
Entry  15+(3)  2+(4)  3+(2) 
Exit  5(+4)  3(+5)  2 
Overall change  +9  -2  +3 
Between within-crisis and  
post-recession (recovery) 
Entry  8  8+(4)  3+(1) 
Exit  3(+4)  1+(1)  2 
Overall change  +1  +10  +2 
Overall change 2006-2010  +10  +8  +5 
*includes filling station stores 
 
Such  new  affiliations  were  not  uncommon  across  the  country  as  independent 
retailers who joined any symbol group could enjoy the benefits associated with being a 
part  of  a  larger  organisation  such  as  lower  purchase  price  or  bigger  distribution 
network  but  importantly  they  could  also  fulfil  rising  consumer  expectations 
(Competition Commission, 2006). For instance, Londis (2011) on its website appeals to 
independent retailers listing other benefits such as training and development, which 
help  to  motivate  staff  and  improve  performance,  legal  assistance,  marketing  and 
promotions or store interior development.  
The corporate gains associated with retail churn within the c-store sector included 
Tesco Express and Somerfield, both in effect resulting from conversions of what in the   Chapter 6 
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pre-crisis had been respectively Budgens and Star Market - a small 600 Sq Ft store at 
Texaco filling station.  
Subsequently,  although  between  the  within-crisis  and  shallow  recovery  periods 
independent retailers have not experienced any entries due to ‘retail churn’ within the 
c-store category the symbol group still had continued with its previous trend drawing 
an  additional  four  stores  from  what  in  the  within-crisis  period  were  non-affiliated 
independent convenience stores. Likewise, the Co-op took over another forecourt c-
store at a Texaco filling station in the shallow recovery period. The simple diagram 
below (Figure 6.8) helps to visualise the magnitude and flow direction of 'retail churn' 
between the three types of convenience stores, showing only those entries that have 
purely resulted from change in fascia/ownership within the c-store sector.  
 
Figure 6.8: Retail churn within c-store category 
 
  C-store change between pre and within-crisis period 
                                                 4                                          2          
                   Independents                 Symbol group*                   Corporate retailers 
                                                  3        
               
            C-store change between within-crisis and shallow recovery period         
                                                 4                                       1 
                   Independents                 Symbol group*                   Corporate retailers 
 
                
*include forecourt stores  
                                   
 
Thus,  incorporating  the  entries  associated  with  'retail  churn'  within  the  c-store 
category into the net changes indicates two things when the wider period between 
2006 and 2010 is considered. First, the total change in convenience store numbers was 
constant using both methods, recording an increase of 23 units. Second, the split by 
type  of  operator  varied  considerably  with  the  non-affiliated  independent  retailers 
being responsible for 43.5% of the overall increase, symbol group 34.8% and corporate 
retailers 21.7%. This implies, perhaps not surprisingly, that both symbol group and 
corporate  retailers  were  more  likely  to  expand  by  taking  over  other,  primarily 
independent and previously existing convenience stores.  Nevertheless, in summary   Chapter 6 
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using both methods, the emerging picture was similar; the independent retailers have 
predominantly driven the increase in convenience store numbers across Bristol high 
streets and town centres. Indeed,  our analysis provides evidence that both symbol 
group and corporate retailers combined, accounted for less than half of the entire 
organic growth in convenience store numbers. 
6.3.2  Retail centre hierarchy 
Taking into consideration the hierarchy of Bristol retail centres’ it has become clear 
that both the major district centres (the town centres as referred to by PPS6) and the 
district centres experienced the highest number of convenience store entries in both 
analysed periods. In terms of entry/exit by  type of operator city and major district 
centres were the preferred choice amongst the corporate retailers. On the other hand, 
the non-affiliated independent retailers favoured  notably major district and district 
centres with local centres being rather the second option. In the case of the symbol 
group,  it  appears that there  was no preferred location  between  the pre-crisis  and 
within-crisis periods, but district and local centres were the most popular options in 
the shallow recovery period (Table 6.6). Remarkably, there was a high number of local 
centres (8) that experienced symbol group c-store entries in the latter period resulting 
either from a conversion in Goad classification or ‘retail churn’ within convenience 
stores.  Four  outlets,  presumably  as  a  'range  extension'  (Wrigley,  2007),  were 
converted from what in the within-crisis were CTN's, and a further four convenience 
stores had simply undergone an ownership change. In other words, although none of 
these local centres, according to Goad survey, experienced a physical entry of a new 
convenience store, essentially there have been eight convenience stores accounted for 
by the overall entry method. In summary, this analysis provides evidence that whilst 
corporate retailers were more likely to open new stores in locations towards the upper 
end of the retail hierarchy, the independent retailers preferred centres towards the 
opposite end.  
As  mentioned  above,  it  appears  that  the  key  location  criterion  for  corporate 
retailers  was  not  only  the  centre’s  higher  position  in  the  retail  hierarchy  but 
simultaneously the inner city location,  which is normally characterised by different   Chapter 6 
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consumer  dynamics.  City  centres  are  normally  associated  with  high  numbers  of 
visitors, workforce and students which on the one hand are likely to generate high 
footfall and on the other hand to create high demand for convenience goods. Our 
analysis confirms that the four centres that experienced corporate convenience store 
net  entry  were  located  in  the  inner  city  including  Broadmead,  Baldwin  Street, 
Bedminster and Queens Road.  
 
Table 6.6:  Convenience store entry/exit by retail centre hierarchy 
Pre/within-crisis 
Centre Type                         Net 
change 
Entry  Exit 
independ
ent 
symbol  corporate  Independ
ent 
symbol  corporate 
City    +2  0  1  2(+1)  0  0(+1)  1 
Major district       +4  7(+2)  1(+3)  1(+1)  2(+3)  2(+3)  1 
District    +2  5(+1)  0  0  3  0(+1)  0 
Local  +2  3  0(+1)  0  0(+1)  1  0 
Total  +10  15(+3)  2(+4)  3(+2)  5(+4)  3(+5)  2 
Within/post-crisis 
City    +3  0  1*  2  0  0  0 
Major district       +1  3  0  1(+1)  1  1(+1)  1 
District    +7  5  3*  0  0  0  1 
Local  +2  0  4*(+4)  0  2(+4)  0  0 
Total  +13  8  8(+4)  3(+1)  3 (+4)  1(+1)  2 
* CTN converted to CS: city x1, district x1 and local x4 
( ) number of additional stores due to change in ownership within CS category 
6.3.3  Convenience store entry and deprivation levels 
Social  exclusion  and  underserved  communities  have  become  a  key  agenda  in 
recent retail planning regulation, giving much attention to poor access of deprived 
areas to fresh food and other retail goods. Large grocery retailers have increasingly 
recognised  that there were  development  opportunities for  them,  especially  if  they 
could  position  their  stores  as  regeneration  investment  for  deprived  communities. 
Table 6.7 shows convenience store entries by average level of deprivation (IMD 2007) 
derived  for  the  immediate  catchment  area  of each  centre  and  grouped  into  three 
bands: low deprivation with IMD scores below 25, medium deprivation from 25 to 45 
and high deprivation with IMD scores above 45. The compiled numbers in Table 6.7 
imply that between the pre-crisis and within-crisis periods only medium and highly 
deprived areas experienced the net entries of c-stores and conversely the areas with   Chapter 6 
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low  deprivation  levels  have  recorded  negative  figures.  However,  in  the  shallow 
recovery period the trend was slightly different, showing a similar level of net c-store 
entries  across  all  levels  of  deprivation.    Breaking  down  these  figures  by  type  of 
operator indicates that in the case of independent retailers there was no prevalent 
trend,  with  entries  and  exits  observed  virtually  across  all  levels  of  deprivation.  
However, symbol group retailers were more likely to open new stores in both medium 
and low deprived areas with only 20% of their new entries having been recorded in 
highly deprived areas.  
 
Table 6.7: Convenience store entry/exit by deprivation score 
Pre/within-crisis 
Deprivation                 
  level                        
Net 
change 
Entry  Exit 
independ
ent 
symbol  corporate  independ
ent 
symbol  corporate 
Low (<25)               -1  4(+2)  1(+1)  0  3(+1)  1(+2)          2 
Med (25-45)           +6  4  1(+3)  3(+2)  0(+3)  2(+2)  0 
High (>45)                      +5  7(+1)  0  0  2  0(+1)  0 
Total  +10  15(+3)  2(+4)  3(+2)  5(+4)  3(+5)  2 
Within/post-crisis 
Low (<25)               +4  2  2(+1)  1(+1)  0(+1)  0(+1)  1 
Med (25-45)           +5  1  4(+3)  2  1(+3)  1  0 
High (>45)                      +4  5  2  0  2  0  1 
Total  +13  8  8(+4)  3(+1)  3(+4)  1(+1)  2 
( ) number of additional stores due to change in ownership within CS category 
 
In  the  case  of  corporate  convenience  store  entries, between  the pre-crisis  and 
within-crisis  surveys,  they  all  fell  within  medium  levels  of  deprivation,  but  in  the 
shallow recovery period, the picture was unclear. 
Thus, it should be concluded that no significant relationship between the levels of 
deprivation in Bristol and convenience stores entries has been found. 
6.3.4  Previous use  
Taking into consideration the past use of the convenience stores entries observed 
in  the  within-crisis  and  in  the  post-recession  shallow  recovery  period,  the  retail 
category they had been drawn from was established. As Table 6.8 shows, 40% of the 
new  convenience  stores’  entries  in  the  within-crisis  period  had  resulted  from 
conversions of what in the 2006 Goad survey were vacant retail units. Further, new   Chapter 6 
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outlets and previously unclassified buildings have each accounted for 10% of new c-
store entries. 
Table 6.8: Retail categories that the net entries of c-stores were drawn from     
Retail/service cat of same 
unit in previous survey 
Additional CS  
within-crisis 
Additional CS 
post-recession 
  units  %  units  % 
Vacant 
Household goods 
Electrical & durable 
CTN 
Kids/ladies wear 
Grocers & Delicatessens 
Off-Licences 
Health & Beauty 
Filling Stations 
Financial services 
Music & video 
Restaurants 
Internet café 
New units 
Unclassified 
8 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
2 
2 
40.0% 
5.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
5.0% 
5.0% 
5.0% 
5.0% 
5.0% 
5.0% 
0.0% 
5.0% 
10.0% 
10.0% 
6 
1 
1 
6 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
2 
0 
31.6% 
5.3% 
5.3% 
31.6% 
10.5% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
5.3% 
0.0% 
10.5% 
0.0% 
 
The former comprise newly built outlets but can also be partially associated with 
the  boundary  change  issue.  The  latter  have  possibly  resulted  from  some  sort  of 
reclassification in Goad categorisation as some unclassified outlets in the pre-crisis 
were recorded as convenience stores in the subsequent surveys. There then follows a 
list of eight retail categories each having had one store converted to a convenience 
store.  On  the  other  hand,  in  the  shallow  recovery  period  vacant  retail   and  CTN's 
accounted for the biggest share (31.6%), in their conversions to convenience stores; 
these were followed by new units and kids/women's wear with 10.5% and a further 
three categories with one converted unit each.   
Finally, the destiny of those units that experienced convenience store exit in either 
of  the  analysed  periods  has  been  verified.  The  results,  shown  in  Table  6.9  below 
indicate that the vast majority of those units vacated by the convenience stores were 
still vacant in the subsequent survey. Some units however had found a new occupier 
such as post office in the within-crisis period and health &  beauty in the shallow 
recovery period. 
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Table 6.9: Use of units that experienced convenience store exit 
Retail cat of same unit in 
the following survey 
C-store exit  
within-crisis 
C-store exit  
post-rec 
Vacant  6  60.0%  5  83.3% 
CTN  1  10.0%  0  0.0% 
Post Office  2  20.0%  0  0.0% 
Furniture  1  10.0%  0  0.0% 
Health & Beauty  0  0.0%  1  16.7% 
Total  10    6   
6.3.5  Assessing growth strategies adopted by food retailers  
This analysis has provided valuable insights into the consequences of more than a 
decade long tightening in retail regulation within the single urban area, demonstrating 
two interrelated aspects. The first shows that the large grocery retailers have widely 
adopted the ‘town centre first’ policy in Bristol, developing a majority of their stores 
in-town  or  edge-of-town  centre  locations.  It  has  been  found  that  of  the  33 
supermarkets considered by this study, only three were classified as the out-of-centre 
developments.  In the pre-crisis period, both the Co-op and Somerfield had the highest 
number of foodstores, which could be partially justified by the fact that Somerfield had 
its headquarters in Bristol.  Although Co-op was ordered by the Office of Fair Trading 
to divest  133  Somerfield  stores  across the  country  as part  of  a  merger  deal  (OFT, 
2009), none of the Bristol’s high streets was a subject to that mandate. Nevertheless, 
some voluntary divestment of the Somerfield supermarkets took place. Presumably, 
after  the  merger  the  Co-op  ended  up  with  not  always  a  viable  option  of  two 
supermarkets  in  some  locations.  The  second  reveals  that  majority  of  large  grocery 
retailers  have  become  flexible  in  terms  of  the  store  format,  with  the  mid-size 
supermarkets and convenience stores having been the prevailing option. The rise in 
convenience  culture  (Wrigley,  2010),  observed  across  Britain  and  other  developed 
countries,  has  contributed  to  the  rapid  expansion  in  a  number  of  the  small 
convenience stores across UK town centres and high streets (Wood et al., 2010). In 
terms  of  corporate  food  retailers,  it  has  been  found  that  Tesco  has  been  rapidly 
expanding into the sector of small convenience stores.  According to Goad surveys the 
number of Tesco convenience stores has increased by 50% in the relative measure 
(M1) between late 2006 and early 2009, taking the lead in a small store sector during   Chapter 6 
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the  within-crisis  period.  Essentially,  Tesco  Express  has  become  the  most  common 
fascia amongst convenience stores in Bristol. This rapid expansion has encountered 
some challenges, clearly demonstrated by the Bristol riots in April 2011 ‘sparked by a 
raid on a squat occupied by opponents of a newly opened Tesco Express store in Stoke 
Croft’, as the Gurdian (22 April 2011) put it bluntly.  
This study has also evaluated the nature and the extent of the convenience store 
entries. It has shown that the increases in convenience stores numbers were recorded 
by  all  types  of  retailers,  however the  independent retailers  accounted for  most of 
those entries, 65% on the net basis and 43.5% on the overall basis. The difference 
between those two figures suggests, perhaps not surprisingly, that both symbol group 
and  corporate  retailers  were  more  likely  to  expand  by  taking  over  the  previously 
existing convenience stores, predominantly independent. However, the examination of 
the past use of the net entries, has confirmed that the new convenience stores were 
most  likely  to  fill  previously  vacant  units,  having  a  positive  impact  on  a  centre’s 
vacancy rate.  
More importantly, the findings which linked corporate convenience store entry to 
the locations towards the upper end of retail hierarchy are both interesting and in a 
need of further consideration. Most of the corporate convenience stores were located 
in the four inner city locations. This suggests two things: a) city centres generate more 
footfall  including  the  night  economy  and  b)  the  geo-demographics  of  city  centre 
catchment areas differ substantially from the residential catchments.  The so-called 
emergence of ‘convenience culture’ driven by changes in consumer culture is more 
likely to prevail in such inner city locations. According to Reimers and Clulow, (2004) 
the factors responsible for the emergence of convenience culture include time scarcity, 
longer  working  hours,  increasing  leisure  orientation  and  the  increased  number  of 
males responsible for shopping, Additionally, the large labour force working in the 
offices located in and around the city centre and the high student population dwelling 
within  the  nearby  vicinity  (DTZ,  2006)  can  be  a  decisive  factor  when  choosing  a 
location for a new store. 
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6.4  Descriptive results 
Descriptive  results  have  depicted  the  differential  performance  of  retail/service 
categories across Bristol high streets and town centres in terms of their relative (M1) 
and  absolute  (M2)  changes.  Firstly,  the  period  between  pre-crisis  and  within-crisis 
surveys  was  analysed,  then  the  changes  between  the  within-crisis  and  shallow 
recovery  periods  were  established.  Such  simple  analysis  provides  a  powerful  tool, 
which  on  the  one  hand  allows  visual  comparison  of  the  immediate  response  of 
particular  retail/service  type  to  the  onset  of  economic  crisis  and  on  the  other, 
facilitates an assessment of the extent to which the recovery in the post-recession 
shallow  recovery  period  took  place.  Moreover,  the economic  performance  of each 
retail/service category in Bristol retail centres was assessed against regional trends and 
averages helping to understand the strengths and weaknesses of Bristol retail centres 
and depicting the dynamics responsible for intra-urban variations.  
6.4.1  Changes between the pre-crisis and within-crisis periods 
At first sight, the analysis of differential performance of retail/service categories in 
Bristol  retail  centres  demonstrates  parallel  trends  to  those  observed  in  both  the 
southern part and the entire four-region sample. The strongest impact of the 2008-09 
economic  crisis  was  mainly  evident  in  the  high  levels  of  shop  closures,  leading  to 
increases  in  retail  vacancy.  Comparison  retail  and  financial  &  business  services 
appeared to have been the most fragile retail/service categories, contributing most to 
shop closures, whilst leisure services were very resistant to the impacts of economic 
crisis, continuing to increase their outlet numbers. However, as Figure 6.9 shows, the 
differential performance  of  the  broad retail/service  categories  reveals  a  somewhat 
more complex picture which can be summarised as follows: 
  The within-crisis surveys the vacancy rate in Bristol stood at 15.4% representing a 
+1.4pp increase on the 14% recorded in the pre-crisis period. Although the change 
in the Bristol vacancy rate was significantly lower than the +2.3pp in the South and 
the +2.7pp in the entire four-region sample, it should be emphasized that that 
change was calculated from a high base as the Bristol vacancy rate in the pre-crisis 
period stood at 12.1%, a significantly higher figure than any regional average.    Chapter 6 
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  Bristol comparison retail,  having declined only -0.4pp in  absolute change (M2) 
terms,  proved  to  be  relatively  resilient  to  the  onset  of  economic  crisis  when 
compared to the averages in the southern region at -2.0pp and -2.5pp in the entire 
four-region  sample.  Remarkably,  since  the  actual  number  of  comparison  retail 
outlets in Bristol rose by +1.8% between the pre-crisis and within-crisis surveys, the 
relative  change  (M1)  has  displayed  a  trend  which  contrasted  sharply  with  the 
regional averages.  The change  in  comparison retail unit  numbers,  measured as 
relative change, showed substantial decline in the South at -3% and in the four-
region sample at -5.3%. 
 
Figure 6.9: Differential performance of Bristol retail by Goad subclass 
 
 
  Convenience  retail  appeared  to  have  been  somewhat  resilient  experiencing 
positive  growth  of  +1%  in  overall  outlet  numbers  between  the  pre-crisis  and 
within-crisis  surveys.  As  far  as  the  absolute  change  is  concerned,  Bristol 
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convenience  retail  recorded  a  small  decrease  of  -0.2pp.  Such  differential 
performance  of  convenience  retail  in  Bristol  was  closely  comparable  with  the 
averages for the South and the entire four-region sample.  
  Financial & business services, although declining by -0.6pp in absolute measure, 
performed slightly better than the South average of -0.8pp. Nevertheless, it was 
the weakest performing category across Bristol retail centres.  
  Leisure services have slightly increased their presence across Bristol high streets 
(+0.2pp), however it was only at half of the rates seen in the southern part (+0.5pp) 
or  across  the  entire  sample  (+0.6pp).Changes  between  the  within-crisis  and 
shallow recovery periods 
 It is clear from Figure 6.9 that, when considering the absolute change, all broad 
retail categories performed somewhat better during the shallow recovery period. This 
is to say that a minor ‘bounce back’ to a positive territory has occurred in the case of 
convenience  retail  and the  remaining  categories,  with  the  exception  of  financial  & 
business services, which continued to decline but at lower rate. Most notably, the 
compiled vacancy rate period increased only by + 0.1pp, which was an equivalent of 
seven additional vacant outlets recorded in the shallow recovery across the entire city. 
The +1.1% rise in the relative change measure has contrasted sharply with the +13.6%, 
which corresponded to 78 new vacant units recorded during the onset of economic 
crisis. Further, the total number of comparison retail outlets recorded in the shallow 
recovery period declined by -1% relative to the within-crisis survey; and although it 
was still above (+0.8%) the pre-crisis numbers, has demonstrated its waning condition 
due to the prolonged economic and competitive hardships. Conversely, convenience 
retail continued with small growth in terms of the overall outlet numbers, which is 
reflected in Figure 6.9 by minor increases in the relative change at +0.2% and the 
absolute change at +0.01 percentage point. Financial & business services did not fare 
very well in the shallow recovery period experiencing further declines.  In fact, the 
closure rate of their outlets has accelerated, measured as a relative change, and has 
positioned financial & business services amongst the poorest performing retail/service 
categories in Bristol. In terms of relative change, this broad category recorded a large 
decline of -3.8%, widening the overall gap in unit numbers between the pre-crisis and   Chapter 6 
175 
 
the shallow recovery period to  -5.9%. Nevertheless, when controlled by size it has 
shown some signs of a fragile improvement, with the absolute change decreasing in 
the shallow recovery period by -0.4pp, compared to -0.6pp in the within-crisis survey. 
Finally, the growth rate of leisure services accelerated in the shallow recovery period 
seeing  a  further  increase  of  +3.2%  in  comparison  to  the  numbers  recorded  in the 
within-crisis survey, this is to say a +0.7pp increase in absolute change. 
6.4.2  Comparison retail 
The  stronger  than  regional  average  performance  of  Bristol  comparison  retail 
reveals a somewhat surprising picture when broken down into smaller sub categories. 
Of  particular  interest  were  the  three  following  categories:  antique  &  arts  sellers, 
jewellers and clothing & footwear retailers, as they all noted positive growth in Bristol 
despite having declined sharply across the four-region sample.  Overall, more than half 
of comparison retail sub categories had expanded between the pre-crisis and within-
crisis periods when measured as a relative change (M1). Some increases were rather 
large, in certain cases exceeding 10% or 15% e.g. telephones and accessories +42.3%, 
antique & arts sellers +16.3%, clothing & footwear +14.9% and jewellers +12%. As a 
result of filling vacant outlets, observed also in the four-region sample, the household 
discounters  and  charity  shops  recorded  substantial  increases,  +11.4%  and  +6.8% 
respectively (Figure 6.10).  
Overall, the array of most resilient retail categories corresponded closely when 
both the relative and absolute changes were considered, however the magnitude of 
those changes varied slightly. The absolute change was highest in the case of clothing 
& footwear +2.8pp, followed by telephones and accessories +0.9pp, antiques & art 
+0.5pp, jewellers +0.4pp, charity shops and discounters both +0.3pp. Interestingly, in 
the  case  of  telephones  and  accessories  the  high  increase  in  outlet  numbers  was 
predominately  due  to  the  low  base  (M1),  so  when  controlled  by  size  (M2)  the 
difference was not that apparent.  Conversely, seven of fifteen comparison retail sub 
categories showed negative growth; these included music & photo -25%, booksellers -
21.1%,  DIY  and  electrical  -10.4%,  department  stores  -10%,  florists  -8.8%,  furniture 
store -5% and gifts & toys -5%. The scale of a decline was comparable with the regional   Chapter 6 
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averages with the exception of booksellers contracting more than twice the rate of the 
averages for the southern part and the entire four-region sample.  
The relatively strong performance of Bristol comparison retail could be associated 
with the considerable enlargement of retail floorspace across the city (+13.3%) and 
crucially,  with  the  fact  that  some  six  of  seven  major  Bristol  retail  centres  were 
surveyed during the early stage of the economic-crisis (Oct 2008). 
 
Figure 6.10: Relative change (M1) in comparison retail by category 
 
 
Although five of these high streets experienced significant rises in vacancy rates the 
adverse impact of economic crisis, in other words the time lag effect, could have been 
concealed in the case of other sub categories, effectively indicating the irregular gaps 
between conducted surveys. This was evident in the case of Woolworths that ceased 
operating half way through our within-crisis surveys, at the end of December 2008. 
The within-crisis survey had recorded three Woolworth’s stores in the Bristol sample 
as trading. Indeed, this had diminished the extent of decline in the department & 
variety stores category between the pre-crisis and within-crisis periods but did escalate 
it in the following period of the shallow recovery.  
Finally, surveys completed in the post-recession shallow recovery period revealed 
that  categories  sustaining  further  growth  included  sport  &  leisure,  charity  shops, 
telephones & accessories and clothing.  Although the growth rates of telephones & 
accessories and clothing have slowed down substantially there were new categories 
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such as DIY, carpets, electrical and furniture stores that after initial decline between 
the pre-crisis and within-crisis period have shown clear signs of a subsequent recovery. 
The categories that remained weak were gift, card & toys and florists. Additionally, 
antique  sellers  and  jewellers  experienced  small  decreases  in  their  numbers  after 
recording strong growth in the preceding period.  
6.4.3  Convenience retail 
Although Bristol's convenience retail observed an overall increase of +1% between 
the pre-crisis and within-crisis, measured as relative change, this was predominantly 
driven  by  the  expansion  of  convenience  stores  and  off  licences.  All  remaining 
categories  have  declined  with  butchers  and  health  food  stores  having  been  most 
adversely affected (Figure 6.11).  
 
Figure 6.11: Relative change (M1) in convenience retail by category 
 
 
Remarkably, while convenience stores as a whole observed large increases in both 
periods  one  of  its  subcategories  -  the  symbol  group  had  initially  declined  before 
accelerating fast in the post-recession shallow recovery period. Bakers and CTNs were 
relatively stable each losing only one store across the entire city. As far as the changes 
in convenience retail numbers were concerned, it appears that in the shallow recovery 
period, the positive trend was reversed in the case of off licences and CTNs. However, 
the  entire  decline  in  Bristol's  off  licences  resulted  from  First  Quench  (owner  of 
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Threshers and Wine Racks) reducing its presence on UK high streets, and it  should be 
highlighted  that  the  independent off  licences  continued to  maintain  their previous 
growth. Decline in CTN numbers could be partially explained by alteration in Goad's 
classification, since the very same six units recorded in the within-crisis survey as CTNs 
appeared as convenience stores in the shallow recovery survey. Further, Figure 6.11 
shows  some  additional  sub  categories  within  convenience  retail  that  experienced 
growth. In particular, butchers, grocers (including ethnic food stores) and health foods 
all recorded gains, possibly confirming the relative strength of the convenience sector 
being  able  to  reorganise  itself  and  bounce  back  quickly  to  new  configurations, 
presumably as consumer confidence began to increase, although temporarily, during 
the shallow recovery period. 
6.4.4  Financial and business services 
Financial and business services is the category that in Bristol was affected most 
severely by the economic crisis, perhaps not surprisingly as Bristol is the third biggest 
financial hub in the UK. These findings have to a degree contrasted with the southern 
region and the entire four-region sample where the strongest adverse impacts were 
felt by comparison retail. However, the changes within this broad category were not 
uniform  as  two  sub  categories  enjoyed  a  small  growth between  the  pre-crisis  and 
within-crisis surveys, namely building supplies & services and property services. The 
biggest impact was felt by the legal, employment and financial services. An even more 
interesting picture can be observed in the post-recession period where virtually all 
categories declined  sharply  except  for  one: the  retail  banks  and  building  societies, 
presumably stimulated by the quantitative easing programme managed to increase by 
+ 11.1% adding up 10 additional units across Bristol high streets/town centres. 
6.5  Vacancy rates 
6.5.1  Vacancy rates in the pre-crisis period 
The overall vacancy rate across Bristol retail centres stood at 14% in the pre-crisis 
period and was higher than the corresponding for the southern part of our sample 
average (8.6%) and slightly above the northern part (12.1%). However, as shown in   Chapter 6 
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Figure  6.12,  the  pre-crisis  vacancy  rate  varied  greatly  across  Bristol  retail  centres, 
ranging from the highest in our four-region sample to virtually nil vacancy rate.  
 
Figure 6.12: Magnitude of vacancy rates across Bristol centres in the pre-crisis period 
 
 
For  instance,  vacant  outlets  in  a  relatively  derelict  high  street  of  Old  Market, 
situated  in  close  proximity  to  Broadmead,  accounted  for  34.3%  of  the  total 
retail/service  unit  numbers.  Other  locations  with  exceptionally  high  vacancy  rates 
included Avonmouth Village (33.3%), Stokes Croft (31.3%), Filwood Broadway (28.6%), 
and St George (25.9%). Conversely, two of Bristol's remarkably small centres, namely 
Crow Lane and Lockleaze, both located on the northern fringe of the city, did not 
record any vacant retail outlets in the pre-crisis surveys. Remarkably, although both 
centres had maintained their nil vacancy rates during the onset of economic crisis, they 
were  listed  amongst  those  that  were  most  adversely  affected  during  the  post-
recession shallow recovery period, recording very high increases in vacancy rates. 
Moreover,  from  Figure  6.12  can  be  detected  that  magnitude  of  the  pre-crisis 
vacancy rates appears to be somewhat positively correlated with the IMD 2007scores, 
which effectively is a measure of multiple deprivation at small area level (Department 
for Communities and Local Government, 2007). Retail centres located in areas with   Chapter 6 
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lower deprivation scores, which effectively indicate catchments  that are somewhat 
more affluent, seem to have lower vacancy rates than those situated in the highly 
deprived areas. 
6.5.2  Vacancy Rate Changes between the pre-crisis and within-crisis surveys 
Figure 6.13 portrays the actual levels of vacancy rates recorded in every Bristol high 
street and town centre for both the pre-crisis and within-crisis periods. It implies that 
19 high streets/town centres, when applying fixed boundaries, recorded declines in 
vacancy rates, 18 centres experienced rises and 10 high streets observed no changes 
(see Appendix 2 for retail centre names). The strongest performing centres such as 
Avonmouth  Village,  Mina  Rd  and  Riding  Leaze  (circled  in  green)  observed  large 
declines in vacancy rate ranging from -8pp to -12pp.  
 
Figure 6.13: Pre-crisis and within-crisis vacancy rates across Bristol centres (fixed 
boundaries) 
 
 
In other words, centres that recorded declines in vacancy rates appear to have 
been  associated  with  enhanced  resilience  to  the  shock  of  economic  crisis  as  their 
dynamics  allowed  them  to  not  only  maintain  but  also  improve  their  economic 
performance. 
In contrast, the most fragile centres, those associated with record high increases in 
vacancy rates (circled in red) included Lawrence Hill (+16.7pp), Arnside Road (+16.3pp) 
and Old Market (+12.1pp). Some retail centres among those with the highest pre-crisis 
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vacancy rates such as Old Market continued to perform poorly increasing further its 
vacancy rate to a record high level (42.6%). However, other weakly performing centres 
in  the  pre-crisis  period  (e.g.  Avonmouth  Village  or  Mina  Rd)  recorded  substantial 
declines in vacancy rates during the within-crisis period. In fact, the latter trend was 
prevailing, with some 15 of the 20 weakest performing high streets in the pre-crisis 
period, although to a smaller degree, having experienced decreases in their vacancy 
rates during the within-crisis survey.  
A slightly different way of exploring the vacancy rate changes was calculating their 
average  values  for  each  respective  period  across  the  analysed  sample.  The 
implementation of that method indicates that the mean pre-crisis vacancy rate across 
the 47 Bristol centres, using merely retail and service units as a base, was 13.9%, but 
the  within-crisis  surveys  figure  stood  at  14.1%.  This  is  to  say  that  the  increase  in 
vacancy  rate  change  at  +0.2pp  between  these  two  periods  was  small,  contrasting 
sharply with the averages for the South (+1.2pp) and across the four-region sample 
(+1.9pp). However, it needs to be emphasized that the pre-crisis base used to calculate 
vacancy rate changes in Bristol was significantly higher than any regional equivalent.  
Using  the  fixed  boundaries,  which  excluded  all  vacant  units  associated  with 
expansion/contraction  of  centre  boundaries,  has  generated  slightly  higher  Vacancy 
Rate Changes (VRCs) which in Bristol was +0.4pp, comparing to +1.4pp in southern part 
and +2.2pp in the entire sample (Table 6.10). Nevertheless, the discrepencies between 
overall aggregated vacancy rates and Bristol mean vacancy rates, already discussed in 
the descriptive analysis section, were substantial. 
 
Table 6.10: Comparison of VRC's in Bristol and analysed regions 
Mean VRC (between pre and within-crisis) 
Study area  Variable boundaries  Fixed boundaries 
Bristol  0.2  0.4 
South  1.2  1.4 
Entire sample  1.9  2.2 
 
The change in overall vacant retail units between the pre-crisis and within-crisis 
periods, aggregated for the entire city, was +1.4pp, however the corresponding change   Chapter 6 
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in  average  vacancy  rates  was  only  +0.2pp.  A  thorough  analysis  of  vacant  outlets’ 
increases/decreases reveals some extreme values in our sample which partly can be 
held responsible for this discrepancy. For instance, Broadmead as a result of opening 
Cabot Circus shopping centre in late 2008 had experienced an enormous increase in 
vacant  unit  numbers  from  44  recorded  in  the  pre-crisis  to  105  in  the  within-crisis 
survey.  This  particular  retail  centre  was  responsible  for  almost  50%  of  the  overall 
increase in Bristol vacant unit numbers between the pre and within-crisis periods. In 
addition, three further large Bristol centres (Gloucester Rd, Baldwin Street and Queens 
Rd) observed substantial increases of at least 10 vacant outlets each, whilst a large 
number of predominantly small centres have seen declines in vacant unit outlets.  
One way of dealing with this issue was to implement medians rather than the 
means  to  measure  Bristol's  average  vacancy  rate.  Medians,  unlike  means,  use  the 
middle value, which is affected by the extreme values within the sample, the so-called 
outliers, to a much lesser degree. The implementation of medians shows that the pre-
crisis average vacancy rate stood at 12.6%, which was 1.5pp lower than the 13.9% 
determined by the mean. In turn, during the within-crisis period, the median vacancy 
rate  at  14.7%  was  0.6pp  higher  than  the  corresponding  mean  value  of  14.1%.  In 
consequence, the values of average vacancy rate depicted for each method had the 
capacity to create some inconsistency and possibly even a conflict. It could be argued, 
that  the  very  low  mean  vacancy  rate  change  (+0.2pp)  between  the  pre-crisis  and 
within-crisis periods was purely a result of the peculiarity of Bristol sample. However, 
had  the  medians  been  used  to  assess  the  differential  performance  of  the  47  high 
streets  within  the  same  period,  the  vacancy  rate  change  would  have  been  set  at 
+2.1pp, which is closely comparable with the cross-regional average.  
6.5.3  Vacancy Rate Changes between within-crisis and shallow recovery periods 
The  overall  aggregated vacancy  rate for  Bristol  centres  in the  shallow  recovery 
period was 15.5%. Although this represented only a +0.1pp absolute increase on the 
within-crisis period, the differential performance of many analysed high streets has at 
least  in  spatial  terms,  widely  deteriorated.  Indeed,  between  the  within-crisis  and 
shallow recovery periods 29 retail centres experienced increases in vacancy rates, as   Chapter 6 
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opposed to 15 centres declining their vacancy rates. However, some centres mainly 
located in the inner city such as Broadmead or Baldwin Street, observed considerable 
improvement in their differential performance, recording declines in vacant outlets 
between the within-crisis and shallow recovery periods. Thus, the overall picture was 
somewhat  complex  as  several  larger  centres  observed  a  reduction  in  previously 
elevated  vacancy  rates,  but  the  majority  of  predominantly  small  centres  recorded 
minor  increases  in  vacant  unit  numbers.  Given  the  small  bases  used  to  calculate 
vacancy rates of those exceptionally small retail centres, they often produced high 
values even in the absolute vacancy rate changes. Some centres comprising no more 
than 25 retail/service units such as Crow Lane, Coldharbour Rd, Lockleaze and Riding 
Leaze,  despite  experiencing  closures  of  no  more  than  three  units  have  recorded 
relatively large vacancy rate changes ranging from +10pp to +20pp.  On the contrary, a 
number of small centres such as Filwood Broadway, Victoria Street or Lawrence Hill  
having filled one or two vacant units observed substantial declines in their vacancy 
rate ranging from -6pp to -8pp.  
The mean vacancy rate in Bristol during the shallow recovery period stood at 15.6% 
representing  an  increase  of  +1.5pp  in VRC  between the 2008/9  and 2010  surveys. 
Regrettably, this could not be compared against the regional averages, due to the lack 
of  systematic  post-recession  data.  As  noted  above  the  high  increase  in  VCR  has 
somewhat  conflicted  with  the  findings  of  the  descriptive  analysis.  Once  more,  the 
implementation  of  median  rather  than  mean  to  measure  the  average  within-crisis 
vacancy rate narrows the gap in the VRC during the emerging austerity to +0.9pp. 
Moreover, if the median vacancy rate in the shallow recovery period of 15.1% was 
used the change between the within-crisis and shallow recovery periods would have 
been +0.4pp rather than +1.5pp when means were applied. Such results are consistent 
with the overall aggregated increases in vacancy rate where increases in vacancy rate 
during  the  emerging  austerity,  have  slowed  down  in  comparison  to  the  period  of 
economic crisis. 
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6.5.4  Spatial trends of Bristol retail centres’ performance 
The majority of Bristol high streets appeared to have been resilient to the shock of 
the  2008-09  economic  crisis  as  62%  experienced  no  increases  in  vacancy  rates. 
Although it could be argued that overall Bristol centres performed stronger than other 
parts of our four-region sample, little was known about the geographically uneven 
performance at the intra-urban scale. Tobler’s First Law of Geography (1970) stating 
that "Everything is related to everything else, but near things are more related than 
distant things" urged to investigate geographical patterns of the differential economic 
performance of Bristol retail centres. Interestingly, when the values of vacancy rate 
changes between the pre-crisis and within-crisis were mapped, they have revealed the 
presence of what could be viewed as special clusters of centres that performed below 
the average (Figure 6.14). The first cluster contained seven largest inner city retail 
centres that experienced substantial rises in vacancy rate change; however, in near 
proximity there were three small high streets, namely Christmas Steps, St Michaels Hill 
and Victoria Street, that performed well. The second cluster of four adversely affected 
centres was located on the southeast suburb of the city and the third comprising five 
centres, was situated to the north of Bristol city centre in close proximity of Cribbs 
Causeway  regional  shopping  centre.  Nearly  all  centres  located  outside  those  three 
clusters appeared to have been resilient to the onset of 2008-09 economic crisis. 
The  post-recession  shallow  recovery  period  has  seen  further  deterioration  of 
vacancy  rates  relative  to  the  within-crisis  surveys.  In  terms  of  spatial  patterns  of 
vacancy rate changes during that period, Figure 6.15 shows that the weakly performing 
centres have been distributed throughout the city, with no obvious trends present.  
The examination of areas affected particularly adversely, indicates that the proximity 
of  a  large  regional  shopping  centre  such  as  Cribbs  Causeway  and  to  an  extent 
Broadmead/Cabot Circus could have a detrimental impact. The northern part of the 
city has underperformed considerably, presumably due to the low attractiveness of 
the shopping parades or poor demand from local catchments which as in the case of 
Riding Leaze, Crow Lane or Southmead Rd are characterised by high deprivation levels. 
However, some affluent neighbourhoods such as Coldharbour Rd experienced some 
rises in vacancy rates, but they were of a smaller magnitude.   Chapter 6 
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Figure 6.14: Spatial distribution of VRC 2006 - 2008/9 (variable boundaries)
 
 
Increases  in  vacancy  rates  were  recorded  by  nearly  all  smaller  centres  located 
around  the  city  centre,  in  particular,  in  the  area  to  the  South  of  the  inner  city 
extending from Hotwells to Brislington and to the North East spreading from St George 
to Mina Rd.  Conversely, a number of retail centres saw their vacancy rates having 
bounced back to some extent in the shallow recovery period. Interestingly, of the 18 
streets/town  centres  that have not  recorded  any  rises  in  vacancy  rates  during  the 
shallow recovery period six were located in what previously had been identified as 
poorly  performing  clusters.  They  appeared  to  have  exhibited  some  geographically 
correlated trends, specifically the inner city retail centres such as Broadmead, Baldwin 
Street, Lawrence Hill and Old Market all reducing their vacancy rates in the range 
between -2 and -6 pp.  
Further, the examination of vacancy rate changes between 2006 and 2010, shown 
on Figure 6.16, implies that the three clusters of poorly performing centres existing in 
the within-crisis survey were still indeed present in the post-recession recovery period; 
however, some alterations have occurred to both southern and northern clusters. The 
central cluster remained unchanged and despite several high streets having bounced   Chapter 6 
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back during the shallow recovery period, their vacancy rate levels remained above 
those recorded in 2006. 
 
Figure 6.15: Spatial distribution of 2008/9 - 2010 VRC for variable boundaries 
 
 
The northern cluster, on the other hand, has notably expanded in size comprising 
in the shallow recovery period as many as 9-10 retail centres. As in the central cluster, 
none of its centres have experienced full recovery with vacancy levels still above those 
seen in the 2006 survey. Nevertheless, four of five centres constituting the northern 
cluster have seen some kind of improvement or remained stable during the shallow 
recovery period. In particular, Arnside Rd and Filton Ave observed a significant boost in 
their performance recording substantial declines in vacancy rates. Moreover, although 
Westbury-on-Trym,  and  Henleaze  experienced  no  additional  outlet  closures,  their 
vacancy rate had gone marginally up due to the slight decrease in the total outlet 
numbers.  On  the  other  hand,  several  centres such  as  Crow  Lane  Lockleaze,  Riding 
Leaze,  saw  substantial  increases  of  their  vacancy  rates  during  the  post-recession 
shallow  recovery  period.  Given  that  these  centres  are  located  in  one  of  the  most 
deprived areas of Bristol it is perhaps not surprising that a running a profitable public 
house, off licence, coffee shop or a CTN could not be sustained in these catchments.   Chapter 6 
187 
 
 
Figure 6.16: Spatial distribution of VRC 2006 - 2010 
 
 
Such areas are particularly vulnerable to the increases in taxes on beer and the 
prolonged harsh economic conditions which seriously undermine the purchase power 
of their already constrained real disposable incomes. However, as all those centres 
proved to have been resilient to the onset of economic crisis, it could be speculated 
along  the  lines  of  ecological  resilience  that  following  the  prolonged  unfavourable 
economic  conditions  they  were  destabilised  and  moved  to  another,  in  this  case, 
inferior configuration.  To a large extent, this could be explained by public spending 
cuts  and  high  inflation  levels  rising  further  the  concerns  about  future  of  UK  high 
streets. Similar findings were also reported by other research institutions such as LDC 
(2011) which published systematic reports on the worsening condition of British high 
streets in the post-recession period. 
6.5.5  Dynamics of the poorly performing cluster 
Having established the existence of poorly performing high streets clusters, it was 
of  central  importance  to  examine  their  characteristics.  The  Southern  cluster 
comprising  in  the  initial  period  four  centres  Filwood  Broadway,  Stockwood,  Gilda   Chapter 6 
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Parade and Whitchurch has offered a good potential as their differential performance 
was most uniform. Undertaking a detailed analysis investigating changes recorded to 
those  retail  centres’  structures  has  provided  valuable  insights  into  their  complex 
adjustment to both the shock of economic crisis and the period of shallow recovery. 
Simultaneously, it has facilitated the assessment of evolutionary trajectories of the 
most fragile retail centres.  
Filwood Broadway was a part of this cluster only in the initial period, as the centre 
appeared to have recovered in the shallow recovery period, recording lower levels of 
vacancy  than  in  the  pre-crisis  survey.  Whilst  the  centre  experienced  only  a  small 
increase in vacancy during the onset of economic crisis (+1.4pp), it has re-organised its 
retail  offer  during  the  post-recession  shallow  recovery  period  by  filling  the  vacant 
outlets with charity shop, household discounter and employment agency. Essentially, 
Filwood Broadway has seen a fall in vacancy rate of -6.3pp between the 2006 and 2010 
surveys,  however  the  centre  was  still  performing  poorly  with  two  major  areas  of 
concern; vacancy rate significantly higher (22%) than the national average (12.5%) and 
overall number of retail outlets continuously declining.   
Stockwood for instance, although perceived as a relatively healthy centre with a 
reasonable shopping environment, was hit particularly badly over the wider period of 
2006-10.  The  high  street  has  lost  a  baker,  butcher,  bank  and  a  florist  whilst 
experiencing an opening of a café shop only. Taking into account its small size (28 units 
in  2006  and  24  in  2010)  the  net  vacancy  rate  increased  from  3.6%  to  16.7% 
respectively,  representing  a  +13pp  rise  in  absolute  change.  In  turn,  Gilda  Parade, 
perceived by local consumers as a rundown centre, suffered from  a relatively high 
vacancy rate (17.4%) in the pre-crisis period. The closure of an off licence, florist and 
employment agency during the economic crisis and a gain of only a disabled goods 
shop have weakened the centre further. Although it was an addition of two net vacant 
units only, given the small centre size (24 units), this accounted for a large increase 
(+7.5pp)  in  vacancy  rate  change.  Both  centres  despite  being  easily  accessible  and 
mainly  serving  local  walk-in  catchment  areas,  suffered  from  low  spending,  low 
frequency  and  short  time  of  an  average  visit  which  in  consequence  has  led  to  a 
significant leakage of local customers to more attractive located nearby centres with   Chapter 6 
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large  supermarkets  such  as  Whitchurch,  Wells  Rd  and  Bedminster  (GVA  Grimley, 
2010). Finally, Bristol Whitchurch, to some extent, has fared better, presumably due to 
the presence of a large supermarket, observing a rise of only one vacant unit in the 
within-crisis and no further increase in the shallow recovery period. Moreover, the 
centre has retained all its retailers as the change in vacancy rate merely resulted from 
the downsizing of Lloyds Pharmacy, which has moved to a smaller and newly created 
unit within the existing local health centre. Though the increase in vacancy rate change 
was high (+8.3pp), this was purely due to the very small number of outlets (12) in the 
centre. If the floorspace was used as a measure of centre size the increase in vacancy 
rate change would have been substantially smaller (+2.9pp). Furthermore, despite the 
presence of large food store, GVA Grimley (2010) reported that the centre experienced 
substantial spending leakage to nearby high streets due to a lack of wide range of 
facilities and has been suffering from long term/structural vacancy. 
6.5.6  Most resilient centres  
On  the  contrary,  nine  high  streets,  shown  in  Figure  6.17,  have  maintained  or 
decreased their vacancy rates in both analysed periods. Although all those centres 
have displayed similar trends in terms of vacancy rate change between the pre-crisis 
and  the  shallow  recovery  period,  the  magnitude  of  these  changes  was  far  from 
uniform ranging from 0pp to -15.2pp. One reason for it was that the base (pre-crisis 
vacancy rate) in each centre has fluctuated substantially between 6.6% and 33.3%; 
however, this was not always the case. For instance, Avonmouth Village which had the 
highest pre-crisis vacancy rate had seen a reduction in it by almost half, from 33.3% to 
18.2%, but in the case of Stokes Croft, a centre with the second highest pre-crisis 
vacancy rate, declined only by -2.8pp. The strongest performer in this category was 
undeniably Stoke Lane initially reducing its vacancy rate by half between the pre-crisis 
and within-crisis surveys, and then declining it further to nil vacancy rate in the shallow 
recovery period. 
All centres from this category, with the exception of Avonmouth Village and Stoke 
Lane, were located in the inner city, which was in close proximity to the largest in-town 
shopping centre, the Broadmead, which in the within-crisis period included the newly   Chapter 6 
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opened Cabot Circus. This may imply that the most resilient centres did not compete 
directly  with the  larger  centres but  rather  filled  the  niche  created  by  the  multiple 
retailers, simultaneously benefiting from the high footfall created by the mechanism of 
linked trips. So what were the characteristics of these centres that despite the location 
and  unfavourable  economic  conditions  were  continuously  improving  their 
performance, perhaps holding the key to the enhanced resilience of UK town centres 
to the economic crisis?  
 
Figure 6.17: Spatial distribution and size of best performing Bristol high streets  
 
 
Initially, we have considered the key determinants of enhanced resilience found by 
the 267 centre and their values, presented in Table 6.11, show a somewhat differential 
picture.  
Firstly,  the  average  ratio  of  services  relative  to  retail  outlets  across  these  nine 
centres at 1.8 was only slightly higher than the Bristol average of 1.7. Secondly, the 
diversity, measured as a proportion of independent retailers relative to all retail units 
in the pre-crisis period was very high in these centres averaging 76%, which was 3pp 
higher than the Bristol average. In the case of five retail centres, independent retailers   Chapter 6 
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occupied more than 85% of all retail outlets; but the exceptional case was Christmas 
Steps with no single multiple retail unit in both the pre-crisis and within-crisis periods. 
 
Table 6.11: Characteristics of the nine most resilient centres 
 
Retail centre 
VRC 2006-
2010 (pp) 
Ratio of 
services vs. 
retail 
Independent 
Retailers (pre-
crisis) 
No of 
foodstores 
(corporate) 
Centre size 
(units no.) 
Avonmouth Village  -15.2  3.0  86.0%  2(1)  42 
Chandos Road  -10.7  3.2  60.0%  1  28 
Christmas Steps  -4.8  1.0  100.0%  1  87 
Clifton  -1.5  0.7  88.0%  3(2)  196 
St Marks Road  0.0  0.8  93.0%  2  31 
St Michaels Hill  -0.5  2.1  71.0%  1(1)  25 
Stoke Lane  -9.1  0.8  45.0%  1(1)  22 
Stokes Croft  -2.8  1.6  92.0%  5  134 
Victoria Street  -9.2  2.9  71.0%  1  32 
 
The  first  non-independent  retailer  entry  experienced by  the  centre  was  in  the 
shallow recovery period due to a conversion of previously independent convenience 
store to a symbol group. The third significant factor was the presence of a foodstore, 
and  as  Table  6.11  indicates,  only  four  of  the  best  performing  retail  centres  had 
corporate supermarkets present however, the remaining centres had either a symbol 
group or independent foodstore present in the pre-crisis period. In total, there were 
17  foodstores  defined  as  in-town  centre;  nine  of  which  were  independent,  five 
corporate and three symbol group retailers. Stokes Croft and Clifton had the highest 
number  of  foodstores  with  five  c-stores  and  two  c-stores  plus  one  supermarket 
respectively. Furthermore, two new entries were recorded in the shallow recovery 
period  including  independent  and  symbol  group  retailers  and  an  additional  two 
independents joined the symbol group retailers.  
The examination  of other  characteristics  proved  that  the  majority of  the  most 
resilient retail centres were small, comprising on average 66 retail/service units in the 
pre-crisis survey with only two centres, Clifton and Stokes Croft, classified as medium-
sized. Additionally, most of the centres, with the exception of Stoke Croft and St Marks 
Rd, had relatively affluent hinterlands and have been enjoying relatively low levels of 
income deprivation. However, as in larger cities it is not uncommon for  an affluent   Chapter 6 
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area to be adjacent to a poor neighbourhood, both centres could draw shoppers from 
diverse  catchments.    Finally,  following  the  observation  made  by  Findly  and  Spark 
(2010), that  some degree  of  retail  vacancy  is  inevitable  and  indeed desirable  as  it 
enhances healthy retail churn, which in turn facilitates the desirable reconfiguration of 
a town centre. The average levels of retail churn were in line with those seen across 
other Bristol high streets; however, these were extraordinary in the case of Clifton 
where 12 of its total 13 vacant outlets were sublet in between the pre and within-crisis 
surveys and 6 of 10 between the within-crisis and shallow recovery.  
In  summary,  the  nine  most  resilient  centres  had  somewhat  different  dynamics 
adding to the complexity of high street evolution trajectory and proving that there is 
no  uniform  formula  for  success.  However  the  three  most  universal  characteristics 
shared by the majority of those centres were the high diversity, foodstore presence 
and  a  smaller  than  average  centre  size.  Remarkably,  non-corporate  foodstores,  in 
particular the symbol group convenience stores appear to have played vital role in 
protecting the vitality of small centres, increasing their attractiveness and generating 
the essential footfall.  
6.5.7  Retail hierarchy, deprivation levels and vacancy rate changes 
Taking into consideration the retail hierarchy it appears that small local centres 
performed  best  between  the  pre-crisis  and  within-crisis  surveys  as  of  the  21  local 
centres only 4 experienced increases in vacancy rate during that period. On the other 
hand, the city and district centres were affected particularly adversely by the shock of 
economic  crisis  and  there  was  no  explicit trend  amongst  the  major  district  (town) 
centres. However, between the within-crisis and shallow recovery periods different 
patterns  could  be  detected.  As  62%  of  local  centres  had  experienced  increases  in 
vacancy rates, it could be argued that small centres started to feel the pinch of the 
economic crisis and emerging austerity. Second type of centres that experienced major 
deterioration  to  their  economic  health  was  the  district  centres  with  82%  having 
experienced increases in vacancy rates. Further, the inner city high streets such as 
Broadmead,  Baldwin  Street  and  Victoria  Street  performed  well  having  recorded   Chapter 6 
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declines in the number of vacant outlets and finally, there was no conclusive trend 
amongst district centres.  
In  terms  of  the  deprivation  levels,  it  has  been  found  that  overall  there  was  a 
positive  correlation  between  increases  in  vacancy  rate  changes  and  the  score  of 
multiple deprivation,  suggesting that  retail  centres  located in  more deprived  areas 
were less resistant to the economic crisis, however in the emerging era of austerity the 
trend was unclear.  Furthermore, there were some exceptions too; centres such as 
Gloucester Rd, Coldharbour Rd and Southmead Rd enjoy one of the lowest deprivation 
levels in the city, however their differential performance between the 2006 and 2010 
surveys was below the average. According to Goad surveys, Gloucester Rd noticed 
higher than average increase in vacancy rate between the pre-crisis and within-crisis 
periods  but  the  other  two  centres  following  the  strong  resistance  to  the  onset  of 
economic crisis, recorded sharp increases in vacancy rate changes during the shallow 
recovery period.   
6.6  Modelling vacancy rate changes  
Having  completed  the  descriptive  analysis  of  the  intra-urban  variation  in 
retail/service  categories  performance,  it  was  important  to  depict  the  statistically 
significant indicators responsible for the increases in vacancy rates during the onset of 
economic crisis and the subsequent period of the shallow recovery. The intra-urban 
modelling  of  vacancy  rate  changes  had  two  implications  as  far  as  the  complex 
adjustment of UK high streets to the economic crisis was concerned. First, there was a 
potential to establish whether the determinants of enhanced resilience significant at 
cross-regional  scale,  would  hold  at  intra-urban  level.  Second,  whether  those 
determinants will be statistically significant when taking into consideration the post-
recession shallow recovery period.  
The latter has been established in two stages: a) the investigation of the dynamics 
associated with vacancy rate changes between the within-crisis and shallow recovery 
periods, and b) the examination of the factors that were statistically significant in the 
entire  period  between  the  2006  and  2010  surveys.  This  task  was  particularly 
important, as it had the potential to provide empirical evidence on the differential   Chapter 6 
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performance  of  traditional  UK  high  streets  in  the  post-recession  period  and  to 
establish their future trajectories. Understanding the indicators associated with the 
enhanced resilience of British high streets over the longer-term could be a key feature 
necessary to utilise by policy makers and town centre managers to turn things round 
after the shock of global economic crisis. 
6.6.1  Vacancy rate change between pre-crisis and within-crisis surveys 
Vacancy rate change is a leading indicator of economic performance of UK high 
streets  and  therefore  has  been  selected  as  a  response  variable  for  the  regression 
modelling. As in the cross-regional sample, the response variable was obtained for 
both variable and fixed boundaries and only retail and service units rather than all 
outlets  (including  non-retail)  were  used  as  a  base  to  calculate  vacancy  rates.  The 
Bristol model has initially employed a comparable set of variables to the cross-regional 
model, with the obvious exception of North-South divide, as all Bristol retail centres 
were located in the southern part of our sample. Also the 'corporate foodstore entry' 
variable  employed  by  the  cross-regional  model  had  to  be  slightly  modified  to  a 
‘corporate  foodstore  presence'  as  only  five  Bristol  high  streets  experienced  net 
corporate  foodstore  entry  between  the  pre-crisis  and  within-crisis  surveys.  To  be 
precise, corporate foodstores included all retailers that the Competition Commission 
(2008) referred to as large grocery retailers.  This is to say that the modified dummy 
variable has accounted for all high streets that in the pre-crisis period had at least one 
policy-compliant  medium  or  large  corporate  foodstore  (above  3500  Sq  Ft)  located 
in/edge-of-town centre.  
Further,  in  the  modelling  stage  we  have  accounted  for  many  possible  sets  of 
explanatory  variables,  including  those  which  in  the  cross-regional  model  had  their 
significance  below  the  conventional  levels.  In  particular,  the  variables  defining  the 
affluence  of  immediate  catchment  areas  based  on  the  IMD  2007  scores,  ease  of 
parking and other supportive schemes implemented by local authorities or various 
traders’ associations such as BID's or presence of town centre manager. 
The exploration of the theoretically grounded explanatory variables has resulted in 
obtaining a six best-supported variable model, shown in Table 6.12. As in the cross-  Chapter 6 
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regional model the negative parameter estimates indicate factors which, holding all 
other things constant, are associated with reductions in the increase of vacancy rate 
change between the pre-crisis and within-crisis surveys; positive parameter estimates 
indicate  the  opposite  -  factors  associated  with  relative  worsening  of  town  centre 
performance during the economic crisis.  
 
Table 6.12: Model of vacancy rate change between pre-crisis and within-crisis in Bristol  
 
Variable 
Parameter 
estimate 
 
Std. Error 
 
T-value 
 
Sig. 
  (Constant)  -.099  .047  -2.124  .040 
Retail vs. services %  .168  .069  2.428  .020 
Centre Size (ln)  .020  .008  2.415  .020 
Retail diversity pre-crisis  -.110  .033  -3.321  .002 
Structural Vacancy pre-crisis  .098  .028  3.506  .001 
Corporate  foodstore 
presence pre-crisis 
-.039  .017  -2.258  .029 
Income deprivation  .101  .057  1.755  .087 
     R
2=48.4%,                    
      N=47  
      Durbin-Watson d value = 2.482 
      Condition index value = 18.6 
 
The model explains almost 50% of the total variance in vacancy rate changes and 
the  OLS  assumption  tests  are  summarised  below  the  table.  Taken  together  with 
standardised residual and predicted value plots, the tests suggest normally distributed 
residuals,  no  evidence  of  significant  heteroscedasticity,  and  multicollinearity  below 
critical thresholds. Also outlier and leverage plots were used to check the robustness 
of the parameter estimates but they have not indicated any abnormalities, so all 47 
high streets have been retained in the model. 
When comparing the model from Table 6.12 to the cross-regional one, shown in 
Table 4.4 two things should be noted. First, the multiplicative variable, combining the 
average store size and floorspace occupied by the twenty UK's key/'magnet' retailers 
has  not  been  significant  in  the  Bristol  model,  presumably  as  a  result  of  the  most 
attractive stores having been only present in a few largest Bristol retail centres during 
the  pre-crisis  period.  Second,  as  opposed  to  the  cross-regional  model  the  ‘income 
deprivation’ variable, which reflects the affluence of the immediate catchment areas,   Chapter 6 
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has been significant at the intra-urban level. In the cross-region model affluence had 
the expected sign but its significance was slightly below the conventional levels.  
Crucially, the main findings of Bristol modelling confirm that the determinants of 
enhanced resilience significant at cross-regional scale hold well at the local intra-urban 
level  and  can  be  summarised  as follows.  Bristol  retail  centres have  been found to 
perform more robustly and to be more resilient to the shock of the economic crisis if 
they were, other things held constant, more likely to have been: 
  smaller rather than larger; 
  those whose business mixes in the pre-crisis period were characterised by higher 
proportions of service units relative to retail units; 
  those whose retail unit compositions in the pre-crisis period were characterised by 
the diversity offered by higher proportions of small independent specialist stores; 
  those which, in the pre-crisis period had a 'large grocery retailer' present in-centre 
or edge-of-centre which conformed with the town-centres-first approach; 
  those with lower levels of structural vacancy in the pre-crisis period; 
  those whose catchment areas  were characterised by lower levels of income 
deprivation in the pre-crisis period. 
6.6.2  Vacancy rate changes and the implementation of ‘third wave data’ 
As reported by some commercial consultancies such as LDC the performance of UK 
high  streets  continued  to  weaken  across  the  country  during  the  shallow  recovery 
period. This study provides compelling evidence that this was also the case across 
Bristol retail centres. Using a third-wave of data, two separate response variables have 
been constructed in order to model the vacancy rate changes in two different periods. 
First,  between  the  within-crisis  and  shallow  recovery  periods  investigating  the 
performance of retail centres as they emerged from the shock of economic crisis and 
the second took into consideration the entire analysed period between the pre-crisis 
and shallow recovery. 
The spatial analysis has shown that the economic performance of retail centres 
during the shallow recovery period has varied considerably. However, it was important 
to establish how  much of that  variance  relative  to both periods the pre-crisis and   Chapter 6 
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within-crisis  could  be  explained  by  statistical  modelling.  The  first  model,  using  an 
identical set of variables to the one in Table 6.12, but derived for the within-crisis base, 
has provided us with valuable insights into the differential performance of Bristol high 
streets between the within-crisis and the shallow recovery periods.  
 
Table 6.13: Regression model for the vacancy rate change between within-crisis and 
shallow recovery periods 
 
Variable 
Parameter     
T-value 
 
Sig.       estimate    Std. Error 
  (Constant)  .113  .045  2.538  .015 
Retail vs. services  %  .137  .066  2.065  .045 
Centre size (ln)  -.016  .008  -2.086  .043 
Independent retail within-crisis  -.058  .034  -1.736  .090 
Corporate  foodstore  presence 
within-crisis 
-.034  .017  -2.050  .047 
Income deprivation  -.104  .055  -1.891  .066 
 
The model shown in table 6.13 explains about 30% of the variance in our response 
variable.  Although  containing  five  variables,  it  was  not  very  robust  as  only  three 
variables had their significance above the conventional levels, with two of those having 
the expected sign. Both the higher ratio of services relative to retail units and the 
presence  of  a  medium/large  corporate  foodstore  within-crisis  were found  to  have 
been protective of retail centre vitality during the shallow recovery period. The third 
significant variable, one with the reversed sign, implies that smaller centres, following 
the stronger resilience to the onset of economic crisis, started to be affected by the 
prolonged  deteriorating  economic  conditions  and  the  fears  increased  by  the  new 
reality of austerity.  
The remaining two parameter estimates had their significance slightly below the 
conventional  levels,  however  they  have  still  provided  some  useful  information. 
Importantly, the beneficial impacts of increased diversity have been confirmed as the 
increased proportion of independent retail during the within-crisis was still associated 
with a decrease in vacancy rate during the shallow recovery period. In contrast, the 
negative sign of income deprivation implies that also retail centres with more affluent 
catchments started to feel the pinch, presumably capturing the worsening position of 
the ‘squeezed middle class’.    Chapter 6 
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The second model has accounted for a wider period, depicting the vacancy rate 
change between the pre-crisis and shallow recovery surveys. The model has employed 
an identical set of explanatory variables to the initial Bristol model, shown in Table 
6.12. To some extent, the design considering the wider period could be seen as an 
attempt to combine two previous models in order to depict the long-term indicators of 
resilience.  Clearly,  the  model  shown  in  Table  6.14,  narrows  down  the  range  of 
statistically significant factors considerably. The simple model, explaining 27% of the 
variance  in  the  response  variable,  has  retained  only  three  significant  variables 
including  retail  mix,  diversity  and  medium/large  corporate  foodstore  presence  in-
town/edge-of-centre.  The  significance  of  centre  size,  income  deprivation  and 
structural  vacancy  has  waned,  however  their  parameter  estimates  retained  the 
expected signs, thus still somewhat corroborating the previous findings. These findings 
imply that taking into account the entire period between the pre-crisis and shallow 
recovery, only three factors could be firmly attributed to the enhanced resilience of UK 
town centres and high streets. The higher proportion of service outlets relative to 
retail units has once more proved a vital determinant of a ‘healthy’ retail centre and 
perhaps underpinning the importance of services in future high streets configurations. 
Crucially, the diversity of a traditional UK high street, proxied by the proportion of 
independent retailers, and the presence of corporate foodstores have been proved 
significant by all statistical models reported by this study, thus corroborating firmly our 
findings that those two factors are vital to a successful retail centre. Although those 
two  factors  have  often  been  portrayed  as  polar  opposite  in  popular  debate,  the 
statistical  modelling  unceasingly  supports  their  beneficial  impacts  on  vacancy  rate 
change. 
 
Table 6.14: Model of vacancy rate change between pre-crisis and shallow recovery 
period 
 
Variable 
Parameter 
estimate 
 
Std. Error 
 
T-value 
 
Sig. 
  (Constant)  0.056  0.043  1.300  0.200 
Retail vs. Services %  0.176  0.077  2.272  0.028 
Independent retail pre-crisis  -0.116  0.039  -2.974  0.005 
Corporate foodstore presence  
in pre-crisis 
-0.037  0.018  -2.002  0.052   Chapter 6 
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This is a strong argument supporting their potential symbiotic relationship, where 
both  type  of  retailers  provide  complementary  offer  rather  than  enhancing  direct 
competition. It is widely recognised that local independent retailers provide economic 
benefit,  environmental  distinctiveness  and  the  social  glue  that  holds  communities 
together (NEF 2006), however the corporate supermarkets are often the magnets that 
bring essential footfall to a centre by the mechanism of linked trips and prevent the 
‘leakage of expenditure’ to a nearby centres (Wrigley et al., 2009b).  Finally, the waned 
effect of structural vacancy on the vacancy rate change in the shallow recovery period 
could be partly explained by the fact that the long-term vacant outlets began to attract 
some  interest  of  the  supportive  institutional  structures,  private  associations 
developing  various  forms  of  increasing  town  centre  attractiveness  and  a  range  of 
businesses searching for potentially cheaper rents. Similar explanation can be offered 
by  the  adaptive  resilience  theory  which  assumes  that  during  the  release  and 
reconfiguration stage, induced by the shock of economic crisis, retail churn increases, 
simultaneously de-locking the previously locked-in configurations characterised in this 
case by high structural vacancy. 
6.6.3  Implications of the statistical results 
The  multivariate modelling  has two  key  implications  related to performance  of 
Bristol high streets during and since the economic crisis. Firstly, it has validated the 
findings of the cross-regional model at a local scale and secondly it has examined the 
robustness of the determinants of town centres’ performance in the shallow recovery 
period. The multivariate analysis evaluating the economic performance of Bristol high 
streets as they adjusted to the onset of economic crisis has largely corroborated the 
previous findings from the four-region 267 centres sample (Wrigley and Dolega, 2011). 
In addition, it has provided some evidence that the affluence of catchment areas  can 
be  beneficial  to  surviving  the  impacts  of  the  economic  crisis  when  local  scale  is 
considered.  
Although these findings are significant and of a considerable importance, it was the 
examination of a ‘third wave’ shallow recovery period data that added the greatest   Chapter 6 
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value.  First,  it  confirmed  the  significance  of  retail  diversity,  corporate  foodstore 
presence  and  the  increasing  role  of  services  in  protecting  the  vitality  of  UK  town 
centres. Despite the public debate viewing the presence of corporate foodstores as a 
direct cause of a rapid decline in the numbers of independent retailers the empirical 
evidence suggest that both those factors are important in protecting the vitality of UK 
town centres. In fact, most of the decline in the independent stores was caused by the 
competition  from  the  online  retailers.  Thus,  it  could  be  argued  that  some  kind  of 
complementarity  or  even  symbiotic  relationship  between  the  corporate  foodstores 
and independent retailers could have emerged. Even more importantly, the growing 
and beneficial role of services can suggest that traditional UK high street is changing 
fast, and it is not only retail units that consumer want in their centre. Indeed, taking 
into consideration the shift in demand, lifestyle and consumer culture it is possible to 
re-imagine the future town centre as a place to enjoy and dwell, not only to shop  
Second implication pertained to the fact that significance of some of the drivers of 
town centre viability waned during the post-recession shallow recovery period. The 
statistical modelling revealed that this was relevant in the instance of centre size, pre-
recession structural vacancy and affluence. This implied that smaller centres started to 
feel the pinch, presumably due to the spatio-temporal lag effects. It could be argued that 
recession affected Bristol city workers before the effects of public expenditure cuts and public 
sector redundancies could be felt at local centres. In the shallow recovery period the so-
called ‘retail churn’ which is an essential element of a centre’s structure reorganisation 
has  increased  simultaneously  lowering  the  significance  of  the  pre-crisis  structural 
vacancy rates. In turn, the waning significance of the affluence could be explained by 
the worsening situation of the ‘middle class’ (The Independent, 8 Nov 2012). As the 
reality of ‘Austerity Britain’ with high inflation and non-existing salary increases kicked 
in,  the  middle-income  families  begun  to  feel  the  squeeze.  Finally,  a  number  of 
variables related to the supportive/unsupportive actions of various local  supportive 
structures  were  tested;  however  they  did  not  generate  conventional  levels  of 
significance. Nevertheless, each of the five retail centres that were a subject to some 
form of institutional help recorded a small decline in vacancy rates. We acknowledge 
that Bristol area might be representative of the southern part of our sample, but by no   Chapter 6 
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means can portray the characteristics of other UK regions. Thus, it would be of an 
uppermost benefit to conduct further research which would examine a comparative 
urban area, preferably in the North, to facilitate the assessment of the differential 
performance of tow centres that take into account underlying geographical patterns 
(see Dorling, 2010).  .  
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  Contextualising high streets evolutionary  Chapter 7:
      changes 
7.1  Economic shocks and ‘slow burns’ 
High  streets  have  rarely  evolved  in  smooth  and  incremental  ways.  These  have 
constantly been reshaped by changing policy and periodic economic or competitive 
shocks. Overall, the evolutionary trajectories of economic systems are affected by two 
types of disturbances, a) unexpected shocks and b) more gradual processes of change 
often  referred  to  as  'slow  burns'  (Pendall  et  al,.  2010).  Although  both  types  of 
disruption have the capacity to alter the configuration of retail centres, their nature 
and extent may vary. Thus, the interest has essentially focused on the capacity of UK 
high streets and town centres to recover from external shock - what Hassink (2010, 
p.45) describes as ‘one of the most intriguing question in economic geography … why 
some regional economies manage to renew themselves, whereas others remain locked 
in decline’. 
In  this  chapter  I  explore  those  issues,  in  particular  the  importance  of  various 
concepts of resilience in explaining the geographically uneven performance of retail 
centres.  The notion  of resilience,  used  for  some  time  by  engineers  and  ecologists, 
describes instances when some sort of disruption pushes a system from an established 
equilibrium (Martin, 2011; Cowell, 2012). In the case of engineering resilience a system 
‘bounces back’ to its pre-shock equilibrium state or growth path but in the case of 
ecological  resilience  can  be  pushed  to  a  new  steady  state.  The  multi-equilibrium 
concept  introduced  by  ecological  resilience  offers  some  analytical  leverage;  in 
particular, the established determinants of UK high streets performance can be viewed 
as tipping points which can move town centres/high streets beyond their elasticity 
thresholds. However, as a result of the scale and length of the global economic crisis 
shock  experienced  by  UK  town  centres  and  high  streets,  it  is  unlikely  that  merely 
bouncing back to previous or new steady configurations will occur. Rather, this chapter   Chapter 7 
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considers the way these new configurations are linked to the notion of adaptability, 
defined  ‘as  the  dynamic  capacity  to  effect  and  unfold  multiple  evolutionary 
trajectories’ (Pike et al., 2010 p. 62).  
However, as already described in Chapters 1 and 2, the shock of economic crisis is 
not  the  only  driver  of  change  re-shaping  UK  high  streets’  configurations  and  their 
evolutionary trajectories. Pike et al., (2010, p. 63) claim that ‘shocks (exogenous and/or 
endogenous) are often closely intertwined with the unfolding of broader, longer run 
and slow-burn processes of change'. Those long-term processes have been referred to 
by Pendall et al., (2010) as ‘drivers of change’ which in the long term have the capacity 
to gradually transform economic systems. In the case of UK town centres and high 
streets, at least three forces could be associated with such transformation. First, the 
impacts of decade-long progressive increases in online retailing, which now exceed 
more  than  10%  of  total  sales,  have  induced  the  mechanisms  of  substitution, 
complementarity  and  modification,  described  in  Chapter 3  (Weltevreden,  2007).  In 
particular  the  former  mechanism,  directly  impacting  certain  types  of  traditional 
retailers  is  strongly  associated  with  the  irreversible  changes  to  town  centres’ 
configuration.  Second,  the  long-term  and  cumulative  impacts  of  competition  from 
large out-of-town developments - a force which as a result of the tightening of retail 
regulation beginning in the mid-1990 and the consequent implementation of ‘town 
centre  first’  policies  (Wood  et  al.,  2006;  Guy,  2007;  Wrigley,  2010a),  has  become 
increasingly complex and difficult to read. Third, the significant changes in consumer 
culture, which as consumers reassessed the time and cost associated with large ‘one 
stop’  shops,  has  led to  a  progressive rise of  ‘convenience  culture’  (Wrigley,  2009), 
forming new interdependencies within town centre structures. What is important to 
note at this stage is that all the above-mentioned drivers of change may be interlinked; 
however, the complex nature of their interaction is still relatively unknown. 
7.2  Evolutionary approach to the resilience of UK high streets  
Viewing  UK  high  streets  and  town  centres  as  dynamic  economic  systems 
undergoing constant evolutionary change, this chapter now attempts to capture the 
subtle  nature  of  the  observed  adjustment  of  UK  high  streets  to  the  mixture  of   Chapter 7 
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macroeconomic shock of global economic crisis and the ‘slow burns’ exposed by the 
severity of the shock, especially their evolutionary aspect.  
Following Martin (2011) we argue that there are four interconnected dimensions 
which can help to unfold and understand the adaptive resilience of UK high streets and 
town  centres  to  the  shock  of  economic  crisis  and  the  other  interlinked  drivers  of 
change. These are:  
a) resistance defined as the degree of fragility or vulnerability of high streets to 
economic shock, 
b) recovery, in particular its speed and extent but also the way it relates to the 
degree of resistance, 
c) reorientation which focuses on the nature of town centres’ reconfiguration and 
adaptation in response to macroeconomic shock,  
d) renewal viewed as the extent to which UK high streets resume their pre-shock 
growth path. 
So far in this thesis, the examination of the first of those dimensions – resistance- 
involved  establishing  statistically  significant  factors  that  have  been  associated  with 
either protecting UK town centres/high streets or increasing their fragility during the 
economic crisis. The assessment of the second – recovery – involved evaluation of the 
speed and extent of the recovery of the intra-urban retail centres from the shock of 
economic crisis using a ‘third wave’ data – the surveys carried out in the post-recession 
shallow recovery period. We now move to the latter two and tackle an issue that 
remains  embryonic  but  is  vital  for  policy  development  i.e.  what  is  the  extent  and 
nature  of  reorientation  and  renewal  which  is  likely  to  characterise  UK  town 
centres/high streets in the decade following the economic-crisis. We approach this 
issue through the lens of two notions often perceived ‘in tension with each other’: 
adaptation and adaptability. 
In the context of an economic system’s response to a shock, adaptation is defined 
by Pike et al., (2010) as the capacity of a system to move back - at least in the short 
run-  to  the  path  that  proved  to  have  been  successful  in  the  past.  Although,  such 
interpretation may reflect the tendency of systems to improve their adaptation to a 
given  niche,  it  could  be  perceived  as  leaning  towards  engineering  or  ecological   Chapter 7 
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resilience, where systems react to a shock by taking a step back before returning to a 
growth path. In the context of high streets and whilst some of them have responded to 
the economic shock in a way which saw vacancy levels ‘bouncing back’ to a degree, 
alternative trajectories of growth, suggestive of resilience through adaptability need 
consideration. Pike et al., (2010) claim that adaptability emerges through a decision to 
leave the path that proved to have been successful in the past. Dawley et al., (2010) 
argue that this kind of response is beneficial in coping with unforeseen shocks, but it is 
also likely to encounter various challenges.  
Viewing  the  long-run  success  of  an  economic  system  through  the  lens  of 
adaptability emphasises the ability of various agents and institutional structures to 
adapt to the changing competitive, technological and market pressures (Simmie and 
Martin, 2011). Indeed, the adaptive capacity of a town centre depends on the actions 
of individual agents, who can learn and store knowledge, are innovative and adjust 
their  behaviour  to  ever-changing  consumer  behaviour  patterns  and  technological 
advancement.  There  has  been  compelling  evidence  that  factors  such  as  diversity, 
innovation and creativity can foster the process of growth and competitiveness of an 
economic system, thus those characteristics should be viewed as inherent elements of 
an  adaptable  system.  Diversity  on  the  one  hand,  can  work  as  a  ‘shock  absorber’ 
preventing  the  system  as  a  whole  from  severe  destruction  disturbance  can  cause 
(Dawley  at  el.,  2010),  and  on  the  other  hand,  innovation  and  novelty  of  local 
entrepreneurs  are  essential  to  create  and  maintain  more  sustainable  growth.  
Importantly, what becomes increasingly clear from this research is that unexpected 
shocks such as the economic crisis, partially by exposing the other forces of concern, 
are likely to increase the responsiveness of various actors. There is an argument that 
for the economic systems to be resilient to major shocks, a long-term and cumulative 
process of adaptive capacity building may be essential. However, adaptive capacity or 
even  transforming  the  system  at  a  local  scale  can  be  protective  only  to  a  certain 
degree as there are other forces beyond the control of local actors.  
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7.2.1  Adaptive cycles  
Complex systems are characterised by self-organising behaviour (Levin, 1998) and 
an adaptive capacity Martin (2011) which enables them to reconfigure their internal 
structures  spontaneously  in  a  response  to  an  unexpected  shock.  Town  centres, 
however, are exposed to a number of other more gradual forces of change which drive 
their  evolutionary  reconfiguration.  In  that  evolutionary  and  adaptive  context,  the 
resilience of self-organised complex systems is often explained by the adaptive cycle 
(Holling et al., 2002; Pendall et al., 2010).  
The simplified version of an adaptive cycle of complex economic systems contains 
four phases: a) growth, characterised by innovation, volatility and high demand for 
products and services, b) consolidation, when the role of growth and innovation slows 
down  and  resources  become  more  fixed,  c)  release  when  some  sort  of  disruption 
creates the need for change and d) reorientation when a system reorganises itself and 
new trajectories of growth emerge. 
Viewing  UK  town  centres  and  high  streets  as  dynamic  and  complex  economic 
systems which constantly evolve and have the capacity to be self-organised, and by 
employing a concept well-established in ecological sciences, this research suggests an 
analytical  framework  to  approach  the  adaptive  cycle  of  UK  high  streets  and  town 
centres. 
Following the four above mentioned phases of the adaptive cycle, the analytical 
framework suggested here in the context of high streets, is illustrated in Figure 7.1 
below. 
The main characteristics of each of the four phases are: 
1) Growth: This phase happens rapidly and is often characterised by a high rate of 
opening up of new stores which may lead to duplication of businesses, and generates 
increased  competition.  Retail  centres,  during  this  stage  are  likely  to  attract  new 
investments and increase available floorspace to meet increasing demand.  The newly 
completed  retail  space  coupled  with  high  retail  churn  and  newly  completed  retail 
space facilitate the changing demand of both existing retailers and new entrants in a 
particular  centre.  Resilience  in  that  phase,  fostered  by  innovation  and  creativity  is 
typically high, but as the phase matures, it slowly decreases.   Chapter 7 
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Figure 7.1: The adaptive cycle of UK high streets and town centres 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2) Consolidation: Over time, as the development path becomes more fixed and the 
connectedness amongst various agents is high, the system’s rigidness increases. In this 
phase retail supply in terms of demand for physical outlets becomes more predictable 
and  established.  Most  commonly  it  is  a  period  when  town  centres  reach  highest 
capacity and experience a period of relative stability. As retail churn decreases and 
efficiency increases retail centres may become ‘locked-in’ in a particular trajectory of 
development. Town centres, however, constantly evolve due to changing consumer 
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culture and arising competition, therefore failing to take appropriate actions or adapt 
to those changes may result in an increased vulnerability and low resilience, especially 
at the mature stage of this phase.  
3) Release: This stage is usually triggered by some sort of unexpected shock. It is 
quite rapid and may feel like an emergency which is often marked by collapse and 
uncertainty. In terms of a town centre the need for change may be driven by internal 
factors such as new corporate superstore entry or by external factors, for instance the 
shock  of  economic  crisis.  As  a  result, the  rate  of  shop  closures  goes up  and  shop 
openings down leading to a dramatic rise in the number of vacant units. but Such 
shock however, has the capacity to open up new possibilities and de-lock previously 
rigid and often declining configurations in the manner referred to by Shumpeter (1942) 
as ‘creative destruction’.  
4) Reorientation: In this stage innovation kicks in creating new potential for growth 
and new configurations are likely to emerge through some internal mechanisms which 
create new interdependencies. Although the mechanisms explaining the emergence of 
new configurations are little understood, however the reconfigured town centres are 
likely to increase their attractiveness and accessibility in order to increase the footfall, 
which is the lifeblood of every retail centre. Moreover, some research (e.g. Wrigley 
and  Dolega,  2011)  suggested  that  developing  symbiotic  relationships  between 
corporate and independent retailers or increasing the presence of various services was 
equally important for the adaptively resilient town centres.  
 
Domains and scales  
The resilience of complex systems to economic and competitive shocks is linked to 
the adaptive cycle, however it is more complex than Figure 7.1 suggests. Importantly, 
an economic system is ‘nested in’ a hierarchy of different scales which interact with 
each other in a rather complex way. Usually, the interactions happen through two 
principal mechanisms where larger scales affect smaller ones and in turn the local 
systems act back on the regional and national ones. Walker and Salt (2012) implied 
that  complex  systems  are  composed  of  at  least  three  interlinked  domains:  social, 
economic and physical which operate at different scales: local, regional and national.   Chapter 7 
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This  study, by  adopting  this idea, derives  the domains through  which  retail  centre 
adaptive capacity is built, (Table 7.1) and positions them at the scales a town centre is 
‘nested’. Although the characteristics of each domain may be overlapping to a degree 
or be interlinked they could be summarised as follows: 
a) The social domain typically includes various demographic indicators driving the 
demand  side  of  retail  (e.g.  affluence  of  catchment  areas,  population  increase, 
unemployment etc.). They have the ability to depict changes in consumer culture and 
fluctuating  levels  of  market  demand  at  different  scales.  For  instance,  the  regional 
variations  in  affluence,  employment  etc.  have  the  capacity  to  create  different 
consumer confidence and levels of demand e.g. North-South divide. 
b) The economic domain at the local level includes various elements impacting the 
‘economic health’ of a town centre such as business rates , other lease terms especially 
the length or presence of various structures of institutional support. At the regional 
and national scale it incorporates underlying dynamics of growth, cyclical economic 
downturns and competition from large retail developments or technological advances 
such as online retailing,  
 
Table 7.1: Town centres viewed as complex systems and their constituent domains and 
scales 
D
o
m
a
i
n
 
  Scale 
Local  Regional  National 
Social  Catchment area 
demographics (e.g. 
affluence, population 
increase, unemployment 
levels) 
Regional variation in 
levels of consumer 
confidence and 
demand  
Changing consumer 
culture 
Economic  Business rates, 
institutional support, 
diversity 
Underlying dynamics 
of growth, economic 
strength, regional 
employment base 
Economic 
downturns, 
increase in online 
sales, change in 
planning policy 
Physical  Retail fabric, streetscape, 
parking ease, presence of 
magnet stores 
Accessibility factors, physical geography, 
rural-urban living 
 
c) The physical domain comprises the condition of retail fabric or streetscape and 
other physical factors impacting footfall levels such as adequate and reasonably priced   Chapter 7 
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parking or presence of most attractive ‘magnet’ stores. Additionally, other factors such 
as  adequate  size  of  a  centre,  presence  of  services  such  as  banks,  post  office  or 
perceived safety and cleanliness are crucial here. At the regional or national levels 
various accessibility factors or constraints by physical geography such as sea, river or 
lake may also be important. 
The concept which links resilience of economic systems to the interlinked hierarchy 
of  ‘adaptive  cycles’  -  referred  to  as  the  panarchy  model  –  has  already  attracted 
increasing attention of several economic geographers (e.g. Simmie and Martin, 2010; 
Dawley et al., 2010; Walker and Salt, 2012). Translating it into retail, the panarchy 
model portrays the adaptive capacity of UK retail centres as a function of complex 
linkages  between  social,  economic  and  physical  domains  which  are  ‘nested  in’ 
different scales. Understanding the mechanisms responsible for interactions between 
various components of a town centre and the extent to which they are affected by 
different scales, is crucial to building adaptive capacity which in turn increases the 
resilience of a particular centre. Indeed, the mechanisms through which town centres 
develop  a  ‘coping  strategy’  to  both  unexpected  shocks  and  ‘slow  burns’  is  largely 
dependent on their long-term strategy and previous experiences such as entry of a 
major competitor‘. This can be helpful in anticipating the internal unexpected shocks, 
however the limitions in terms of the external shocks can be far greater.  
7.2.2  Targeted interventions 
Walker  and  Salt  (2012)  have  however  questioned  the  extent  to  which  self-
organising  behaviour  can  induce  the  anticipatory  and/or  reactive  reorganisation  in 
social or economic systems. Although, the evidence from the cross-regional analysis 
found only a limited evidence on the positive impacts of institutional support during 
the economic crisis, there is a growing body of evidence that targeted interventions 
might be important to the enhancement of a system’s adaptive capacity (Simmie and 
Matrin, 2010, Dawley et al., 2010) In addition, it has been long argued that building 
adaptive capacity is a long process and requires multi-scale coordination. There are 
three key dimensions to the targeted interventions: (i) timing, (ii) role of actors and (iii) 
scales.   Chapter 7 
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(i) Both timing and sequencing of interventions are important because they can 
have negative impact on a system if implemented before agreeing on safety measures 
or regulatory frameworks. In the context of an adaptive cycle there is a consensus view 
that a key time for developing action plans, aiming at increasing the adaptive capacity 
of a system, is the conservation phase. Otherwise, the increasing connectedness of 
elements in a very efficient system may break apart in an uncontrolled manner during 
an unexpected shock or disturbance. Walker and Salt (2012) claim that lack of action 
plans  and  visionary  management  may  lead  to  a  loss  of  opportunities  and  any 
consequent back-loop phase can be long, chaotic and expensive.  
(ii) Equally important in building the adaptive capacity of a system is the role of 
various actors, whose good knowledge is helpful in identifying the structural problems 
of a system, in particular, the drivers of change and anticipating the response to that 
change. There is evidence that institutions which learn from previous challenges can 
adapt  their  behaviour  more  easily,  even  in  the  absence  of  major  shocks  or 
disturbances.  Some  of  the  most  challenging  interventions  may  involve  a 
transformation  of  system,  introduction  of  new  components  or  downsizing. 
Nevertheless, initiating a successful transformation requires a good understanding of 
the way a system works, what change is required and what is the role of particular 
actors in that system. Usually, the options for transformation ‘require encouraging and 
investing  in  novelty  and  experimentation  as  well  as  help  to  change,  rather  than 
subsidies that allow people to continue doing the same thing when it  is no longer 
viable’ (Walker and Salt, 2012, p.126). In the case of UK high streets, anticipating the 
changes in demand and consumer culture, often exposed by periodic shocks, is crucial 
to  the  economic  health  of  a  town  centre.  Indeed,  the  presence  of  a  town  centre 
manager and participation in BID’s or other revitalisation schemes can be beneficial, 
however, equally important may be attracting novel and innovative retailers whose 
investment enhances the vitality and protects the function of an existing centre. 
(iii) In addition to the above dimensions, the scales at which targeted interventions 
take  place  are  of  central  importance.  Dawley  et  al.,  (2010,  p.8)  indicate  that  the 
institutional co-ordination of multiple actors vertically across and horizontally between 
multiple  spatial  levels, from  the  supra-national  to  the  local’  is  vital to a  successful   Chapter 7 
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adaptation of economic systems to the drivers of change. The spatial scale may be also 
critical when deciding on the duration and intervals of targeted interventions (Walker 
and Salt, 2012; Pike et al., 2010) because the timing required for an intervention may 
vary at each scale. They also suggest that since a transformation at a large scale is risky 
and potentially expensive, support for experimentation at a finer scale is needed and it 
should  be  undertaken  in  a  bottom-up  manner.  Taking  into  consideration  UK  high 
streets, at the level of a town centre it is important to understand the causes of poorly 
performing retail/service types before drawing an action plan for the whole centre. 
Certainly, acknowledging the issue and commissioning a comprehensive study of town 
centre viability are important first steps to facilitate any successful intervention.  
A  good  example  of  such  targeted  intervention  which  incorporates  all  three 
dimensions  discussed  above  is  the  initiative  led  by  Mary  Portas,  launched  by  the 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills in 2011. The Review, which made 28 
recommendations,  has  identified  key  tasks  for  policy  makers,  local  authorities  and 
local communities that have to be implemented in order to create prosperous and 
diverse high streets. The Government has accepted the recommendations and as a 
response has decided to “run a number of Town Teams ‘Portas Pilots’ to test proof of 
concept”  (Department  for  Communities  and  Local  Governments,  2012).  Initially  12 
town centres were selected in May 2012 for the programme and then a further 15 
town  centres  so-called  ‘second  wave  Portas  Pilots’  were  added  in  July  2012.  This 
initiative has generated much interest amongst many struggling town centres in the UK 
and  as  a  result,  more  than  400  towns  have  applied  to  be  ‘Portas  Pilots’.  The 
Government has offered all those Town Teams that were not selected the opportunity 
to become a Town Team Partners. In effect, more than 300 Town Teams registered 
and they will have access to the network of advisers managed by the Association of 
Town Centre Management and will receive a share of a multi-million pound fund to 
take forward elements of their plans.  
7.2.3  Assessing the adaptive cycle framework 
Some aspects of the adaptive cycle concept may to a degree overlap with other 
notions found in economic geography such as system lock-in. It is a process found in   Chapter 7 
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path dependence theory which shows that economic systems have the capacity to 
become ‘locked into’ a particular trajectory of economic development (see Martin and 
Sunley, 2006). One interpretation is that if a system was ‘locked into’ a successful 
development  path  it  may  be  resistant  to  an  external  disturbance,  thus  viewed  as 
resilient. The contrasting argument goes that as a system becomes efficient in the 
consolidation stage; the connectedness between its components becomes very strong, 
increasing the rigidness of the system, which in consequence reduces its resilience to 
the unexpected shocks.  Simmie and Martin (2010) suggested that there is a ‘trade-off’ 
between connectedness and resilience and often an external shock is required to ‘de-
lock’ the system from the rigid path. Such shock has the capacity to open up a new 
opportunity for a system, which can then reorganise its form and function through the 
process  of  either  adaptation  or  adaptability  –  the  notions  discussed  earlier  in  this 
chapter. 
In that context, the important aspect provided by the ‘adaptive cycle’ framework 
shows that if an economic system responds to the external shock through adaptation, 
it is likely to omit part of the cycle. In fact, by adopting the previously successful path 
of growth it moves directly from an early release stage to the established growth and 
consolidation phases, reducing the length of a cycle considerably. This is to say, that 
such  response  can  be  viewed  as  closely  related  to  the  notions  of  engineering  or 
ecological  resilience,  where  systems  respond  by  ‘bouncing  back’  to  previous 
configurations. 
On  the  contrary,  the  response  of  a  system  to  an  external  shock  through 
adaptability utilises a whole adaptive cycle with the focus placed on the emergence of 
new interdependencies during the release and reorientation stages. Most likely, the 
emergence of a new path is stimulated by the pre-existing resources, knowledge and 
experiences (Simmie and Martin, 2010). Furthermore, the nature and extent of the 
renewal of a previous trajectory of development depends on the evolving dynamics of 
a system and severity of the disruption. In the context of UK high streets, the adaptive 
response  to  both  unexpected  external  shocks  and  ‘slow  burns’  is  highly  desirable, 
however  it  can  be  seriously  constrained  by  a  need  of  accumulating  the  required 
resources, both financial and intellectual, in a relatively short period of time.     Chapter 7 
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The adaptive cycle framework has several advantages when considering UK high 
streets and town centres: a) it depicts their dynamic and evolving nature, b) links their 
potential  resilience  to  the  pre-shock  position  in  the  cycle  and  c)  offers  some 
explanation of the mechanisms responsible for creating the adaptive capacity.  
As town centres are complex systems which constantly evolve, the dynamics of 
that  change  are  depicted  relatively  well  by  the  adaptive  cycle.  In  particular,  the 
panarchy model implies that the evolution of UK town centres is intertwined with the 
regional dynamics of growth and national retail planning policies. However, what is 
even clearer from the adaptive cycle framework, is the fact that the resilience of town 
centres is linked to the nature of their pre-shock state; in other words, the phase in the 
adaptive cycle in which a retail centre was in the pre-crisis period can determine its 
resilience.  As  Figure  7.1  shows,  the  response  of  high  streets  in  consolidation  and 
release phases is characterised by less resilience than those which are in either the 
growth or reorientation stages. The adaptive cycle also suggests that building adaptive 
capacity  is  a  process  that  on  the  one  hand  draws  from  previous  knowledge  and 
experiences,  but  on  the  other  hand,  is  fostered  by  novelty  and  innovation,  which 
underpin the emergence of new growth trajectories.  
Despite considerable analytical leverage in explaining the adaptive resilience of UK 
retail centres, the ‘adaptive cycle’ framework has some limitations (see Table 7.2).  
 
Table 7.2: Strengths and weaknesses of an adaptive cycle framework 
Strengths  Weaknesses 
  Depicts dynamic nature of 
UK high streets and considers the 
evolutionary aspect 
  Back loop (release and 
reorientation phases) little 
understood and developed 
  Links the potential 
resilience of a retail centre to the 
pre-shock position in the cycle  
  Becomes very complex 
when multiple scales are 
accounted for 
  Explains to a degree 
mechanisms responsible for 
creating adaptive capacity 
  Does not account for the 
power and conflict present in 
regional, local governance  
  Shows that the 
emergence of a successful path is 
linked to the accumulated 
knowledge and innovation 
  The extent of regional 
evolution and national retail 
planning policy following 
adaptive cycle unclear 
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 (i) The ‘back loop’ of an adaptive cycle – the release and reorientation phases – is 
undeveloped and little understood. Indeed, as there has been less research conducted 
on the ‘back loop’, partly due to the fact that release and reorientation often happen 
very  rapidly,  so  the  mechanisms  of  that  process  require  further  consideration.  In 
contrast, phases one and two, often referred to as the ‘front or development loop’, are 
relatively predictable and well understood as they last much longer than the release 
and reorientation stages (Walker and Salt, 2012).  
(ii) The adaptive resilience of UK high streets and town centres is more complex 
than Figure 7.1 indicates as there is a need to take into account: a) multiple scales the 
system is nested e.g. failure of regional or national retail chain affects local centre; b) 
and  the  power  and  conflict  ‘present  in  regional  governance  in  ways  they  are  not 
present in ecosystems’ (Swanstrom, 2008, p.3) e.g. a constant struggle between policy 
makers and developers.  
(iii) The phases of the adaptive cycle as well as their length and speed are not 
always easily distinguishable. Moreover, as Robinson (2010) observed the movement 
between phases is sometimes not as linear as shown on Figure 7.1. In terms of UK 
town centres, this may not only question our ability to specify the stages of adaptive 
cycles at regional or national scales, but also query the extent to which adaptive cycles 
represent the evolution of regional dynamics or national retail planning policy.  
7.3  Reconfigured high streets - emerging visions 
Although  a  substantial  part  of  that  task  lies  ahead,  it  is  our  view  that  some 
indicators of the potential evolutionary trajectories of `adaptively resilient' high streets 
are available. In this context the analysis of entry and exit of small and specialist stores 
in over a thousand UK town centres and high streets during the early to mid-2000s 
conducted by the Competition Commission (2007), together with the parallel study 
carried out by the University of Southampton (Wrigley et al., 2009a), and aspects of 
our results on the differential performance of convenience retail at both cross-regional 
and intra-urban levels, are relevant. Some evidence of UK high streets’ evolutionary 
trajectories  was  observed  in  the  Competition  Commission  (2008)  analysis  which 
despite  confirming  a  long-term  decline  in  almost  all  convenience  retail  specialist   Chapter 7 
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stores, demonstrated that over the past ten years specialist stores have experienced 
also a different trend. The entry of corporate supermarkets was often accompanied by 
positive or at least non-detrimental impacts on particular types of small stores: bakers, 
health  food  shops,  independent  convenience  stores  and  delicatessens.  Those 
controversial findings, not supporting the uniform decline amongst specialist stores, 
have been extended by the parallel Southampton study which identified some areas in 
the UK, particularly the high-growth part of `London and prospering southern England', 
where  additional  types  of  convenience  retail  experienced  growth.  In  that  region, 
butchers, delicatessens, fishmongers and CTNs, joined the positively impacted small-
store groups identified by the Commission, suggesting that the differential regional 
growth  had  some  implications  on  the  economic  performance  of  evolving  UK  high 
streets. What these findings implied more widely, was that the small-specialist store 
sector  was  potentially  able  to  adapt  to  a  significant  external  competitive  shock. 
Following the out-of town development era over the previous thirty years (Guy, 2007; 
Wrigley, 1998), the implementation of ‘town centre first’ policies has resulted in the 
return  of  leading  corporate-food  retailers  to  town  centres/high  streets,  which  was 
regarded by smaller independent retailers as a shock. Moreover, that shock was not 
merely a defensive and destructive force. It could be viewed as a foundation of an 
adaptability process within convenience retail which in an evolutionary context has 
transformed the structures of those centres/high streets that experienced corporate 
foodstore  entry.  The  vital  component  of  such  configuration  was  the  adaptation  of 
small  stores  `flexing'  their  offers  and  raising  their  levels  of  service  to  achieve 
complementarity  to  those  provided  by  the  corporate-foodstore  entrants.  Such 
specialist stores would then potentially be able to access, via the mechanism of `linked 
trips' (Guy, 2007; Wrigley et al., 2010b), a share of the expenditure which previously 
would have leaked away from the town centres/high streets, but which would now be 
`clawed back' by policy compliant corporate foodstore entry/presence. In this way it 
was possible to envisage an evolutionary trajectory of reconfigured town centres and 
high streets in which adaptability was centred on new mixes and offers of small and 
specialist store types, providing symbiotic relationships with the in-centre or edge-of-
centre corporate foodstores.    Chapter 7 
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Similarly,  it  can  be  suggested  that  small  comparison  retailers  can  compete 
successfully against large corporate stores and cheaper internet or ‘brick and click’ 
retailers either by delivering a complimentary offer or embracing the technology and 
adopting  the  multi-channel  retailing  strategies.  The  severe  impact  of  the  global 
economic  crisis  on  the  comparison  retailers  and  the  more  vulnerable  independent 
retailers in particular, has exposed the structural problems in the sector and compelled 
those retailers to seek new interdependencies and complementary relationships. 
Overall, this research implies that UK high streets have the capacity to reconfigure 
in  two  distinctive  but  often  interlinked  ways:  (i)  spontaneous  reorientation  in  a 
response to an unexpected shock, typical to the behaviour of a complex system (ii) 
controlled reorientation – induced by implementation of targeted interventions (see 
Figure 7.2).  
 
Figure 7.2: The reorientation process of a retail centre – the inputs and outputs 
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(i) One emerging version involving the complementarity-based adaptability - what 
might be termed the high-growth-Britain vision - was characterised by rising numbers 
of artisanal bakers, butchers, and fishmongers, accompanied by town-centre farmers 
markets.  In  that  version  the  small  and  specialist  retailers  `raise  their  game'  to 
complement  and  also  to  re-challenge  the  offer  of  in/edge-of-town  corporate 
supermarkets as expressed by The Independent on Sunday ``New bakers and butchers 
are  opening  up  all  over  the  country,  ending  a  decades-long  decline.  Retail  experts 
believe  the  resurgence  reflects  a  growing  demand  for  high-quality  produce,  from 
artisanal  loaves  to  dry-aged  beef  ...  Traditional  shops  have  improved  their  game 
retailers had to become as professional as the supermarkets. Butchers have realised 
they have a niche they can fill that supermarkets can't'' (23 January 2011, p.7). The 
second  version  could  be  termed  the  low-growth-Britain  vision  and  was  of  course, 
somewhat more muted as it attracted less artisan produce and more of the tertiary 
brands  and  Asian-sourced  non-food  bargains.  This  was  reflected  in  our  empirical 
results by the rapid expansion of a limited-range hard discounters, pound and charity 
shops.  However, in the more affluent prospering smaller towns of northern England, 
Scotland,  South  Wales,  and  Northern  Ireland,  the  vision  of  a  diverse  `ecology'  of 
complementary and revitalised small stores re-emerged and could again be supported 
by the findings of the Southampton study of entry and exit (Wrigley et al., 2009a, page 
2080).  
(ii) Another vision of reconfigured UK high streets involved the implementation of 
various  targeted  interventions.  One  of  the  most  important  types  of  intervention, 
having the potential to change future configuration of the post-crisis UK high streets, 
was  institutional  support.  Retail  centres  that  can  identify  and  remove  barriers 
perceived as damaging to their performance can recover faster from the economic 
shock. Here, the key role is played by the presence of town centre managers with a 
long-term vision and participation in various high street revitalisation schemes such as 
BID’s. Further, numerous local supportive initiatives such as improving town centre 
accessibility by providing adequate and reasonably priced parking facilities or investing 
in retail centre streetscapes can also help ameliorate underlying problems.  On the 
contrary, retail centres which lacked the long-term vision or institutional support were   Chapter 7 
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less likely to remove the barriers damaging their performance and see the emergence 
of coping strategies preventing them from retail blight.  
Finally, taking into account the necessity to protect and enhance competition, the 
development of policy measures which promote innovation, creativity, and upgrading 
of  quality  standards  may  be  vital  to  future  high  street  trajectories.  For  example: 
drawing  lessons  from  analysis  of  centres  which  have  thrived  in  difficult  times; 
investment in `good-practice' guides; recognition of the local retail heroes whose skills 
can  catalyse  the  upgrading  of  centres  in  which  they  operate  etc.,  together  with 
encouragement of planning regulation to focus more proactively on the sustainable 
economic  health  of  centres  whilst  simultaneously  maintaining  and  protecting  the 
beneficial effects of the widely supported ‘town-centres-first’ approach. 
7.3.1  Renewal of the pre-crisis evolutionary trajectories 
In our view the shock of the economic crisis, fragile consumer confidence and the 
subsequent  austerity  has  had  two  different  implications  on  the  evolutionary 
trajectories of UK town centres and high streets, observed in the first decade of the 
2000s.  
(i) The reorientation process, initialised by the regime in retail planning policy and 
changes in consumer culture has been muted, but it has not been eliminated entirely. 
As a result of corporate food retailers returning to those smaller town centres and high 
streets,  we  see  evidence  in  our  descriptive  results  which  show,  in  both  southern 
regions as a whole and particular urban areas, a continuation albeit at a lower level of 
similar  trends  to  those  observed  in  the  early  to  mid-2000s.  That  is  to  say,  in  the 
southern  parts  of  our  sample  and  despite  the  problems  of  economic  crisis,  fragile 
consumer confidence and recessionary impacts on household incomes, a continued 
robustness  of  bakers,  delicatessens  and  independent  convenience  stores  can  be 
observed. Furthermore, the intra-urban analysis has shown that during the shallow 
recovery period and despite the emerging austerity, butchers and health food shops 
joined that group. Additionally, the new evolutionary trajectory of reconfigured UK 
town centres/high streets is likely to be associated with a substantial number of leisure 
amenities  offering  experience-based  activities  e.g.  cafés,  restaurants  or  health  and   Chapter 7 
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beauty shops. On the one hand the presence of entertainment and leisure facilities is 
extremely important to a successful high street as consumers can enjoy the ‘shopping 
experience’, but on the other hand amenities that provide sensory stimulation and 
hands-on experience cannot be fully substituted by the internet (BCSC, 2010).  
(ii)  The  reorientation  process  induced  by  the  technological  advancements,  in 
particular the increase in online sales, has been somewhat enhanced. The prolonged 
economic crisis and the emerging reality of austerity both had negative impact on 
customer disposable income and as a result have boosted the pursuit of ‘good value’ 
amongst UK consumers. Online shopping offers great opportunity in that respect, and 
as a result of the economic crisis the share of internet sales has been recorded  even 
more robust growth and is predicted to reach at least 30% by the 2020. The UK has the 
highest share of internet sales in Europe and Internet shopping can now be conducted 
almost anywhere, offering consumers not only lower price but also other benefits such 
as choice and convenience (Experian, 2012). This trend has also been recently boosted 
by the emergence of m-commerce (sales over mobile devices such as mobile phones 
and tablets). One consequence of such rapid growth of online sales coupled with large 
increases in the volume of physical retail space, recorded in second half of the 2000’s, 
is that vacancy rates in 2011/12 across the UK have been at their highest levels.  
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   Discussion and conclusions  Chapter 8:
This  chapter  discusses  the  implications  of  the  research  for  the  study  of  the 
performance of UK high streets during economic crisis. It begins by assessing how the 
findings of  this  study  differ  from  and  complement  previous  comparable  research - 
conducted mainly by commercial consultancies and property firms. It then proceeds to 
evaluate the contributions of the research to: a) systematic evidence on cross-regional 
and intra-urban high street performance during the economic crisis and austerity, b) 
identification  of  the  key  drivers  of  the  performance  of  UK  high  streets  and  town 
centres derived by one of the first attempts of multivariate analysis of this issue and c) 
conceptualisation of the likely reconfiguration of UK retail centres, in particular linking 
that to the concept of resilience. 
Additionally, this chapter highlights a novel contribution of the analysis, that is to 
say  a)  the  diversity  of  a  retail  centre  as  it  entered  the  economic  crisis,  b)  the 
entry/presence of policy-compliant corporate foodstores, are both vital to preserving 
the economic health and sustaining performance of retail centres. Finally, this chapter 
discusses what this analysis tells us of two forces of change (i) tightening in the retail 
planning policy and the subsequent adaptation of a ‘town centre first’ approach to 
retail development, and (ii) the rise of convenience culture including the wider effects 
of  an  expansion  of  large  food  retailers  into  the  convenience  store  sector  on  the 
specialist convenience retailers. 
8.1  Links to previous studies 
The shock of global economic crisis, fragile consumer confidence, and the emerging 
reality of Austerity Britain have resulted in a deterioration of household disposable 
incomes and impacted the retail/service configuration of UK town centres and high 
streets. The popular image of these changes tends to dwell upon the cataclysmic decay 
of UK high streets involving the emergence of highly unattractive and dominated by 
vacant outlets town centres with a focus on the possible `death' of the traditional UK   Chapter 8 
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high street dominated by small independent specialist retailers. However, does the 
evidence support those views?  
This research, investigating those impacts has provided compelling evidence on 
both  the  performance  of  UK  high  streets  and  town  centres  during  and  since  the 
economic crisis and the changes to their configurations. This study as in the case of 
other related studies, finds evidence of harmful impacts of the economic crisis on UK 
retail  centres  which  were  signalled  by  the  progressively  rising  vacancy  rates, 
originating predominantly from the closures of comparison retail and financial services 
units, and by the vulnerability of regional economies of northern Britain struggling to 
support the pre-crisis configurations of town centres and high streets. However, the 
descriptive analysis revealed that the response of UK retail centres to the shock of 
economic  crisis  and  the  other  forcers  of  change  has  been  far  from  uniform.  The 
uneven adjustment of UK town centres to the onset of economic crisis was evident in 
both differential performance of retail/service types and complex spatial variability of 
the  vacancy  rate  change.  Whilst  comparison  retail  and  financial  services  felt  the 
adverse  impacts  of  the  economic  crisis,  some  types  of  convenience  retail  such  as 
convenience stores and virtually all types of leisure services, with the exception of 
public  houses,  displayed  strong  resilience  to  the  shock  of  economic  crisis.  Those 
retailers not only maintained the pre-crisis number of units but significantly managed 
to  record  substantial  increases.  Additionally,  taking  into  consideration  the  key 
indicator of town centre performance - vacancy rate - this study has found that almost 
one in three retail centres in the cross-regional sample did not record any increases in 
vacancy rate.  
Most of the descriptive analysis results are comparable with the findings of other 
commercial consultancies and property firms such as Local Data Company (LDC) or 
Colliers CRE. Despite the fact that there are some important differences in the number 
of centres surveyed, the spread of those centres, the retail hierarchy and the base 
used to calculate vacancy rates, both our analysis and that of LDC identify what LDC 
terms  as  the  `gathering  storm'  as  a  result  of  the  shock  of  global  economic  crisis. 
Similarly,  both  analyses  identify  other  factors  having  adverse  effects  on  the 
performance of UK retail centres, in particular, the substitution effects of increasing   Chapter 8 
225 
 
online sales which have seriously impacted the sales of some types of retail, such as 
music,  video,  bookshops  and  travel  agents  (Weltevreden,  2007).  Conversely,  this 
analysis and that of LDC report an upward trend in vacant units; although LDC’s low 
starting  base  produced  a  much  higher  percentage  of  rises  (Colliers  CRE,  2009). 
Presumably  as  a  result  of  employing  sparse  data  (GENECON,  2011),  the  LDC’s 
estimation of vacancy rate at about 4.5% was much lower than Colliers’ at 7.3% or that 
of  the  cross-regional  sample  at  10.1%,  used  by  our  study.  Given  that  the  Colliers 
sample includes London, where vacancy rates in 2006 were below the UK average, 
Colliers' figures are clearly much closer to those recorded in our sample than those 
reported by LDC.   
However, the major difference between this research and those of  commercial 
consultancies and property firms relates to the fact that it has extended the list of 
drivers of UK town centre performance during and since the economic crisis in one of 
the first attempts of multivariate analysis of this issue and conceptualisation of the 
nature of change in configurations of UK retail centres by implementing the concept of 
resilience. 
8.2  The value added by this study                                                              
The value added by this study has three dimensions: a) evidence on the differential 
performance of retail centres during and since the economic crisis, b) establishment of 
the factors driving the performance of UK high streets and town centres in response to 
the  shockwave  of  economic  crisis  and  during  the  emerging  period  of  austerity,  c) 
contextualisation of the nature of evolutionary change of UK high streets and their 
complex adjustment to the shock of economic crisis and other forces of change.  
8.2.1  Evidence on the differential performance of retail centres during and since 
the economic crisis 
The  descriptive  analysis  has  provided  systematic  evidence  on  the  differential 
performance of retail centres during and since the economic crisis, in particular by 
establishing the severity of the impact of economic and competitive shocks on both 
broad and detailed types of retail/service. For instance, it demonstrates that the high   Chapter 8 
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closure rates were mainly recorded by comparison retailers and business and financial 
services. This decline has been strongly related to the declining household incomes 
and progressive rise of online sales, typically offering better value. Although it could be 
argued that these results were comparable to those of commercial consultancies, the 
novelty of these findings relates to the fact that the difference between responses of 
multiple  and  independent  retailers  was  captured.  The  assessment  separating  the 
performance of multiple and independent retailers is of considerable importance to 
the public and policy debate on the economic health of UK high streets as it provides 
valuable insights into the differential ways these two types of retailers adjusted to the 
economic and competitive shocks. Furthermore, we are not aware of any commercial 
consultancy  which  would  provide  systematic  evidence  based  on  that  important 
distinction.  
The emergence of the so-called ‘digital’ generation (Currah, 2006) has over past 
years been exerting increasing pressure on some types of traditional small retailers, 
especially on those that have not embraced technological change. What the economic 
crisis did was to exacerbate the impact of online sales on the traditional UK high street 
and spread them on additional types of comparison retailers. As a result, it was not 
only the large corporate retailers that were likely to be adversely effected by the e-
commerce.  In  fact,  this  research  shows  that  the  large  decline  recorded  by  the 
comparison retail as a broad category was mostly associated with the closures of small 
independent shops. Indeed, small independent comparison retailers proved to be very 
vulnerable to the competition from ‘e-tailers’, which reinforced by the economic crisis, 
often experienced what Weltevreden (2007) referred to as the ‘substitution effects’ - 
the  replacement  of  physical  stores.  On  the  contrary,  the  majority  of  multiple 
comparison retailers, with the exception of ‘department stores’ and ‘kids wear’, which 
were adversely impacted by the closure of ‘Woolworths’ and ‘Adams’ chains, remained 
relatively resistant to the shock of the economic crisis and rapidly growing online sales. 
Arguably, large corporate retailers have been better equipped to deal with the direct 
consequences of economic crisis such as decline in disposable household income and 
increasing demand for ‘value for money’. As large comparison retailers have become   Chapter 8 
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multichannel operators and embraced the new technology they were maximising the 
sales experiencing predominantly the complementarity effects of e-commerce.  
In  the  case  of  convenience  retail  the  picture  was  rather  different;  overall,  this 
broad  category  demonstrated  some  resilience  to  the  shock  of  economic  crisis  and 
other drivers of change, presumably due to the fact that food shopping is a necessity 
(Anagboso, 2009). More specifically however, our evidence suggested that the robust 
performance of convenience retail was primarily driven by large increases in all types 
of small convenience stores, with independent retailers recording the highest growth. 
Also  taking  into  consideration  the  specialist  convenience  retailers,  of  a  particular 
interest was the finding that independent retailers showed much stronger resistance 
to  the  onset  of  economic  crisis  relative  to  the  multiple  retailers.  Some  types  of 
independent convenience retailers such as butchers and greengrocers recorded merely 
smaller declines than their multiple counterparts, but others such as greengrocers, 
grocers, bakers and off licences experienced genuine growth either in the four-region 
or southern part of our sample. This finding could challenge the commonly held view 
of many trade organisations and NGOs that increasing competition from ‘town centre 
first’ policy-compliant corporate food retail developments  threatens the viability of 
small specialist stores.  
8.2.2  Factors driving the performance of retail centres in response to the shock of 
economic crisis 
One of the key aims of this study was to establish the indicators of retail centre 
performance during the economic crisis and austerity period. Understanding of those 
determinants  is  vital  to  maintain  town  centre/high  street  vitality  and  viability  and 
protect them from unexpected cyclical and competitive shocks. This study, in one of 
the first attempts of multivariate analysis of this issue, provided statistically significant 
drivers of town centre performance. These drivers were obtained for two different 
spatial scales: (i) cross-regional and (ii) intra-urban. 
(i) Vacancy rate which is the key indicator of retail centres’ economic performance, 
has been widely used not only by researchers but also by local authorities and town 
centre managers (Findlay and Sparks, 2010; Wrigley and Dolega, 2011). Drawing from 
Findlay and Sparks’ (2010) schema of retail vacancy causes, this study viewed changes   Chapter 8 
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in vacancy rates as a product of filtering the shock of economic crisis through two 
different structures: regional and local. The regional dimension was reflected in a clear 
north-south  divide  with  the  southern  part  of  our  sample  demonstrating  stronger 
underlying growth dynamics compared with the more vulnerable regional economies 
of northern England (Dorling, 2010; Wrigley and Dolega, 2011). Similarly, filtering the 
macroeconomic shock through the local systems such as mix and interdependencies of 
businesses within town centres themselves and the physical configurations of those 
centres, produced theoretically expected results in terms of the beneficial impacts of: 
a)  small-independent-specialist-store-based  diversity,  b)  town-centres-first  policy-
compliant  corporate  foodstore  entry/presence,  c)  substantial  amount  of  
entertainment-linked service units;  and in terms of detrimental impacts – long-term 
structural vacancy.  
These  results,  although  largely  consistent  with  the  theoretical  expectations, 
contained  some  factors  that  were theoretically  more  ambiguous.  For instance,  the 
influence of centre size on economic health had been unclear and the findings that 
smaller centres performed better than larger centres was reassuring as similar results 
have been reported by recent LDC’s findings. Moreover, it is essential to stress that 
these  findings  represent  important  new  evidence  going  well  beyond  previously 
reported  evidence  on  the  differential  performance  of  UK  high  streets  during  the 
economic  crisis.  In  particular,  despite  being  central  to  highly  polarised  debates 
surrounding the impacts of corporate food-retail entry/presence on UK high streets, 
we  are  aware  of  no  publicly  available  evidence  simultaneously  supporting  the 
protective power of town centre diverse structures. Additionally, we are not aware of 
any evidence on whether diverse town centres/high streets proved more resilient to 
the  shock  of  economic  crisis  than  centres  which  were  transformed  by  corporate-
foodstore entry/presence. 
Finally, the cross-regional model deriving the indicators of enhanced resilience had 
also some limitations. None of the measures of the group of factors which we termed 
supportive  local  institutional  structures  and  business  practices  were  statistically 
significant. Several of our proxies (e.g., BIDs scheme, town centre manager, ease of 
parking), when included in preliminary specifications of the regression modelling, had   Chapter 8 
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parameter estimates consistent with our theoretical expectations, however, at best, 
they suggested weak relationships. The issue remains open therefore as to whether 
this group of factors is not included in the model as a result of: inappropriate proxies 
being selected, the particular structure of our 267 town centre/high street sample, or 
because  they  genuinely  had  a  relatively  marginal  impact  on  the  differential 
performance of centres experiencing significant macroeconomic shock.  
(ii) The intra-urban analysis, utilising the above drivers derived for the 267 centre 
sample, confirmed that those factors hold well at local scale. This was a significant 
finding  which  could  also  be  viewed  as  a  validation  of  the  cross-regional  results. 
Importantly, some variables which did not reach conventional levels of significance in 
the cross-regional model, such as affluence of immediate catchment areas, proved to 
be significant at the local scale. The causes of such varying significance are not clear 
but it can be speculated that using constant size of catchment areas is less accurate in 
the cross-regional context than in the local one. Depicting accurate catchment areas 
for such a large sample is indeed a very complex process; one that is determined by a 
number of dynamics for each particular retail centre including its size, position in retail 
hierarchy or distance from nearest competitor. 
8.2.3  Factors  driving  the  performance  of  town  centres  during  the  emerging 
austerity 
Central to obtaining the drivers of town centre performance during the shallow 
recovery period was incorporating of ‘third wave’ post-recession data, available for the 
intra-urban  analysis.  The  results  of  that  analysis  have  revealed  two  trends:  a)  the 
significance  of  some  factors  such  as  centre  size,  affluence  and  structural  vacancy 
waned in the shallow recovery period and b) the beneficial impact of services, policy-
compliant corporate foodstores and diversity was statistically significant.  
Such results implied that the smaller centres started to feel the pinch during the 
emerging austerity period and the waning effect of affluence could be associated with 
the worsening situation of the ‘squeezed middle’, an instance increasingly reported by 
the media(The Independent, 8 Nov 2012). Furthermore, the evidence showing that the 
detrimental  impact  of  structural  vacancy  vanished  and  the  positive  ‘retail  churn’ 
increased could suggest that the effects of various supportive actions, triggered by the   Chapter 8 
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economic crisis, begun to be noticeable. In the case of some town centres improved 
accessibility, revitalised streetscape and falling business rates began to attract rising 
number of new ‘start-ups’. 
However,  of  central  importance  was  the  fact  that  three  determinants  retained 
statistical significance and this had two implications. First, the finding that a substantial 
provision of services had beneficial impact on retail centre vitality has corroborated 
the trend which was underway during the period of prosperity. This could be linked to 
the fact that a wide range of services encourage customers to visit and spend more 
time in a particular centre (Zweeden, 2009; Moeller, 2009). Some trade associations 
for retail industry such as BRC also recognised this trend and in order to protect town 
centre  vitality  suggested  aligning  services  and  cultural  activities  along  shops  (BRC, 
2009). However, the statistical evidence supporting those claims was provided by this 
study which also demonstrated that the increasing presence of service units is vital to 
the evolving configurations of UK high streets and town centres. 
A  second  and  perhaps  novel  contribution  was  the  finding  that  both  policy-
compliant corporate foodstores and independent retailers are beneficial to preserving 
town centre vitality not only during the shockwave of economic crisis but also in the 
emerging period of austerity. It is essential to highlight that these two novel findings 
have been  statistically  significant  in  all models attempting  to  explain  town  centres 
differential performance. Although it is not consistent with the view taken by various 
small-retailer trade organisations and environmentally focused NGOs, we suggest that 
supporting the new interdependencies is a key and an inherent element of adaptively 
resilient town centres. As a result, these are the important but previously unexplored 
two issues that we now turn to.  
8.2.4  Conceptualising the nature of evolutionary change of UK high streets 
The  complex  response  of  UK  high  streets  and  town  centres  to  the  shock  of 
economic  crisis  and  the  other  forces  of  change  has  drawn  our  attention  to  the 
differential ability of those centres to recover from the economic shock. Essentially, 
the concept of resilience, which has recently become increasingly popular amongst 
economic and regional geographers, was applied to the retail sector. After reviewing   Chapter 8 
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three different concepts of resilience, it had to be acknowledged that the idea of UK 
high streets simply ‘bouncing back’ to the pre-shock configuration: a) did not capture 
the  subtle  and  complex  way  UK  retail  centres  adjusted  to  the  economic  and 
competitive shocks depicted by the descriptive analysis and b) was not only unlikely 
but  also  undesirable.  Rather,  the  empirical  findings  of  this  study  were  positioned 
against the type of resilience that stresses the anticipatory and reactive capacity of a 
system  to  minimise  the  impacts  of  a  destabilising  shock  and  which  focuses  on 
resilience  as  a  dynamic  and  evolutionary  process.  This  research,  viewing  UK  high 
streets as complex and dynamic economic systems undergoing constant evolutionary 
change, suggested a conceptual framework of adaptively resilient town centre which 
linked the resilience of retail centres to the position in the adaptive cycle and the role 
of various actors across different scales. Moreover, we highlighted the importance of 
the  ‘back  loop’  –  release  and  reorientation  stages  –  to  understanding  of  the 
emergence  of  new  trajectories  of  growth,  in  particular  by  utilising  the  process  of 
adaptability.  In  agreement  with  other  studies  (e.g.  Dawley  et  al.,  2010,  Salt  and 
Walker,  2012)  this  thesis  questioned  the  ability  of  UK  retail  centres  to  adapt  to 
economic  and  competitive  shocks  solely  by  a  mechanism  of  spontaneous 
reconfiguration. Rather, it suggested that the ability of UK town centres to survive 
unexpected  disturbances  and  ‘slow  burns’  in  a  relatively  good  shape,  can  be  also 
related to the previous knowledge and experience of various actors who can anticipate 
the changes in demand and consumer culture. This in turn, facilitates a multi-scale 
intervention,  one  which  can  transform  the  configuration  of  a  high  street  and  is 
typically fostered by novelty, creativity and innovation. The conservation phase was 
identified  as  the  key  time  in  which  such  intervention  should  be  developed  as 
otherwise,  the  system  may  break  apart  in  an  uncontrolled  manner  during  an 
unexpected  shock  or  disturbance.  However,  it  needs  to  be  pointed  out  that  the 
statistical  modelling  showed  only  a  limited  relationship  between  the  institutional 
support  and  town  centres’  vitality.  More  compelling,  in  that  respect,  was  the 
qualitative evidence from the intra-urban analysis, which demonstrated that all five 
retail centres that received some form of institutional help during the economic crisis 
improved their performance in the subsequent period.   Chapter 8 
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Despite some limitations of the adaptive cycle framework such as the complexity or 
not accounting for the power and conflict ‘present in regional governance in ways they 
are  not  present  in  ecosystems’  (Swanstrom,  2008,  p.3)  there  might  be  significant 
implications for the design of policy proposals and instruments aimed at revitalising UK 
town centres and high streets.  This in particular should include addressing the new 
and policy-significant empirical findings on the increasing role of services and complex 
relationship  between  the  large  corporate  and  independent  retailers.  In  the 
evolutionary context, the adaptability of reconfigured town centres and high streets 
was centred on new mixes and offers of small and specialist store types, providing 
symbiotic  relationships  with  the  in-centre  or  edge-of-centre  corporate  foodstores. 
Nevertheless, it is essential to highlight that the concept of adaptively resilient high 
streets is still in the embryonic stage. Therefore, further research testing the above 
assumptions is essential, in particular one investigating the aspects of: a) relationship 
between the pre-shock development stage of a retail centre and its response to the 
economic crisis, b) the role of institutional support in building adaptive capacity of UK 
high streets and town centres and c) the nature and extent of the emerging symbiotic 
relationship between corporate foodstores and independent retailers.  
8.3  Corporate  food  retailers  and  the  drivers  of  change  -  reactive  or 
proactive response? 
In the context of the adaptive resilience framework, the reactive response of large 
food retailers to the tightening retail policy can also be viewed as being continuously 
reshaped by the evolving cultural context. This research investigated the response of 
corporate food retailers to both the adoption of a ‘town centre first’ policy and the rise 
of ‘convenience culture’ during and since the economic crisis. The evidence provided 
by this research has contributed to the public and policy debate in three ways: a) by 
establishing the role played by diversity - measured by proportion of small stores - and 
corporate retail entry in protecting the performance and enhancing the resilience of 
centres/high streets, b) by evaluating the reactive and proactive response of corporate 
food  retailers  to  the  changes  in  planning  policy  and  convenience  culture  c)  by   Chapter 8 
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providing evidence of the impacts of ‘convenience culture’ on the configurations of UK 
high streets and retail centre. 
8.3.1  What  has  this  thesis  told  us  about  diversity  of  retail  centres  and 
entry/presence of corporate food retailers? 
Small-retailer trade organisations such as the Association of Convenience Stores 
(ACS), together with environmentally focused NGOs and campaigning organisations 
such as the Campaign for Rural England, Friends of the Earth, and New Economics 
Foundation (NEF) have long argued that the vitality and sustainable development of 
small retail centres is closely linked to their diversity. In the context of an economic 
crisis, NEF (2009) regarded diversity as a factor potentially enhancing resilience of UK 
high  streets;  otherwise  they  can  find  themselves  buffeted  by  wider  corporate 
disinvestment  decisions  during  the  economic  crisis  such  as  Woolworths,  Adams, 
Borders  etc.  Typically,  the  organisations  who  subscribe  to  this  view,  regard  the 
corporate-food-retail entry into UK high streets which took place in the late 1990s and 
2000s,  as  uniformly  destructive  of  those  town  centres/high  streets’  locally-owned 
amenities. Although this entry could be regarded as a consequence of the adoption of 
a  town-centres-first  approach  to  planning  regulation,  the  common  view  amongst 
above organisations and a large proportion of the public was to strongly resist it in 
order to prevent further loss of diversity (Wrigley and Dolega, 2011). 
In contrast, a growing body of academics have argued that corporate foodstore 
entry/presence has also positive impacts on town centres’ economic performance. In 
particular, highlighting their role as anchor stores in maintaining the quality and range 
of shopping in smaller towns, arguing that they should be 'seen as a vital element in 
sustainable  development  plans'  (Powe  and  Shaw,  2004,  p.  407)  and  corporate 
foodstore entry ‘can act as a catalyst for further investment in those centres' (DETR, 
1998, p. 8). The evidence of positive impacts associated with the corporate foodstore 
entry/presence included their role in ‘clawing back’ trade from larger urban centres 
and supporting the use of other services in the town by the mechanism of linked trips 
(Thomas & Bromley, 2003; Wrigley et al., 2010b).    Chapter 8 
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Popular debate, however, portrays these two views as polar opposites in terms of 
attempts to protect and/or enhance the vitality and viability of town centres and high 
streets.  
This study has concentrated on the extent to which policy-compliant corporate 
foodstores,  those  located  in  and/or  edge-of-town  centre,  have  impacted  the 
performance  of  UK  high  streets  and  town  centres,  in  particular  the  specialist 
convenience retailers.  It is therefore of central importance that both factors, high 
diversity  and  corporate  foodstore  presence/entry,  were  statistically  significant  and 
associated with the enhanced performance of UK town centres; that is to say, with 
smaller increases or reductions in vacancy rate. Indeed, the desirable and emerging 
evolutionary trajectory of reconfigured high streets likely to characterise the post-crisis 
decade, was one in which adaptability was centred on new mixes and offers of small 
and specialist store types, providing symbiotic relationships with the in-centre or edge-
of-centre corporate foodstores. Moreover, the view that corporate policy-compliant 
foodstores  have  uniformly  detrimental  impacts  on  the  centre’s  diversity  was  also 
rejected by the intra-urban convenience store entry/exit analysis, where all the high 
streets  that  experienced  net  corporate  convenience  store  entry  had  retained  their 
vitality,  measured  by  the  number  of  specialist  convenience  retailers.  In  fact,  a 
somewhat opposite trend was detected where in some cases the entry of a corporate 
convenience  store  was  supplemented  by  rising  numbers  of  small  specialist 
convenience retailers.  
8.3.2  Reactive  or  proactive  response  of  large  food  retailers  to  the  drivers  of 
change? 
This study has also provided valuable insights into the incompletely understood 
consequences of more than a decade-long transformation of UK town centres and 
large  corporate  food  retailers  flexibly  adapting  to  the  tightening  in  retail  planning 
regulation.  In particular, by considering the nature  and extent to which corporate 
foodstores presence/entry have adopted ‘town centre first’ policy during and since the 
economic crisis, this study demonstrated two valuable aspects of those consequences. 
First, it strongly confirmed that large grocery retailers have widely adopted the ‘town 
centre first’ agenda by developing the majority of their stores in-town or edge-of-town   Chapter 8 
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centre locations. The intra-urban analysis showed that of the 33 supermarkets present 
in  the  pre-crisis  period,  as  many  as  30  were  the  policy-compliant  in/edge-of-town 
centre  developments.  Furthermore,  the  descriptive  analysis  results  revealed  two 
underlying trends:  
a) The overall number of supermarkets has slightly declined in the cross-regional 
sample.  This  could  be  partly  explained  by  the  closure  of  Kwik  Save  stores  in  the 
northern part of our sample and the divestment of 133 Somerfield stores across the 
country as the Co-operative Group was ordered by the Office of Fair Trading (OFT, 
2009) as a part of the acquisition deal. In addition, as a result of that merger some 
voluntary divestment of the former Somerfield supermarkets took place, presumably 
to avoid the cannibalisation issue. Nevertheless, the number of supermarkets operated 
by the so-called ‘big four’ grocery retailers (Tesco, Sainsbury, Asda and Morrisons) has 
recorded  net  increase,  despite  the  harsh  economic  conditions  and  declining 
households income. 
b) Although Tesco had the biggest share amongst all grocery retailers it was the Co-
op that operated the highest number of supermarkets across the analysed 267 town 
centres and high streets. Our evidence shows that after the merger, Co-op had as 
many stores, predominantly medium sized, as Tesco and Sainsbury’s combined. 
 
The second feature revealed by this study relates to the store formats adopted by 
corporate  food  retailers  as  a  response  to  the  planning  policy  regime.  Some 
commentators (e.g. Wrigley et al., 2009; Wood et al., 2010) suggested that one of the 
reasons corporate food retailers entered the sector of small convenience stores was 
attributed  to  the  Competition  Commission  (2000,  2003,  2007)  having  provided  a 
shelter  for  such  developments  interpreting  the  wider  UK  grocery  market  as  a 
combination of two separate sectors, the ‘one stop’ which was highly regulated and 
the secondary/convenience store sector, which was highly fragmented and neglected 
by the large retailers. 
Indeed,  the  intra-urban  results  demonstrated  that  the  prevailing  store  formats 
were the policy-compliant a) mid-size supermarkets (between 3 000 and 15 000 SqFt) 
and b) convenience stores (below 3 000 SqFt). This study has also demonstrated that   Chapter 8 
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the strong growth in convenience store numbers during the first half of the 2000s, 
reported  by  the  Competition  Commission  (2007)  and  Wrigley  et  al.,  (2009),  was 
maintained despite the shock of economic crisis.  In particular, Tesco was found to 
expand rapidly the small Express stores, increasing the number of outlets by 50% in 
the relative measure (M1) between late 2006 and early 2009, and essentially becoming 
the  most  common  fascia  amongst  the  convenience  stores  in  Bristol.  Such  rapid 
expansion encountered some challenges too. They were clearly demonstrated by the 
Bristol riots in April 2011 which, as the Guardian (22 April 2011, p. 1) heralded, had 
been ‘sparked by a raid on a squat occupied by opponents of a newly opened Tesco 
Express store in Stoke Croft’.  
Although the media portrayed parts of Bristol as in ‘the war with Tesco’, the results 
of this study suggested that a more moderate view of those events might be essential, 
one that takes into account the proactive response of large food retailers to changes in 
consumer culture.  
Indeed,  the  rise  in  convenience  culture  across  Britain  and  other  developed 
countries pointed out by Wrigley, 2010 is associated with the rapid expansion of the 
small convenience store sector as a whole. It could be argued that consumers have 
rethought economic and social cost associated with long rather than short distances to 
shops and the time cost associated with large and often inhospitable stores and this 
has placed increasing doubts on a long term prospects of large format out-of-town 
retail developments. Although all types of convenience store operators were found to 
increase their presence on UK high streets substantially, there was emerging evidence, 
that corporate retailers may prefer different locations than the independent retailers. 
The intra-urban analysis revealed that large food retailers were more likely to open 
new  convenience  stores  in  centres  towards  the  upper  end  of  the  retail  hierarchy, 
whilst independent retailers preferred the opposite end. This could be explained by 
the  fact  that  factors  responsible  for  the  emergence  of  convenience  culture  -  time 
scarcity, longer working hours, increasing leisure orientation and a growing number of 
males responsible for shopping (Reimers and Clulow, 2004) - are more likely to prevail 
amongst inner city dwellers. For instance, as suggested by DTZ (2007) certain dynamics   Chapter 8 
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such as a large labour force and high student population, prevailing in central Bristol, 
created higher demand for convenience shopping. 
8.3.3  Impact of convenience culture on UK high street configurations 
The  strong  growth  of  convenience  stores,  in  particular  the  entry  of  corporate 
retailers  into  that  sector  has  attracted  increasing  attention  of  various  trade 
organisations  commercial  and  academic  research.  In  agreement  with  the  anti-
supermarket rationale outlined in Chapter 3, some trade organisations (e.g. ACS) and 
academic researchers (Sadun, 2008) claimed that expansion of corporate retailers into 
the c-store market has been associated with adverse effects on convenience specialist 
retailers. The findings of this research however, suggest that this was not necessarily 
the case when considering: a) the number of independent convenience stores and b) 
the number of other specialist convenience retailers. In terms of the former, this thesis 
provides compelling evidence that all types of convenience store operators increased 
their  numbers  substantially,  with  independent  retailers  accounting  for  the  largest 
share  of  that  growth.  In  fact,  the  intra-urban  study  showed  that  the  independent 
retailers accounted for more net growth in convenience store numbers than corporate 
and symbol group retailers combined. In terms of the latter, we acknowledge that 
although certain convenience specialists e.g. butchers, greengrocers and health food 
stores recorded considerable declines during the onset of the economic crisis, there 
was no evidence to support the view that those declines were associated with the 
growth in corporate convenience stores. It could be argued that whilst the growth in 
convenience stores was attributed somewhat to the response of corporate retailers to 
the  rise  of  convenience  culture  (Wrigley,  2010)  the  decline  in  some  specialist 
convenience  retailers  could  be  largely  explained  by  the  decrease  in  personal 
disposable  income  (Angaboso,  2009)  observed  during  the  economic  crisis  and  the 
following period of austerity. Indeed, the intra-urban descriptive analysis revealed that 
the health shops and butchers after the initial drop in numbers recorded between the 
pre-crisis and within-crisis surveys, managed to recover in the post-recession period. 
Such  an  engineering  resilience  like  recovery  implied  that  the  unexpected  shock  of 
economic crisis could be blamed for their misfortune rather than the steady expansion   Chapter 8 
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of corporate retailers into the small convenience store market. Moreover, this claim 
seemed  to  be  supported  by  two  additional  pieces  of  evidence.  1)  The  substantial 
decline in off licence stores, which was recorded in the shallow recovery period, was 
entirely associated with the national chain First Quench going into administration. In 
consequence,  this  trend  had  not  been  experienced by the  independent off  licence 
stores, which recorded constant growth throughout the analysed periods.  2) More 
importantly, the four Bristol retail centres that experienced net corporate convenience 
store entry did not record any loss of vitality, measured by the number of convenience 
specialist  retails.  Although  there  was  some  evidence  of  ‘retail  churn’  and  adverse 
effects associated with the initial shock of the economic crisis, the total number of 
convenience specialist retailers remained constant between 2006 and 2010 in two of 
those centres and slightly increased in the remaining two.  
Thus, the evidence from this study strongly supports the view that the impacts of 
corporate c-store entry on the independent convenience specialist retailers were not 
uniformly  negative.  Rather,  we  find  evidence  of  neutral  or  in  some  cases  positive 
impacts.  This  is  a  crucial  finding  to  the  debate  on  the  impacts  of  corporate 
convenience stores on the traditional UK high streets. It supports the argument that 
convenience  stores  have  risen  to  prominence  and  partially  have  taken  the  role  of 
supermarkets, and as a result ‘anchoring’ small retail centres, enhanced the viability of 
existing  centres  through  the  spill-over  trade  effects  of  linked  trips.  The  claims  on 
uniformly negative impacts of corporate convenience stores on UK high streets, raised 
by ACS and other researchers, appear to be overstated at best, at worst, biased. This 
research  contributes  to  the  view  that  in  the  face  of  economic  and  competitive 
challenges the ‘healthy’ UK high streets are likely to focus on forming symbiotic and 
complementary relationships between corporate and independent retailers. However, 
we acknowledge that the Bristol area might depict the dynamics of the South West or 
southern  part  of  our  sample,  but  by  no  means  can  represent  the  UK  as  a  whole. 
Therefore, it would be of a great benefit to conduct further research examining the 
nature of corporate food retailers’ entry into the small convenience store sector, using 
survey data for large urban areas in other regions of the UK.     Chapter 8 
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8.4  In conclusion 
This study has investigated the complex adjustment of UK town centres and high 
streets to the global economic crisis and other powerful and interlinked forces that 
have recently been (re)shaping the economic performance and physical structures of 
those retail spaces. These forces include: a) more than ten years of rapidly increasing 
online  sales  systematically  exerting  pressure  via  substitution  effects  on  several 
components of traditional British high streets, b) the competition from out-of-town 
large retail developments and the subsequent tightening of retail policy leading to the 
implementation of a ‘town centre first’ policy and c) the progressive and until recently 
little discussed rise of ‘convenience culture’ which has led to rethinking by consumers 
of the value attributed to ‘one stop’ shopping and the desire of corporate retailers to 
enter the fast growing convenience stores market.  
What the global economic crisis did was to expose these forces.  Over the past 
fifteen years, all four factors have differentially impacted the vitality of UK high streets 
and have become an increasing focus of government and public anxiety. Although this 
study has mainly concentrated on the response of UK retail centres to the shock of the 
2008-09 economic crisis and its aftermath by depicting their differential performance 
between the pre-crisis, within-crisis and shallow recovery periods and establishing the 
determinants of enhanced resilience significant at both cross-regional and intra-urban 
levels,  there  were  also  strong  linkages  with  the  remaining  forces  of  change.  In 
particular, the intra-urban analysis has strongly focused on the pre-existing structure 
of corporate food retailers and their recent expansion into the small convenience store 
sector. In consequence, this study has provided evidence that the picture of corporate 
convenience stores directly competing with the convenience specialist retailers in the 
manner  portrayed  by  ACS  and  other  NGOs  was  not  an  accurate  one.  Rather,  the 
dynamic and constantly evolving UK high streets have increasingly begun to create 
new  interdependencies  and  symbiotic  relationships  between  corporate  and 
independent retailers. The new empirical evidence provided by this research on the 
drivers of performance and reconfiguration of UK high streets and town centres and 
the mechanisms responsible for that change have expanded our understanding of the   Chapter 8 
240 
 
complex adjustment of high streets to those forces – enhancing available knowledge. 
The implications of these findings are threefold: 
(i)  First, some results although providing new and valuable insights have 
essentially corroborated previous studies, conducted by both academia and 
commercial research consultancies. In particular, the descriptive analyses 
which examines the differential performance of broad and detailed types of 
retail, revealed substantial increases in vacant retail/service units, resulting 
mostly from closures in comparison retail and financial services. 
Furthermore, the convenience store entry/exit analysis has confirmed a 
strong growth of small food-retail-based convenience stores despite the 
adversities of economic crisis, a finding extending similar results reported 
previously by both the Competition Commission (2008) and Wrigley et al., 
(2009a).  
(ii)  Second the drivers of performance identified by the multivariate analysis 
are of themselves important to the policy debate on the future of UK high 
streets. The study found a set of statistically significant factors protective of 
town centre vitality during the shock of economic crisis and the subsequent 
period of austerity. Although some of those findings could be viewed as 
controversial, they have set a benchmark against which future studies 
evaluating the resilience of retail centres can be positioned and 
interpreted. Specifically, the effects of high diversity of retail centres, 
substantial presence of various services and the entry/presence of a policy-
compliant corporate foodstore, have been shown to be beneficial to the 
economic health UK town centres and high streets.  
(iii)  The study provides a theorisation of these important changes, in particular 
utilising the concept of resilience of economic systems to understand the 
reconfiguration of UK high streets as a result of the shock of economic crisis 
and the subsequent period of austerity. In particular, we use the concept of 
adaptive resilience to understand the dynamic and evolutionary process in 
which UK high streets have gradually and constantly changed. In this 
research we suggest a conceptual framework which links the notions of   Chapter 8 
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adaptive capacity and adaptive resilience and indicates how a position of a 
centre in the adaptive cycle and the role of various actors may be important 
to performance of that centre.  
 
Never before has the economic health of high streets been so high at the political 
agenda, nor generated such a large amount of research. This thesis has participated 
within the rise of that research and some of the results, previously published or in 
press, have been presented and disseminated at high profile Government meetings 
and are acknowledged to have made a significant contribution to those debates. The 
work presented here is by default a snapshot of both emerging analytical research and 
policy response which both reflects and is shaped by the nature of those debates. 
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Comparison                      Convenience                Retail Service                    Leisure Services         Financial & Business Services    Vacant Outlets 
Antique Shops                                 Bakers & Confectioners           Clothing & Fancy Dress Hire            Bars & Wine Bars                        Building Societies                                Vacant Retail & 
Service 
Art & Art Dealers                             Butchers                                   Dry Cleaners & Launderettes           Bingo & Amusements                 Building Supplies & Services             Other vacant outlets 
Booksellers                                   CTN                                          Filling Stations                               Cafes                                          Business Goods & Services 
Carpets & Flooring                       Convenience Stores               Health & Beauty                             Casinos & Betting Offices         Employment & Careers 
Catalogue Showrooms                 Fishmongers                          Opticians                                        Cinemas & Theatres                  Financial Services 
Charity Shops                                Frozen Foods                        Other Retail Services                     Clubs                                          Legal Services 
Chemist & Drugstores                   Greengrocers                         Photo Processing                          Disco, & Nightclubs                  Other Business Services 
Childrens & Infants Wear              Grocers & Delicatessens      Photo Studio                                   Fast Food & Take Away           Printing & Copying 
Clothing General                           Health Foods                          Post Offices                                    Hotels & Guest Houses            Property Services 
Crafts, Gifts, China & Glass          Markets                                   Repairs, & Restoration                   Public Houses                           Retail Banks 
Cycles & Accessories                   Off Licences                            Travel Agents                                  Restaurants 
Department & Variety Stores         Supermarkets                         TV, Cable & Video Rental               Sports & Leisure 
DIY & Home Improvement                                                             Vehicle Rental 
Electrical & Durable Goods                                                           Vehicle Repairs & Services 
Florists                                                                                            Video  Tapes Rental 
Footwear 
Furniture Fitted 
Furniture General 
Gardens & Equipment 
Greeting Cards 
Hardware & Household Goods 
Jewellery, Watches & Silver 
Ladies & Men Wear & Acc. 
Ladies Wear & Accessories 
Leather & Travel Goods 
Men Wear & Accessories 
Music & Musical Instruments 
Music & Video Recordings 
Newsagents & Stationers 
Office Supplies 
Other Comparison Goods 
Photographic & Optical 
Secondhand Goods, Books, etc. 
Sports, Camping & Leisure Goods 
Telephones & Accessories 
Textiles & Soft Furnishings 
Toiletries, Cosmetics & Beauty Products 
Toys, Games & Hobbies 
Vehicle & Motorcycle Sales 
Vehicle Accessories 
Shoe Repairs Etc. 
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ID  Intra-urban centre name 
1  Bristol - Arnside Road 
2  Bristol - Ashley Road 
3  Bristol - Avonmouth Village 
4  Bristol - Baldwin Street 
5  Bristol - Bedminster 
6  Bristol - Bishopsworth 
7  Bristol - Brislington 
8  Bristol - Broadmead 
9  Bristol - Chandos Road 
10  Bristol - Christmas Steps 
11  Bristol - Clifton 
12  Bristol - Coldharbour Road 
13  Bristol - Crow Lane 
14  Bristol - Filton Avenue 
15  Bristol - Filton Road 
16  Bristol - Filwood Broadway 
17  Bristol - Fishponds 
18  Bristol - Fishponds Road 
19  Bristol - Gilda Parade 
20  Bristol - Gloucester Road 
21  Bristol - Henleaze 
22  Bristol - Hotwells 
23  Bristol - Lawrence Hill 
24  Bristol - Lockleaze 
25  Bristol - Lodge Causeway 
26  Bristol - Millennium Square 
27  Bristol - Mina Road 
28  Bristol - North View 
29  Bristol - Old Market 
30  Bristol - Queens Road 
31  Bristol - Riding Leaze 
32  Bristol - Sandy Park Road 
33  Bristol - Shirehampton 
34  Bristol - Shirehampton Road 
35  Bristol - Southmead Road 
36  Bristol - St George 
37  Bristol - St Marks Road 
38  Bristol - St Michaels Hill 
39  Bristol - Stapleton Road 
40  Bristol - Stockwood 
41  Bristol - Stoke Lane 
42  Bristol - Stokes Croft 
43  Bristol - Victoria Street 
44  Bristol - Wells Road 
45  Bristol - Westbury-on-Trym 
46  Bristol - Whitchurch 
47  Bristol - Whiteladies Road Appendix 2 
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Abstract 
 
At a time of increasing Government concern with the economic health of UK town centres 
and high streets, and with an independent inquiry (led by Mary Portas) on Revitalizing the 
High Street to report by the end of 2011, this paper seeks to make four contributions. 
 
First, to inject into an available evidence base, currently notable for its sparseness, new 
descriptive evidence on the differential performance of a sample of over 250 centres/high 
streets in four regions of the UK as those centres adjusted to the shock wave of global 
economic  crisis.  Second,  to  address  the  task  of  theorizing  the  nature  of  the  complex 
adjustments underway by positioning the policy-significant findings provided in the paper 
within  conceptualisations  of  ‘resilience’  in  economic  systems  -  particularly  those  which 
stress  the  anticipatory  or  reactive  capacity  of  systems  to  minimise  the  impacts  of  a 
destabilising shock and which focus on resilience as a dynamic and evolutionary process. 
Third, to offer findings from theory-driven statistical modeling of the determinants of the 
differential resilience or fragility exhibited by that sample of centres. Fourth, to assess what 
the implications of those findings and a focus on ‘adaptive resilience’ might mean for the 
design of policy proposals and instruments aimed at revitalising UK town centres and high 
streets.  
 
Although  some  of  the  paper’s  empirical  findings  parallel  those  suggested  by  specialist 
commercial research companies which have emerged to fill the need to chart the  post-
economic  crisis  malaise  of  UK  retail  centres,  they  also  significantly  extend  available 
knowledge.  In particular. they offer novel insight into the impact of two factors – ‘diversity’ 
of a centre’s pre-existing retail structure and ‘town centres first’ policy-compliant ‘in-centre’ 
or ‘edge-of-centre’ corporate foodstore entry.  Although conventionally portrayed as polar 
opposites within popular debate in terms of attempts to protect and/or enhance the vitality 
and viability of town centres and high streets, our analysis suggests that this may not be the 
case.  Indeed the retail centres in our sample which proved most resilient to the shock wave 
of global economic crisis were characterised by  both diversity and corporate food store 
entry 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Town centres and high streets in the UK have adjusted in complex, and as yet not fully 
understood and documented ways, to the global economic crisis of 2007-09 and the sharp 
deterioration  in  UK  consumer  confidence  recorded  during  late  2007  and  early  2008.  
Moreover,  that  adjustment  has  taken  place  on  top  of  the  incompletely  understood 
consequences of two other forces.  First, of the progressive rise of online retailing which 
year-on-year has had increasingly marked ‘substitution’ effects on certain types of town-Appendix 3 
 
centre  retailers  (Weltevreden,  2007).  Second, of the  decade-long  transformations  which 
have  resulted  from  the  increasingly  effective  implementation  of  a  ‘town  centres  first 
approach’ to retail planning policy following the adoption of PPG6 and the ‘sequential test’ 
in the mid 1990s (Guy, 2007; Wood et al, 2006; Wrigley 2010; Cheshire et al, 2011). 
 
At  a  time  of  considerable  Government  concern  about  the  economic  health  of  UK  high 
streets,  two  tasks  are  vital  in  any  attempt  to  address  the  policy-significant  gaps  in 
knowledge  concerning  the  differential  ability  of  those  retail  centres  to  adjust  to  the 
macroeconomic shock wave of global crisis. First, and most obviously, there is the critically 
important task of providing new empirical evidence.  However, that must not merely be 
descriptive.  Specialist  commercial  research  consultancies  (e.g.  the  Local  Data  Company) 
have been created and/or have risen to prominence in response to that need. In particular, 
the  Local  Data  Company  (LDC)  has  charted  for  the  UK  press  and  media  the  declining 
fortunes of certain types of high street and categories of retailer during the plunge into 
recession in 2008, the shallow recovery of 2009/10, and the threat of ‘double dip’ in early 
2011  associated  with  the  UK  Government’s  public-sector  expenditure  cuts,  declining 
household incomes and the emerging reality of ‘Austerity Britain’.  Rather the empirical 
knowledge required most urgently, and which can add greatest value, derives from the 
more detailed and higher-order insights that can be provided by considered, and inevitably 
more complex, academic analysis.  Second, however - and of equal importance - is the task 
of  theorizing  the  nature  of  the  complex  adjustments  underway.  The  differential 
performance of UK town centres and high streets during economic crisis is clearly intimately 
related to their capacity to be resilient to the impacts of macro-economic shock. However, 
as recent debates in evolutionary economic geography have demonstrated (particularly the 
work of Martin, 2011) the concept of ‘resilience’ is itself a multi-dimensional one, reflecting 
the alternative interpretations adopted by different scientific traditions. Nevertheless, as we 
demonstrate below, both individually and in combination, those varying interpretations of 
resilience  -  particularly  the  concept  of  ‘adaptive  resilience’  -  offer  analytical  leverage  in 
structuring  understanding  of  the  likely  evolutionary  paths  of  UK  town  centres  and  high 
streets post economic crisis. 
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This paper addresses both these challenges. First, it contributes to an evidence base which is 
currently  notable  primarily  for  is  sparseness.  In  particular,  by  using  a  specially  created 
dataset  consisting  of  Goad/Experian
3 retail-composition  survey  information  for  267 
centres/high streets in  4 regions of the UK, it begins the task of providing the missing 
analytical insights into the factors which shaped the performance of those centres during 
economic crisis. Second, it addresses the task of theorizing: (i) the complex adjustments of 
UK town centres and high streets to the shock wave of economic crisis, (ii) what that might 
mean in terms of pre -existing evolutionary trajectories of UK town centre/high street 
reconfiguration, and (iii) what the implications might be for the design of policy pro posals 
and instruments aimed at revitalising those centres. Specifically, it does that by positioning 
the  new  and  policy -significant  empirical/analytical  findings  which  it  provides  within 
conceptualisations of ‘resilience’ in economic systems, particularly those which stress the 
anticipatory or reactive capacity of systems to minimise the impacts of a destabilising shock 
and which focus on resilience as a dynamic and evolutionary process.  
 
The paper proceeds in the following way. First, it provides a summary of our approach to 
the empirical knowledge task. Specifically it addresses the design and execution of our 267 
centres/4 regions study of retail change –  detailing at a descriptive level, and triangulating 
                                                      
3 The Goad/Experian retail survey data provides detailed maps and associated databases for over 2,300 retail centres 
in the UK.. Essentially each retail unit in a centre is mapped onsite by Experian surveyors, and retail occupancy information 
on the fascia of the occupying retailer/service provider, their retail/service category, and the floor space of the unit is 
collected.  The initial surveys and maps date to the mid 1960s when Charles Goad  started  the Goad  map and database at 
the  request  of  the  then  Department  of  Trade  and  Industry.  Since  then,  the  coverage  of  retail  centres  has  been 
progressively extended over time both geographically and to include smaller centres.  Currently, the top 500 ‘ranked’ retail 
centres in the UK are surveyed on an annual basis with the remainder being surveyed every two years. The longitudinal 
richness of the available data on large numbers of centres has resulted in increasing use of the information outside the 
retail and property industries –as illustrated in the parallel analyses of exit and entry of small stores in over 1000 centres 
between 2000 and 2006 reported by the Competition Commission (2007) and by the University of Southampton retail 
research group Wrigley et al, 2009).  The issue of how the boundaries of the retail centres mapped by the Experian 
surveyors are defined is discussed later in the paper 
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against other sources, the overall losses and gains of different types of retail and service 
provision experienced by these centres following the macroeconomic shock of global crisis.  
Next it addresses the task of theorizing the nature of resilience and adaptation revealed by 
the contrasting performances of UK town centres and high streets. Structuring the paper in 
this  way  is  a  deliberate  choice  and  should  not  be  misinterpreted  as  indicating  any 
downplaying of the theoretical.  Rather, it is positioned at this point to signal and preface 
the important shift - from descriptive to theoretically-leveraged analytical - in the paper’s  
focus  which  then  follows.  Moving  into  the  presentation  of  that  analytical  statistical-
modelling phase of our research it is important to stress that our motivation was, as far as 
possible, to ensure a ‘top-down’ theoretically-driven approach to the analysis. Likewise, and 
as shown in the final sections of the paper, we consistently sought and have attempted to 
provide, a contribution to UK policy debate - in particular to the Government’s Revitalising 
the High Street initiative launched in May 2011 - which positions the findings of our study 
within a conceptualisation of ‘adaptively resilient high streets’ and which remains sensitive 
to issues of existing and emerging evolutionary trajectories. 
 
The Empirical Knowledge Task 1 
Study design 
As part of a broader research programme at the University of Southampton focused on the 
consequences of a decade of tightening UK retail planning regulation, the opportunity arose 
- with ESRC RIBEN support - to design a study of the differential ability shown by 267 town 
centres  and  high  streets  spread  across  four  regions  of  the  UK  in  adjusting  to  the 
macroeconomic  shock  wave  of  global  crisis.  The  study  relied  on  retail  composition 
information drawn from the detailed and long-established Goad/Experian surveys - a data 
source (see Footnote 1) which has increasingly been used to provide vital evidence-based 
research  for  UK  regulatory  enquiries  and  policy  debate.  (See  Competition  Commission, 
2008,  A5(1)  8-18  and  Wrigley  et  al,  2009a,  p.2066  for  discussions  of  the  strengths  and 
weaknesses of the Goad/Experian data. In particular, note the Competition Commission’s 
(2008, A5(2) -9) publicly expressed confidence in the quality of the data.)  
 
The 267 town centres/high streets each had Goad survey data which allowed assessment of 
the retail change experienced by those centres as they adjusted to economic crisis. That is Appendix 3 
 
to  say,  change  in  their retail/service-unit  composition between  the  immediate pre-crisis 
period (2006-2007) and the period (Q4 2008 through 2009) which followed the steep plunge 
in UK consumer confidence shown in Fig 1.  Given that the consumer confidence index is a 
‘leading indictor’, it was not until that latter period (Q4 2008 - 2009) that the effects of the 
economic crisis began to be felt most strongly by those centres. 
 
 Figure 1: UK consumer confidence index 2002-09 
 
 
 
 
The 267 centres/high streets (shown in Fig 2) were divided into two groups –a ‘northern’ 
group of 117 centres (93 in the North West and 24 in West Yorkshire) and a ‘southern’ 
group of 150 centres (119 in the South West and 31 in East Anglia.  The design represented 
a pragmatic ‘least cost’ supplementation of a set of Goad surveys to which the researchers 
had  access  in  order  to  meet  the  requirements  of  a  complementary,  but  much  larger, 
industry-funded project in the wider University of Southampton research programme (see 
Wrigley et al, 2010, Ch 14)  Nevertheless, as Fig 2 indicates, despite the pragmatic and 
constrained nature of its design, the sample of centres/high streets included offered good 
representation across centre size, the urban/rural spectrum, contrasting underlying regional 
economic growth dynamics, and so on.   However, it was in no sense a sample which was 
spatially structured or sufficiently large to be representative of the UK – most significantly, it 
omitted London, where very different patterns and levels of growth of some types of retail 
and service provision had been found in the early to mid 2000s by both the Competition 
Commission  (2007)  and  the  University  of  Southampton  research  group  (Wrigley,  2007; 
Wrigley et al, 2009a) Appendix 3 
 
 
 
 Figure 2: Location and type of 4-region sample of centres/high streets 
 
 
 
 
Descriptive analysis of changes in retail composition 
For each retail or service type in the 267 town centres/high streets sample, two measures of 
change between the ‘pre-crisis’ and ‘within-crisis’ (subsequently referred to as ‘recession’) 
surveys were calculated.  
(c) The first, measure M1, was the relative change in retail/service units of a particular 
type in the centre/high street. That was computed as the difference between unit 
numbers recorded in the two Goad surveys (‘pre-crisis’ and ‘within-crisis’), relative to 
the ‘pre-crisis’ numbers as a base. Appendix 3 
 
(d) The second, measure M2, was the simple absolute basis-points increase/decrease 
recorded between the two surveys in the percentage of retail/service units of a 
particular type in a centre/high street. 
In the case of M1, low ‘pre-crisis’  base figures recorded for a particular retail/service type in 
a  centre  have  the  capacity  to  produce  high  and  unstable  values  of  relative  change.  
Conversely, M2 measures absolute change in the percentage of each retail/service type in a 
centre and is more stable 
 
Overall change in the retail composition of sample centres/high streets 
The  most  commonly  used  indicators  of  the  impact  of  the  macro-economic  ‘shock’  of 
economic-crisis experienced by UK town centres/high streets are retail/service unit closures, 
empty units and, in turn, increases in the measured ‘vacancy rate’ of a centre. As Fig 3 
shows, in our sample of 267 centres, between the ‘pre-crisis’ and ‘recession’ surveys, vacant 
units increased by 28% (based on relative change measure M1) from an average of  10.4% to  
13.1% - that is to say 2.7 basis-points on absolute change measure M2.  
 Figure 3: Relative (M1) and absolute (M2) change by retail category - ‘pre-’ to ‘within-crisis’ 
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In  terms  of  the  broad  types  of  retail/service  which  contributed  to  those  closures  and 
increased  vacancy  rates,  the  greatest  adverse  impact from the  ‘shock’  of  economic-crisis 
appears  to  have  been  felt  by  ‘comparison’  retail  (essentially  non-food  retailing,  but  see 
Appendix 1 for a full listing of the types of retailing falling into that category)   As Fig 4 shows, 
virtually all types of retailing within that broad category lost units as ‘discretionary’ spending 
by  UK  consumers declined.   However,  the  hardest hit  appear  to  have  been  ‘department 
stores’, ‘music, video & photography’ retailers, ‘florists’, ‘furniture & furnishings’ retailers , 
‘booksellers’,  and  ‘cards,  gifts  &  toys’  retailers  –  each  type  recording  a  relative  decline 
(measure M1) in the range -29% to -9%. Nevertheless, the impact on ‘comparison‘ retail was 
clearly  far  from  uniform.  ‘Telephones  &  accessories’  retailers,  ‘household  discounters’ 
(consisting  of  ‘pound  shops’, household  bargain  shops  etc)  and to  a much  lesser  degree 
‘chemists  & beauty’  retailers  recorded  increases  rather  than  declines  -  indeed telephone 
retailers recorded a relative increase of almost 16%.  Moreover, as many types of comparison 
retailers closed units, so ‘charity shops’ mirrored ‘household discounters’ by moving into 
some of the vacated space. The consequence was that charity units increased by almost 7%. 
 Figure 4:  Relative change (M1) in comparison retail categories – ‘pre-crisis to ‘within-crisis’  
 
                  
In contrast, ‘convenience’ retail, ‘financial & business services’, ‘retail services’ and ‘leisure 
services’ contributed far less to the increased vacancy rates.  Indeed, as Fig 3 shows, in each 
of these broad categories – with the exception of ‘financial & business services’ –  there was 
some evidence of continued growth, both in terms of ‘relative change’ (M1) in units and in 
square feet of floor-space.  Appendix 3 
 
In the case of ‘convenience’ retail (see Appendix 1 for full listing of types of retailing falling 
into the category), Fig 5 shows that only three categories - ‘butchers & fishmongers’(-8.2%), 
‘greengrocers’  (-7.9%),  and  ‘CTNs  &  off-licences’  (-7.1%)  -  experienced  relative  declines  
close to the lower-bound (9%) figure recorded by the hardest hit types of  ‘comparison’ 
retail.  Moreover, the strong growth which both the Competition Commission (2007, 2008) 
and the Southampton research team (Wrigley 2007; Wrigley et al 2009a) had uncovered in 
relation to small food-retail-based ‘convenience’ stores during the early to mid 2000s, and 
which had been reported to the Groceries Market Inquiry (2006-08), appears to have been 
maintained  despite the shock of economic crisis.  Moreover, as in those earlier findings 
which related to the first half of the 2000s, significant increases (above 20%) were recorded 
not only in corporate convenience stores, but also among ‘symbol group’ and ‘independent’ 
convenience stores – the latter having been seen, during the early to mid 2000s to be 
associated with the growth of ethnic retail (particularly in London and prospering southern 
England), or what Guy (2008) referred to as the ‘Polish grocer’ effect. However, growth 
during economic crisis was not confined to the small food-retail-based ‘convenience’ store 
sector.    There  was  also  evidence,  in  the  ‘southern’  part  of  our  4-region  sample  of 
centres/high streets, of increasing numbers of specialist small food retailers, with ‘bakers’ 
and ‘delicatessens’ recording gains of between 5% and 10%. 
 Figure 5: Relative change (M1) in convenience retail categories – ‘pre-crisis’ to ‘within-crisis’  
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Likewise, in the case of ‘leisure services’, Fig 6 shows that growth was recorded for almost 
all categories of ‘leisure services’ (a decline in pubs is masked by the categorisation in Fig 6 ).  
In particular, there was a substantial (+13%) relative increase in cafes – a finding duplicated 
at the local level in an earlier study of the transformation of the retail structure of a market 
town in South West England (Wrigley et al, 2009b) 
 
 Figure 6:  Relative change (M1) in leisure services categories – ‘pre-crisis’ to ‘within-crisis’  
 
 
 
Assessing and triangulating the descriptive findings 
In assessing these initial descriptive findings, two issues can usefully be considered. First, 
how do they compare to the results obtained by the Local Data Company - specifically from 
the  LDC’s  analysis  of  a  larger  but  more  thinly  spread  sample  of  705  UK  centres  which 
includes less smaller (district and local) centres than in the research reported here.  Second, 
what  are  the  indicators  that  the  differential  performance  of  UK  town  centres  and  high 
streets  as  they  responded  to  macro-economic  ‘shock’  might  have  systematic  and 
identifiable dimensions – not least relating to geography?  In other words what are the 
initial  hints  in  the  descriptive  analysis  that  UK  town  centres/high  streets  exhibited 
differential, but explainable, levels of ‘resilience’? 
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First, with regard to the findings of the Local Data Company, we note three things. 
 
(a)  In  regular  reports  released  since  2009  and  covering  similar  issues  to  those  in  the 
descriptive results outlined above (LDC, 2009, 2010 ,2011), the LDC  has charted, for a non-
academic  audience,  the  ‘gathering  storm’  affecting  UK  high  streets  following,  but  not 
entirely as a consequence of, the shock of global economic crisis.  In particular rising retail 
vacancy rates have been highlighted – with average rates reaching 12% at the end of 2009 
and 14.5% at the end of 2010. Likewise, the LDC has highlighted the main contributions to 
closures and increased vacancy rates as coming from ‘comparison retail’, with ‘convenience’ 
retail categories displaying much greater resistance to the shock of economic crisis. 
 
(b) The LDC’s end-2009 vacancy figure (12%) across its wider but more thinly spread UK 
sample Is not dissimilar to the 13.1% recorded in our 2008 Q4 – 2009 ‘within crisis’ sample. 
Likewise,  despite  the  different  categorisations  of  ‘comparison’  and  ‘convenience’  retail 
types used by LDC compared to our study – the LDC’s findings are broadly equivalent to 
those  reported  above.  In  particular,  ‘department  stores’,  ‘gifts’  and  ‘stationary/cards’ 
retailers,  ‘florists’,  ‘furniture  and  related’  retailers,  and  ‘music  &  video’  (or  ’home 
entertainment’)  retailers  are  identified  in  both  studies  as  amongst  the  hardest  hit 
‘comparison  retail’  categories  –  with  relative  declines  in  the  -29%  to  -10%  range  being 
recorded  in both.  Similarly,  both  LDC  and  our  study  agree  that  the  ‘convenience’  retail 
categories showing greatest relative decline include ‘butchers & fishmongers’, ‘CTNs’ and 
‘off-licenses’, but that the declines experienced by these categories place them at or below 
the lower end of the range noted for the hardest hit ‘comparison’ retailers 
 
(c) The most striking difference between our figures and those of the LDC relates to the 
average vacancy rate in the pre-crisis period.  In our 2006/07 ‘pre-crisis’ sample, that figure 
has  been noted  above in  relation  to  Fig 3  to be  10.4%.    In  contrast,  LDC  calculate  the 
‘gathering storm’ of shop closures and high street retail vacancies from a Q1 2008 base 
vacancy  rate  which they  estimate to  have been be  around  4.5%.  In part  the  difference 
reflects  a  general  reduction  in  vacancy  rates  which  occurred  during  2006/07,  and  the 
different geographical structure of the samples. However, we also note concerns expressed 
by some leading UK property consultancies (e.g Colliers, 2009), when reviewing LDC and Appendix 3 
 
related figures, regarding ‘confusing’ data and ‘inconsistency of approaches’ to measuring 
empty retail units. Colliers report that their own figures, in contrast, suggest that retail 
vacancy rates – defined on the basis of empty units available for occupation (‘hard voids’) - 
rose from 7.3% in October 2006 (a central point of our ‘pre-crisis’ sample) to 13.8% in April 
2009 (a central point of our Q4 2008 -2009 ‘within-crisis’ sample).  Given that the Colliers’ 
sample includes London - where vacancy rates in 2006 were below the UK average - Colliers’  
figures are clearly much closer to those recorded in our sample. 
 
Secondly, what indicators are there within these descriptive findings that there may be 
systematic and identifiable dimensions of the differential performance of UK town centres 
and high streets as they adjusted to macro-economic ‘shock’?  Here it is sufficient simply to 
highlight the obvious ‘north-south divide’ present throughout Figs 3 to 6.  (See Dorling 2010 
for  a  recent  consideration  of  the  enduring  significance  of  the  concept  to the economic 
geography of the UK).  That divide - with northern town centres/high streets performing 
significantly  worse  in  terms  of  rising  vacancy  rates  and,  moreover,  threatened  in  the 
medium-term  with  continued  struggle  given  their  heavier  dependence  on  public  sector 
employment at a time of severe Government expenditure cuts - has also consistently been 
highlighted  in  the  LDC  reports.  Additionally,  the  LDC  reports  suggest  differential 
performance related to centre size which, in turn, compounds the north-south differential.  
That is to say, whilst large and medium-size centres in the north appear in the LDC results to 
have  performed  poorly in  terms  of  increasing vacancy  rate,  medium-size  centres  in the 
south have shown much greater ‘resilience’ to the shock of economic crisis. 
 
Having contributed to the available descriptive evidence base, the focus of the study now 
shifts  from  descriptive  to  theory-leveraged  analytical.  Specifically,  we  explore  the  value 
which  can  be  added  to  debates  on  the  economic  health  of  UK  high  streets  from  a 
consideration of alternative conceptualisations of ‘resilience’ in economic systems. We then 
report the findings obtained from a ‘top-down’ theoretically-informed statistical modelling 
of  the  differential  performance  of  our  sample  of  town  centres  and  high  streets  during 
economic  crisis,  asking  what  factors  determined  the  levels  of  resilience  and  fragility 
exhibited by those centres. 
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The Theoretical Interpretation Task 
Three concepts of ‘resilience’ 
The concept of ‘resilience’ – broadly defined as the ability to ‘recover from and position 
elastically’ following a disturbance of some form - has recently attracted attention in both 
urban and regional studies and evolutionary economic geography (Foster, 2007; Hill et al, 
2008; Christopherson et al, 2010; Hassink, 2010; Martin and Simmie, 2010; Martin, 2011).   
That interest has essentially focused on the capacity of a local economic system to recover 
from external ‘shock’ – what Hassink (2010, 45) describes  as 
 ‘one of the most intriguing questions in economic geography … why some regional  economies 
manage to renew themselves, whereas others remain locked in decline’ 
In  particular,  Martin  (2011)  in  an  insightful  exposition  has  drawn  attention  to  three 
alternative  interpretations  of  the  concept  of  resilience  adopted  in  different  scientific 
traditions. Martin refers to these as: (i) the ‘engineering resilience’ interpretation found in 
physical science, (ii) the ‘ecological resilience’ interpretation found in biological science, and 
(iii) the ‘adaptive resilience’ interpretation found in complex systems theory. 
 
Whereas the ‘engineering resilience’ interpretation focuses on the ability of a system to 
bounce back (return to a stable configuration) - that is to say, to be resistant to economic 
shock -  the ‘ecological resilience’ interpretation focuses, as Martin shows, on the scale of 
shock a system can absorb before it is destabilised and moved to a new configuration.  In 
other words, what pushes a system beyond its ‘elasticity threshold’ to a new configuration.  
In the ecological interpretation, therefore, the degree of ‘resilience’ is the size of shock a 
system  can  tolerate  before  it  is  unable  to  return  to  its  former  configuration  and  must 
change form, function or position. 
 
Clearly, in existing uses of the term ‘resilience’ in the context of the responses of UK town 
centres and high streets to macro-economic shock, the notion of ‘bounce back’ has often 
been  implicit.  Additionally,  however,  the  notion  of  ‘tipping  points’  which  move  town 
centres/high streets beyond their ‘elasticity thresholds’ has regularly been present in public 
policy  debate  on  the  future  of  the  high  street.  In  particular,  arguments  relating  to  the 
potentially adverse impacts of corporate foodstore entry on the fragile ‘ecologies’ of small Appendix 3 
 
and  specialist  independent-retailer-dominated  town  centres  and  high  streets  have  been 
mounted by both small-retailer trade organisations (e.g. the Association of Convenience 
Stores) and by anti-corporate-food-retail or environmentally-focused NGOs. That is to say, 
both ‘engineering’ and ‘ecological’ interpretations of ‘resilience’ are present in the debates 
which inform and frame policy. 
 
Yet,  in  our  view  -  although  acknowledging  that  aspects  of  the  ‘ecological  resilience’ 
interpretation potentially offer analytical leverage - neither of these interpretations quite 
capture the subtle nature of town centre/high street adaptation which we observe via our 
descriptive analysis.  Rather, we find greater traction in the third interpretation identified by 
Martin - ‘adaptive resilience’ - which focuses on anticipatory or reactive reorganisation of 
the form and function of a system so as to minimise the impact of a destabilising shock. As 
Martin observes, complex adaptive systems are distinguished by ‘self-organizing’ behaviour 
and  an  adaptive  capacity  which  enables  them  to  reconfigure  their  internal  structures 
spontaneously. As a result, the ‘adaptive resilience’ interpretation focuses on resilience as a 
dynamic and evolutionary process. Moreover, it is an interpretation which in Martin’s view 
resonates  with Schumpeterian  (1942)  notions of the  ‘creatively destructive’ potential  of 
macro-economic shocks – in which the sweeping away of outmoded economic structures 
opens up opportunities to develop new configurations and new trajectories of growth. 
 
There is considerable leverage we believe to be gained from using an ‘adaptive resilience’ 
interpretation  to  structure  understanding  of  the  likely  evolutionary  paths  of  UK  town 
centres and high streets post economic crisis. Conversely, the notion  that  centres/high 
streets will simply ‘bounce-back’ in an ‘engineering resilience’ manner following economic 
recovery,  or  indeed  that  returning  to  the  previous  configurations  of  those  centres/high 
streets is achievable or desirable,  is one for which we have little sympathy. Moreover, 
despite  the  intrinsic  attraction  of  the  concept  of  ‘tipping’  mechanisms  which  have  the 
potential to push centres/high streets - in an ‘ecological resilience’ manner - beyond their 
‘elasticity thresholds ’to new configurations of form, function and position, that represents, 
in our view, only part of the story. In particular, the protective nature of ‘diversity’ argument 
which is often used by small-retailer trade organizations and NGOs to support the need to 
underpin  the  ‘fragile  ecologies’  of  small  and  specialist  independent-retailer-dominated Appendix 3 
 
centres  is  poorly  articulated.
4     Rather,  we  are  attracted  to  the  notion  that  town 
centres/high streets have, in ways that are poorly understood, complex self -organizing 
anticipatory and/or reactive capacities.  That is to say, by the idea that what we are 
observing in our empirical research is essentially an  evolution - albeit at differential rates 
across  the  UK  -  to  new  configurations  of,  and  functional  relationships  within,  those 
centres/high streets.  
 
But  what  are  the  key  dimensions  of  a  retail  centre’s  structure  –  not  least  its  mix  of 
businesses  (both  retail  and  services),  the  relationships  and  interdependencies  between 
those businesses, and with local institutional structures  - that served to protect centres 
differentially  against  the  shock  of  economic  crisis  and  to  facilitate  adaptive  resilience?  
Moving into the statistical modelling phase of our study, our primary motivation, therefore, 
was to ensure a ‘top-down’ theoretically-driven analysis of these dimensions, avoiding as far 
as possible over-mechanical reliance on ‘bottom-up’ data exploration. 
 
 
The Empirical Knowledge Task 2 
The nature of the response variable 
As noted above, the most commonly used indicators of the impact of macroeconomic shock 
on UK town centres and high streets are retail/service unit closures, empty and/or ‘available 
but still trading’ units (referred to as ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ voids), and changes in retail/service 
vacancy rates. In a similar fashion, our analysis uses vacancy rate change as the ‘response 
                                                      
4 In this context, we are grateful to one of our referees for suggesting that there would be value to 
be  gained  from  considering  the  ‘diversity’  component  of  the  arguments  surrounding  the  need  to 
protect the fragile ecologies of small and specialist independent-retailer dominated centres, within the 
context of what is termed the Jacobs vs. Marshall-Arrow-Romer (MAR) debate (Glaeser et al. 1992). 
In particular, the issue of concentration versus diversification considered within that debate, and which  
has important  implications for the ability of  regional economies to cope with changing competitive 
dynamics  flowing  from  the  macroeconomic  shocks  of    rapid  globalization  of  industries,  requires 
appropriate  translation into, and evaluation within, the discussion of retail ‘diversity’. In particular, the 
potentially protective effects of small independent store based diversity in dealing with the changing 
competitive dynamics and macroeconomic shock waves engulfing UK town centres and high streets 
require articulation and their mechanisms spelling out    Appendix 3 
 
variable’ in the multivariate models reported below. As a result, we begin by showing in Fig 
7  the  complex  spatial  variability  of  those  vacancy  rate  changes  across  our  four-region 
sample.  Overall, Fig 7 reveals that 69.3% of our sample centres/high streets experienced an 
increase in vacancy rates - with some centres seeing rises in the 5 to 10 basis points range 
between the pre- and within-crisis surveys in terms of absolute change measure M2.  In 
contrast, and more surprising given the concerns of UK Government and media with the 
deteriorating  economic  health  of  town  centres  and  high  streets,  22.8%  of  our  sample 
centres recorded reduced vacancy rates in the ‘within-crisis’ surveys, with a further 7.9% 
experiencing  no change in rates.   
 
 
 Figure 7: The spatial variability of vacancy rate changes across the 4-region sample 
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Moreover, consistent with the dynamic and evolutionary ‘adaptive resilience’ perspective 
outlined above, it must be stressed that ‘vacancy rate change’ is not a uni-dimensional 
variable.  Indeed, as Findlay and Sparks (2010) point out in a rare discussion of the issue, 
(summarised via the schema in Fig 8) retail/service unit vacancies are not uniformly and 
inevitably an indicator of the fragility of a centre/high street. They may equally be a sign of 
ongoing and essential readjustment.  That is to say, in stable economic conditions, a degree 
of what is termed ‘churn’ is essential to accommodate and facilitate often rapidly changing 
retailer/service-provider requirements in terms of store formats, sizes, and preferred micro 
locations  within  centres/high  streets  as  those  retailers  and  service-providers  adjust  to 
shifting consumer tastes and fluctuating levels of market demand. In other words, a certain 
level of vacancy is essential to, and reflects, a ‘healthy high street’.  By extension, in periods 
of macro-economic shock, a somewhat higher ‘churn’ rate might simply be a necessary 
element  in,  and  reflection  of,  self-organizing  anticipatory  or  reactive  reconfiguration  by 
‘adaptively  resilient’  town  centres/high  streets  as  they  evolve  dynamically  to  new 
configurations, trader interdependencies, and trajectories of growth. 
 
 Figure 8: Determinants of retail vacancy – the view of Findlay and Sparks (2010) 
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More prosaically, there are also some definitional issues regarding the use of vacancy rates 
as the response variable in a multivariate analysis which require clarification. The first of 
these relates to the base from which the vacancy rate is calculated. As the Colliers’ (2009) 
report  on inconsistency of approaches to the assessment of high street performance makes 
clear, some researchers have calculated vacancy rates at a given point in time ‘by expressing 
empty units as a percentage of all shop units (only), whilst others take all town centre units 
into  account  –  resulting  in  a  lower  percentage’.  In  our  case,  we  adopted  the  former 
approach – expressing empty units as a percentage of retail and service units.  If we had 
adopted the latter, then the average vacancy rate in the pre-crisis period across our sample 
of 267 centres/high streets would have been 9% rather than 10.4% 
 
The second relates to the more complex issue of whether the vacancy rates were calculated 
on the basis of what can be termed ‘fixed’ or ‘variable’ boundaries.  The Experian/Goad 
surveys of town centres and high streets allow the boundaries of the shopping areas to 
expand or contract over time (from survey to survey) – or, as the Competition Commission 
(2007) noted, to have ‘no fixed size in geographic terms’. However, as the University of 
Southampton research team pointed out in submissions to the Commission (see Wrigley et 
al, 2009, p2069) those boundaries can also be held constant. That is to say, vacancy rate 
change  can  be  calculated  within  fixed  boundaries,  allowing us to  report  what  might  be 
termed the like-for-like increases or decreases in vacancy rates. In the multivariate analysis 
which follows we report the ‘fixed boundaries’ like-for-like figures. However, both ‘fixed’ 
and ‘variable’ boundaries results were derived and used to assess the robustness of the 
findings reported. 
 
Specification of the explanatory variables 
As  the  schema  (Fig  8)  of  Findlay  and  Sparks  (2010)  implies,  the  differential  changes  in 
retail/service unit vacancy rates experienced across UK town centres and high streets as a  
result of the macro-economic shock of global economic crisis, can be viewed as  a product of 
filtering that ‘shock’ through two structures.   
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(a) First, through the regional economic system in which centres/high streets are located. 
That produced, in turn, regional, sub-regional and local variations in both levels of consumer 
confidence  and  levels  of  demand  across  the  immediate  catchment  areas  of  those 
centres/high streets.  
 
(b)  Second,  through  the  existing  economic  structures  of  the  centres/high  streets 
themselves.  That is to say, through their pre-existing mix of businesses, the relationships 
and interdependencies between those businesses, and through local institutional structures 
supportive or less supportive of their business-practice environments and entrepreneurial 
cultures.  Additionally via the way that process is translated into wider retail and property 
industry assessment of the likely trajectories of growth of the centres/high streets. 
 
As a result, attempts to identify potential explanatory variables focused on capturing both 
these dimensions. 
 
In terms of the first dimension (economic system in which embedded), a clear North-South 
divide was present in the descriptive findings discussed above, and also in similar results of 
the LDC. The expectation going into the multivariate modelling was that filtering the ‘shock’ 
of  economic  crisis  through  regional  economic  structures  that  had  a  previously  strong 
underlying growth dynamic (i.e. the previously prospering ‘South’) would, other things being 
held  constant,  have  resulted  in  less  severe  increases  in  vacancy  rates  than  in  similarly 
configured centres/high streets in the more vulnerable regional economies of the ‘North’.  
There  was  also  the  expectation  that  within  regional  economies,  holding  other  things 
constant,  centres/high  streets  with  more  affluent  catchments  or  with  demographics 
favouring higher rates of consumer demand, would likewise have experienced less severe 
increases in vacancy rates. 
 
In terms of the second dimension (economic structures and configurations of centres/high 
streets  themselves),  given  the  argument  advanced  above,  attention  focused  on  the 
following groups of factors. 
(a) The mix and interdependencies of businesses – in particular:  
(i)  the balance of retail versus service units;  Appendix 3 
 
(ii) the proportion of small independent retailers - i.e what has been argued by small-     
retailer  trade  organizations  and  NGOs  to  be  the  potentially  protective,  but  fragile, 
‘diversity’ of independent specialist-store dominated centres/high streets;  
(iii) the presence, or entry via a ‘town centres first’ policy-compliant in-centre or edge-
of-centre  site,  of  a  corporate  foodstore  able  to  anchor  the  centre/high  street  and 
provide a vital element in ensuring its sustainable development in the manner described 
by Powe & Shaw (2004), Thomas & Bromley (2003), and Wrigley et al (2010a). 
 
(b)  Local  supportive  or  unsupportive  institutional  structures  and  business-practice 
environments  that  impact  on  the  attractiveness  of  the  centre/high  street.  In  particular, 
indicators such as: investment in the design and maintenance of the built environment and 
’streetscape’  of  the  centre;  funding  of  a  ‘town  centre  manager’;  involvement  in  BIDs 
schemes;  supportive  car  parking policies;  encouragement  (perhaps  by  incentives) of  the 
entry of key ‘magnet stores’ and/or investment in temporary ‘crowd pulling’ attractors to 
enhance the attractiveness of the centre/high street and to encourage spill-over spending 
by consumers, etc.  
 
(c) The physical configuration of the town centre or high street and the extent to which that 
might  help  facilitate  re-configuration  and  renewal.  In  particular,  the  overall  size  of  the 
centre/high  street  and  the  distribution  of  floorspace  across  units  in  the  centre.    The 
argument here is that larger centres potentially offer a wider variety of niches but also 
higher prevailing levels of competition compared to small centres.  Additionally they are 
also likely to be characterised by a higher proportion of larger modern shop units offering 
potential for flexible re-configuration when compared to the typically older less adaptable 
retail fabric of many UK smaller centres/high streets.  Finally, the level of what can be 
termed ‘structural vacancy’ in the centre/high street - defined as long-term empty units in 
existence  for  more  than  two  years  indicating  poor  retail  fabric  and  harmful  to  the 
attractiveness of the centre has also been argued to be potentially important  (Zweeden, 
2009; Findlay and Sparks, 2009). That is to say, the level of ‘bad’ vacancy as opposed to the 
short-run ’healthy’ vacancy which is associated with normal ‘churn’ and which facilitates 
both adjustment of store formats, sizes and in-centre locations by existing retailers/service-
providers and a necessary level of entry and exit Appendix 3 
 
 
The theoretical expectations going into the multivariate modelling regarding these second 
dimension  groups  of  factors  were  as  follows.  Filtering  the  macro-economic  shock  of 
economic  crisis:  (a)  through  centre  configurations  underpinned  by  supportive  local 
institutional  structures  and  business  practices  which  promoted  the  attractiveness  of 
centre/high  street;  (b)  through  retail/service  and  trader  type/size  mixes  which  were 
‘diverse’ going into the period of crisis; (c) through structures involving corporate foodstore 
presence or, alternatively, entry conforming with the town centres first approach to retail 
planning policy and which helped anchor the centre by encouraging expenditure retention 
and linked trips (Powe and Shaw, 2004; Wrigley et al, 2010b) were - other things being held 
constant - likely to have protected centres against the most severe increases in vacancy 
rates. Finally, in the case of physical structures which facilitate flexible re-configuration, 
whilst expectations relating to the influence of centre size were far more ambiguous, there 
was a clearer consensus that higher levels of existing ‘structural’ vacancy going into the 
period of crisis was likely to have been detrimental to the attractiveness of a centre/high 
street and to have been associated with more severe increases in overall vacancy rates. 
 
The best-supported theoretically-grounded model of vacancy rate change 
Table 1 summarises the results of our multivariate modelling. That is to say, a parsimonious 
seven-variable  OLS  regression  model  obtained  after  exploration  of  many  different 
specifications  of  possible  sets  of  explanatory  variables  which  might  capture  the  two 
dimensions discussed above – dimensions through which the shock of economic crisis was 
filtered into differential changes in vacancy rates across our four-region sample of 267 town 
centres and high streets.  Negative parameter estimates indicate factors which, holding all 
other things constant, are associated with reductions in  the rate of increase in vacancy rate 
between the pre-crisis and within-crisis surveys.  In other words, which are linked to relative 
improvement  in  performance  of  centres/high  streets  during  economic  crisis.  Positive 
parameter estimates indicate the opposite – factors associated with relative worsening of 
performance during economic crisis.  
 
Overall, the model in Table 1 explains 36% of the complex spatial variability of changes in 
vacancy rates shown in Fig 7 – a respectable level for a parsimonious model of a relatively Appendix 3 
 
large cross-sectional sample, and one which leaves more than 250 degrees of freedom
5.  
The model has been subject to a battery o f standard tests to check the extent it conforms 
both to OLS assumptions and provides robust estimates. The OLS assumption tests are 
summarised below the table.  Taken together with standardized residual and predicted 
value plots, the tests suggest normall y distributed residuals, no evidence of significant 
heteroscedasticity, and multicollinearity below critical thresholds. Outlier and leverage plots 
were used to check the robustness of the parameter estimates. On the basis of outlier/high 
leverage detection criteria which have become standard practice in regression diagnostic 
approaches (Belsley et al, 1980; Henderson and Velleman, 1981; Wrigley, 1983), a small 
number of centres (8) were removed from the initial sample of 267 to produce the 
estimates reported in Table 1  
 
 Table 1   A parsimonious theoretically-grounded model of vacancy rate change 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
  Explanatory Variable        Parameter estimate      Standard Error                T-value 
 Constant                                              -0.076                          0.019                      -3.998
** 
 South-North divide                            -0.016                          0.004                     -4.170
** 
 Centre size (Log)                                +0.013                          0.002                    +5.743
** 
 Retail diversity pre-crisis                  -0.027                          0.013                      -2.139
* 
 Corporate food store entry              -0.008                          0.004                      -2.081
* 
 Retail vs services % pre-crisis          +0.095                          0.021                     +4.463
** 
 Structural vacancy pre-crisis            +0.060                          0.010                    +6.130
** 
 Std Avg Store Size x Std 
   magnet store floorspace                 -0.349                          0.082                      -4.243
** 
 
* *parameter estimate
 significant at 1%, 
* significant at 5%.     R squared = 35.6   N = 259
 
  
                                                      
5  We accept, of course, that despite the  attraction  of this theory-driven  parsimonious model,  
more than 60% of the complex spatial variability of changes in vacancy rates remains unaccounted 
for, and that there is a strong  probability that there may be missing explanatory variables that we 
have not been able to include in our model which may be found to have an important role to play in 
accounting for the differential performance of our sample of centres in response to the shock wave of 
global economic crisis.  Differential  parking policies and charges are perceived to play a significant 
role in the economic health of town centres and high streets but unfortunately we had no access to 
systematic information on these factors, Neither  did we have access to systematic information on 
retail rents at a centre or retail/service unit level.  Omission of either of these variables may have 
played a role in our inability to retain a catchment affluence variable in  the model reported in Table 1. Appendix 3 
 
P-value for normality test of residuals =0.84 
Durbin-Watson d value = 2.17  
Condition index value of = 28.61 
--------------------------------------------------------  
 
The  main  findings  of  the  model  of  vacancy  rate  change  presented  in  Table  1  can  be 
summarised as follows 
 
Town  centres  and  high  streets  in  our  4-region  sample  which  displayed  the  greatest 
resilience  to  the  shock  of  economic  crisis  (as  measured  by  lower  rates  of  increase,  or 
reductions, in vacancy rates) - that is to say, which were more likely to have sustained their 
vitality and viability - were all other things being equal/held constant more likely to have 
been: 
  ‘southern’ rather than ‘northern’; 
  ‘smaller’ rather than ‘larger’; 
  those whose business mixes in the pre-crisis period were characterised by  
higher proportions of service units relative to retail units;  
  those whose retail unit compositions in the pre-crisis period were 
characterised by the ‘diversity’ offered by higher proportions of small 
independent specialist stores; 
  those which, despite the shock of economic crisis, had experienced between 
the ‘pre-‘ and ‘within-crisis’ surveys an in-centre or edge-of-centre corporate 
foodstore entry which conformed with the ‘town centres first’ approach to 
retail planning policy; 
  those with lower levels of ‘structural vacancy’ in the pre-crisis period – i.e.  
with lower levels of the ‘bad’ long-term vacancy potentially harmful to the 
attractiveness of centres/high streets; 
  those whose physical structures going into economic crisis could be seen as 
both relatively attractive and facilitative of re-configuration – in the model 
this was proxied in terms of centres/high streets characterised by larger 
average store sizes which additionally had higher levels of that floorspace 
occupied by 20 of the UK’s  key/’magnet’ retailers (i.e. by the multiplicative 
effect of these two characteristics)  
       
The majority  of these  findings  are  consistent  with  our  theoretical  expectations  outlined 
above. For example, filtering the ‘shock’ of economic crisis through regional structures that 
in the pre-crisis period had relatively strong underlying growth dynamics compared to the 
more vulnerable regional economies of northern England was reflected, as expected, in a 
clear  ‘North/South’ divide  in performance.  Similarly,  filtering the  macro-economic  shock Appendix 3 
 
through the mix and interdependencies of businesses within town centres/high streets and 
the  physical  configurations  of  those  centres,  produced  theoretically  expected  results  in 
terms of the beneficial impacts of: (a) small independent specialist store based ‘diversity’, 
and (b) ‘town centres first’ policy-compliant and expenditure-retaining corporate foodstore 
entry, plus additionally in terms of the detrimental impacts of  (c) long-term ‘structural 
vacancy’.  Moreover, in the case of  factors such as the influence of centre size where our 
expectations were theoretically more ambiguous it is reassuring that our findings – that 
‘smaller’  centres  performed  better  than  larger  centres,  other  things  being  equal  –  lend 
support to similar findings now being reported by the LDC.  
 
It is important, however, to highlight two further aspects of Table 1.  
(a) First, that the model reported includes none of the measures of the group of factors 
which we termed ‘supportive local institutional structures and business practices’. 
Several of our proxies (e.g. BIDs scheme, town centre manager, etc), when included 
in preliminary specifications of the model, had parameter estimates consistent with 
our theoretical expectations. However, at best they suggested weak relationships 
and none approached conventional levels of significance.  The issue remains open 
therefore as to whether this group of factors are not included in the model as a 
result of: inappropriate proxies being selected, the particular structure of our 267 
centre/high street sample, or because they genuinely had a relatively marginal 
impact on the differential performance of centres experiencing significant 
macroeconomic shock.  Likewise our expectation that: within regional economies, 
holding other things constant, centres/high streets with more affluent catchments or 
with demographics favouring higher rates of consumer demand were likely to have 
performed relatively well in the face of the shock of economic crisis, again produced 
parameter estimates of the expected signs.  Nevertheless, despite suggesting 
stronger relationships with centre performance than the factors we assessed from 
the local institutional structures/business practices group, none of the proxies of 
catchment affluence we experimented with reached conventional levels of 
significance. 
(b) Second, although we have suggested that the majority of the findings of the model 
in Table 1 are consistent with our theoretical expectations, it is essential to stress 
that these findings represent important new evidence which goes well beyond what 
has previously been reported about the differential performance of UK high streets 
during economic crisis. In particular, despite being central to highly polarised 
debates surrounding the impacts of corporate food retail incursion into UK high 
streets, we are aware of no publicly available evidence on whether centres/high 
streets which experienced the shock of economic crisis with diverse independent 
small-store dominated structures, were protected by that diversity. Additionally, we 
are not aware of any evidence on whether ‘diverse’ centres/high streets proved 
more resilient to the shock of economic crisis than centres which were transformed Appendix 3 
 
by corporate foodstore entry/investment. As a result, it is to that important but 
previously unexplored issue that we now turn. 
 
Diversity versus corporate retail entry 
As noted above, small-retailer trade organizations such as the Association of Convenience 
Stores (ACS), together with environmentally-focused NGOs and campaigning organizations 
such  as  the  Campaign  for  Rural  England  (CPRE),  Friends  of  the  Earth  (FoE),  and  New 
Economics Foundation (NEF) have long argued that the vitality and sustainable development 
of  small  retail  centres  can  be  equated  with  the  diversity  and  ‘extra  value  that  small, 
independent and genuinely local shops provide in terms of economic benefit, environmental 
distinctiveness  and  the  social  glue  that  holds  communities  together’  (NEF,  2006).  By 
extension, despite being viewed by these organizations/NGOs as highly fragile ecologies 
threatened  by  a  ‘supermarket  onslaught’  driven  by  corporate  retailer  responses  to  the 
‘town centres first’ approach to planning policy, that diversity has also been regarded as 
potentially protective of small centres and high streets faced with the shock of economic 
crisis.    Small  centres  otherwise  can  find  themselves  buffeted  by  wider  corporate 
disinvestment decisions (e.g. the closures of Woolworths, Adams, MFI) - decisions taken at a 
considerable remove, sometimes without a strong local logic, but frequently with severe 
consequences for the functioning of the centre. The groups who subscribe to this view 
regard the corporate food retail entry into smaller centres and high streets which took place 
in the late 1990s and 2000s, and which was an inevitable consequence of the adoption and 
progressive  strengthening  of  a  ‘town  centres  first’  approach  to  planning  regulation,  as 
uniformly destructive of the amenity of those centres/high streets and to be resisted to 
prevent further loss   
 
In contrast there has been a growing body of academic opinion - represented in the work of 
Powe, Hart & Shaw (2004, 2008, 2009), Thomas  Bromley (2002 2003), Wrigley et al (2010a) 
and reflected in statements by Government Departments - which has argued that corporate 
foodstores ‘often play a vital role as anchor stores in maintaining the quality and range of 
shopping  in  smaller  towns  and  district  centres’  (DoE,  1995),  should  be  ‘seen  as  a  vital 
element in sustainable development plans’ for those centres (Powe & Shaw, 2004, 407), and 
that corporate foodstore entry ‘can act as a catalyst for further investment in those centres’ Appendix 3 
 
(DETR, 1998, 8).  In this view, corporate foodstore entry confers a form of positive spatial 
externality  on  other  retailers  and  service  providers  in  the  centre.    The  externality  is 
articulated  via  the  mechanisms  of  linked  trips  (Wrigley  et  al,  2010b);  retention  of 
expenditure which would otherwise have been lost to larger centres and distant out-of-
centre superstores; and the generation of footfall and associated urban ‘buzz’ (Storper & 
Venables,, 2004) essential to the health of the centre. 
 
Popular debate portrays these two views as polar opposites in terms of attempts to protect 
and/or enhance the vitality and viability of town centres and high streets.  It is therefore of 
very  considerable  interest  that  both  factors  appear  in  the  specification  of,  and  reach 
conventional  statistical  significance  levels  within,  the  model  of  vacancy  rate  change 
reported  in  Table  1.  Moreover,  both  factors  are  seen  to  be  associated  with  better 
performance - that is to say, with smaller increases or reductions in vacancy rate.  In simple 
terms, holding all other things constant, both factors appear to have been protective of the 
vitality and viability of centres/high streets or, in other words, to have been associated with 
enhanced resilience 
 
To the best of our knowledge this is a novel finding of very considerable significance for 
policy debate in the UK. To help visualise what it implies, Figure 9 provides a graphical 
summary of the impacts of four of the explanatory variables in Table 1 on predicted values 
of vacancy rate change, the other three explanatory variables being set at their average 
values.  ‘Larger/smaller’,  ‘high/low’  etc  values  of  four  assessed  explanatory  variables  are 
defined by setting them to their upper or lower quartile values. and the numbers in brackets 
in the centre (average size) circle of each quadrant are the number of cases in the sample 
falling into that quadrant/group.  Appendix 3 
 
                                      
Figure 9 - Visualising the impacts of four of the explanatory variables in Table 1 on predicted values of vacancy rate change   
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The  detailed  key  under  the  diagram  helps  interpret  what  initially  may  seem  a  complex 
picture.  What that key shows, is that beginning in the top left hand quadrant of the left side 
part of Figure 9, here the model in Table 1 provides predictions of the change in vacancy 
rate  ‘pre-crisis’  to  ‘within-crisis’  for  ‘southern’  centres/high  streets,  with  high  levels  of 
‘diversity’ (measured in terms of the proportion of small independent specialist stores) in 
the ‘pre-crisis’ period, and which also experienced a planning policy compliant, in-centre or 
edge-of-centre, corporate foodstore entry. These are the better performing centres/high 
streets in our study, and within that group smaller centres are shown to have performed 
better than larger centres. In summary, therefore, what the model in Table 1 predicts for 
this quadrant is that In the case of ‘southern’, ‘smaller’ town centres/high streets, with high 
levels of ‘diversity’ in the ‘pre-crisis’ period, with corporate foodstore entry between the 
‘pre-‘ and ‘within-crisis’ surveys, and with the three other explanatory variables set at their 
sample average values, the absolute vacancy rate (M2) would have decreased by 0.02 basis 
points. If that specification is then changed slightly from one applicable to ‘larger’ rather 
‘smaller’  centres/high  streets,  all  other  things  remaining  the  same,  Figure  9  shows  the 
predicted vacancy rate would have changed from the small (-0.02 bp) decrease to a +1.26 
basis  points  increase.  Finally,  if  we  average  over  smaller  and  larger  size  centres  in  the 
quadrant (i.e take an average size ‘southern’, ‘diverse’ centre/high street which experienced 
corporate foodstore entry), the predicted change in vacancy rate would be altered to an 
increase of +0.5 basis points.  
 
Conversely in the lower right hand quadrant of the right side diagram, vacancy rate changes 
are displayed for what, on the same basis, the model predicts to be poorer performing 
centres/high streets.  Here, in the case of ‘northern’, ‘larger’ centres/high streets, with ‘low 
levels of diversity’ in the pre-crisis period, and which did not experience corporate foodstore 
entry between the ‘pre-‘ and within-crisis’ surveys, the model predicts that the absolute 
vacancy rate would have increased by +4.39 basis points. That is to say, almost 5 basis 
points  worse  than  the  small  improvement  (-0.02bp)  predicted  for  the  best  performing 
centre-type in Figure 9. Appendix 3 
 
 
 
 
 
Examination of Figure 9 shows that, other things being equal, the effect of a centre/high 
street being located in ‘northern’ rather than ‘southern’ regions of England is to raise the 
predicted  absolute  change  in  vacancy  rate  by  +1.6  basis  points,  and  the  effect  of  the 
centre/high street being ‘larger’ rather than ‘smaller’ is to raise the vacancy rate by +1.3bp.   
On the same basis, Figure 9 shows that not only do both factors - ‘diversity’ and corporate 
food  store  entry  -  appear  in  the  specification  of  the  model  at  conventional  levels  of 
significance,  with  both  being  associated  with  beneficial  impacts  on  performance,  but 
additionally that both factors have identical impacts on predicted changes in vacancy rates. 
The predicted rate is raised by +0.8 basis points if the centre/high street had ‘low’ rather 
than  ‘high’  diversity  in  the  pre-crisis  period,  and    raised  by  an  identical  +0.8  bp  if  the 
centre/high street did not experience in-centre or edge-of-centre corporate foodstore entry. 
 
Although some of the absolute differences predicted in this way between various levels - 
‘larger/smaller’, ’high’/low’ and so on - of the factors included in the model, might seem 
somewhat muted, that is simply a function of:  the limited time which separates our pre-
crisis  to  ‘within-crisis’  surveys:  the  two-sample-points  design  of  the  surveys;  and  the 
particularities of the 4-region sample available to us.  Rather it is the qualitative picture that 
is  more  important  –  in  particular  our  novel  and  policy-significant  findings regarding  the 
similarly protective effects of small-store diversity and corporate foodstore entry on the 
performance of our sample of more than 250 UK town centres and high streets adjusting to  
the shock of  economic crisis.  
 
Adaptively Resilient High Streets? – Evolutionary Trajectories and Policy Implications 
 
The shock of global economic crisis, fragile consumer confidence, and the expectation and 
reality of deteriorating household incomes, has clearly had a significant impact on UK town 
centres  and  high  streets.  As discussed  above, despite  concerns about  inconsistencies  of 
approaches, all studies we are aware of find evidence of a ‘gathering storm’ signalled by 
progressively  rising  vacancy  rates,  hard  hit  ‘comparison  retail’,  and  with  the  vulnerable Appendix 3 
 
 
 
 
regional economies of ‘northern’ Britain demonstrating the least ability to support their 
‘pre-crisis’ configurations of centres and high streets. 
 
 
 
The value added by our study 
The  popular  image  of  these  developments  portrayed  by  the  media  tends  towards  the 
cataclysmic – involving the emergence of highly unattractive high streets where sometimes 
more retail units are vacant than occupied, with a focus on the disappearance of iconic and  
cherished stores (e.g. Woolworths) and on the possible ‘death’ of  traditional UK high street 
dominated by small independent specialist retailers. Set against this popular image, all the 
research we are aware of shows a more modest and differentiated picture. That picture is 
one of increasing retail and service unit vacancy rates but increases confined largely to the 
single-digit basis points range;  in which  some centres and high streets have performed 
strongly and against the trend or, alternatively, relatively better than the majority; and in 
which  certain types of retail and services (e.g. telephones & accessories retailers, small 
food-retail-based  convenience  stores  (independent  as  well  as  corporate),  cafes  and 
restaurants, etc) have increased their presence across the UK in general, or sometimes (e.g. 
delicatessens,  bakers)  more  strongly  in  ‘southern’  regions,  as  a  result  of  longer-term 
structural  change  in  the  industry.    What  we  have  been  able  to  do  via  the  research 
documented here is to add value to that picture, and to the essentially descriptive analysis 
on which it is based.  
 
We  have achieved that  added  value,  not  only by  exploring  a  more  clustered  sample of 
centres/high streets with greater representation of smaller centres than that analysed by 
the LDC but also, crucially, via providing the theoretically-grounded multivariate statistical 
modelling  notably  not  present  in  the  research  of  commercial  companies  like  LDC.    Our 
analysis, whilst confirming the dimensions of UK high street decline documented by both 
the  LDC  and  leading  property-industry  consultancies  (progressively  rising  vacancy  rates, 
differentially greater pressure on ‘comparison’ rather than ‘convenience retail, a consistent Appendix 3 
 
 
 
 
north-south  differential  in  the  health  of  centres/high  streets,  and  a  more  recent 
identification of weaker performance by larger centres) also provides findings which are not 
only novel but are also certain to surprise some of the groups contributing to public debate 
on these topics.  Notably, our findings suggest that the ‘diversity’ of high streets conferred 
by greater representation of small independent specialist stores should not be viewed as 
the  polar  opposite  of  what  has  been  argued  to  be  the  expenditure-retaining,  further-
investment-catalysing,  vitality-enhancing,  sustainable-development-promoting  impacts  of 
planning policy compliant corporate foodstore entry. Rather, in our sample  both factors 
appear to have been associated with greater resilience of centres/high streets in the face of 
economic  shock  –  indeed  associated  with  an  identical  relative  improvement.  To  our 
knowledge, this is the first occasion in which any empirical study (particularly one, such as 
ours,  designed  and  executed  to  rigorous  and  transparent  standards)  has  reported  this 
finding, and it is clearly a finding which merits further investigation and replication across 
other samples.   
 
Unpacking the adaptive capacity and resilience of town centres and high streets 
Nevertheless, the consensus position of all available research (including our own) is that the 
scale of the shock which has been experienced by UK high streets -  coming on top of the 
significant processes of ‘substitution’, ‘complementarity’, and ‘modification’ impacting high 
streets  and  particular  types  of  retailer/service  provider  (music  &  film,  books,  computer 
hardware & software, travel agents) from the decade long progressive increases in online  e-
retail sales (Weltevreden, 2006,2007)  - is such that ‘bounce back’ to previous configurations 
is unlikely.  Moreover, there is a strong argument that seeking for a return to previous 
configurations is of itself undesirable - that high streets have always been dynamic and 
adaptive, have rarely evolved in smooth and incremental ways, and have constantly been 
reshaped by periodic economic and competitive shocks. 
 
Rather we suggest that the focus should be placed on understanding the adaptive capacity 
and  resilience  that  has  enabled  some  UK    town  centres/high  streets  to  perform  both 
relatively  (and  in  some  cases,  absolutely)    better,  despite  macro-economic  shock  and Appendix 3 
 
 
 
 
despite  the  ongoing  and  complexly  interrelated  forces  of:  online  e-retail,  a  regulatory 
regime which has prioritised a ‘town centres first’ approach to retail development, and the 
rise of what has been termed ‘convenience culture’.  In this context, we draw on Martin 
(2011) who, more generally, has suggested that four interrelated dimensions are helpful in 
unpacking and understanding the resilience of the responses of local economies to macro-
economic shock. Namely: 
  resistance – or, conversely, the degree of fragility or vulnerability of such 
economies to macro-economic shock 
  recovery  - in particular its speed and extent plus the way it relates to the degree 
of resistance; 
  re-orientation – the nature of reconfiguration and adaptation in response to 
macro-economic shock 
   renewal - the extent to which economies resume their pre-shock  growth path. 
 
In this study, we have essentially concentrated on two of these dimensions – resistance and 
recovery.  First, by offering new insights into the factors which have been associated with 
either  protecting  UK  town  centres/high  streets  or  increasing  their  fragility  during  the 
economic crisis. Second, by extension, by considering what factors might play a role in the 
speed and extent of recovery of centres/high streets from the recessionary impacts of the 
crisis.  What remains as a task for both future research and policy development is a better 
understanding of the nature and extent of  re-orientation and renewal which is likely to 
characterise UK town centres/high streets during the post-economic crisis decade.  That 
same task – together with formulation of policy instruments which might help ameliorate 
some of the most pressing of the problems perceived to afflict the post-crisis high street 
also  lies  at  the  heart  of  the  UK  Government’s  Revitalising  the  High  Street  initiative                               
led by Mary Portas and launched by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills on 
May 17 2011. 
 
Evidence of evolutionary trajectories  
Although most of that task lies ahead, it is our view that some indicators of the potential 
evolutionary trajectories of ‘adaptively resilient’ high streets are available. In that context, 
the analysis of entry and exit of small and specialist stores in over a thousand UK town Appendix 3 
 
 
 
 
centres  and  high  streets  during  the  early  to  mid  2000s  conducted  by  the  Competition 
Commission  (2007),  together  with  the  parallel  study  conducted  by  the  University  of 
Southampton (Wrigley et al, 2009a), and aspects of Figures 5 and 6 above, are germane.  
 
What  the  Commission’s  analysis  essentially  demonstrated  was  that  entry  of  corporate 
supermarkets  into  one  thousand  plus  centres/high  streets  was  often  accompanied  by 
‘positive’  (exit  reducing/entry  promoting),  or  at  least  ‘non-detrimental‘,  impacts  on 
particular types of small stores.  (Bakers, health food shops and independent convenience 
stores were positively impacted by supermarket entry with others, including delicatessens, 
falling into the no-clear pattern/non-detrimental impact category.)  That finding - highly 
controversial for being at variance with received public opinion about uniformly negative 
impacts  of  supermarket  entry  -  was  then  confirmed  and  extended  by  the  parallel 
Southampton study which demonstrated that it applied particularly strongly in the then high 
growth part of the UK,  ‘London and Prospering Southern England’. In that region, butchers, 
delicatessens  fishmongers,  CTNs,  and  independent  music  &  video  shops  joined  the 
‘positively’ impacted small store groups identified by the Commission. 
 
What these findings implied, more widely, was that the small store sector was potentially 
able to adapt to what at the time (early to mid 2000s ) was regarded as a significant external 
‘shock’ - the competitive shock of the leading corporate food retailers returning to town 
centres/high streets they had largely moved away from over the previous 30 years (Guy, 
2007; Wrigley,1998). Moreover, that adaptation was not merely defensive and negative.  
Rather,  it  was  possible  to  conceive  of  new  configurations  of  those  centres/high  streets 
evolving.  
 
Reconfigured high streets – emerging visions 
Central to those new configurations was the adaptation of small stores ‘flexing’ their offers 
and raising their levels of service to achieve complementarity to those provided by the 
corporate  foodstore  entrants.  Those  ‘complementary-offer’  small  stores  would  then 
potentially be able to access, via the mechanism of ‘linked trips’ (Guy, 2007; Wrigley et al, Appendix 3 
 
 
 
 
2010b), a share of the expenditure which previously would have leaked away from the 
centres/high streets but which would now be ‘clawed back’ as a result of the supermarket 
entry.  In this way it was possible to conceive of an evolutionary trajectory towards a new 
vision of reconfigured town centres/high streets - retail centres in which adaptation centred 
on new mixes of small and specialist store types, and on the ranging and offers of those 
stores, provided symbiotic relationships with the new types of corporate in-centre or edge-
of-centre foodstores.  
 
One version of that vision - what might termed the ‘high-growth Britain vision’ - was of 
rising  numbers  of  artisanal  bakers,  butchers  and  fishmongers,  complemented  by  town 
centre  farmers  markets,  as  the  small  and  specialist  retailer  sector  ‘raised  its  game’  to 
complement and also to re-challenge the corporate supermarket entrants. As a report in 
The Independent  expressed it 
        ‘New bakers and butchers are opening up all over the country, ending a decades-long decline. 
             Retail experts believe the resurgence reflects a growing demand for high-quality produce, from 
          artisanal loaves to dry-aged beef  … Traditional shops have improved their game – retailers  
had to become as professional as the supermarkets. Butchers have realised they have a niche    
they can fill that supermarket’s can’t’ (Independent on Sunday, 23 January, 2011). 
 
The ‘low growth Britain’ vision was of course, somewhat more muted – less artisan produce 
and more the tertiary brands and Asian-sourced non-food bargains  of the rapidly expanding 
limited-range hard discounters and ‘pound’ shops - and empirically that was reflected in a 
significantly reduced number of categories of small stores which were found to be positively 
associated (in the sense of reduced exit or increased entry) with corporate foodstore entry 
in those areas of the UK (see Wrigley et al 2009a, p2077, for detail).  However, in the more 
affluent  ‘Prospering  Smaller  Towns’  of  ‘northern  England’,  Scotland,  South  Wales,  and 
Northern Ireland, the vision of a diverse ‘ecology’ of complementary and revitalised small 
stores re-emerged and could again be supported by the findings of the Southampton study 
of entry and exit (Wrigley et al, 2009a, p2080).    
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Our reading of the more dramatic ‘shock’ of global economic crisis, recession and fragile 
consumer confidence on the evolutionary trajectories of UK town centres and high streets is 
therefore that it damped down but did not eliminate the re-orientation processes underway 
as  a  consequence  of  the  return  of  corporate  food  retailers    to  those  centres  and  high 
streets.  We  see  evidence  supporting  that  in  Figure  5  above  which  shows,  in  ‘southern’ 
regions, a continuation – albeit at a lower level – of similar trends to those observed in the 
early to mid 2000s.   That is to say, in the ‘southern’ parts of our sample – and despite the 
problems  of  economic  crisis,  fragile  consumer  confidence,  and  recessionary  impacts  on 
household incomes – a continued robustness of bakers, delicatessens, health food shops, 
and independent convenience stores can be observed. Additionally, in Figure 6, the longer term 
trend towards a higher share of retail services – e.g.  cafes and restaurants – is seen to continue.  
 
As  UK  town  centres  and  high  streets  gradually  emerge,  in  the  medium  term,  from  the 
depths of their current crisis, we anticipate therefore that the evidence will show that they 
have  not  ‘bounced back’  in  an  ‘engineering resilience’  sense,  but  rather that they  have 
resumed - albeit at  different levels - their evolutionary trajectories of the pre-crisis period. 
That is to say we anticipate renewal of those trajectories, in the sense outlined by Martin 
(2011) and noted above. We acknowledge, of course, that the shock of economic crisis will 
have damped down and modified the re-orientation processes strongly underway prior to 
the unexpected shock of global crisis.  Moreover, we suggest that an intuitive, if as yet 
unarticulated, sense of these developments and processes may already exist among leading 
analysts and stakeholders. For example, the Director of the Local Data Company is reported 
as observing similar trends towards small independent retailers providing complementary 
offers and higher service-levels. 
      ‘Vulnerable businesses are disappearing and being replaced by service-based retailers offering 
         something that cannot be provided online.  There are more independents than multiples  
         opening in affluent parts of the country or market towns’ (Matthew Hopkinson, Director LDC,  
         quoted in Measure, 2011) 
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Policy implications and measures 
The design of policy proposals and instruments which will speed recovery by identifying and 
removing barriers perceived to be damaging the performance of town centres/high streets, 
and by supporting those centres that have thrived despite the shock of economic crisis, is 
the critical task of the Government’s Revitalising the High Street initiative. However, based 
on the evidence reported in this paper, it is a task which in our view is unlikely to be best 
achieved by attempting to reset town centres/high streets to their configurations before the 
partly  regulatory-induced  (‘town  centres  first’)  and  partly  consumer-lifestyle-induced 
(convenience  culture  and  on-line  e-retail)  re-configurations  of  the  past  decade.    The 
rediscovery of the high street by the UK’s leading food retailers which is now 15 years into 
its evolution is simply too entrenched, too important to the necessary ‘raising of the game’ 
of small and specialist retailers, and (despite what popular opinion might wish to believe) 
has too strong a consumer mandate, to be rolled back.  Rather, the key to the leverage 
achievable by and success of any package of policy measures emerging from the High Street 
initiative will, in our view depend on working  ‘with the  grain’  of evolutionary trajectories 
that  were  becoming  clear  before  the  shock  of  global  economic  crisis,  fragile  consumer 
confidence, and declining household real incomes impacted UK high streets. Our findings on 
the performance of a four-region sample of over 250 retail centres suggests that at the core 
of adaptively resilient  centres/high streets is ‘complementarity’, raised levels of quality and 
service, and new forms of symbiotic relationship between small independent stores and 
corporate retailers.       
 
That suggests - taking due account of the necessity to protect and enhance competition –
the development of policy measures which promote innovation, creativity and upgrading of 
quality standards.  For example: drawing lessons from analysis of centres which have thrived 
in  difficult  times;    investment  in  ‘good  practice’  guides;  recognition  of  the  ‘local  retail 
heroes’ whose skills can catalyse the upgrading of centres in which they operate;  support of 
mentoring  schemes  (perhaps  mediated  through  networks  of  leading  universities),  etc, 
together  with  encouragement  of  planning  regulation  to  focus  more  proactively  on  the 
sustainable economic health of centres whilst simultaneously maintaining and protecting Appendix 3 
 
 
 
 
the beneficial effects of the widely supported ‘town centres first’ orientation.   Finally, in the 
context  of  issues  whose  discussion  has  frequently  been  blighted  by  only  the  loosest 
connection  to  the  evidence  base,  there  should  be  commitment  to  grounding  policy 
formulation  in  robust  and  verifiable  analysis  of  what  actually  has  underpinned  and/or 
promoted  the  attractiveness  and  performance  of  UK  high  streets  during  a  period  of 
economic  crisis.    The  research  summarised  in  this  paper  seeks  both  to  make  a  major 
contribution to knowledge, and to add value to policy debate, on exactly that basis.            
 
 
 